Exhibit No.: KCP+L-9

Issue: Policy
Witness: Curtis D. Blanc
Type of Exhibit: Surrebuttal Testimony
Sponsoring Party: Kansas City Power & Light Company
Case No.: ER-2010-0355
Date Testimony Prepared: January 5, 2011

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

CASE NO.: ER-2010-0355

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

CURTIS D. BLANC

ON BEHALF OF

KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Kansas City, Missouri January 2011

Date 1/18/11 Reporter L. Banks File No. ER-2010-0355

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

CURTIS D. BLANC

Case No. ER-2010-0355

1	Q:	Please state your name and business address.
2	A:	My name is Curtis D. Blanc. My business address is 1200 Main Street, Kansas City,
3		Missouri, 64105.
4	Q:	Are you the same Curtis D. Blanc who prefiled direct and rebuttal testimony in this
5		matter?
6	A:	Yes.
7	Q:	What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony?
8	A:	The purpose of my surrebuttal testimony is to respond to the positions taken by certain
9		witnesses in their pre-filed rebuttal testimony. Specifically, I address (i) the rebuttal
10		testimony of Staff witness William Harris, who proposes to impose additional off-system
11		sales risk on the Company; (ii) the rebuttal testimony of Staff witnesses Lisa Kremer and
12		Gregory Brossier concerning the appropriateness of providing a performance incentive
13		for utilities to provide better service than is strictly required under Missouri law; (iii) the
14		rebuttal testimony of Staff witness Keith Majors, who argues that fees paid to Chris Giles
15		should be disallowed; and (iv) the rebuttal testimony of Staff witness Charles Hyneman
16		concerning KCP&L's management of the latan construction contracts.
17 18		THE COMMISSION SHOULD NOT IMPOSE ADDITIONAL OFF-SYSTEM SALES RISK ON THE COMPANY
19	Q:	What is Mr. Harris's recommendation concerning the treatment of KCP&L's off-
20		system sales margins for ratemaking purposes?

Mr. Harris adopts the recommendation suggested by MEUA witness Greg Meyer in his Direct Testimony. That is, Mr. Harris believes it would be appropriate to significantly increase the portion of KCP&L's off-system margins that are presumed to be realized in KCP&L's Missouri retail rates. In KCP&L's prior rate cases, the amount of off-system sales margins the Company is presumed to earn is set using a probabilistic analysis of the likelihood of KCP&L realizing a particular level of margins, as explained in the Direct Testimony of Michael Schnitzer. The Commission has adopted the 25th percentile level of off-system sales margins as the appropriate level, which is consistent with KCP&L's request in this case. Mr. Harris and Mr. Meyer argue to increase KCP&L's presumed off-system sales margins from an amount equal to the 25th percentile to an amount equal to the 40th percentile.

Q: Do you agree?

A:

A:

Absolutely not. As I explained in my rebuttal testimony in response to Mr. Meyer, in KCP&L's prior rate cases, the Commission has chosen the 25th percentile as the appropriate level of off-system sales margins that it presumes KCP&L will realize. That presumed level of margins is credited against KCP&L's cost to serve its customers. That is, KCP&L's rates are set as though it is a certainty KCP&L will realize at least that level of off-system sales margins. No such certainty exists. KCP&L is entirely at risk for realizing the threshold level of off-system sales margins. If at least that level of margins is not ultimately realized, there is no way for KCP&L to be made whole. For ratemaking purposes, it is the same as an unrecovered cost.

For these reasons, in KCP&L's prior rate cases, the Commission has used the 25th percentile as the appropriate level of off-system sales margins to presume that KCP&L

will realize. That continues to be appropriate, and neither Mr. Meyer nor Mr. Harris provides a sufficient rationale for changing the Commission's prior practice. All of KCP&L's off-system sales margins are returned to customers under either KCP&L's or Staff's proposal. The only question is what level of margins KCP&L should be presumed to realize when setting its Missouri retail rates.

6 Q: What rationale does Mr. Harris offer in support of his proposal?

Mr. Harris argues that (i) the completion of Iatan 2; (ii) the need to "provide a greater incentive" for KCP&L to make off-system sales; as well as (iii) the fact that off-system sales margins fluctuate support his proposal to shift additional risk to the Company.

Do you agree?

A:

Q:

A:

No, I do not. The completion of latan 2 does not decrease KCP&L's exposure to the risks of the off-systems sales market. If anything, it increases it. Iatan 2 coming on line means that KCP&L will likely have more megawatt hours available for sale off system. Most importantly, the 25th percentile level of presumed off-system sales margins proposed by KCP&L includes the additional capacity from Iatan 2. The Company's proposal already takes into account the additional capacity that results from the completion of Iatan 2. That is, the Company's proposal to continue using the 25th percentile level already presumes that KCP&L will realize additional off-system sales revenues from Iatan 2. It is not necessary to also use the completion of Iatan 2 as an excuse to increase the percentile level of margins from the 25th percentile to the 40th percentile.

Next, Mr. Harris argues that using the 40th percentile provides "a greater incentive" for KCP&L to make off-system sales. However, Mr. Harris does not present

any evidence suggesting that KCP&L needs a greater incentive, or more importantly, that exposing KCP&L to more risk is the appropriate incentive if one is needed. If a greater incentive is needed, letting KCP&L retain a portion of its off-system sales margin is better than arbitrarily exposing the Company to additional risk.

Q:

A:

Finally, Mr. Harris correctly notes that KCP&L "has experienced a fluctuating level of off-system sales, costs and resulting margins." Harris Rebuttal, at p. 5. That is precisely why it would be inappropriate to increase the percentile level of margins KCP&L is presumed to realize. Off-system sales margins fluctuate significantly due to factors entirely beyond KCP&L's control, e.g., the price of natural gas and the demand for wholesale power in this region of the country. As a result, increasing the presumed level to the 40th percentile accomplishes nothing more than to increase the likelihood that KCP&L will not recover its cost to serve its customers, as deemed just and reasonable by the Commission in this case.

IT IS APPROPRIATE TO REWARD KCP&L FOR STRONG CUSTOMER SERVICE AND RELIABILITY

Do you agree with Ms. Kremer's and Mr. Brossier's claim that it is inappropriate to provide a performance incentive for a utility with strong customer service and reliability?

No, I do not. Their argument is essentially two fold: (i) that a utility is required by law to provide safe and adequate service and (ii) that KCP&L's rates include its costs to provide customer service and maintain the reliability of its system. Neither argument supports denying KCP&L's request for a 25 basis point adder to its authorized return on equity. To the contrary, the issues highlighted by Ms. Kremer and Mr. Brossier support the Company's request.

Q: Please explain.

A:

KCP&L provides safe and adequate service, as do all of the utilities against which it is compared for customer satisfaction and reliability, which is precisely the point. KCP&L has achieved stronger customer satisfaction and reliability for its customers than its peers at costs that are generally consistent with those peers. That is, all of the utilities have customer service and reliability costs in their rates that a commission has deemed to be prudently incurred and to result in just and reasonable rates. With that same level of investment, KCP&L has achieved stronger performance. That is the type of management I would think the Commission would want to reward. No one is suggesting that KCP&L is passing along excessive costs to its customers to "gold plate" its system or to provide unnecessarily good customer service.

The position advocated by Ms. Kremer and Mr. Brossier is potentially dangerous in my mind. Rather than encourage utilities to excel to the highest level of customer satisfaction and reliability that is possible at just and reasonable rates, their argument has the potential to create the perverse incentive for utilities to provide the bare minimum of what would be deemed safe and adequate under the law. Staff suggests bad things would happen if a utility falls below the "safe and adequate" threshold, but rejects as inappropriate an incentive for better performance. That policy effectively sets a minimal level of service that Missouri utilities must provide. However, that policy does nothing to incent Missouri utilities to provide service that is better than safe and adequate at rates that continue to be just and reasonable.

FEES PAID TO CHRIS GILES WERE PRUDENTLY INCURRED AND SHOULD BE RECOVERED

Do you agree with Mr. Majors's proposal to remove "all dollars KCPL has included

in rate case expense related to Mr. Giles' services as an independent contactor"?

Q:

Q:

A:

Majors Rebuttal, p. 21.

No, I do not. Mr. Majors presents two rationales for this adjustment, both of which are flawed. First, Mr. Majors argues that it is appropriate to exclude fees paid to Mr. Giles because his salary was included in the rates that resulted from KCP&L's last rate case. That logic represents the very definition of single-issue ratemaking, and as such, should be rejected. The Commission must look at all relevant factors when setting a utility's rates—not the change in employment status of a single individual. KCP&L witness John Weisensee also addresses this issue in his surrebuttal testimony.

Second, Mr. Majors incorrectly suggests that Mr. Giles has the same job duties that I have, and therefore customers are paying two people to do the same job. That is not the case. While Mr. Majors is correct that I have "assumed the former duties of Mr. Giles," Majors Rebuttal, at p. 22, that does not mean that Mr. Giles continues to perform those same duties as well. Mr. Giles provides support to me in the same manner as any contract employee or KCP&L employee in the Regulatory Affairs Department. Staff does not provide a substantive basis for denying KCP&L recovery of the fees it has paid Mr. Giles. As such, the Commission should reject Mr. Majors's proposed adjustment.

KCP&L MANAGED THE IATAN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS WELL.

Do you agree with Mr. Hyneman's contention that "there is substantial evidence that KCPL has been ineffective at managing its Iatan construction contracts and

1 enforcing the terms and conditions of its contracts with major latan construction 2 contractors and consultants"? Hyneman Rebuttal, at p. 4. 3 A: No, I do not. To the contrary, there is substantial evidence that KCP&L was extremely 4 effective in managing its Iatan construction contracts, as explained in the pre-filed 5 testimony of KCP&L witnesses William Downey, Chris Giles, Brent Davis, Forrest 6 Archibald, Bob Bell, Steve Jones, Ken Roberts, Daniel Meyer, and Kris Nielsen. Iatan 2 7 was completed within three months of a target date established more than five years ago. 8 In addition, Iatan 2 was completed at a cost only 15% greater than the Control Budget 9 Estimate that was established in December of 2006. Those results are telling evidence 10 that KCP&L effectively managed its Iatan construction contracts. 11 What "substantial evidence" does Mr. Hyneman suggest supports his claim? Q: 12 A. Mr. Hyneman relies almost exclusively on self assessments and audits KCP&L 13 conducted to ensure it was effectively managing the Iatan projects. 14 Q: Is it appropriate for Mr. Hyneman to use KCP&L's self assessments and audits in 15 this manner? 16 A٠ No. First, Mr. Hyneman recites the findings of KCP&L's self assessments and audits 17 without also discussing how KCP&L reacted to its own findings. KCP&L responded to 18 issues as they arose. Second, Mr. Hyneman fails to acknowledge that conducting these 19 kinds of self assessments and audits is precisely what a prudent manager should do. 20 Considering this same issue, the Kansas Corporation Commission found that "use of 21 internal audits to criticize KCPL's decisions ignore the fact that the process of conducting 22 on-going internal audits during a complex construction project is considered part of the 23 prudent management decision making process." KCC Order, Docket No. 10-KCPE-415-

- 1 RTS (Nov. 22, 2010), at p. 27. Trying to hold against a company the findings of self
- 2 assessments and audits, as Mr. Hyneman proposes here, likely has a chilling effect on a
- 3 company's willingness to conduct such self assessments and audits in the first place.
- 4 Such a policy would be bad for Missouri utilities and ultimately their customers.
- 5 Q: Does that conclude your testimony?
- 6 A: Yes, it does.

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of the Application of Kansas City Power & Light Company to Modify Its Tariffs to Continue the Implementation of Its Regulatory Plan) Docket No. ER-2010-0355		
AFFIDAVIT OF CURTIS D. BLANC		
STATE OF MISSOURI)		
COUNTY OF JACKSON)		
Curtis D. Blanc, being first duly sworn on his oath, states:		
1. My name is Curtis D. Blanc. I work in Kansas City, Missouri, and I am employed		
by Kansas City Power & Light Company as Senior Director - Regulatory Affairs.		
2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my Surrebutta		
Testimony on behalf of Kansas City Power & Light Company consisting of		
(
captioned docket.		
3. I have knowledge of the matters set forth therein. I hereby swear and affirm that		
my answers contained in the attached testimony to the questions therein propounded, including		
any attachments thereto, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, information and		
belief. Curtis D. Blanc		
Subscribed and sworn before me this day of January, 2011.		
Micol A. Wey		
Notary Public		
My commission expires: The Hamiltonian of the My Commission Expires 2/4/2011 Commission Number 07391200 Commission Number 0739120 Commission Number 0739		