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1	STATE OF MISSOURI
2	PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
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6	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
7	Evidentiary Hearing
8	September 27, 2012
9	Jefferson City, Missouri
	Volume 17
10	
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12	In the Matter of Union Electric)
	Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri's)
13	Tariffs to Increase Its Annual) File No. ER-2012-0166
	Revenues for Electric Service)
14	
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16	
17	MORRIS L. WOODRUFF, Presiding,
	CHIEF REGULATORY LAW JUDGE.
18	
19	KEVIN D. GUNN, Chairman,
	TERRY M. JARRETT,
20	ROBERT S. KENNEY,
	STEPHEN M. STOLL,
21	COMMISSIONERS.
22	
23	REPORTED BY:
24	KELLENE K. FEDDERSEN, CSR, RPR, CCR
	MIDWEST LITIGATION SERVICES
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(WHEREUPON, the hearing began at 8:32 a.m.)
3	(STAFF EXHIBIT NOS. 200 THROUGH 236 WERE
4	MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
5	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Welcome to the evidentiary
6	hearing concerning Ameren Missouri's request for a rate
7	increase. This is Case ER-2012-0166. We'll begin today
8	by taking entries of appearance, beginning with Ameren.
9	MR. BYRNE: Thank you, your Honor. Tom
10	Byrne and Wendy Tatro appearing on behalf of Ameren
11	Missouri. Our address is 1901 Chouteau Avenue, St. Louis,
12	Missouri 63103.
13	MR. LOWERY: Good morning, your Honor. Jim
14	Lowery, the law firm of Smith Lewis, LLP, P.O. Box 918,
15	Columbia, Missouri 65205, also appearing on behalf of
16	Ameren Missouri.
17	MR. MITTEN: Your Honor, Russ Mitten, the
18	law firm of Brydon, Swearengen & England, P.C., 312 East
19	Capitol Avenue, Jefferson City, Missouri, also appearing
20	on behalf of Ameren Missouri.
21	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. And for Staff.
22	MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, your Honor.
23	Kevin Thompson, Jennifer Hernandez, Sarah Kliethermes,
24	Meghan McClowery and Amy Moore for the Staff of the
25	Missouri Public Service Commission. Our address is

Page 106 Post Office Box 360, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102. Thank you. 2 3 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Public Counsel. MR. MILLS: Let the record reflect the 4 5 appearance of Lewis Mills, Post Office Box 2230, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102, on behalf of the Office of 6 7 the Public Counsel and the public. Thank you. JUDGE WOODRUFF: For the NRDC, Renew 8 Missouri and Sierra Club. 10 MR. ROBERTSON: Henry Robertson, Great Rivers Environmental Law Center, 705 Olive Street, 11 12 Suite 614, St. Louis, Missouri 63101, appearing for NRDC, Renew Missouri and the Sierra Club. 13 14 JUDGE WOODRUFF: For Department of Natural 15 Resources. 16 MS. BLUME: I'm Jessica Blume for the 17 Department of Natural Resources, appearing on behalf of Jennifer Frazier who will handle the remainder of the 18 hearing but is unable to be here today. Our address is 19 P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102. 20 JUDGE WOODRUFF: For MIEC. 21 MS. VUYLSTEKE: Diana Vuylsteke and Ed 22 Downey of the law firm Bryan Cave, LLP. Also appearing 23 24 will be Carole Iles and Brent Roam of Bryan Cave. The address is 211 North Broadway, Suite 3600, St. Louis, 25

Fax: 314,644,1334

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1	Missouri 63102, appearing on behalf of the Missouri
2	Industrial Energy Consumers.
3	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. Barnes-Jewish
4	Hospital.
5	MS. LANGENECKERT: Good morning. I'm Lisa
6	Langeneckert of the law firm of Sandberg, Phoenix &
7	von Gontard, 600 Washington Avenue, 15th Floor, St. Louis,
8	Missouri 63101, appearing on behalf of Barnes-Jewish
9	Hospital.
10	JUDGE WOODRUFF: And for KCPL.
11	MR. DORITY: Thank you, Judge. Larry W.
12	Dority and James M. Fischer, Fischer & Dority, PC,
13	101 Madison, Suite 400, Jefferson City, Missouri 65101,
14	appearing on behalf of intervenors Kansas City Power &
15	Light and KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company.
16	JUDGE WOODRUFF: And for MEUA.
17	MR. WOODSMALL: David Woodsmall appearing
18	on behalf of MECG. I previously entered my written
19	appearance with the court reporter.
20	JUDGE WOODRUFF: For the record, you might
21	want to say what MECG is. I'm sorry.
22	MR. WOODSMALL: Midwest Energy Consumers
23	Group.
24	JUDGE WOODRUFF: MEUA was your last case.
25	MR. WOODSMALL: The predecessor, yes.

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1	JUDGE WOODRUFF: I wondered why you looked
2	confused back there.
3	MR. WOODSMALL: That's often.
4	JUDGE WOODRUFF: AARP and Consumers
5	Council.
6	MR. COFFMAN: John B. Coffman, 871 Tuxedo
7	Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63119, appearing on behalf
8	of AARP as well as the Consumers Council of Missouri.
9	JUDGE WOODRUFF: The other parties are the
10	Missouri Retailers, and Mr. Schwarz called me yesterday
11	and indicated he would not be here today. He was excused.
12	The other party are the unions, and Sherry Schroeder also
13	contacted me yesterday and indicated she would not be here
14	and she is also excused from the hearing for the openings.
15	All right. We have a couple matters we
16	want to take care of, preliminary motions. One was
17	Staff's motion to declassify a portion of Mr. Cassidy's
18	surrebuttal, and Ameren filed a response to that
19	indicating that they had attached a document that was no
20	longer highly confidential. Is Staff satisfied with that?
21	MR. THOMPSON: Absolutely, your Honor.
22	Thank you.
23	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Then we won't need to deal
24	with that motion.
25	The other motion that's before us is a

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1	motion for reconsideration that Public Counsel filed very
2	late yesterday asking for reconsideration of an order that
3	the Commission issued on Monday. Mr. Mills, do you want
4	to be heard about that?
5	MR. MILLS: Judge, I think the motion
6	speaks for itself. It goes to the question of whether or
7	not the Commission should entertain a new issue that was
8	introduced for the first time in sur-surrebuttal
9	testimony, which from my point of view greatly prejudices
10	the parties, particularly parties like Public Counsel that
11	don't have the ability to simply call on a stable of
12	in-house experts or already retained outside experts to
13	address something like that in the four days that the
14	Commission allowed between the time it allowed that
15	testimony and the deadline for testimony, which is
16	tomorrow.
17	And, of course, that's complicated by the
18	fact that during those four days we are for the last
19	two days we have been preparing for the hearing. The next
20	two days, of course, we will be in the hearing.
21	I think a better course of action would be
22	simply to keep that testimony out and deal with the
23	question of whether or not we should have a tracker for
24	transmission costs in some case in which that testimony is
25	introduced in the company's direct case and the other

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1	parties have a sufficient opportunity to respond to it and
2	the record gets developed about it.
3	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Anybody else wish to
4	respond to that? We'll let the Staff go first.
5	MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, Staff has
6	drafted a written response to Mr. Mills' motion. We
7	haven't filed it yet because, frankly, we haven't gotten
8	approval to file it yet.
9	And I didn't bring it with me, but Staff is
10	opposed to the motion and believes the tracker, the
11	transmission tracker issue has to be brought up in this
12	case because the issue of taking the MISO transmission
13	charges and revenues out of the FAC has to be addressed in
14	this case. And the transmission tracker idea that has
15	been proposed by the company is a natural outgrowth of
16	Staff's urgent request to the Commission to remove those
17	revenues and charges from the FAC.
18	The issue developed late in the case, and,
19	frankly, it's because Staff did not know that those MISO
20	charges and revenues were in the FAC. Staff only knows
21	those things about the company's operations that the
22	company tells it. Sometimes we don't ask the right
23	questions or for other reasons we just don't learn things
24	as soon as we should or that we hope we would.
25	But once we discovered that these costs

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1	were going through the FAC, in particular the construction
2	costs of the Lutesville transmission line, which is
3	directly violative of Missouri's anti-CWIP law, then Staff
4	believed it was essential to remove those charges and
5	revenues from the FAC.
6	The company, not wanting to lose recovery
7	of those things, naturally proposed the tracker. And
8	frankly, Staff could live with the tracker if appropriate
9	safeguarding conditions are imposed on it, and we'll have
10	a witness later in this case who will discuss those
11	things.
12	So that's why we're opposed to Mr. Mills'
13	motion. The charges, the MISO charges can't be brought up
14	anywhere but in a general rate case because they're
15	structural. They have to do with how the FAC is designed
16	to work. It's not a prudence issue. We're not saying the
17	charges are imprudent. We're just saying they shouldn't
18	go through the FAC, at least not until the Commission and
19	all the parties have had a chance to consider them in a
20	general rate case.
21	This is where they need to be dealt with,
22	and that's why we're opposed to Mr. Mills' motion.
23	Thank you.
24	JUDGE WOODRUFF: For Ameren?
25	MR. LOWERY: Your Honor, we as well are in

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- 1 the process of preparing a written response. We didn't
- 2 get this motion until late yesterday, and we haven't
- 3 completed that, but let me just follow up on a couple
- 4 things Mr. Mills said.
- 5 I agree with a number of things that -- or
- 6 not Mr. Mills. Mr. Thompson said. I agree with a number
- 7 of things Mr. Thompson said. I do want to point out that
- 8 the fact that these charges have been included in the FAC
- 9 is transparently contained in the monthly FAC reports that
- 10 we do submit to the Commission and that the Staff gets.
- 11 And, in fact, Staff's witness on this issue, who I deposed
- 12 last week, agreed that, in fact, they are reported there.
- So I'm not -- I'm not saying that Mr. Mills
- 14 was necessarily suggesting that the company was
- 15 withholding information in some fashion, but I want to
- 16 make it clear that this information has been reported.
- 17 And if Staff didn't examine those reports, I can't control
- 18 that, the company can't control that, but the information
- 19 transparently has been out there.
- 20 As to the merits of Mr. Mills' motion, the
- 21 Commission said it best in its order denying MIEC's motion
- 22 to strike and giving an opportunity to provide responsive
- 23 testimony. In this regard, meaning the transmission
- 24 tracker alternative to removing these charges from the
- 25 FAC, the Commission said, it is appropriate responsive

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1	testimony and should not be struck.
2	The Commission's already ruled that it was
3	appropriate, and as Mr. Thompson said, it is appropriate.
4	It is a natural outgrowth of an issue that really should
5	have been brought up in direct testimony, should have been
6	explained in the case of chief of the Staff. And
7	certainly in MIEC's case, MIEC should have been rebutting
8	the Staff's or the company's case and not waiting 'til
9	surrebuttal to bring up the issues that it had.
10	The reason we're in this fix, so to speak,
11	I think as Mr. Mills might characterize it, is because the
12	issue was not properly brought up in compliance with the
13	Commission's testimony rules to begin with. The company
14	has now been given a full and fair opportunity to deal
15	with it, and other parties have also been given a full and
16	fair opportunity to deal with it. And for the reasons
17	that the original motion by MIEC was denied, Mr. Mills'
18	motion should also be denied.
19	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Any further response? Any
20	questions from any of the Commissioners?
21	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I do.
22	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Go ahead.
23	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So, Mr. Thompson
24	I'm sorry. Mr. Lowery. Good morning, everybody. Who was
25	the witness that was deposed that acknowledged the

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1	transmission charges were being run through the FAC and
2	being reported in the monthly reports?
3	MR. LOWERY: Ms. Mantle acknowledged in her
4	deposition that that information is, in fact,
5	transparently contained in the FAC monthly reports.
6	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And, Mr. Thompson,
7	how did Staff discover that MISO transmission charges were
8	being run through the FAC? You said that Staff wasn't
9	aware of that fact.
10	MR. THOMPSON: In Staff's direct case, in
11	the revenue requirement report, Ms. Mantle said that we
12	would do some FAC tariff cleanup because the several FAC
13	tariffs in the state, which all work more or less the same
14	way, use different terminology, and that makes it
15	confusing. And so Staff has embarked on an idea to try to
16	move all the tariffs to use the same language so that it
17	would be easier to understand how they work.
18	And part of that was to add a line to the
19	tariff to the definition of Factor PP, which is purchased
20	power, saying that only amounts for fuel and purchased
21	power necessary for buying and selling power, I believe
22	was the language, would be appropriate to put through the
23	FAC.
24	When the company then responded with its
25	rebuttal testimony the company said wait a minute this

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- 1 is going to cause a problem because that means all those
- 2 MISO transmission charges that we've been running through
- 3 the FAC from the very beginning will have to be excluded.
- 4 And Staff's reaction was, what MISO transmission charges
- 5 are those?
- 6 And from there Staff learned what sort of
- 7 charges were going through the FAC and determined that
- 8 they were not appropriate. We're not saying they're not
- 9 appropriate to recover. That's not what we're saying.
- 10 We're saying they're not appropriate to recover through
- 11 the FAC.
- 12 And you will recall, I know, that the FAC
- 13 is conditioned by a statute. The statute limits it to the
- 14 cost of fuel, purchased power and transportation. Now, I
- 15 think we can argue all day about whether or not
- 16 transportation includes transmission or not, but Staff is
- 17 of the view that if the General Assembly meant
- 18 transmission, they would have used that word or included
- 19 that word. We believe transportation means something with
- 20 a wheel on it, like a rail car.
- 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So this is a question
- 22 for Mr. Mills, then. Is the new issue about which OPC is
- 23 objecting the alternative proposal to create a tracker?
- MR. MILLS: Exactly.
- 25 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So the new issue

Page 116 isn't the removal from the FAC, the MISO transmission 2 charges in general? 3 MR. MILLS: No. It's simply the tracker. It's my opinion -- and Mr. Lowery is right, the Commission 4 5 has ruled on this. This is why I asked for reconsideration. I'm asking the Commission to reconsider 6 7 its ruling allowing in that transmission tracker 8 testimony. 9 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I mean, if we're dealing with the issue of removing the MISO transmission 10 charges from the FAC, don't we necessarily need to agree 11 12 with some alternative of what to do with it? MR. MILLS: Frankly, Judge, I would prefer 13 that because the issue, as Mr. Thompson acknowledges, was 14 15 joined late in the case, that we take that issue entirely out of this case. We can address that question in the 16 17 next FAC case in which there are actually charges at issue. 18 19 I just -- I don't think that there is going to be an adequately developed record about a tracker in 20 21 this case. Public Counsel's not going to be able to file testimony. Staff just said they can live with the 22 tracker. So you're going to get testimony in support of a 23 tracker and nobody is going to be able to chime in and 24 tell you the reason why we should not have a tracker. 25

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1	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: But you do agree that
2	the testimony is sufficiently developed to deal with the
3	issue about whether transmission charges should be in
4	definition of Factor PP and included in the FAC at all?
5	MR. MILLS: I think the Commission could
6	address that question in this case. I don't think it's
7	necessary. There are no dollars at stake in this case
8	having to do with that issue.
9	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: But, I mean, we've
10	got enough evidence to do it?
11	MR. MILLS: I think you have enough
12	evidence to deal with that without dealing with the
13	tracker question, yes.
14	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I don't have any
15	other questions.
16	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Mr. Chairman.
17	CHAIRMAN GUNN: The issue of Mr. Mills,
18	the issue was first brought to the attention of Public
19	Counsel of the MISO transmission cost, not necessarily the
20	tracker, in rebuttal testimony; is that correct?
21	MR. MILLS: Correct.
22	CHAIRMAN GUNN: I guess I'm just trying to
23	figure out, similar along the lines to what Commissioner
24	Kenney said, by taking it out of the case, are we are
25	we essentially ruling on it? I mean, aren't we

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1	essentially ruling on the track I mean, there has to be
2	some consideration of alternatives at some point, right?
3	I mean, if we take it out of the fuel adjustment clause,
4	then we're kind of left with this open-hanging issue.
5	MR. MILLS: But my point is you don't have
6	to take it out or leave it in the fuel adjustment clause.
7	The fuel adjustment clause languages is not does not
8	need to be changed. It's the same language that it has
9	been for years, and the Commission does not need to
10	determine in sort of a declaratory way in this case
11	exactly what that language means. The Staff thinks it
12	means one thing. The company thinks it means one thing.
13	That issue will be joined in the next case in which the
14	FAC costs are sought to be changed.
15	CHAIRMAN GUNN: But aren't there broader
16	implications for revenue requirement and other things if
17	you remove it from the FAC and put it somewhere else?
18	MR. MILLS: I don't I mean, we can go
19	through the reconciliation and the parties can correct me
20	if I'm wrong, but I don't know that there are
21	CHAIRMAN GUNN: I think there might be some
22	disagreement on that between other folks.
23	MR. WOODSMALL: Mr. Chairman, if I may jump
24	in. I think the fallback position if you eliminate the
25	tracker from this case is they continue to get

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1	transmission expenses on a normalized basis in rates. So
2	it won't affect revenue requirement in this case. What it
3	does is eliminate the tracker so that they can't carry any
4	amounts above that into the next case. So this mechanism
5	will drive rate increases in the next case, but it won't
6	affect the revenue requirement in this case.
7	MR. LOWERY: Chairman Gunn, there is
8	another consideration. That's not entirely accurate
9	because in order to determine what the net base fuel cost
10	in the FAC is, we have to know how the transmission
11	charges are being handled or not handled. There are
12	actually different buckets of these transmission charges
13	as well. The Staff and MIEC, for example, don't
14	completely necessarily agree if some were to stay in the
15	FAC which bucket is which. If we don't resolve this
16	issue, we can't set the net base fuel cost in this case.
17	Secondly, the consequence of Mr. Mills'
18	position is, if the Commission were to agree with the
19	Staff's position that the charges should not be in the
20	FAC, then the company, as Mr. Woodsmall points out, the
21	company is faced with uncontrollable mandatory MISO
22	transmission charges that it must pay in order to gain the
23	benefits of the MISO market, 95 percent of which flow
24	through the FAC, that everybody I think would agree are
25	expected to increase and are increasing, and then the

Page 120 company has no ability to even ask the Commission to 1 2 address that problem. 3 And the only reason the issue came up in the first place the way that it did is because other 4 5 parties didn't flesh the issue out in the way that they should have, and I don't -- I don't think the Commission 6 7 has disagreed with that. I think that's why the 8 Commission denied the motion to strike in the first place. 9 So I can understand why Mr. Mills takes the position that he does because it leaves the company 10 11 essentially exposed, but to say that the record -- that 12 they don't have a chance to file testimony, I would expect MIEC is probably going to file testimony on this tomorrow, 13 for example. I don't know that, and they don't have to 14 15 tell me that. That's their strategic issue. But there has been an opportunity to 16 17 address this issue, just as much a one as we were given. Mr. Mills can cross-examine our witnesses. He can 18 cross-examine Staff's witnesses. So can MIEC and anybody 19 else that wants to on this issue. But it would be 20 21 inappropriate in my view to simply kick the can down the 22 road. 23 The other point is, when it comes to what you do about an FAC, we have to do it in a general rate 24 That's the nature of the statute. We can't do it 25 case.

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1	later. We have to do it now. And the issue has properly
2	now been joined, and there is evidence on the issue, and
3	there probably will be more, and we would urge the
4	Commission take it up now. It's a very important issue,
5	and it's not an issue that's inconsequential, as the
6	Commission might be aware.
7	CHAIRMAN GUNN: Before you respond to that,
8	let me ask you a procedural question. Can't we just
9	really kind of take this with the case? I mean,
10	ultimately if we make a determination that there isn't a
11	sufficient record to support a tracker and the record
12	isn't developed enough to support a tracker and our Report
13	and Order doesn't rely on an undeveloped record to deal
14	with a tracker, we can still deal with the fuel adjustment
15	clause. So we can still make the determination. If we
16	deny your motion and say we're going to go ahead and
17	proceed, we can take it at the end of the case depending
18	on what the Report and Order says.
19	You can ultimately challenge, if we do make
20	a certain finding, that there wasn't sufficient record,
21	but I mean, because there wouldn't it be better to just
22	kind of do this now and consider and then potentially in
23	the Report and Order either not deal with it or take up
24	your motion at the end after we've seen what's out there?
25	I mean, testimony really is not due until

Page 122 tomorrow, right? So there's still a potential that 1 2 certain parties could file testimony on the evidence, 3 so -- or on that. I'm not saying that you have the resources to do it, but isn't that something we can take 4 5 into account after the -- after the hearing? 6 MR. MILLS: Certainly you can. I'm not 7 sure that I would agree that it's not violative of my due

9 MR. BYRNE: Mr. Chairman, could I add

process rights, but you can do that.

- 10 something? I think part of the problem is if you take --
- 11 if you consider taking these costs out of the fuel
- 12 adjustment clause, something has to be done with them.
- 13 And what Mr. Mills is trying to say is, consider taking it
- 14 out of the fuel adjustment clause but don't consider what
- 15 should be done with those costs. And we're saying, if
- 16 you're going to consider taking them out of the fuel
- 17 adjustment clause, you must consider what's to be done
- 18 with those costs.

8

- 19 MR. MILLS: In fact, that is not what I'm
- 20 saying, and I disagree with Mr. Lowery. I think this
- 21 category of costs is much like the AEP and Wabash costs.
- 22 I think there is a question about whether or not these
- 23 kinds of costs properly flow through the fuel adjustment
- 24 clause, and I think that question is better and more
- 25 appropriately taken up in an FAC case rather than a rate

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1	case.
2	In this rate case you're simply talking
3	about you know, as I said, it's like a declaratory
4	judgment. You are interpreting what the language means
5	without having the dollars in controversy as you will in
6	an FAC case.
7	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Mr. Coffman, you wanted to
8	respond?
9	MR. COFFMAN: Yes. Thank you. I want to
10	go on record supporting the Public Counsel's motion, and I
11	want to object to the concept that this is an issue where
12	certain costs have to be treated by a fuel adjustment
13	clause or a tracker. Both are extraordinary mechanisms
14	that my clients believe strongly not favorable to
15	consumers, and they are not mechanisms that are necessary
16	in order to recognize even mandatory uncontrollable
17	transmission charges.
18	These are costs that can be dealt with in
19	the regular cost of service ratemaking formula when those
20	costs come up. Granting a fuel adjustment clause or a
21	tracker is an extraordinary burden and imposition on
22	consumers generally and are extraordinary. They are not
23	the only two alternatives in which these costs can be
24	addressed.
25	CHAIRMAN GUNN: And in a lot of ways that's

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1	kind of my point. My point is that we are making a much
2	broader determination than just whether these MISO costs
3	are included. We're making a determination whether there
4	is a fuel adjustment clause, what percentage pass through
5	that is, whether or not these costs are appropriately
6	taken up here or somewhere else.
7	So we have so as we're taking into
8	account all relevant factors, we don't need to make this
9	decision right now. We can say we're going to hear it,
10	but ultimately we're going to make the determination, and
11	I don't know that if I I guess I would fundamentally
12	disagree that said that it was a violation of your due
13	process rights because, I mean, constrained resources I
14	don't know is necessarily I mean, you might have an
15	issue with the Legislature doing that, but I don't know
16	that you haven't had an opportunity to present or an
17	opportunity to cross-examine or an opportunity to
18	challenge.
19	And ultimately if the record is not
20	developed, then it's on us to make that determination that
21	the record is not developed and the record is not is
22	not fully informed.
23	So I guess I just feel and we're
24	different in a lot of ways than a court, right. I mean,
25	in some ways it's better for us to have everything come in

	Page 12
1	and so we can kind of separate the wheat from the chaff as
2	we go through rather than excluding something and saying,
3	oh, we're not going to deal with this now, we'll deal with
4	it in a separate proceeding.
5	Because we can do that through our process
6	and say, you know what, at the end of the hearing the
7	evidence doesn't support what the company or Staff is
8	trying to say. The evidence may not support a fuel
9	adjustment clause. The evidence might not support a
10	tracker. But all of those things we can still talk about
11	and we can still consider because ultimately our Report
12	and Order is based upon what the record is and has been
13	developed.
14	MR. MILLS: And Mr. Chairman, I don't
15	disagree with that. My concern is that when you say let
16	everything in, the problem is you're not letting
17	everything in. By giving parties the opportunity to file
18	sursur-surrebuttal testimony at the point in the case in
19	which you did with four days notice prohibits, precludes
20	parties like AARP, parties like MECG that don't have
21	outside experts already on contract from filing testimony.
22	It prohibits parties like Public Counsel that don't have a
23	stable full of testimony from filing testimony. You're
24	not letting everything in. You're letting in one side of
25	testimony.

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1	CHAIRMAN GUNN: But you couldn't you
2	have didn't you have the opportunity to do that in
3	surrebuttal?
4	MR. MILLS: This issue was not brought up
5	in surrebuttal. The issue about the tracker was not
6	brought up until sur-surrebuttal, and that's my point.
7	CHAIRMAN GUNN: But you still have 'til
8	tomorrow to file testimony.
9	MR. MILLS: Yes. That's correct. And as
10	I've said, I believe that is an impossibility, not only
11	for me but for a number of parties.
12	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Kenney, did
13	you have something?
14	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I do. Mr. Lowery,
15	did you say that this issue needs to be determined in
16	order to be able to make a determination about net base
17	fuel costs?
18	MR. LOWERY: Yes. You've got to figure out
19	whether or not whether or not the what costs are in
20	the fuel adjustment clause or not in the fuel adjustment
21	clause.
22	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I thought the net
23	base fuel cost issue was already dealt with.
24	MR. MILLS: I've been informed that it's
25	been settled.

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1	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: That's what I was
2	informed of yesterday.
3	MR. WOODSMALL: Your Honor, it's not
4	necessary to determine the net base fuel costs. A
5	normalized amount of these costs are already in the net
6	base fuel costs. We know what that's going to be coming
7	out of this case. What is at issue is whether they will
8	be able to track against that amount or run any increases
9	through the fuel adjustment clause.
10	The baseline, though, is set. We've all
11	agreed on that. It's how whether they will and how
12	they will address any increases over that baseline amount.
13	MR. LOWERY: Your Honor, that's not
14	entirely accurate because if they're not to remain in the
15	fuel adjustment clause, then the net base fuel cost number
16	will change. We know what the depending on what you
17	rule, we can figure out what the number would be, but the
18	number will have to change if they don't remain in the
19	fuel adjustment clause as they have been.
20	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: But the number for
21	the net base fuel cost will change by a number that's
22	already been determined?
23	MR. LOWERY: It's determinable, I would
24	say. I would put it that way, yes. It's determinable
25	based on the company's records.

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1	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Irrespective of what
2	we decide to do with dealing with this tracker issue or
3	not?
4	MR. LOWERY: That's true. That is true.
5	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So the number will
6	change, but it would change by a determinable number that
7	we can't determine without any additional evidence
8	regarding the FAC issue, right, or tracker issue?
9	MR. LOWERY: I think that's true.
10	MR. WOODSMALL: The number just goes from
11	one pot to the other. It goes from inclusion to the FAC
12	to inclusion in regular base rates. So they still get the
13	same amount. It's just that they won't be able to track
14	or automatically pass through increases.
15	MR. LOWERY: I would also, if I could add,
16	you're not asking you're not being asked to make a
17	declaratory judgment about what the FAC tariff that's been
18	in effect since March 1, 2009 'til now, you're not
19	necessarily making any kind of declaratory judgment about
20	the transmission costs that have been run through that
21	FAC. You're being asked to make a prospective change to
22	the FAC.
23	If parties in a later proceeding involving
24	those past accumulation periods want to take the position
25	that charges have gone through the FAC that shouldn't

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- 1 have, then they will be able to do that.
- 2 The other problem if you don't take up this
- 3 tracker issue is -- and you really can't make a
- 4 declaratory order, you don't really have the power to make
- 5 a declaratory order that will bind the Commission
- 6 tomorrow, for example, is then we're sort of in the
- 7 situation where we're going forward, you haven't really
- 8 dealt with all aspects of this issue.
- 9 And we would contend, and Staff agrees,
- 10 that the tracker is one aspect of this issue where we
- 11 don't really know ultimately how these costs ought to be
- 12 handled. This is a very important policy issue that has
- 13 been properly joined.
- I'd also point out this: I don't know what
- 15 Mr. Mills' office situation is. And as Chairman Gunn
- 16 said, that may be an issue for the Legislature. I do know
- 17 that, for example, Mr. Kind of his office is very well
- 18 versed in these MISO issues, and I don't know necessarily
- 19 that he had to go hire a different expert to address these
- 20 issues.
- 21 Maybe they don't have the time to deal with
- 22 it, but that is not a due process issue. They have been
- 23 given the process that they're due. They may wish to have
- 24 more process, but they've been given the process they are
- 25 due.

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1	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: The MISO transmission
2	charges have been run through the FAC since its enactment,
3	since you had it?
4	MR. LOWERY: Yes, they have. And, in fact,
5	many of these charges existed at the time the FAC was
6	approved.
7	MR. THOMPSON: If I could, Mr. Chairman? I
8	am advised that the net base fuel charge figure that is
9	agreed to at the moment does not include the MISO
10	transmission charges. If your determination is to take
11	them out of the FAC and not put them in a tracker, then
12	those charges would simply be added back into the net base
13	fuel charge figure.
14	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Well, I think
15	we're getting pretty far down into the weeds here on this
16	issue. I'm going to go ahead and make a ruling from the
17	bench. I have spoken with the Commissioners before the
18	or with the individual Commissioners before the hearing,
19	and I'm going to deny the motion. If any Commissioner
20	disagrees, now's the time to speak.
21	Okay. Let's go ahead and move to opening
22	statements, then.
23	MR. LOWERY: Your Honor, there were a
24	couple of preliminary matters that, if it pleases the
25	Commission, I'd like to just bring up.

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1	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Go right ahead.
2	MR. LOWERY: The reconciliation was filed
3	late yesterday, and we think there are some mistakes in
4	it, but we haven't had the opportunity to tie those out
5	and figure out exactly what those are and discuss those
6	with the Staff. I just wanted to mention that. We don't
7	think it fairly presents, not intentionally mistaken, but
8	we think there are some mistakes. We will be talking to
9	the Staff about that and would anticipate perhaps a
10	revised reconciliation will have to be filed.
11	We also have reached a settlement in
12	principal with the Staff on several issues, and this
13	affects scheduling perhaps or at least what you might
14	expect. We need to reduce that to writing, but we expect
15	that that will be done in fairly short order. And those
16	issues are advertising and dues and donations, which are
17	scheduled to be taken up tomorrow; miscellaneous expenses,
18	the nesting study is what that really dealt with, which
19	was scheduled to be taken up on the 2nd. Part C and D of
20	the low income weatherization issue have been resolved.
21	That was expected to be taken up on 9/4. And the Sioux
22	construction accounting also on that day has been
23	resolved. And finally, the Entergy issues, which were
24	scheduled to be taken up on the 9th, have been
25	resolved.

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1	All of those issues are issues for which
2	only Staff and company have any testimony or had any
3	witnesses, and we've resolved those with the Staff and
4	don't expect those to need to be taken up in the hearing.
5	The last thing I'd like to bring up is, we
6	filed a Stipulation & Agreement on the Pure Power issue
7	several days ago. I believe the ten days runs Saturday.
8	We the unions aren't here, so I couldn't ask them, but
9	everybody else, including Mr. Robertson this morning, has
10	indicated to us they have no objection to that
11	stipulation. I would be very surprised if the unions do.
12	We have some contract negotiations that we
13	need to enter into and complete. So I would just urge the
14	Commission, if possible, to very quickly, assuming there's
15	no objection, approve that stipulation so that we can do
16	that. It has some financial implications for the company.
17	JUDGE WOODRUFF: I was anticipating doing
18	that at agenda for next week. Is that soon enough?
19	MR. LOWERY: If there has been no
20	objection, unless we have some reason to believe the
21	Commission would have a concern, I think that will
22	suffice.
23	JUDGE WOODRUFF: It's actually seven days
24	to respond. I believe it has actually run, or will
25	tomorrow.

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1	All right. Ready for opening statements,
2	then, beginning with Ameren.
3	MR. LOWERY: Good morning again. May it
4	please the Commission? My name is Jim Lowery, and I along
5	with Tom Byrne, Wendy Tatro, Russ Mitten and Mike Tripp
6	represent the company in this case.
7	This case was filed for many of the same
8	reasons that have necessitated four previous rate cases in
9	the past approximately five years. First of all, to
10	rebase the company's net base fuel costs which, despite
11	the company's efforts, continue to rise mostly because
12	they reflect the impacts of commodities markets over which
13	the company essentially doesn't have any control.
14	Secondly, to reflect the substantial
15	capital investments the company has made in its energy
16	generation and delivery systems since the last rate case,
17	about \$700 million since March 2011.
18	Third, to account for lower kilowatt hour
19	sales, which are driven by several things, including the
20	continued sluggishness of the economy and customer
21	conservation efforts.
22	Fourth, to address other higher costs,
23	things like pension costs, medical costs, labor costs and
24	other operating costs, many of which are also not within
25	the company's complete control.

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1	And finally, to reflect for the first in
2	rates the costs of the largest energy efficiency program
3	in the state of Missouri, the company's MEEIA programs
4	which the Commission approved pursuant to a stipulation in
5	that case that was approved a few months ago.
6	I mentioned a moment ago that the company
7	has had four prior rate increases. This would be the
8	fifth. And those have occurred in June 2007, March 2009,
9	June 2010, and then in July of last year. Those prior
10	rate increases have totaled approximately \$600 million, or
11	about 27 percent of an increase since, I guess, compared
12	to the pre June 2007 rates. The average increase has been
13	just under 7 percent.
14	While the final true-up calculations for
15	this case aren't done, we expect the company's final
16	request after we account for the final true-up, revisions
17	in the case, settlements that have occurred, we expect
18	that increase request to be between 11 and 12 percent.
19	And about 60 percent, in fact more than
20	60 percent of that request consists of two things: The
21	net base fuel cost rebase, 95 percent of which would have
22	flown through the fuel adjustment clause anyway, and the
23	MEEIA program costs for the energy efficiency programs.
24	Now, no one likes increases in utility
25	rates, but it's important to maintain one's perspectives

Page 135 about why those increases have been necessary and what 1 2 they've been for. So what has the company done with the 3 funds from those prior rate increases? Since 2007 the company has invested more than \$3.5 billion in its energy 4 5 generation and delivery systems. 6 And what have those investments produced? 7 What tangible things can we point to? They have produced an improvement of 27 percent in the company's reliability 8 since 2006. Coincidentally, they've reduced sulphur dioxide emissions by 27 percent since 2006. 10 11 They've allowed the company to keep the 12 equivalent availability of its generating plants high, among the best in the industry. In fact, just yesterday 13 the company's two largest base load plants, the Labadie 14 15 and Rush Island plants, received the Electric Utility Cost Group's Prestigious Top Performer Awards for 2011. Those 16 17 awards are given to power plants that demonstrate excellence relating to operations and maintenance costs 18 and equivalence forced outage rates; in other words, to 19 plants that deliver high quality and reliable service at 20 21 comparably low cost. Now, what about the company's rates? What 22 23 have the company's rates done? Despite those four rate 24 increases, the company's rates also continue to compare very favorably to its peers nationally, regionally and in 25

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1	this state, 25 percent below the national average,
2	17 percent below other Missouri utilities. In fact, the
3	lowest of all investor-owned utilities in Missouri. And
4	all of those utilities, as you know, are before the
5	Commission again for their own rate increases.
6	The bottom line is that the company has
7	been an excellent steward of the funds provided by the
8	rate increases this Commission has given it over the last
9	few years. The company provides an essential service to
10	its customers, and we expect who continue to expect an
11	ever-increasing level of reliability for the devices they
12	depend on, their smart phones, tablets, laptops, flat
13	screens, integrated home security and convenience systems,
14	the appliances that they have.
15	The company is providing that reliability,
16	and the company is doing so at a reasonable and at
17	reasonable and comparably very favorable rates. When
18	storms hit, the company has done an excellent and
19	aggressive job of responding to those storms. In short,
20	the company's doing what it should be doing, delivering
21	very reliable service at comparably low rates.
22	Now, the testimony filed in this case
23	doesn't really take issue with any of the facts that I
24	just recited, but when one reads some of it, most notably
25	from our industrial customers and to some extent from the

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1	Staff, one could get the impression that all is well. One
2	could be misled into thinking that the regulatory compact
3	has worked just fine, and aside from rebasing the
4	company's net fuel costs and including the MEEIA costs,
5	that there's really no need for a rate increase. By the
6	way, those same industrials can opt out of paying those
7	MEEIA costs if they choose to. That's their right under
8	the statute.
9	But while they may be claiming, if not
10	using these words, essentially claiming that the company
11	is doing just fine, the facts don't support such a
12	contention. The facts also don't support the contention
13	that the status quo is in the best interests of all of the
14	company's customers.
15	The Commission is charged with setting just
16	and reasonable rates, and what that means is it's charged
17	with setting rates that provide the company with a
18	reasonable opportunity to actually earn a fair return. In
19	each case this Commission determines what that is.
20	By definition, unless it's because of the
21	company's improvidence that it's not able to earn that
22	return, if the company systematically can't earn it, then
23	there exists an unmistakable problem. And unfortunately,
24	that unmistakable problem has and continues to exist as
25	reflected in two charts from company president and CEO

Page 138 Warner Baxter's surrebuttal testimony. 2 The first one, which Mr. Byrne just put on 3 the easel, shows that on a weather normalized basis, which is how rates are set and how earnings are judged, the 4 5 company has not even one time earned its allowed return in the last, I quess it's been about five years despite four 6 7 separate rate increase. 8 Now, others have claimed that part of the 9 reason that's happened is because of the Taum Sauk failure, because of, quote, prudence issue involving AEP 10 11 and Wabash. But as the next chart that Mr. Byrne is 12 putting on the easel shows, which is the third schedule to Mr. Baxter's surrebuttal, even if you ignore those 13 impacts, even if you ignore that, the company still has 14 15 been unable even one time to earn its allowed return. I would also note that all of the charts 16 17 that we've presented, the figures we've presented reflect the company's absorption of the lost energy and capacity 18 value of the Taum Sauk plant. So the returns would have 19 20 been better had we not absorbed that, but that -- we took 21 responsibility for that, and so we did absorb. 22 The point is that the data, the actual 23 information unmistakably shows that despite filing rate 24 case after rate case after rate case, the regulatory framework the company operates under continues to fall 25

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1	short of where it needs to be. That is, if the company is
2	going to be expected to continue to invest in its system
3	as it has, if the company's going to be expected to
4	continue to deliver the very high quality and reliable
5	service that it has, and if the company is going to meet
6	the tremendous challenges that it faces in other areas,
7	mandates like renewables, environmental expenditures and
8	investments, transmission reliability investments that
9	NERC, for example, imposes on it, consistent constructive
10	regulatory ratemaking policies are essential if the
11	investments and expenditures the company needs to make and
12	should be making are going to be made.
13	Unless one were to believe that the very
14	hot weather that we've experienced the last couple of
15	years has sort of, quote, solved this problem, as the
16	other schedules to Mr. Baxter's surrebuttal testimony
17	show, even accounting for that hot weather the company has
18	only been able to earn its allowed return or has not
19	earned its allowed return in 53 of the 62 12-month periods
20	since June 2007, only 15 percent of the time.
21	If the regulatory compact was working as it
22	should, what we should be seeing is those bars above,
23	below, above, below, above, below that red allowed return
24	line. Then we would have a then we would have a system
25	that's symmetrical. Then we'd have a system that's

Page 140 balanced. 1 2 But what's happening is, as the other chart 3 that Mr. Byrne had up just a moment ago shows, what's happening is, we file a rate case, the situation improves 4 5 a little bit, then starts to degrade. Then we quickly 6 file another rate case, and it improves and it degrades. 7 Then we file another rate case. And I don't think that's the pattern that the Commission really wants to see. 8 In fact, if you -- I don't know if you're 9 aware of this or not, but Missouri has seen the second 10 most rate case filings of any state in the Union in the 11 12 last three years. I think that that kind of pattern and 13 that circumstance probably is why the Commission is looking at rate stabilization mechanisms, first an order 14 15 in this case and now in the workshop docket, and the company will most certainly engage in that discussion and 16 17 try to work with the Commission to find constructive solutions, but those same issues must be addressed now in 18 19 this rate case. As the evidence in this case will also 20 21 show, the pattern that these charts are showing is simply unsustainable. It's not in the customers' long-term best 22 interests. While the company continues to invest in its 23 24 system at considerably more than its depreciation expense, the company has decreased the level of capital 25

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	Page 14.
1	expenditures it's making. The company has reduced its
2	expenditures by hundreds of millions of dollars over just
3	the last three or four years.
4	The problem that we have for all of us is
5	that the company's system is aging. Much of it was built
6	out in the '60s, '70s and '80s when suburban expansion was
7	occurring and when air conditioning became prevalent. The
8	average age of the company's base load plants is 45 years,
9	its coal plants. Callaway is almost 30 years old.
10	Substantial components of the energy delivery system must
11	be replaced. Loads are not growing, and they sometimes
12	might even be going down or not growing very much.
13	What is on the doorstep is a perfect storm
14	where more investment is needed and where operation and
15	maintenance costs probably should be going up, but they
16	are under extreme pressure to be cut or held flat. The
17	company will meet its service obligation to deliver safe
18	and adequate service, but absent changes in how the
19	regulatory compact has been working, the exceptional
20	reliability the company's been able to achieve, the high
21	level of performance of its energy delivery and general
22	systems is not going to be sustainable.
23	Continuing to put one's heads in the sand
24	by contending that the system is working just fine, which
25	some of the other testimony in this case strongly suggests

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1	if they don't use those words, is shortsighted, it's
2	unwise and it's not good policy.
3	That's why the Commission is proposing
4	mechanisms, which are within this commission's authority
5	to adopt, that will in part address the dilemma that we
6	are all facing. Among those mechanisms is a two-way storm
7	restoration cost tracker, which would remove from the
8	storm response equation the real concern that responding
9	aggressively and effectively to storms may in the end
10	actually hurt the company, and plant in service
11	accounting, which mitigates a substantial disincentive the
12	company has to invest in good discretionary projects
13	dealing with this aging system because the historical
14	approach again hurts the company.
15	Let me reiterate what our witnesses have to
16	say on that issue. Under the historical approach, the
17	company incurs substantial losses between rate cases
18	solely because of investment assets that go into service
19	to serve customers, because once those assets go into
20	service, the company isn't compensated at all for the cost
21	of the capital that it has fronted to put those assets in
22	service.
23	To make matters worse, the company's bottom
24	line starts to be immediately impacted by the increased
25	depreciation expense that was not taken into account in

Page 143 rates on those same assets. Yet those assets are 2 benefitting customers and at the same time hurting the 3 company's earnings. When one looks back at the first schedule 4 5 from Mr. Baxter's surrebuttal testimony, what you'll see is that other factors, cost savings, revenue increases, 6 7 are not compensating, they're not offsetting this permanent loss that the company suffers because of the 8 investments that it's making. 10 Consider the problem a utility manager faced with the understandable need to achieve at or near 11 the return this Commission has said is fair faces when he 12 has to decide about investments. If he invests, the 13 company's bottom line is hurt and its ability to attract 14 15 capital, both debt and equity, both of which are needed, is undermined. If he doesn't invest, he creates more risk 16 17 for the company's system. 18 Plant in service accounting is a step in the right direction toward helping resolve that difficult 19 dilemma, and there is nothing about plant in service 20 21 accounting that limits or impairs the Commission's ability in a future rate case when you would actually be asked to 22 reflect the deferred amounts and accrued amounts in rate 23 24 base, to ensure that only dollars associated with

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prudently incurred investments are actually included in

25

Page 144 rate base. 1 2 The Commission has been attempting to think 3 outside the box a bit in talking about low income rates, talking about rate stabilization that I mentioned a moment 4 5 ago, and the company is urging the Commission to step maybe a little bit outside the box with its plant in 6 7 accounting -- plant in service accounting proposal, not really all that far out of the box, and the storm tracker 8 as well. Storm trackers are not unheard of at all in this country, and plant in service accounting is very much akin 10 to construction accounting that this commission and other 11 12 commissions have used. 13 Now, aside from the two-way storm tracker and the plant in service accounting proposal, there are 14 15 several other issues in this case. I'm only going to address two of them this morning, and we'll talk about the 16 17 others when we get to those issues, and those issues are return on equity, or ROE, and the fuel adjustment clause. 18 19 As is almost always the case, the largest disputed issue from a dollar perspective is ROE. I spoke 20 21 earlier of a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return, but what does that mean? What is a fair return? A fair 22 return is one that is commensurate with the returns on 23 investments of enterprises having corresponding risk, it's 24 one that's sufficient to ensure the company's financial 25

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1	integrity, and it's one that's adequate to allow the
2	company to attract capital on reasonable terms so that it
3	can continue to meet the service expectations of its
4	customers.
5	Not only must the return meet those
6	standards, but the rate order as a whole must be such that
7	the company actually has a reasonable opportunity to earn
8	the return. That means that when this Commission sets the
9	allowed return and makes decisions on other issues in this
10	case, it needs to be cognizant of the circumstances the
11	company faces in actually having that reasonable
12	opportunity to earn.
13	This chart that Mr. Byrne is putting up
14	depicts the return recommendations from all of the ROE
15	witnesses in this case and the recommendation from OPC.
16	Only one of them is within shouting distance of the
17	national average for integrated electric utilities that
18	has been being awarded by other state commissions, and
19	that's the 10.5 return recommended by Ameren Missouri
20	witness Robert Hevert.
21	The evidence will show that this
22	recommendation is reasonable based on the fact that the
23	national average for integrated utilities over the last
24	year, year and a half is between 10.15 and 10.27 percent.
25	Mr. Hevert's recommendation is only about 25 to 30 basis

Page 146 points above that. 1 2 And keep in mind, for the reasons discussed 3 by Mr. Hevert and also by John Reed, a regulatory economist with more than 30 years of experience in the 4 5 industry, Ameren Missouri faces regulatory hurdles, some of which the commission can't solve, like CWIP, for 6 7 example, but some of which the Commission can, that make it harder, as we've seen, for Ameren Missouri to actually 8 earn its authorized return. And that's one of the reasons that Mr. Hevert's recommendation, even though a little 10 higher than those averages, is reasonable and appropriate. 11 12 Consider the ROE's recommended by the other ROE witnesses in this case. MIEC witness Gorman 13 recommends a 9.3 percent ROE. That's well below the 14 15 10th percentile of any other ROE that's been granted in the last year, year and a half, and it's almost outside 16 17 the zone of reasonableness that the Commission has employed as a reasonableness check on ROEs and as the 18 Western District has indicated is an appropriate thing for 19 the Commission to do. 20 21 Or consider the recommendation of Staff witness Murray, just 9 percent. It's essentially 22 completely off the chart, and it's completely outside the 23 24 zone of reasonableness. The evidence, in fact, will show that Mr. Murray doesn't even expect the Commission to 25

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Page 147 adopt his recommendation. And OPC's arbitrary 8 percent 1 2 recommendation is nothing more than unreasonable and 3 punitive. If the company while drastically cutting 4 5 its costs and investment levels can't earn the returns the Commission said it should have had the opportunity to 6 7 earn, it's easy to see what would happen if the Commission went along with these ultra-low recommendations. 8 9 Adoption of those recommendations would mean that the company would have no reasonable choice but 10 11 to try to find a way to go further down the unsustainable 12 path of reducing expenditures at a time when it ought to 13 be increasing them to deal with its aging infrastructure and to meet the energy needs and expectations of its 14 15 customers. 16 The last issue I want to talk about is the 17 fuel adjustment clause, which we've talked a little bit about this morning. There's two issues there, the sharing 18 percentage issue and the transmission charge issue from 19 20 the MISO that we've already spoke about. 21 First the sharing percentage issue. Staff is back with the same proposal that the Commission 22 rejected about a year ago and which was also rejected by 23 the Commission in the case before that and the case before 24

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that when the FAC was first approved.

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1	That is, the Staff proposes to experiment
2	with the company's fuel adjustment clause sharing
3	mechanism by changing it from 95/5 percent to 85/15
4	percent. And just like last year, the Staff has not a
5	shred of evidence that supports the need to change the
6	sharing percentage. In fact, in every case, the case
7	where the FAC was adopted and since then, someone has
8	argued for a greater sharing percentage, and each time the
9	Commission has said no.
10	The reason the Commission has said no is,
11	first of all, no one has produced any evidence, and they
12	still haven't, that there's actually a need to change it.
13	And secondly, more sharing will simply make even more
14	unreasonable the company's chance to earn a fair return
15	because the company will effectively have disallowed
16	have imposed disallowances of more prudently incurred fuel
17	costs.
18	In the last case, the Commission said that
19	adoption of Staff's proposal would have imposed a, quote,
20	heavy burden on the company had it been in place because
21	it would have cost the company an additional \$22.5 million
22	of prudently incurred fuel costs. That number is now
23	30 million. The burden has gotten heavier. Yet Staff's
24	evidence is as weak as ever, and the company continues to
25	struggle to earn its authorized return.

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1	When I stood in this same spot last year on
2	the same issue, as I said then, there continues to be no
3	competent and substantial evidence to support a change in
4	the sharing percentage. As was true in the last case,
5	Staff witness Lena Mantle's testimony on this issue
6	remains a meandering collection of thoughts and largely
7	supposition that she transforms into a recommendation,
8	although she admits that she doesn't really have any idea
9	if doing so, if making the change would induce a change in
10	behavior or if there's a need to induce a change in
11	behavior. She apparently just wants to find out, at the
12	expense of the company, \$30 million worth of expense.
13	The evidence will show that there's been no
14	proof whatsoever that the company has been imprudent in
15	how it buys fuel, how it makes off-system sales, how it
16	operates its generating plants, that the company has made
17	no changes since it had the FAC in how it goes about any
18	of those activities, and we have three witnesses that will
19	testify about that.
20	The company recognizes, as the Commission
21	has said, that having a fuel adjustment clause is a
22	privilege and not a right, and that is incentive enough.
23	The other main issue, as I mentioned, deals
24	with MISO transmission charges. Three times the
25	Commission has approved the company's participation in the

	Page 150
1	MISO, and that participation has been approved because it
2	has significant benefits for customers, 95 percent of
3	which flow through to customers, and essentially all of
4	which come from the transparent energy markets that the
5	MISO has.
6	But with that MISO participation, to gain
7	those benefits through the FAC come costs. The simple
8	truth is that the company must pay MISO transmission
9	charges, including charges that are based calculated
10	based upon regional transmission projects in part, but
11	must pay those charges based upon the company's load,
12	based upon the power it's taking from the MISO, in order
13	to take power from the MISO, in order to participate in
14	those markets. The costs are essentially unavoidable.
15	They are essentially beyond the company's control, in
16	fact, completely beyond it, and the costs are rising and
17	expected to rise in the future.
18	Some of these costs were incurred even
19	before there was an FAC, and the FAC we contend has
20	provided for their inclusion from the day it was approved.
21	But now the Staff and MIEC want to change the FAC to
22	prevent the company from including these costs in the FAC.
23	At Mr. Haro our witness will testify, that we believe
24	that's inappropriate. The costs and revenues which are

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part and parcel of MISO participation belong in the FAC.

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1	But if for some reason the company were to
2	determine that the Commission did not agree with that,
3	then they then it is critical that the Commission
4	implement a transmission cost and revenue tracker so the
5	company can defer changes in these costs and revenues
6	between rate cases so that it can be accounted for,
7	considered in a future rate case, and we would propose at
8	that time that they be amortized over five years.
9	Mr. Thompson's already indicated that a
10	properly designed tracker is not objectionable to the
11	Staff. In fact, when this issue came up a couple of years
12	ago in a KCP&L GMO case, the Staff recommended essentially
13	just such a tracker. What the Staff said was, Staff
14	recognized that these costs are much less controllable
15	than most other utility costs and that they are large and
16	expected to rise substantially.
17	If these costs are removed from the FAC and
18	if there is no tracker, the company will bear an even
19	greater and fundamentally unfair burden caused by MISO
20	costs that it must incur to gain benefits almost entirely
21	for the customer, not for itself.
22	Conversely, such a tracker is not going to
23	harm customers at all. They would simply be paying the
24	costs that are necessary to gain the benefits of being in
25	the MISO market. If these costs are not in the FAC and if

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1	they're not tracked, again, the company's going to be put
2	in the position of having to find a way to cut
3	expenditures when probably it should be increasing them,
4	increasing investment and addressing the wave of aging
5	infrastructure that is coming its way. Such a significant
6	change would clearly be a step backwards in regulatory and
7	ratemaking policy in the eyes of the investors that the
8	company relies upon for capital, both debt and equity.
9	There are a number of other important
10	issues. As I mentioned, I'm not going to go into those
11	now. We'll address those later. But for now, I want to
12	thank you for your attention, and as always, I want to
13	express that we look forward to developing the record in
14	this case for you. Thank you.
15	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Questions?
16	CHAIRMAN GUNN: I actually have a couple
17	questions to start out. I seem to recall in the last case
18	you presented a chart which showed that in certain months
19	Ameren actually did earn their authorized ROE. Am I
20	mistaken? But then you also seem to say that, and just to
21	be clear, that out of the last 62 months you've been
22	unable to earn for 53 of those.
23	MR. LOWERY: There are two charts in
24	Mr. Baxter's testimony that are not weather normalized
25	that do demonstrate that occasionally the company has been

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1	able to earn its authorized return. That's essentially
2	weather related.
3	CHAIRMAN GUNN: In the last year, how many
4	months has that been?
5	MR. LOWERY: I think once in the last
6	through July of this year, I think there's been one
7	period.
8	CHAIRMAN GUNN: Do you know what month that
9	was?
10	MR. LOWERY: I think it was June.
11	CHAIRMAN GUNN: What about do we have
12	information on July yet?
13	MR. LOWERY: I'm not sure what that
14	information is. It might be that we also were able to do
15	it for July. I think that was weather related as well.
16	CHAIRMAN GUNN: Do we know about August?
17	MR. LOWERY: I don't know about August
18	certainly. Some of our witnesses might, but I don't.
19	This is Schedule WLB-ES2, I believe it is, shows on a
20	non-weather-normalized basis the results. There are some.
21	You can see a few bars.
22	CHAIRMAN GUNN: And I thought you presented
23	that in the last rate case. I just wanted to make sure I
24	wasn't going crazy.
25	The second thing is, is that you have had,

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1	as you said, four rate increases in the last four years.
2	MR. LOWERY: Five years.
3	CHAIRMAN GUNN: Five years. Isn't the
4	premise of your argument, though, that the company is
5	being perfectly managed and perfectly efficient?
6	MR. LOWERY: Well, I don't think any
7	company is perfectly managed or perfectly efficient, but
8	the premise of the argument is that, for example, we took
9	into account the two significant prudence issues that the
10	Commission ruled against us on. We still did not earn our
11	authorized return. Beyond that, there haven't been
12	allegations of imprudence at all. We haven't had prudence
13	issues in our cases and
14	CHAIRMAN GUNN: But imprudence doesn't
15	equal what I'm talking about. You are saying that the
16	only reason that there is not that the regulatory
17	compact isn't working is because the institutional
18	structures and because of the decisions of this
19	Commission.
20	MR. LOWERY: We do believe that's to be the
21	case.
22	CHAIRMAN GUNN: I just want to be clear.
23	That is the only reason you're saying is that is that
24	you are not earning your ROE is because of the
25	institutional implications or barriers and the decisions

	Page 15.
1	by this Commission. So then you are assuming perfect
2	and perfectly efficient running of the company.
3	MR. LOWERY: I would amend what you said
4	just a little bit. No company is perfect. So if the
5	company was perfect, if there were robots running the
6	company and they did everything perfectly, could the
7	results be a little bit better? Sure. I suspect that
8	they could.
9	But we have a systemic long pattern where
10	the company has been unable to earn its authorized return
11	except in very isolated instances driven by the luck of
12	having some hot weather once in a while. That pattern we
13	believe is indicative of structural issues, some of which
14	you can't address, we acknowledge, for example CWIP, but
15	some of which you can.
16	And so yes, we do believe that it is those
17	structural issues and decisions the Commission has made
18	and we're hoping the Commission may make some different
19	decisions in this case that is the primary driver of
20	that problem. If it was a blip, we wouldn't be making
21	that argument, but it's not a blip. It's a longstanding
22	pattern.
23	CHAIRMAN GUNN: Now, you one of the
24	reasons why one of the things you pointed out is that
25	the average ROEs are higher other places, but you also

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1	pointed out that in Missouri we filed more rate cases here
2	than anybody else over the last three years. Is it
3	possible that those averages are higher because companies
4	are earning higher ROEs and they're afraid to come into
5	their commissions because there might be a recognition
6	that ROE should be lower?
7	MR. LOWERY: It's possible, but I've looked
8	at the RRA reports, and perhaps you have, too, the SNL
9	reports that everybody sort of looks at, and there are
10	very large numbers of electric rate cases in all of those
11	years. Missouri's had the most, but other states have had
12	many, many, many rate cases as well.
13	And I think Mr. Reed, who will testify this
14	morning, would probably have more of a national
15	perspective on that. But I think if you look across the
16	country, you're going to see lots of rate cases in most
17	jurisdictions.
18	CHAIRMAN GUNN: What was the average ROE
19	five years ago?
20	MR. LOWERY: I don't know that. I know
21	from the 0036 case I believe it was 10.36 percent.
22	CHAIRMAN GUNN: So they have declined?
23	MR. LOWERY: They've declined a little bit,
24	but not very much.
25	CHAIRMAN GUNN: But they have declined?

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1	MR. LOWERY: They have.
2	CHAIRMAN GUNN: And you also have another
3	acknowledgement that the MIEC ROE is within the zone of
4	reasonableness?
5	MR. LOWERY: I did, because it is, not by
6	much.
7	CHAIRMAN GUNN: And the Western but it
8	is, and the Western District has essentially taken that as
9	a jurisdictional issue. I mean, they say if you're within
10	the zone of reasonableness, we're not even going to look
11	at it.
12	MR. LOWERY: I think that might be a
13	fair not going to look at it I don't think is fair. It
14	depends on the evidentiary support and other things. But
15	for that reason, if there's evidentiary support, then yes,
16	I think the Western District is going to give a great deal
17	of deference to the Commission. I would certainly agree
18	with that.
19	CHAIRMAN GUNN: And I simplified it. I
20	will admit to that. But essentially they and I've
21	never liked the zone of reasonableness. It's never been
22	my favorite, because I think the evidence supports what
23	the evidence supports. So I've never really liked that.
24	But they have kind of given us a safe harbor with the zone
25	of reasonableness.

1	Page 158 MR. LOWERY: Largely, yes. I'm being too
2	much of a lawyer, I realize.
3	CHAIRMAN GUNN: No. I think that's fair.
4	I think that's fair. All right. I look forward to the
5	rest of the case. I don't have any other questions.
6	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Kenney?
7	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Thank you. I just
8	have a couple of questions, and some of them are similar
9	to Chairman Gunn's questions. So the plant in service
10	accounting the plant in service accounting would
11	address loss of cost of capital in between the time the
12	plant's placed into service and the rate case
13	MR. LOWERY: Yes.
14	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: and increased
15	depreciation expense?
16	MR. LOWERY: That's correct.
17	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And as I understand
18	the last several rate cases, the problem with regulatory
19	lag is that it results in those losses, the permanent loss
20	of depreciation expense and cost of capital?
21	MR. LOWERY: That is certainly the primary
22	driver of the pattern that we're seeing is this
23	investment. There are some other things. There's some
24	O&M expenses. This one's definitely number one on the
25	list by a fairly large measure.

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1	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: This may be a bit of
2	a rhetorical question. You can answer it or not. If you
3	combine the plant in service accounting with storm tracker
4	and with FAC and the availability of the environmental
5	cost recovery mechanism and am I missing any?
6	MR. LOWERY: Those would probably be the
7	ones that might come to mind.
8	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Would there be
9	anything else that Ameren would need in order to address
10	regulatory lag after that?
11	MR. LOWERY: Well, I don't I can't say
12	that we wouldn't, because even with those mechanisms, I
13	think it's the opinion of our experts that we still face
14	some hurdles that are greater than average than our peers
15	do.
16	And let me address the ECRM mechanism a
17	moment. Because of the way the ECRM mechanism was
18	structured statutorily and the caps that exist and the way
19	the Commission's rules came out, the ECRM doesn't help
20	this problem. That's why you that's why we haven't
21	asked for one, and that's why I guess we asked for one
22	once, but we withdrew the application, and why you don't
23	see other utilities asking for it. So it really isn't
24	effective to help us with these problems.
25	As far as the other mechanisms, virtually

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1	everyone else already has an FAC. So we're sort of on an
2	equal playing field somewhat in that area. Many
3	jurisdictions have CWIP. Many other jurisdictions use
4	other mechanisms that sort of level this playing field.
5	If you were to if you were to include
6	the storm cost tracker, even the transmission tracker, if
7	those costs don't stay in the FAC, less than 5 percent of
8	our non-fuel O&M expenditures would be subject to being
9	tracked. More than 95 percent would still be subject to
10	the vagaries of what happens between rate cases.
11	So it would help, and I was very careful to
12	say, I don't I can't tell you it's going to absolutely
13	solve this problem, but it would help solve the problem,
14	and we're asking the Commission to do what it can within
15	its authority.
16	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So one other question
17	is, kind of based upon what you just said, the FAC is what
18	everybody else has and so that levels the playing field,
19	and then the plant in service accounting would further
20	assist in leveling the playing field. Why is the
21	comparison to everybody else relevant if the issue is
22	dealing with regulatory lag? If really the issue is the
23	11-month process that we have here in Missouri according
24	to Ameren, what is the relevance of what everybody else
25	has?

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1	MR. LOWERY: Well, the relevance is, it has
2	implications for our cost of capital, our ability to
3	access the capital we need, including equity capital.
4	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: That's because of
5	what Wall Street says, then, in other words? It's not a
6	function of our regulatory process because you have an
7	external third party saying that if you don't have these
8	mechanisms, then you're not as attractive as other
9	utilities?
10	MR. LOWERY: I don't think it's because of
11	what Wall Street says. It's the reality of what the cost
12	of capital is and where people are going to put their
13	money. And if Missouri is disadvantaged, then the money
14	is not going to flow in the same way that it would, and we
15	depend on this. Whether folks like the fact that Wall
16	Street has an influence on these things or not, the
17	reality is that they do.
18	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Then this brings me
19	to my next question, because what I think I hear is
20	that I'm going to paraphrase it, and tell me if I'm
21	correct. The point of these charts is to demonstrate a
22	pattern of constant earning beneath the authorized ROE?
23	MR. LOWERY: Earnings attrition earning
24	attrition I think may be the term.
25	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Earnings attrition.

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1	Would you also call it under-earnings?
2	MR. LOWERY: Sure.
3	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And if we use the
4	phrase under-earnings or earning attrition, implicit in
5	that phrase is that there's somehow anything beneath
6	the authorized ROE is deficient.
7	MR. LOWERY: In fact, that's not what I
8	said. What I said was, when we have a systemic problem
9	that it's for a long period of time below, that is
10	deficient. If we were under some months and over some
11	months and under and it was random and it was not
12	systemic, then we don't we don't have to earn our
13	authorized return every single month, and there's nothing
14	wrong if we were to earn more than our authorized return
15	from time to time.
16	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: But it's the
17	consistent and sustained under-earnings that indicates a
18	systemic problem?
19	MR. LOWERY: Yes.
20	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Is it therefore
21	and I think this is a legal conclusion and a legal
22	question. Is it Ameren's assertion that consistent
23	earnings attrition or under-earnings is equal to a denial
24	of a reasonable opportunity to earn?
25	MR. LOWERY: I think we have been denied a

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1	reasonable opportunity to earn, yes.
2	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: As demonstrated by
3	consistent earnings attrition?
4	MR. LOWERY: Yes.
5	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So the denial of a
6	reasonable opportunity, you've been denied a reasonable
7	opportunity to earn as evidenced by consistent
8	under-earnings?
9	MR. LOWERY: Yes.
10	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Implicit in that
11	and maybe you don't agree with me, but implicit in that
12	then is a right to earn at your authorized ROE?
13	MR. LOWERY: No. I actually respectfully
14	don't agree with that. It's a right to have a reasonable
15	opportunity to earn it, and we don't believe we've had a
16	reasonable opportunity, and we believe the evidence is
17	indicative of the fact that we've not had a reasonable
18	opportunity.
19	If we're given a reasonable opportunity and
20	we squander it because we I won't aspire that we have
21	to be perfect, but because we're extremely imperfect, then
22	that's a different question.
23	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So is the evidence of
24	the lack or denial of a reasonable opportunity more than
25	just the consistent under-earnings? Is it the absence of

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1	these other regulatory mechanisms? I mean, is it your
2	position then that the current regulatory structure in and
3	of itself is inherently flawed to the point that it denies
4	a reasonable opportunity to earn?
5	MR. LOWERY: The current regulatory
6	structure as it has been employed we believe has denied
7	that reasonable opportunity. We believe that there are
8	things the Commission can do that are within its toolbox,
9	so to speak, that could improve that opportunity, and
10	that's what we're asking you to do.
11	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Okay. Thank you.
12	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. Next up is
13	Staff. And while Mr. Thompson's coming up, I will mention
14	that we will be doing mini openings on the individual
15	issues, as the Commission practice has been in the past.
16	MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, your Honor. May
17	it please the Commission?
18	We're here today for the opening of the
19	Ameren Missouri general rate case. The case is just the
20	first of a series of major electric utility rate cases
21	that you will hear and determine over the next few months.
22	This case began on February 3rd, 2012 when Ameren filed
23	proposed tariff sheets, direct testimony, accounting
24	schedules and other documents calling for a general rate
25	increase of approximately \$375.6 million on an annual

Page 165 basis. 1 2 Nearly eight months have passed since 3 February 3rd, and those months have seen a lot of hard work by Staff, by the intervenors and by the company as 4 5 well. Staff has conducted a thorough audit of the company's books, and based on that audit, Staff's position 6 7 is that a rate increase is indeed warranted, but not of the magnitude requested by the company. It is Staff's 8 position that a rate increase of \$202 million on an annual 10 basis is warranted. This hearing will be about the several 11 12 areas where Staff and the other parties do not agree in 13 whole or in part with the company's rate increase request. We will present 19 separate issues to you for 14 15 determination over these next three weeks. The good news is that at one time there were as many as 27. They're 16 17 still continuing to fall. Five issues were resolved late last night. 18 19 Your decision on these issues will determine just what kind of rate increase Ameren Missouri 20 21 will enjoy. The flip side of that coin, of course, is what kind of rate increase Ameren Missouri's customers 22 will have to bear. 23 24 Your job as Public Service Commissioners is to set a just and reasonable rate after consideration of 25

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1	all relevant factors. A just and reasonable rate is one
2	that is fair, fair to the company, fair to the ratepayers.
3	It is sufficient to cover the company's prudent operating
4	and maintenance expenses and to offer a fair opportunity
5	for the shareholders to earn a reasonable return on their
6	investment. As we like to say, it's not one penny more
7	than is necessary to achieve that balance.
8	Today you will hear policy witnesses who
9	will talk to you about economic and regulatory policy.
10	There is no decision that is part of today's evidence, but
11	it is rather part of those all relevant factors that the
12	parties want you to keep in mind.
13	The company witnesses will tell you that
14	Ameren needs more money, and that you need to change the
15	way you do things so that they can have it. They will
16	tell you that Ameren Missouri has suffered from
17	significant and chronic under-earnings resulting from
18	excessive regulatory lag that's inherent in the way
19	Missouri does utility regulation.
20	Regulatory lag, by the way, as I'm sure you
21	know, is the length of time it takes for a change in
22	revenue requirement to be reflected in rates.
23	The company policy witnesses will tell you
24	that Ameren Missouri has not earned its authorized return

on equity on a weather normalized basis in 53 of the past

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- 1 62 months despite four rate increases. The truth,
- 2 however, is that the company's actual earned return on
- 3 equity for the 12 months ending June 30th, 2012 was
- 4 10.53 percent. 10.53 percent, which is well above Ameren
- 5 Missouri's current authorized return on equity, and that
- 6 is based on a quarterly surveillance report filed in
- 7 August. You'll find it attached to Ameren's response to
- 8 Staff's motion to declassify.
- 9 In the policy area, Staff will present the
- 10 testimony of Robin Kliethermes. She will talk about
- 11 economic conditions in Ameren Missouri's service area.
- 12 Ms. Kliethermes will testify that things are not so good
- 13 with many of Ameren Missouri's customers.
- 14 Since 2007, Ameren Missouri's rates have
- 15 increased by 30.09 percent -- that's a higher figure than
- 16 Mr. Lowery used -- while wages in its service are have
- 17 only increased by 11.09 percent.
- 18 You will recall that we had a very serious
- 19 recession beginning in 2008. Missouri's economic recovery
- 20 from that recession has been slow and remains incomplete,
- 21 as indeed is true of the nation as a whole. As of March
- 22 2012, Missouri was at only 89.7 percent of its
- 23 pre-recession level of economic activity compared to
- 24 97 percent on the part of the nation as a whole.
- 25 Missouri's GDP growth has lagged. Personal and household

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1	income are lower in Ameren Missouri's service area than in
2	the nation generally.
3	The company's witnesses will tell you that
4	Ameren Missouri's rates are lower than the national
5	average, and that's true, and that's good news for all
6	Missourians, at least those who live in Ameren's service
7	territory.
8	It's also true, however, that 47 percent of
9	the company's customers receive a weekly wage below the
10	national average. Over half of Ameren Missouri's
11	customers enjoy less last personal income than national
12	average per capita. Unemployment rates are above 2007
13	pre-recession unemployment rates for all 61 counties in
14	Ameren Missouri's service territory. Your personal
15	attendance at the several local public hearings held in
16	this case has certainly informed you that many consumers
17	are wildly unhappy at the prospect of a rate increase.
18	Tomorrow you will hear the issue of cash
19	working capital. This issue is worth \$5.8 million in
20	revenue requirement terms. Cash working capital is a rate
21	base issue. It is the amount of cash necessary for the
22	company to operate and pay its expenses while waiting for
23	customers to pay their bills.
24	Staff is concerned with only one part of
25	this issue, and that is the calculation of what's called

	Page 169
1	the collection lag. That is the wait between when you
2	send the bill and when you get the payment back. Staff's
3	position is that the appropriate lag is 21.11 days
4	calculated from what's called the CURST 246 report for the
5	12 months ending October 31, 2010. Staff's witness on
6	this topic is Kofi Boateng.
7	On Monday, we'll take up the issue of plant
8	in service accounting. This is a regulatory innovation
9	that the company proposes to reduce earnings attrition and
10	to ameliorate the effects of regulatory lag. Plant in
11	service accounting would allow the company to accrue a
12	return on invested capital and to defer depreciation for
13	non-revenue-producing plant additions in a regulatory
14	asset during the period between the in-service date and
15	the date the new asset is added to rate base in a rate
16	case.
17	Staff opposes the plant in service
18	accounting proposal because Staff sees it as an
19	unjustified departure from traditional cost of service
20	ratemaking principles. Its effect would be to shift a
21	substantial portion of Ameren Missouri's business risk to
22	the ratepayers with no corresponding reduction in Ameren
23	Missouri's authorized return on equity. Staff's witness
24	on this issue is John Cassidy.
25	Also on Monday you will hear a pair of

	Page 170
1	income tax related issues. Staff's witness again is John
2	Cassidy. The first of these issues relates to tax
3	benefits realized by Ameren Corporation on an employee
4	stock ownership plan, or ESOP. A proportion of the
5	employees participating in the ESOP are Ameren Missouri
6	employees. Staff's position is that an equivalent
7	proportion of the tax benefits should be enjoyed by Ameren
8	Missouri as an offset to revenue requirement.
9	The second issue is whether accumulated
10	deferred income tax, ADIT, related to construction work in
11	progress should be treated as an offset to rate base, that
12	is as a negative addition to rate base. In the past it
13	has been so treated, and Staff's position is that that
14	treatment should continue.
15	Also, you will hear the issue of rate case
16	expense. Staff's witness Lisa Hanneken will testify that
17	revenue requirement should include one and a half million
18	dollars for rate case expense on an 18-month basis. So
19	that works out to a million dollars per year. This is
20	based on an analysis of historical data obtained from the
21	company and the company's own projections as to when it
22	will file its next rate case.
23	On Tuesday of next week, you'll hear the
24	issue of property tax refund. Staff witness Erin Carle
25	will testify that Ameren Missouri won a property tax

Page 171 appeal and was awarded a refund of approximately 1 2 \$2.9 million. It received that money during the test year 3 and true-up period for this case. Because ratepayers originally paid that money to Ameren, it is Staff's 4 5 position that ratepayers should receive the \$2.9 million 6 refund amortized over two years. And I should note that 7 this is the resolution contemplated by this Commission in Ameren's last rate case, and there is a note to that 8 effect in the Report and Order. 10 Also on that day you will hear property tax Staff's witness again is Erin Carle. The first 11 expense. 12 question is what property tax rate should be used in 13 calculating the amount of property tax expense to include in revenue requirement. Staff's position is that the 14 15 actual amount of property tax paid in December 2011 is the appropriate amount. That amount is \$127.2 million. That 16 17 is the most recent known and measurable figure for this 18 expense. 19 The second question under property tax concerns property tax expense attributable to the new 20 21 Maryland Heights Renewable Energy Center. Staff's position is that no amount should be included in revenue 22 requirement for property tax expense attributable to this 23 24 energy center because that tax will not be due until 25 December 2013.

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1	Also on Tuesday will be RES costs,
2	renewable energy standard costs. Staff witnesses Dan Beck
3	and John Cassidy will testify that the Commission should
4	order the company to include a base level of costs in
5	permanent rates in the amount of \$4.7 million, with the
6	base level to be netted against any future deferred
7	expenditures that occur beyond the true-up cutoff date in
8	this case.
9	As to the amortization of these costs,
10	Staff recommends the Commission order that they be
11	amortized over three years. Alternatively, if you give
12	them rate base treatment, that is if you allow the company
13	to earn a return on the deferred amount, then Staff
14	suggests an amortization over six years.
15	The fuel adjustment clause, we'll take that
16	up on Wednesday of next week. This is an important issue,
17	as you've already heard. Staff witness Lena Mantle will
18	testify that the sharing percentage should be changed from
19	95 percent and 5 percent to 85 percent and 15 percent for
20	these reasons:
21	First, the comparisons of the actual fuel
22	costs Ameren Missouri did not collect under the 95/5
23	mechanism with what Ameren Missouri would not have
24	collected under an 85/15 mechanism suggests that they have
25	absorbed less than 15.3 million out of their total fuel

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1	and purchased power costs of 1.4 billion. That is only
2	1.1 percent of their net energy costs. Had the sharing
3	mechanism been instead 85/15, they would have absorbed
4	less than 45.9 million. That is 3.3 percent of their net
5	energy costs, and customers would have paid \$30.6 million
6	less.
7	The whole point about the sharing mechanism
8	is something we're all familiar with, the concept of skin
9	in the game. Skin in the game. If Ameren Missouri has no
10	skin in the game when it comes to fuel and purchased power
11	costs, then why, why would they act energetically and
12	aggressively to be efficient, to capture efficiencies?
13	Why would they do it? They would have no skin in the
14	game.
15	In other words, if they recover 100 percent
16	of those costs no matter what, then they don't have to
17	worry about whether they are efficiently seeking the least
18	cost alternative to obtain what they need because they
19	know the ratepayers are going to cover it. Ratepayers
20	will cover that. We don't have to worry. They have to
21	have, in Staff's opinion, skin in the game, and that's
22	what the sharing mechanism does.
23	Why is Staff suggesting the sharing
24	mechanism should be changed? So that they will have more
25	skin in the game. We know how it works at 95/5. We have

	Page 174
1	seen that. We know how it would work at 100/zero. So how
2	would it work at 85/15? We don't know. That hasn't been
3	tried. I would be a liar if I told you we know how that
4	would work. But we do know it would increase their skin
5	in the game, so theoretically, theoretically it would give
6	them all the more reason to seek efficiencies and to do it
7	right.
8	We're also going to talk on Wednesday about
9	changes to the fuel adjustment clause tariff, and boy is
10	this a hot issue. That's what we were talking about in
11	part with the transmission tracker motion that was
12	resolved in the prehearing section of this morning.
13	Staff witness Lena Mantle will testify that
14	the MISO schedule costs allowed to flow through the FAC
15	should be specifically listed on the FAC tariff sheets,
16	specifically listed so everyone knows what's allowed to go
17	through. There will be no more surprises.
18	She will also testify that the definition
19	of Factor PP, purchased power, should be modified to state
20	that only transmission costs incurred for the purchase or
21	sale of electricity shall be included. That's the
22	sentence that caused all the uproar.
23	Staff contends that no other transmission
24	costs or revenues should flow through the FAC unless and
25	until they have been presented to this Commission at a

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- 1 general rate case, considered by all the stakeholders, and
- 2 placed into the FAC by the determination of this
- 3 Commission based on evidence. That's how things are
- 4 supposed to work. They shouldn't sneak into the FAC.
- 5 They shouldn't just be discovered in the FAC. You need to
- 6 put them there after a hearing.
- 7 Ms. Mantle will further testify that Ameren
- 8 Missouri should not be permitted to flow these MISO
- 9 transmission charges through the FAC, particularly charges
- 10 including the cost of building transmission facilities.
- 11 By statute amounts flowing through the FAC are limited to
- 12 prudently incurred fuel and purchased power costs,
- 13 including transportation. Section 386.266.1, Revised
- 14 Statutes of Missouri.
- 15 Staff considers the word transportation to
- 16 indicate, for example, the cost of delivering fuel to a
- 17 power plant, such as coal arriving in a train. Had the
- 18 Legislature meant to include transmission costs, we
- 19 believe they would have used the word transmission.
- 20 Additionally, costs related to
- 21 non-operational property of electric corporations is
- 22 forbidden by law in Missouri to be charged to ratepayers.
- 23 Section 393.135, Revised Statutes of Missouri. Staff's
- 24 position is that Ameren Missouri's practice of flowing
- 25 construction costs of yet unfinished transmission lines

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1	through the FAC is a direct violation of the anti-CWIP
2	statute.
3	Ms. Mantle will also testify that the MISO
4	transmission charges and revenues that Staff urges the
5	Commission to exclude from the FAC should not be deferred
6	in a transmission cost in revenue tracker unless this
7	commission imposes carefully crafted conditions designed
8	to protect ratepayers from potential abuses. Those
9	conditions would include at the very least detailed
10	monthly reporting. Staff will file testimony tomorrow
11	setting out in detail the conditions that Staff believes
12	would be necessary.
13	And let me say that when I said during the
14	argument on the motion that Staff could live with the
15	tracker, I did not mean that Staff wants the tracker. I
16	did not mean that that's Staff's preferred outcome or
17	preferred alternative. What I meant was just what I said,
18	we could live with it if and only if it has the right
19	conditions to protect ratepayers.
20	What's the big concern about this tracker?
21	The concern is not the MISO charges and revenues that are
22	currently known. They are instead increases, future
23	increases. What happens if those go up between rate
24	cases? Well, if they're in the FAC, that's okay, because
25	the increase just flows through to the ratepayers like any

	Page 17'
1	other increase in FAC things like the cost of fuel or
2	purchased power. They just would flow right now. They're
3	taken care of.
4	If, however, they are in base rates which
5	are set in stone and only changed in rate cases, well,
6	then any increase between rate cases is lost to the
7	company and never recovered. That's the concern here. A
8	tracker is sort of like an ongoing AAO. It's money the
9	company might recover, but there's no guaranteed recovery.
10	It simply segregates that money into a special pot so it
11	can be considered for recovery at the next rate case.
12	That's and if you granted such a
13	tracker, well, then that would catch any increases between
14	cases, and that was why the company wants a tracker if you
15	take it out of the FAC. It's not the known charges. It's
16	possible increases, and increases are likely on the
17	horizon of about 18 months from now. About when the next
18	rate case will come along, MISO charge increases are
19	expected to become significant.
20	Ms. Mantle will further testify that
21	hedging gains and losses should be excluded from the FAC
22	except for hedging gains and losses associated with
23	mitigating volatility in fuel costs and SO2 and NOX
24	emission allowances. No other hedging costs or revenues
25	should flow through the FAC unless and until it's been

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1	presented to this Commission at a rate case, fully
2	litigated and examined by all the parties and the
3	Commission then makes that decision in consideration of
4	all the evidence.
5	Finally, she will testify that certain
6	other changes should be made to the FAC tariff which are
7	detailed in exemplar tariff sheets attached to her
8	testimony. There are certain exceptions which are listed
9	and set out in her testimony that I won't repeat now.
10	On Thursday of next week, you will hear the
11	low income weatherization issue. Staff witness Henry
12	Warren will testify that the next evaluation of Ameren
13	Missouri's low income weatherization program should
14	continue the effect of weatherization on natural gas usage
15	as well as electric usage, and the cost of including that
16	evaluation is not expected to be great.
17	Dr. Warren will also testify that the
18	timing of any evaluations subsequent to the second
19	biennial evaluation should be at the discretion of the
20	company in consultation with the stakeholders but
21	certainly not less than every five years.
22	On Friday of next week we come to another
23	very big issue, cost of capital, and you heard Mr. Lowery
24	talking about cost of capital a few moments ago. This is,
25	as is usually the case, the largest single issue in terms

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- 1 of dollar amount that you will decide in this case.
- 2 Staff's position is worth \$83.1 million on an annual
- 3 basis. MIEC's position is worth \$70.4 million on an
- 4 annual basis. Public Counsel's position is worth
- 5 \$147.3 million on an annual basis. Wow.
- 6 The rate of return is designed to provide
- 7 utility owners with a return on their investment. It's a
- 8 return on investment. It's equal to the utility's
- 9 weighted average cost of capital, which is calculated by
- 10 multiplying each component in the capital structure by its
- 11 cost and then just summing the results.
- 12 While the proportion in cost of most of
- 13 these components are a matter of record, the cost of
- 14 common equity can only be determined through expert
- 15 analysis. Staff's expert financial analyst, David Murray,
- 16 has determined Ameren Missouri's cost of common equity by
- 17 applying well-respected and widely-used methodologies to
- 18 data derived from a carefully assembled group of
- 19 comparable proxy companies.
- 20 Staff has used that estimated cost of
- 21 common equity net of any risk adjustments together with
- 22 other capital component information as of September 30th,
- 23 2011 to calculate Ameren Missouri's fair rate of return.
- You will recall that the company policy
- 25 witnesses will testify that Ameren has chronically failed

	Page 180
1	to earn its authorized return on equity. You heard a lot
2	about that. You will also recall that Ameren Missouri's
3	actual earned return on equity for the 12 months ending
4	June 30th, 2012 was 10.53 percent. That's according to
5	that quarterly surveillance report that I mentioned a few
6	moments ago. And that ROE, that return, that's the effect
7	on a power company of a long hot summer.
8	The evidence will show you that the
9	national average of awarded ROEs for the first half of
10	2012 was 10.36 percent. The average for the first three
11	months of the year was 10.84 percent, and the average for
12	the second quarter was 9.92 percent. So the trend is
13	downward, okay, over this year. The first six months of
14	this year, the trend has been downward. And the
15	recommendations offered by Mr. Murray and Mr. Gorman in
16	this case are in line with that falling trend.
17	Mr. Murray will testify that Ameren
18	Missouri's cost of common equity falls within the range of
19	8.0 to 9.0 percent, midpoint 8.5 percent, resulting in an
20	overall rate of return of 6.99 percent to 7.52 percent,
21	midpoint 7.25 percent. Based on a consideration of all
22	relevant factors, Mr. Murray will testify that he
23	recommends the Commission authorize a return on common
24	equity for Ameren Missouri of 9.0 percent.

MIEC witness Michael Gorman will recommend

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1	the 9.30 percent, the midpoint of his range of 9.2 to 9.4,
2	resulting in an overall rate of return of 7.64 percent.
3	Lewis Mills we believe will argue, based on
4	David Murray's testimony, for a return on common equity
5	set at 8.0 percent, the low end of Mr. Murray's rates. As
6	you have just heard, company expert Robert Hevert will
7	testify that the appropriate figure is 10.5 percent.
8	How is it, you might wonder, that these
9	experts using the same methods and solving for the same
10	unknown have produced such a wide range of, frankly,
11	dissimilar results? The answer lies in the inputs used by
12	each expert. The analytical methods these experts use are
13	mathematical models. They are simply equations. And we
14	all know from high school and college that the results of
15	any equation depend entirely on the numbers you plug into
16	it.
17	The Commission has used an analytical tool
18	dubbed the zone of reasonableness. Over the past several
19	years, the zone of reasonableness has been used to compare
20	the recommendations of the experts to the average of
21	awarded ROEs by other commissions. The term zone of
22	reasonableness originates in the ratemaking jurist
23	prudence of the United States Supreme Court. It is after
24	all the Supreme Court that set the standards that we all
25	refer to as guiding this ROE estimation process in its

Page 182 Hope and Bluefield decisions. 1 2 The Supreme Court uses the term zone of 3 reasonableness, however, to describe a somewhat different analytical construct than the one this Commission has 4 5 applied that term to. As defined by the United States 6 Supreme Court, the zone of reasonableness is founded on 7 the Constitution. Ameren Missouri's owners have a 8 9 constitutional right to a return on their investment. deny them a return is to confiscate their property. 10 That's unconstitutional. It is not permitted for the 11 12 government to take private property without compensation. 13 They have to be compensated. That compensation is the return that you allow them. 14 15 The question is, of course, how much of a return? How much of a return? In constitutional terms 16 17 the question is, where is that point below which is unlawful and unconstitutional confiscation and at -- and 18 above which you have an appropriate and acceptable return? 19 20 Where is that point, that lowest point? 21 The Supreme Court calls that the lowest reasonable rate. And in their zone of reasonableness 22 analysis, the first thing the court looks for is the 23 lowest reasonable rate. That doesn't mean that's the rate 24 they're going to wind up with. It's an intermediate step 25

Page 183 in the process. 1 2 And I suggest to you it is equivalent to 3 deciding what is the actual cost of common equity. What is the actual cost of common equity? That's what the 4 5 experts are reporting to you. They're telling you really two things, what the cost of common equity is and then 6 7 their recommendation as to what the return on common equity should be, two different quantities. 8 9 We suggest to you that the cost of common equity is found in the range reported by David Murray, 10 between 8 percent and 9 percent. That is where the actual 11 12 cost of common equity lies. That is where the lowest reasonable rate is to be found. But his recommendation is 13 9 percent, the high end, somewhat higher. 14 15 I suggest to you that on the basis of a rationally articulated regulatory purpose supported by 16 17 evidence, you can set the return on equity above that cost of common equity where you need it to be. Somewhere 18 above, somewhere above it again becomes illegal, because 19 then you're confiscating from the ratepayers. You're 20 21 taking more money from them than is reasonable in view of the service they're getting back for it, and that becomes 22 confiscation as well. 23 So that's the zone of reasonableness. It's 24 the zone between confiscation from the company at the 25

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- 1 bottom and confiscation from the ratepayers at the top.
- 2 And those are the two points, I suggest to you, that you
- 3 need to define in your decision and then set the return on
- 4 equity between based on articulated and appropriate
- 5 regulatory purposes.
- 6 You will also on October 9 hear the issue
- 7 of coal inventory, specifically coal in transit. Ameren
- 8 Missouri tells us that they own at any moment a
- 9 significant amount of coal that is undelivered, that is on
- 10 train cars wending their way to Ameren Missouri's
- 11 facilities. They contend that rate base has always
- 12 included coal in transit.
- 13 Staff witness Lisa Hanneken will tell you
- 14 that, no, that's not the case, we've never included coal
- in transmit in Missouri, and that we shouldn't include it
- 16 now. Why? Because that coal hasn't been paid for yet.
- 17 It does not reflect any investment by the shareholders, so
- 18 it doesn't belong in rate base. Until they pay for it,
- 19 they may own it, but they have no right to earn a return
- 20 on it.
- 21 You will also hear on October 10 the issue
- 22 of severance costs. This is Ameren Missouri's VS11
- 23 program where they attempted to achieve greater operating
- 24 efficiencies by encouraging employees to voluntarily
- 25 separate from the company, and as an enticement these

	Page 18.
1	employees were paid severance costs. This issue is worth
2	8 and a half million dollars.
3	Staff witness Lisa Ferguson will testify
4	that by the time rates in this case become effective,
5	Ameren Missouri will have already recovered from savings
6	on payroll, payroll tax and employee benefits all of its
7	costs for the VS11 program. Therefore, in Staff's view
8	there's absolutely no justification for including these
9	costs in revenue requirement.
10	You will also hear on that day three
11	storm-related issues, the first of which is the storm cost
12	tracker. You heard Mr. Lowery tell you about the storm
13	cost tracker. This is something a regulatory
14	innovation that the company has proposed.
15	Staff witness Kofi Boateng will testify
16	that the Commission should not, should not establish this
17	two-way storm restoration cost tracker because existing
18	procedures are adequate for all storm events. There are
19	two existing procedures. A certain amount of storm
20	restoration costs are included in rates as a matter of
21	course, as we say baked into rates, and that's about
22	\$7 million.
23	If an extraordinary storm event occurs, as
24	has happened in some years, where Ameren faces costs in
25	excess of that \$7 million, what the company has done in

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1	the past and can do in the future is simply come ask for
2	an accounting authority order allowing it to defer those
3	extraordinary costs in a regulatory asset that the
4	Commission would then take up in the next rate case and
5	allow them to recover or not as the Commission might
6	decide based on the evidence. And the reality is, they
7	have recovered every penny. They have recovered every
8	penny. So existing procedures we believe are adequate and
9	sufficient for storm restoration costs.
10	The second storm-related issue is how much
11	do you put in revenue requirement? I think I already told
12	you, \$7 million. That is based on a 60-month average.
13	Again, Kofi Boateng will testify to you about that. If
14	you do establish the two-way storm cost restoration
15	tracker, then \$7 million should be the base level.
16	The third storm issue is storm assistance
17	revenue. As you may know, when there's a large storm
18	event, utility companies send crews to help each other
19	out. When Katrina occurred, for example, in Louisiana,

Staff witness John Cassidy will testify

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Ameren Missouri sent crews down to Louisiana to help clear

debris and restore power in that area, and that happens

all the time. What happens to the costs of that? Who

bears those costs is the issue here.

20

21

22

23

24

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	Page 187
1	utilities should be annualized and normalized and included
2	as an offset in revenue requirement. That is, since this
3	is money they're earning from another utility company
4	using the crews and the equipment provided by the
5	ratepayers, then that money should lower the revenue
6	requirement that the ratepayers are responsible for
7	providing. Expenses associated with providing storm
8	assistance should be addressed the same way.
9	These storm assistance revenues and
10	expenses are appropriately accounted for through
11	traditional annualization and normalization methods and
12	should not be included in a tracker if you do establish
13	one.
14	Mr. Cassidy will also tell you that you
15	should include \$581,000 of storm assistance revenue in the
16	cost of service calculation. This is based on a five-year
17	normalization.
18	You will hear also on October 10th the
19	vegetation management and infrastructure inspection
20	tracker issue. These are trackers that you established
21	some time ago. Staff witness Roberta Grissum will testify
22	that the unamortized balance of regulatory asset
23	associated with this tracker should be amortized over
24	three years rather than two to avoid overcollection, and
25	that any unamortized amount should be rolled into the

							Page	188
amortization	established	in	this	proceeding	so	that	only	

2 one tracker remains.

1

- 3 Finally, the last issue. I'm glad to get
- 4 to it. I bet you are, too. This is class cost of service
- 5 and rate design. The last day of this hearing, Thursday,
- 6 October 11 we will take up this very thorny issue. Staff
- 7 witness Mike Scheperle will testify firs that generation
- 8 fixed costs and non-fuel, non-labor components of
- 9 production, operation and maintenance expense should be
- 10 allocated among customer classes using the base
- 11 intermediate peak allocation factors.
- 12 He will also testify that based on his
- 13 class cost of service study results, adjustments should be
- 14 made on a revenue neutral basis to all classes.
- 15 The residential class should receive a positive 1 percent
- 16 adjustment. The lighting class should receive a positive
- 17 3 percent adjustment. The remaining classes, small
- 18 general service, large general service, small primary
- 19 service, large primary service and large transmission
- 20 service, should receive a negative adjustment of
- 21 approximately 1 percent.
- 22 After these recommended revenue neutral
- 23 class shifts are made, any overall change in revenues,
- that is the rate increase ordered by the Commission,
- 25 should be applied on an equal percentage basis across the

Page 189 board to the adjusted class revenues. 2 Mr. Scheperle will further recommend that 3 special precautions be taken that no class receive an overall reduction in its rate revenues while any other 4 5 class receives an overall increase. 6 Mr. Scheperle will also testify that the 7 residential class customer charge should be \$9, and that 8 the small general service class customer charge, single phase and three phase, should be increased by a revenue 10 neutral adjustment of 0.93 percent plus whatever the 11 system average increase is that's awarded in this case. 12 Finally, Mr. Scheperle will testify that 13 Staff has no position on the question of whether or not the Commission should address declining block rates. 14 15 Thank you very much for your patience and attention. 16 17 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Ouestions? 18 CHAIRMAN GUNN: Can I just ask a couple 19 questions? So is it Staff's position that there are no 20 transportation costs for wind, solar, hydro or storage? 21 MR. THOMPSON: If there's no wheels, then there's no transportation costs I believe is Staff's 22 position. In other words, we don't believe transmission 23 24 is included in the term transportation. Now, if there's some other way of moving those things around, I haven't 25

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1	talked with my experts about those things, and perhaps I							
2	should.							
3	CHAIRMAN GUNN: Since wind and solar can't							
4	be put on anything, the only way to move it from the							
5	source of the generation to somewhere else, let's say it's							
6	to a storage facility, so let's say it's not directly							
7	delivered into the grid, you would say that those costs							
8	are transmission costs, not transportation costs, and							
9	therefore excluded?							
10	MR. THOMPSON: Yeah, because how would you							
11	distinguish them from the MISO transmission costs that we							
12	want to exclude?							
13	CHAIRMAN GUNN: You couldn't.							
14	MR. THOMPSON: You could not. Exactly. If							
15	you allow some in, then you allow them all in.							
16	CHAIRMAN GUNN: All right. Staff's							
17	position has changed since the last rate case on the							
18	sharing mechanism, correct?							
19	MR. THOMPSON: I think I think we came							
20	in with the same $85/15$ position, and I think we lost in							
21	that case.							
22	CHAIRMAN GUNN: Maybe it was two years ago,							
23	but at one point Staff didn't challenge the 95/5 fuel							
24	adjustment clause. Am I correct on that?							
25	MR. LOWERY: Yes, you are.							

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1	CHAIRMAN GUNN: I think my recollection was
2	at least maybe the second or the there's been so many,
3	but
4	MR. THOMPSON: Right.
5	CHAIRMAN GUNN: At one point they thought
6	5 percent was enough skin in the game in order to do this,
7	so
8	MR. THOMPSON: That may very well have been
9	the decision made at that time in contemplation of a lot
10	of different things.
11	CHAIRMAN GUNN: All right. And then
12	finally, could you describe to me what you think the
13	difference is between what is on that schedule that was
14	attached to the response to Staff's motion to declassify
15	which shows that for the 12 months ended June 30th,
16	2012 and I'm going to ask the company this, too, when I
17	get a chance later on the difference between what they
18	presented in their opening statements and the 10.53 actual
19	earned return on equity?
20	MR. THOMPSON: I think the difference is
21	this: What they showed you was a graph showing the value
22	for each period, for each month. What Staff has presented
23	to you is a single figure that sums up the result of what
24	occurred during a 12-month period. And remember, that
25	figure came from the company.

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1	CHAIRMAN GUNN: No. I understand. That's
2	why I'm trying to figure out what the difference is. I'll
3	get to you guys when we have a witness on the stand.
4	MR. THOMPSON: You may need a math literate
5	respondent.
6	CHAIRMAN GUNN: That's why I took the bar
7	exam. No math on that test. I'll ask the questions of
8	some of the policy witnesses when we get to the ROE
9	issues. Thanks, Kevin.
10	MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
11	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Thank you.
12	we've been going for almost two hours now, so we need to
13	take a break before we go on to the next opening
14	statement. We'll take a break now and come back at 10:45.
15	(A BREAK WAS TAKEN.)
16	JUDGE WOODRUFF: We're back from the break,
17	and we're ready to proceed with further opening statements
18	from Public Counsel.
19	MR. MILLS: Thank you. May it please the
20	Commission? You'll be happy to know that I'll be briefer
21	than Mr. Thompson was. I plan to reserve some of my
22	opening statement for the mini openings when we get to
23	those particular issues.
24	We're here today because Ameren is asking
25	for, according to the latest reconciliation, a 350

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1	\$345 million rate increase. As someone who went to all of
2	the local public hearings in this case, I have to ask,
3	why? What is going on with this company that it cannot
4	operate without constant rate increases? And another
5	question is, what is going on with the regulatory process
6	in Missouri that it can't seem to protect customers from
7	these constant rate increases?
8	The answer to the first question is simple.
9	It's doing it because it can, because it does so
10	successfully, because every time it comes in for a rate
11	increase it gets a rate increase.
12	And the answer to the second question is
13	directly related. The regulatory process is so
14	overwhelmed that it cannot deal with the constant barrage
15	of rate increase cases. The people who are supposed to be
16	investigating rate increase cases, the Staff, the people
17	that are supposed to be opposing the rate increase cases,
18	the Public Counsel, are so overwhelmed that they cannot
19	adequately respond to the rate increase cases along with
20	all the other duties that are imposed upon us.
21	Now, in this case, the best outcome, the
22	very best outcome that customers can hope for based on the
23	record in the case and the reconciliation as filed is
24	about a \$140 million rate increase. That's working from
25	the best of Staff's case and the low end of the Staff

Page 194 witness on ROE at 8 percent. 2 Ameren budgeted \$2 million to prosecute 3 this case. It may spend more. It may spend less. won't really know the final figure until all the bills are 5 in. But we do know that Ameren budgeted \$2 million for this case. 6 7 Now, if I had \$2 million to spend on this 8 case, the range of possible outcomes would be vastly different. I'm not saying that the outcome would be different because the outcome, of course, is up to you 10 guys, but the range would be different because you would 11 12 have a much broader range of evidence to look at. 13 If I had money to spend on this case, you would have evidence that would show you that this company 14 15 is failing to implement rigorous productivity enhancing programs. Look at any competitive company. Competitive 16 17 companies year after year after year demand and achieve 2 percent, 4 percent, 5 percent productivity gains for the 18 19 same production, and they do it year after year after 20 year. 21 There is nothing in the regulatory process in Missouri that encourages or forces that kind of an 22 23 outcome on a regulated utility. 24 Now, the way the process is set in Missouri, it is much, much easier for a company to come in 25

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- 1 and simply put up charts to show that they are not earning
- 2 their authorized rate of return than it is for any other
- 3 party to show why they are not earning their authorized
- 4 rate of return. It's not -- it's not an issue in this
- 5 case whether or not they have earned their rate of return
- 6 in the past, and, in fact, it is not an issue in this
- 7 case, although it should be, a question of why that is.
- 8 And Chairman Gunn got to this, I think, with one of his
- 9 questions of Mr. Lowery.
- 10 The question of whether or not the company
- 11 is able to earn its rate of return is a good question.
- 12 You constantly hear the companies coming in and saying,
- 13 oh, look at this chart. We have been unable to earn our
- 14 rate of return.
- Well, look at it another way.
- 16 Under-earning their rate of return also means that they're
- 17 overspending so that they can't earn their rate of return.
- 18 They're either earning too little or spending too much,
- 19 and we don't know based on the record in this case which
- 20 of those it is, and it could be a combination of the two.
- 21 We simply don't have a record that will allow us to
- 22 determine whether or not the company's operating
- 23 efficiently, as efficiently as it could.
- Now, in this case, unlike some of the past
- 25 cases, for example, the last case we had the Sioux

Page 196 scrubbers. The customers got something significant for 1 the rate increase. In this case, we're not. If you went 2 3 to the local public hearings, you heard customers say, we'd be happy to pay if we were getting better service, if 4 5 we were getting something different, if we were getting something better, if we were getting a new power plant, 6 7 that would be one thing. 8 What we're talking about in this case is 9 something from the company's point of view better than a 10 10 percent rate -- better than a 10 percent rate increase 11 for simply increases in the cost of doing business, and 12 that's not acceptable. The only reason that they can increase the cost of doing business by 10 percent in a 13 year's time is because they're a regulated company. 14 15 Competitive companies would not be able to get away with 16 that. 17 Well, okay. And I have to correct myself. They are getting something in this case. They're getting 18 the Maryland Heights plant, but that's a relatively small 19 20 portion of the overall increase. And perhaps the service 21 is a little bit better, but -- because you've looked at 22 the company's numbers in terms of the overall outage rate, and it's a little bit better. You need to ask, how much 23 24 of that is due to the fact that in recent years we have not had some of the big storms, and how much of that in 25

	Page 197
1	any event is from the last increase, is a delta between
2	the level of service reliability since you last increased
3	the rates? How much of this 10, 12, 14 percent, whatever
4	they're asking for now, how much of that is being driven
5	by the current investments? Very little.
6	Now, another question you need to ask is
7	whether customers, for the small increment in increased
8	reliability, are customers desirous of paying a 10 or 12
9	or 14 percent rate increase for that. I think if you went
10	to the local public hearings, I think you'll find the
11	answer is no. Customers do not perceive that the level of
12	service they're getting is commensurate with the number of
13	increases they're getting.
14	Now, I know that all of you went to some of
15	the local public hearings, and some of you went to a lot
16	of them. All of that testimony's in the record, and I'm
17	not going to go into it in this opening. I know in some
18	of the later opening statements you're going to hear more

- But a lot of that testimony, as you know,
- 21 as it is in many of these cases, is about the customers'
- 22 individual experience with economic conditions in Ameren
- 23 Missouri service territory.
- You also have from two experts in this case
- 25 similar testimony on a more macro level about economic

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about it.

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1	conditions in Missouri's service territory. The first is
2	OPC witness Barbara Meisenheimer and then Staff witness
3	Robin Kliethermes.
4	Now, Ms. Meisenheimer urges you and she
5	will be Public Counsel's witness on the issue we're
6	hearing today of overall regulatory policy questions. She
7	urges you to take into account, as you have in the past,
8	evidence about the value of service, the affordability of
9	service, rate impacts and rate continuity when you
10	determine the rate increase in this case.
11	She points out, similar to some of the
12	things that Mr that Mr. Thompson raised in his opening
13	statement that Staff witness Kliethermes talks about, the
14	economic conditions in Missouri are dismal and have been
15	for some time. In fact, Missouri's RGDP is below its 2007
16	level. Every county in Ameren Missouri's service
17	territory experienced an increase in unemployment between
18	2006 and 2011.
19	In these dismal economic times, the company
20	has had authorized base rate increases totaling
21	approximately \$604 million, plus \$235 million additional
22	increases through the FAC, and it goes on.
23	So as a bottom line, Ms. Meisenheimer in
24	her testimony and Public Counsel in its position statement
25	urges the Commission to find appropriate for this company

	Page 199
1	in this case a return on equity that is at the bottom end
2	of the range that the Commission finds reasonable.
3	And I agree with Mr. Thompson's opening
4	statement about the constitutional question. The only
5	question that you need to ask is whether the whether
6	the return on equity you are authorizing for the company
7	is unduly confiscatory. And I think you will find that
8	Mr. Murray's testimony is persuasive. Mr. Murray's a
9	recognized expert in this field, and his testimony is that
10	a range of returns that goes down to 8 percent is
11	reasonable and would not be confiscatory to the company.
12	Now, the next issue I want to address in
13	this case, in this opening statement is rate case expense.
14	Now, as I said earlier, Ameren Missouri's rate case
15	expense is budgeted at \$2 million. Just as a point of
16	reference, that's about three times my annual operating
17	budget.
18	And that's one of the ways that the
19	regulatory system is broken, and fortunately, it's one
20	thing in this case that you can actually take concrete
21	steps to work on. You can tell the company that it
22	doesn't get to spend whatever it wants on outside experts
23	in this case. You can tell the company that it has to
24	look first to the people that are already on salary, that
25	are already being paid for by ratepayers.

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1	And once they've done that, you can tell
2	the company that the shareholders need to bear some of the
3	cost of pursuing a rate case because the shareholders
4	benefit at least as much from an increase in rates as
5	customers do.
6	Now, the Commission has quite some time ago
7	docketed a generic rate case expense investigation docket.
8	That case is apparently not going anywhere. It certainly
9	has not given any form of relief to customers, and I don't
10	think that the existence of that case is any reason to
11	defer a decision on rate case expense in this case.
12	The Commission should follow the
13	recommendation of Public Counsel witness Ted Robertson on
14	rate case expense, and I will talk more about that, of
15	course, when we get to that particular issue.
16	Now, the last issue I'm going to address in
17	this general opening statement is return on equity. We're
18	going to do mini opening statements on the other issues,
19	and I will address even return on equity in more detail,
20	or Christina Baker will, when we get to that issue, but I
21	want to talk about it briefly this morning.
22	The Commission in this case is once again
23	fortunate to have the testimony of a number of experts on
24	this issue, and they're all, I think they all recognize
25	each other as experts, and the Commission has in the past

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- 1 recognized at least a couple of them as experts in this
- 2 state. I don't know that Mr. Hevert has testified in
- 3 Missouri before, at least not to my memory. But the
- 4 others certainly have been recognized as experts, and
- 5 their testimony established a range of reasonable returns
- on equity from 8 percent to somewhere well north of
- 7 10 percent.
- 8 Now, I'm not going to go into detail over
- 9 the court case in the last few years. I think
- 10 Mr. Thompson did that quite well. But one of the things
- 11 that I do want to touch on is the fact that, and this was
- 12 brought out again with questions to Mr. Lowery, is that
- 13 looking at returns on equity for Ameren Missouri and using
- 14 returns on equity for other regulated utilities as a
- 15 benchmark is perhaps a flawed tool.
- 16 Despite the economic turmoil that this
- 17 country and the world has gone through in the last few
- 18 years, returns on equity for regulated electric utilities
- 19 have gone down only a tiny bit. And to me, that indicates
- 20 that that is -- that's a flawed yardstick, that what's
- 21 being authorized and what has been authorized in the last
- 22 few years for regulated electric utilities is not a return
- 23 that is commensurate to the risk that those utilities
- 24 face. And that's the standard that you need to use
- 25 according to Hope and Bluefield, is to award a return on

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1	equity that is commensurate to other enterprises of
2	similar risk, and there are there are other enterprises
3	of similar risk that are not regulated utilities that are
4	not getting anywhere near 10 percent. In fact, none of
5	them are.
6	So I think if you're looking only at what
7	regulated utilities are earning, then you're not
8	adequately judging what the utility's actual return should
9	be.
10	With that, I will as I usually do when I
11	close my opening statements in rate cases, I will remind
12	the Commission that its principal duty is to serve and
13	protect ratepayers, and that any benefit given to the
14	utility is merely incidental, and I'll be happy to take
15	questions.
16	CHAIRMAN GUNN: I just have a couple.
17	Would you consider the energy efficiency programs that are
18	contained in this as significant benefit?
19	MR. MILLS: They are, absolutely.
20	CHAIRMAN GUNN: I just want to because
21	that's been agreed that was agreed upon previously.
22	The positions are all the same in this case. And when you
23	said nothing significant of value, I wanted to make sure
24	that you were excluding that.
25	MR. MILLS: I was excluding that. I do

	Page 203
1	believe that is a value, and that is a fairly significant
2	part of the rate increase.
3	CHAIRMAN GUNN: And I apologize for not
4	knowing this, but just briefly on the rate case expense,
5	are there specific disallowances that are proposed by OPC
6	or is it more of an approach to controlling rate case
7	expense?
8	MR. MILLS: It's sort of a combination of
9	both. There are specific disallowances, and then once
10	disallowances are made, then the remaining amount we
11	propose be split between ratepayers and shareholders.
12	CHAIRMAN GUNN: Some sort of sharing
13	mechanism
14	MR. MILLS: Correct.
15	CHAIRMAN GUNN: once disallowances are
16	made?
17	MR. MILLS: Correct.
18	CHAIRMAN GUNN: I just want to get your
19	opinion. It seems to me that using proxy groups for ROE
20	kind of creates a feedback loop
21	MR. MILLS: Exactly.
22	CHAIRMAN GUNN: that keeps ROEs stable.
23	So you're not because you're continually using other
24	companies to determine what the ROE is, you're using the
25	same numbers to create a new number, and then once that

Page 204 number is used it goes back into a proxy group to be used 2 for others. So you get this kind of -- and it's -- and 3 we've had a range between 10 and 11 recently, but then it appears to still be the range, but it is -- it does kind 4 5 of create -- it's kind of a self-fulfilling prophecy. 6 MR. MILLS: That's exactly right. That's 7 why it never dropped when the rest of the economy and the rest of the world tanked because it's a self-fulfilling 8 9 loop. 10 CHAIRMAN GUNN: I don't have anything further. Thanks. 11 12 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Thank you, 13 Mr. -- I'm sorry. Commissioner Kenney. 14 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Thank you, Mr. Mills. I want to ask you about the -- you said that had OPC had 15 the budget, we would hear evidence that the company was 16 17 failing to implement rigorous productivity gains. MR. MILLS: Yes. 18 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: In what form would that evidence have been? 20 21 MR. MILLS: I think if I had \$2 million to try this case, I would have hired several productivity 22 experts to talk about what normal non-regulated 23 24 competitive industries do in terms of wringing more

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productivity out of their businesses. And I think the

25

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fact that you're not seeing the company talk about those	
kinds of programs means that they're not there, and if	

- 3 they are there, they are certainly not there to the extent
- 4 they are in competitive industries.
- 5 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And then you said --
- 6 well, this is, I guess, corollary to the question about
- 7 productivity gains. Is it the company's burden to
- 8 demonstrate that it's operating perfectly or even at
- 9 maximum efficiency or merely to demonstrate that they're
- 10 not behaving imprudently?

1

2

- 11 MR. MILLS: According to the law in
- 12 Missouri, some other entity -- I mean, their costs are
- 13 generally presumed to be prudent, and some other entity
- 14 bears the burden of raising a serious doubt about that
- 15 presumption of prudence.
- 16 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So Mr. Robertson's
- 17 going to testify about rate case expense. Generally
- 18 speaking, is there legal support for the idea of dividing
- 19 rate case expense evenly between ratepayers and
- 20 shareholders?
- 21 MR. MILLS: There is. Yes, there are cases
- 22 I believe that support the Commission's allocation of the
- 23 cost of advertising, for example, between ratepayers and
- 24 shareholders. Some of it benefits shareholders more than
- 25 ratepayers and ratepayers don't pay for that. No one

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1	argues that those aren't prudent expenses, but there is no
2	benefit to ratepayers for them, and so the ratepayers
3	don't pay them.
4	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So the argument is
5	based upon the general notions of regulation that those
6	costs that benefit the ratepayers should be borne by the
7	ratepayers?
8	MR. MILLS: And there are cases that talk
9	about prudence in much broader terms than simply you made
10	the wrong decision at the wrong time, that it talks about
11	the question of benefits to ratepayers.
12	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: But it's not
13	necessarily an issue of prudence. I mean, it's really
14	that those costs that help and benefit the shareholders
15	should be borne by the shareholders?
16	MR. MILLS: Well, that portion of our
17	position not a question of prudence, but the other
18	question is a question of prudence. We argue that it's
19	imprudent that they spent all of this ratepayer money on
20	outside experts when they didn't need to.
21	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And in that regard,
22	you argue for complete disallowances?
23	MR. MILLS: Correct.
24	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And the balance is
25	divided equally between shareholders and ratepayers based

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1	upon those economic and regulatory principles?
2	MR. MILLS: Correct.
3	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And this is just a
4	follow-up to Chairman Gunn asked about using other proxy
5	groups. Other proxy groups of regulated utilities creates
6	this
7	MR. MILLS: Feedback loop.
8	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: this
9	self-fulfilling prophecy. It would be permissible, then,
10	though, to broaden the proxy group to enterprises of
11	similar risk. How would one determine I mean, if we
12	just said enterprises of similar risk, we could ultimately
13	end up with an unwieldy proxy group or just proxy groups
14	that are so subjective depending upon the expert that's
15	conducting the analysis. Would that not lead to a bad
16	result as well?
17	MR. MILLS: Well, I think in any event
18	you'll have to rely on the expert's expertise and the
19	expert's credibility and, you know, just as though now you
20	have to sort of weed out the experts who are plugging in
21	unrealistic growth estimates, you know, if you took a
22	broader group, you would have to look at the way that the
23	expert chose those groups. You'd have to look at the
24	betas of the groups. There are fairly standard ways of
25	judging the risk of an enterprise, and I don't think that

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1	would be an issue. If you have one expert who seems to
2	find a dozen enterprises that all have similar betas but
3	all have really, really high returns and someone else who
4	finds all really, really low ones, then you simply have to
5	judge among those experts the same way you do when you
6	judge among experts now when they talk about growth rates.
7	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: That's all I have.
8	Thank you.
9	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Jarrett.
10	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Just a couple of
11	questions, Mr. Mills. Isn't it true that the Legislature
12	sets your budget
13	MR. MILLS: Yes.
14	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: for the year?
15	MR. MILLS: Uh-huh.
16	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: And while many of us
17	or most of us might agree that you should have a bigger
18	budget, it is ultimately the Legislature that decides what
19	your budget should be?
20	MR. MILLS: It is, and I'm certainly not
21	here today asking you-all to increase my budget. What I'm
22	expressing to you is that, you know, your role is partly
23	as an adjudicator, but it's also partly as a public policy
24	setter, and so you need to take into account the state of
25	the record, how it was developed when you make your

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1	when you make your decisions in this case in order to
2	arrive at the appropriate public interest, which is your
3	ultimate destination.
4	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: And ultimately isn't
5	it the company's burden of proof to prove that they
6	deserve a rate increase?
7	MR. MILLS: Yes.
8	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: And wouldn't that
9	wouldn't that mean that they should be given a little more
10	leeway since they have the burden of proof to pick who
11	they want and how they present their rate case?
12	MR. MILLS: Well, they have the burden of
13	proof, but they also have the benefit of the presumption
14	of prudence. So to my mind, those those really cancel
15	each other out. They have a burden of proof, but they
16	have the benefit of the presumption. So I don't think
17	that their task is really any more difficult than the
18	other parties' task.
19	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Yeah, but the rate
20	increase really isn't a prudence issue. It's proving a
21	need for a rate increase as far as their costs and so
22	forth.
23	MR. MILLS: But it in many respects,
24	it's based on the judgments about the prudency of
25	individual decisions as we go along.

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1	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: And if there's a
2	prudence issue, there's mechanisms for you and for the
3	Staff and for other parties to file complaints
4	MR. MILLS: Yes.
5	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: if there's
6	imprudence?
7	The other issue that both Chairman Gunn and
8	Commissioner Kenney talked about was the proxy groups. Do
9	you know, did Mr. Murray use any companies outside of
10	electric utilities in determining his ROE?
11	MR. MILLS: I don't believe any of the
12	experts in the case did.
13	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Mr. Gorman didn't
14	either. So is this something we should consider since
15	none of the witnesses
16	MR. MILLS: I think
17	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Since all the
18	witnesses used electric as proxy groups, isn't that
19	outside the record for us to consider what other companies
20	do?
21	MR. MILLS: Well, the record certainly
22	isn't closed yet. In fact, it's hardly even opened yet,
23	and I think you may find witnesses who will explain to you
24	that companies that are of similar risk that are outside
25	the regulated world are getting lower returns than the

Page 211 return that this company is asking for. 2 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Are you aware of any 3 states' regulatory commissions that consider --MR. MILLS: I have not looked at that. I'm 4 5 not aware of any as I stand here today. 6 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Thank you, 7 Mr. Mills. 8 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you, Mr. Mills. Opening for MIEC. 10 MS. VUYLSTEKE: I hope the Commission can see my exhibit. May it please the Commission? 11 12 Once again, for the fifth time in five 13 years, Ameren's rate request is inflated to the greatest possible extent, and as this exhibit shows from Maurice 14 15 Brubaker's direct testimony on revenue requirement -excuse me, his rebuttal testimony -- yes, it's his direct 16 17 testimony on revenue requirement, Ameren's rate filing far exceeds the amount as has been determined reasonable by 18 the Commission and as the evidence shows. 19 20 In the present case, the evidence shows 21 that Ameren overstates its revenue requirement by \$170 million or 45 percent. Ameren testifies in this case 22 that it believes that Missouri regulatory procedures are 23 not balanced. Ameren's testimony looks at earnings from 24 2007 forward considering several, quote/unquote, unusual 25

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1	events, including mostly Taum Sauk and the fuel adjustment
2	imprudence disallowance, and concludes that Ameren has
3	only earned its authorized return on equity 15 percent of
4	the time during that time period.
5	But Ameren's evidence fails to take into
6	account that the United States is experiencing the
7	greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression.
8	Ameren does not measure the impact of this crisis on its
9	earnings in its ROE.
10	Ameren tells investors, however, that its
11	Missouri electric service regulatory framework has
12	improved in recent years. How has it improved? It has
13	improved through myriad regulatory advantages that Ameren
14	has pressed this Commission to gain despite the depressed
15	economy. These new advantages include since 2006 a fuel
16	adjustment surcharge, an environmental cost recovery
17	surcharge, a renewable energy surcharge, a special cost
18	recovery for energy efficiency and a vegetation management
19	tracker.
20	Now, in the present case, Ameren asks you
21	to consider additional, quote/unquote, regulatory
22	improvements. These include plant in service accounting,
23	and this is a form of plant in service accounting that is
24	not adopted or given such broad scope in any other state

in the United States, a storm tracker. It is asking also

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1	for now suddenly in this case a transmission cost tracker,
2	which I would urge the Commission is a monumental decision
3	about making a regulatory policy with trackers. I think
4	we already have more regulatory improvements than
5	ratepayers can stand.
6	Ameren argues that these new features are
7	needed because it faces unacceptable regulatory risk and
8	regulatory lag that it claims has caused it to under-earn,
9	to earn less than its authorized return. It argues for
10	this new open-ended regulatory asset, plant in service
11	accounting. Ameren fails to show financial need for this
12	proposal, nor does Ameren show financial need for any of
13	its for its proposed transmission tracker or any of the
14	other piecemeal single issue ratemaking mechanisms that it
15	presents in this case.
16	And while Ameren asks the Commission to
17	choose to look only at the period from 2007 to the present
18	in determining its under-earnings, the Commission should
19	also consider that Ameren consistently and very
20	significantly over-earned during the period from 1996 to
21	2006. And I would like to present an exhibit from
22	Mr. Mike Gorman's testimony to demonstrate this.
23	The evidence shows that the Missouri rate
24	process when viewed in its totality, even without the
25	special advantages of the tracker, bestows and the

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1	surcharge, bestows many regulatory benefits and advantages
2	to Ameren which it sees the opportunity to take advantage
3	of to develop very strong earnings and a recent history,
4	relatively recent history of significant overearnings.
5	Ameren readily avails itself of opportunities to retain
6	the benefits of savings due to regulatory lag.
7	It seems from Ameren's testimony that it
8	views authorized return as a guarantee, and I think that
9	the questions that Commissioner Kenney has asked in
10	particular get to the heart of the question of whether
11	Ameren believes that this regulatory process can ever work
12	as traditional regulation.
13	We don't believe that the authorized return
14	is a guarantee. Ameren has at times earned more and at
15	times earned less than its authorized return. There is no
16	evidence to suggest and it is not the law that Ameren must
17	earn its authorized return. There is no evidence to
18	suggest that Ameren has been unable to provide safe,
19	reliable and adequate service.
20	The single largest issue in this case is,
21	of course, return on equity, and the evidence shows that
22	Ameren's authorized return is significantly higher than
23	comparable utilities and should be reduced by the MIEC
24	witness Mike Gorman's testimony to a range of 9.2 to

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9.4 percent. But other issues in this case, including

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Page 215 Ameren's proposed plant in service accounting and, very 1 2 importantly, the new transmission tracker it proposes 3 require the Commission to make a very crucial decision about its own rules and its own authority and its own 4 5 discretion in what the rate case process is going to be. 6 The Commission has to decide if it will 7 continue to be a true guardian of the public interest. The Commission was established and conceived to protect 8 consumers by using its judgment and its discretion to decide on just and reasonable rates, to decide on those 10 rates, not to simply approve costs. The Commission is not 11 12 a tracker approver. It is not a true-up supervisor. 13 The Commission's decisions can't always be predicted with certainty, but the Commission's discretion 14 15 has been one of Missouri's greatest strengths. The ability of the Commission to exercise its judgment over 16 17 all costs in the time that they're incurred and to consider all relevant factors is essential to the public 18 19 interest. 20 The Commission -- the MIEC urges the 21 Commission to draw the line at the continued expansion of trackers and surcharges, especially for such large costs 22

including in its 2010 rate order and its 2008 Ameren rate

The Commission recognized in recent orders,

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as transmission costs.

Page 216 order, the dangers of trackers. In its 2010 order the 1 Commission stated, trackers should be used sparingly 2 3 because they tend to limit a utility's incentive to prudently manage its costs. In its 2008 order the 4 5 Commission said, the Commission does not intend to allow the overuse of tracking mechanisms in this case or in 6 7 future rate cases. 8 The so-called regulatory improvements that Ameren seeks will ultimately improve the Commission out of its job. Under this vision, the Commission would merely 10 determine whether the utility has calculated its costs 11 12 correctly for numerous isolated cost categories sought by 13 the utility. The Commission should reject this path and preserve its ability and that of future commissions to 14 15 protect the public interest. I would note that with regard to the energy 16 17 efficiency statute, the MIEC will show that the revenue -in the revenue allocation process, that it is imperative 18 to assign energy efficiency costs by customer class in 19 20 order to preserve the statutory opt out for all eligible 21 customers. Since 2000 Missouri has lost a third of its 22 manufacturing jobs, and the unemployment rate in St. Louis 23 24 is 7.2 percent. Ameren can and will request additional

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rate increases if those are needed. But if jobs leave

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1	Missouri, the economic harm will be permanent. Those jobs
2	will almost certainly never return. We trust that the
3	Commission will keep the economic hardships in Missouri in
4	mind as it weighs the evidence in this case. Thank you.
5	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. Questions?
6	CHAIRMAN GUNN: I just have a quick one.
7	The plant in service accounting, you said it hasn't been
8	implemented anywhere else?
9	MS. VUYLSTEKE: Not in the form or allowing
10	such broad deferrals as it does in Ameren's proposal.
11	CHAIRMAN GUNN: And that's my question. So
12	there aren't uniform standards for what plant in service
13	accounting means? It's an art as much as it is a science
14	in what could be considered plant in service?
15	MS. VUYLSTEKE: I would ask that the
16	Commission we have a policy witness on that very topic,
17	Mr. Mike Brosch, and so I would I would hate to opine
18	on that issue, but I believe that there is discretion and
19	it's not a defined.
20	CHAIRMAN GUNN: Thank you. That's all I
21	have.
22	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Jarrett?
23	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: I had one question.
24	What is MIEC's position on the increase? They do admit
25	Ameren is entitled to some rate increase in this case,

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1	correct?
2	MS. VUYLSTEKE: That's correct. Most of
3	well, I won't say. It's roughly, I think it's half or so
4	is the fuel cost and the MEEIA cost.
5	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. Thank you.
6	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Kenney.
7	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Ms. Vuylsteke, I want
8	to ask a question about specifically the transmission,
9	MISO transmission costs in the tracker. And I think my
10	question is, and it's a legal question, the MISO
11	transmission costs that Ameren pays are charged to it by
12	MISO, correct?
13	MS. VUYLSTEKE: I believe so, yes.
14	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And it's as a result
15	of a FERC-approved tariff?
16	MS. VUYLSTEKE: I believe so.
17	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: To what extent do we
18	even have the ability to reject those? These are dollar
19	for dollar pass throughs if we adopt the tracker proposal,
20	and they're costs over which arguably Ameren has no
21	control, at least to the extent once FERC approves the
22	tariff and MISO charges those charges to Ameren. How are
23	consumers harmed if you're tracking through a tracker
24	costs over which the utility has no control and arguably
25	over which supremacy clause would prevent us from and

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1	the filed rate doctrine prevents us from disallowing?
2	MS. VUYLSTEKE: Commissioner Kenney, the
3	legal issue with the tracker is not the costs themselves,
4	but the fact that they're being taken out of context of
5	every other cost that would balance them, declining costs,
6	increasing costs, and the tracker allows the utility to
7	recover costs from a year in which there is no rate case.
8	They're carrying costs from year to year to year, and in
9	any one year they might have had countervailing costs.
10	They might have had rate cost decreases that would
11	balance out that tracked cost.
12	So inherently in a tracker you're allowing
13	the utility to recover one item of cost to the exclusion
14	of considering other countervailing cost decreases. So
15	the more you allow in through a tracker, the greater those
16	distortions can become. If a utility's filing a rate case
17	every year I'm sorry. Go ahead.
18	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: No. No.
19	MS. VUYLSTEKE: However long you allow them
20	to continue the tracker, the harm is even greater. It's
21	never, I think, a good way to set rates. It's unlawful.
22	We think it violates the Missouri Supreme Court decision
23	against single-issue ratemaking. But the real harm, as
24	you said, they're entitled to recover the costs anyway.
25	There may be many costs that it could recover, but if you

	Page 220
1	look at them in isolation, and that's I think where
2	ratemaking could be headed if Ameren's proposals are
3	adopted. For every large cost, for every increasing cost,
4	there's a tracker or surcharge, and that's good to reduce
5	the risk for the utility, but it greatly increases the
6	risk for the consumer, and that's the problem we see.
7	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And I think you
8	answered my question by referring to the single-issue
9	ratemaking issue. So MIEC's legal position then is that
10	trackers period are illegal?
11	MS. VUYLSTEKE: That's correct.
12	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: All right. Thank
13	you.
14	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you, Ms. Vuylsteke.
15	Barnes-Jewish?
16	MS. LANGENECKERT: We have no opening
17	statement.
18	JUDGE WOODRUFF: NRDC?
19	MR. ROBERTSON: May it please the
20	Commission? I can be brief because I have a limited
21	number of issues in this case.
22	We ask the Commission not to allow Ameren
23	to increase its customer charges on the residential and
24	small general service classes. This would send the wrong
25	message contrary to the MEEIA policy of encouraging energy

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1	efficiency. If customers participating in an efficiency
2	program may have to pay off a higher level of fixed costs
3	before they can start paying down their contribution to
4	the energy efficiency measure, then their payback period
5	is lengthened. That's a disincentive to efficiency.
6	Furthermore, the company's rate stability
7	is not affected because they are protected from the
8	throughput disincentive through the net shared benefits
9	mechanism under MEEIA.
10	Second, we have noticed that Ameren has
11	declining block rates for winter use in the residential
12	and SGS classes. This is another departure from state
13	policy to incentivize energy efficiency, because above a
14	block of say 1000 or 750 kilowatt hours, customers who use
15	more than that are paying less for each additional
16	kilowatt hour.
17	This is an issue that I've heard mooted
18	various times in various commission meetings, and so we're
19	asking the Commission to open a workshop docket to
20	consider this and other rate design practices that should
21	be brought into line with new realities.
22	Third, I have noted in a data request
23	response an item for Meramec environmental study, and the
24	company has now admitted to me in the course of discovery
25	that this item should not have been included in revenue

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1	requirement. I noticed another item in that data request
2	response, which is a baseline mercury testing project for
3	Meramec, and this is related to retrofitting the plant for
4	utility max rule, which would I guess Meramec would
5	have to be in compliance with 2015. We do not believe
6	that Meramec should be retrofitted. It is too old. It
7	should be retired, and well, that's all I have. Are
8	there any questions I can answer?
9	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Questions?
10	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: What should Meramec
11	be replaced with, then?
12	MR. ROBERTSON: In Ameren's 2011 IRP, they
13	said if they did wrap DSM, they they're now committed to
14	doing, they could retire Meramec. So DSM can replace
15	Meramec, and I would add renewables as well.
16	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Thanks,
17	Mr. Robertson.
18	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you, sir. AARP/
19	Consumers Council?
20	MR. COFFMAN: Good morning. May it please
21	the Commission? I'm here today speaking for AARP and the
22	Consumers Council and hopefully for many thousands of
23	ordinary folks who are frustrated with this process and
24	who would probably agree with me that the regulatory
25	compact is broken or at least seriously out of whack,

Page 223 seriously out of whack since 2008 when the economy 1 2 collapsed and left many people worrying about whether they 3 will be able to find a job, whether they will be able to keep their job, and the act of sitting down to pay the 4 5 bills at the kitchen table every month is a very painful, sometimes life and death situation. And I just want to 6 7 remind you that every penny that you can keep rates from 8 rising will be appreciated by those folks. 9 Since we'll get a chance for mini openings later, I just want to focus on the two biggest issues in 10 this case, obviously return on equity and the -- and then 11 12 the fuel adjustment clause. Maybe I would group together 13 all the various surcharges and trackers that seem to be constantly proposed and foisted upon consumers. 14 15 Every one of these surcharges and trackers puts consumers at a disadvantage and chip away at the 16 17 inherent idea of a cost of service ratemaking. single one of these single issue or piecemealed out 18 trackers undermine the idea that we are granting an 19 opportunity to earn a profit for a company and giving them 20 21 the opportunity to manage that risk. 22 The fuel adjustment clause currently 23 alleviates the risk of a very large part of their 24 business. The fuel and purchased power costs, at least

95 percent of that, the risk in volatility of those costs

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1	is now borne by consumers. All of that uncertainty is no
2	longer a worry, except for maybe 5 percent skin in the
3	game that they now have. And for many, many years the
4	company bore 100 percent until the law was changed
5	allowing the fuel adjustment clause and consumers, of
6	course, had to pay an amount in the rates reflecting a
7	return on equity, but the utility had the opportunity to
8	manage that, and that incentive was recognized even by
9	past executives in this company as being a very strong
10	incentive to urge more cost efficient contracts, and the
11	incentive was a very positive cost efficiency motivation.
12	So I won't most of you have heard these
13	arguments 100 times perhaps, but we don't favor the fuel
14	adjustment clause because it reduces the incentive to be
15	cost efficient with fuel. If despite the fact ironically
16	that it creates more cases and there's constant prudence
17	reviews and true-ups, there is less scrutiny.
18	I would suggest that the fact that we are
19	only finding out late in this case that certain MISO costs
20	have been slipped in the fuel adjustment cause is evidence
21	the process may not be able to scrutinize things well
22	enough, that and the fact that we have had rare
23	adjustments to the prudence of these fuel and purchased
24	power costs.
25	Obviously my clients don't have the

Page 225 resources to intervene in every one of those cases. 2 prefer the costs to be set at a reasonable level going 3 forward. But assuming that you will continue, as you have the last few cases, in granting not -- this is not a right 5 that they have, but the privilege of a fuel adjustment clause under the law, which you have the right to approve, 6 7 reject or modify, we would urge that you bring the sharing of the risk more to an equitable level. The Staff is 8 asking that for an 85/15. 10 In our minds, if you're going to have a fuel adjustment clause, it should be -- you're wanting to 11 12 share this risk, it should be closer to 50/50. So we 13 would urge that the current fuel adjustment clause mechanism be modified to a 50/50 sharing of risk between 14 15 the utility, which has some control, and we expect that the evidence will show in this case, as it has in the 16 17 past, that the utility has some control over its fuel and purchased power costs, not all, and consumers who have 18 19 zero control over those costs. 20 I am very grateful to Mr. Thompson for his 21 exposition on constitutional low, Hope and Bluefield. agree with his explanation, and I am also thankful that 22 others have brought up what I see as a real fatal flaw in 23 return on equities approved by a majority of jurisdictions 24 in this country since 2008. 25

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1	I believe that this feedback loop, this
2	circular aspect of looking over at everyone else's
3	approved ROEs has prevented these numbers from coming into
4	line with the economic realities of the last few years.
5	Those numbers should be much lower, but there seems to be
6	a drag by the aspect of using proxies and what other
7	utilities are in other states and they look back at you.
8	In my mind, it's similar to the way that some executive
9	compensation is kept at such a high level by surveying
10	what every other company does.
11	We have seen in recent years, I think, two
12	or three years too late, some dropping of the ROEs
13	overall, but I I would urge you not to use the zone of
14	reasonableness in the way that it has been used sometimes
15	in this state, and that is to look at other approved
16	returns. Rather, to focus on commensurate risk, and for
17	every special privilege, special mechanism that a utility
18	is granted, we would urge you to recognize that that
19	lowers the risk even further. Sadly, we don't often see
20	that fuel adjustment clause or trackers have a
21	corresponding reduction in the return on equity.
22	We would simply urge you to focus on the
23	evidence in this case, which we think is fairly solid for
24	an 8 percent return, and to recognize that under the law
25	you have the authority to approve nothing greater than

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1	what is con confiscatory to the company.
2	There's much more I could talk about, but I
3	think maybe it would be best if I just shut up and would
4	let you hear from the folks who spoke at the public
5	hearing, and I have just some short just a couple
6	minutes in a video of folks who have spoke at the public
7	hearing.
8	I know that you have all gone to these
9	public hearings, and I want to thank you. My clients are
10	very grateful that this Commission more than any other
11	Commission I'm aware of has provided great opportunities
12	for the public to come out and give their opinion about
13	what is just and reasonable and not just opportunities for
14	public hearings in almost every part of the service
15	territory but also other means to do so.
16	And I know that you-all have the
17	transcripts and you've read them or will be reading them,
18	but I think it would be helpful to be reminded of voices
19	and the faces of the folks who will be having to pay any
20	rate increase that comes out of this case.
21	(Video excerpts from local public hearings
22	were played.)
23	MR. COFFMAN: Thank you. We hope that you
24	take those comments which are now in the record into
25	account in determining what the reasonable return is, and

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- 1 we think that they are relevant to affordability and
- 2 reasonableness.
- 3 And on rate design, I do want to mention
- 4 that we are in agreement with NRDC and OPC about keeping
- 5 the customer charge low. We think that is very important.
- 6 We'd like to retain the current \$8 of customer charge.
- 7 That helps with affordability and low usage customers.
- 8 I'm open to questions.
- JUDGE WOODRUFF: Any questions? Thank you.
- 10 MECG?
- 11 MR. WOODSMALL: Whenever I use a computer,
- 12 it's always trying, so I'm glad that worked. Good
- 13 morning. My name is David Woodsmall, and I represent the
- 14 Midwest Energy Consumers Group.
- 15 One of the benefits of going later in the
- day is I get to hear what everybody else says, so it gives
- 17 me the opportunity to respond to some things, but it will
- 18 also inevitably lead to me repeating some things. So I
- 19 hope you bear with me.
- 20 First off, I want to address some of the
- 21 things that Mr. Lowery said. Mr. Lowery tries to point
- 22 out that the Missouri system is broke. He says that
- 23 Missouri has had more rate cases than many other states,
- 24 and naturally then the Missouri system must be broke. I
- 25 think the rate cases are a function of the fact that you

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- 1 have more electric utilities.
- 2 Look around you. Kansas has two. Iowa has
- 3 two. Arkansas has two. Oklahoma has two. Just by the
- 4 number of utilities, you're going to have twice as many
- 5 rate cases. So don't look at rate cases as a signal that
- 6 the process is broken.
- 7 He also tries to say that because they
- 8 haven't earned their authorized rate of return, that the
- 9 system is broke. I think you see here that Ameren simply
- 10 wants to take a short-term view of the system. They want
- 11 to say in the last couple years they haven't earned their
- 12 authorized return and, therefore, something is broke.
- 13 Over the long term you can see that the system worked.
- 14 The system worked to their benefit. Let's see how the
- 15 system helped others.
- 16 Southwestern Bell was a Missouri utility, a
- 17 Missouri utility stationed -- or headquartered in
- 18 St. Louis. They bought Ameritech. They bought Bell
- 19 South. They bought AT&T. They've taken over the world,
- 20 but they started as a Missouri utility working under
- 21 Missouri regulation.
- 22 Ameren itself, a Missouri utility, bought
- 23 Illinois Power, bought SIPCO, bought SILCO. The other
- 24 companies didn't buy it. It went out, based upon Missouri
- 25 regulation, and was able to thrive. KCPL has brought

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- 1 Aquila. Look long-term. The system works. Taking a
- 2 short-term view will lead to you breaking things that
- 3 aren't broken.
- 4 Mr. Lowery talks about the need for this
- 5 rate case being driven by fuel, labor, energy efficiency
- 6 and lower customer usage. Interesting, none of those
- 7 things are issues in this case. All of those have been
- 8 settled.
- 9 So why are we here? Because Ameren wants
- 10 to reduce risk. We talked about that some this morning
- 11 with Mr. Mills' motion, and that is the entire point of my
- 12 opening statement, reducing risk. So let's get on with my
- 13 opening statement.
- 14 First off, I want to put this case into
- 15 context. First thing I want you to do is understand how
- 16 Ameren's rates have increased recently and compare that to
- 17 the economic conditions for the service area. Next thing
- 18 I want to do is I'd like you to understand the dynamics of
- 19 utility ratemaking, specifically the risk and
- 20 opportunities for Ameren under ratemaking. Finally, I'd
- 21 like you to understand that this case is not driven about
- 22 the rates arising from the case. Rather, this case is
- 23 largely driven by Ameren's attempts to shift risk to
- 24 ratepayers while simultaneously keeping all the
- 25 opportunities for increased profits.

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1	On this slide you can see the timing and
2	magnitude of Ameren's last four rate increases. You can
3	see that the increases have become routine, and from a
4	customer perspective, the size of those increases have
5	been disconcerting. In three straight years Ameren has
6	had rate increases that exceeded 7 percent.
7	Now, for the fourth year in a row, Ameren
8	is seeking another increase. This increase is larger than
9	the previous increases. Based upon its current case,
10	Ameren is seeking an increase of 13.39 percent. In
11	contrast, Staff is recommending an increase of
12	7.83 percent.
13	While Ameren has been receiving these
14	regular rate increases, average weekly wages have only
15	increased by 11.1 percent. Similarly, the CPI has
16	increased by only 11.6 percent. Even if the Commission
17	accepts the Staff's position on every issue, Ameren's
18	rates will have increased 40.27 percent over the same
19	period. Worse still, this does not include the rate
20	increases that have been allowed to automatically flow
21	through through the FAC. Graphically, this is what you're
22	looking at. Rates have skyrocketed.
23	Why do I look back on the past? Why are
24	these past rate increases relevant to today? I mention
25	these past increases because Ameren's cases are no longer

Page 232 simply about rates. Many of these issues that you will 2 discuss concern mechanisms that Ameren is requesting that 3 will lead to even more frequent or larger increases in the future. 4 5 This is not unique to Ameren. Each one of your regulated utilities are following the same script. 6 7 Whenever a utility files a rate case, you can bet it's 8 simply about more than just the rates increasing. It is about mechanisms. Every time a utility files a rate case, I want you to ask yourself, what do they want now? 10 Because the mechanisms you approve today will drive the 11 12 rate increases you have to give tomorrow. Utilities can manipulate -- what are the 13 dynamics of ratemaking in Missouri? In general, Missouri 14 15 ratemaking is about a risk reward system for the utility. Here's a quote from a 1979 Missouri Supreme Court case. 16 17 As you can see, it references the risk that utilities take that rates will be inadequate. On the other hand, it 18 provides an opportunity that rates will be excessive. 19 20 Under either scenario, it's the utility, not the consumer, 21 that is supposed to assume the risk in opportunity. 22 Utilities can manipulate the ratemaking dynamic to cause certain windfall profits. The utility 23 24 may conveniently time a debt refinancing. Ameren has done

this just recently. Immediately following the end of the

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Page 233 true-up in this case, Ameren announced and scheduled a 2 debt refinancing. This leads to lower expenses 3 immediately, and Ameren will get to keep the entirety of the savings associated with this refinancing. 4 5 Similarly, the utility may conveniently time an employee severance. This leads to lower payroll 6 7 costs and will immediately increase profits. Also the 8 utility can benefit from warm weather and higher sales, or the utility can receive a windfall through greater participation in the wholesale market. 10 While the utility would have you believe 11 12 that this opportunity for windfall profits does not 13 routinely occur, Ameren's current situation proves this wrong. For the 12 months ending June 30th, 2012, Ameren 14 15 earned a 10.53 percent return on equity. This is above their authorized return, but given the dynamic in 16 17 Missouri, Ameren gets to keep the entirety of these profits, and worse still, despite these windfall profits, 18 Ameren gets to request a 13.39 percent rate increase. 19 20 While Ameren is permitted to keep any 21 windfall profits, the dynamics in Missouri ratemaking also states that they are supposed to accept the risk that 22 current rates are not sufficient. Therefore, if they 23 cannot control expenses or if there is a cool summer, the 24 utility must assume this risk and wait until another rate 25

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- 1 case is complete before increasing rates.
- 2 Bottom line, utilities love the opportunity
- 3 for windfall profits, but utilities hate the risk of
- 4 inadequate rates. So if you were a utility, what do you
- 5 do? You obviously want to minimize your risk of
- 6 inadequate rates while inflating your opportunity for
- 7 windfall profits.
- 8 How do you do this? You do this by
- 9 contriving mechanisms that will reduce risk and shift that
- 10 risk to ratepayers. You've probably heard of several of
- 11 these already. You've heard them talked about today.
- 12 They are called AAOs, adjustment mechanisms, trackers and
- 13 accounting authorization.
- 14 Let's talk about them. What are AAOs? In
- 15 order to understand AAOs, you must understand test year
- 16 ratemaking. In Missouri you set rates by looking at a
- 17 historical period. The historical period is called the
- 18 test year. You look at every aspect of the utility, you
- 19 look at capital investment, expenses, depreciation, fuel,
- 20 revenues, cost of capital, everything. Under the test
- 21 year concept you typically don't consider items that
- 22 appear prior to the test year or after the test year. You
- 23 use the test year to maintain the proper relationship
- 24 between investment, revenue and expenses.
- 25 What does an AAO do? An AAO is a mechanism

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1	that is designed to allow the utility to defeat the notion
2	of test year ratemaking. An AAO allows the utility to
3	capture an expense that would be out of the test year,
4	defer it, and bring it into the test year in the next case
5	for recovery.
6	This is great for the utility. The utility
7	can continue to overearn and simply hold that expense for
8	recovery from ratepayers later. As you can see, the
9	utility no longer accepts the risk of this particular
10	expense. Instead, the utility can continue to overearn,
11	and the expense has been pulled into the next year for
12	recovery from ratepayers.
13	What's the next mechanism? That's the
14	adjustment clause. Under an adjustment mechanism, a
15	utility is not required to wait until its next rate case
16	to recover an expense. Instead, the utility is allowed to
17	immediately increase rates to reflect that increased
18	expense. So while the utility may otherwise be
19	overearning, they are still allowed to increase rates to
20	reflect an increase in one single expense item.
21	For Ameren, they have an adjustment
22	mechanism for fuel costs. These costs represent
23	approximate 50 percent of Ameren's total O&M costs. So
24	the risk of an increase in fuel cost has now been entirely
25	shifted to the ratepayers. Ameren no longer has any

Page 236 interest in minimizing theses costs because they are 2 simply a pass through. 3 The next mechanism designed to reduce utility risk is a tracker mechanism. Under a tracker, a 4 5 baseline amount of an expense is built into rates. If the expense increases, the utility is allowed to collect that 6 7 difference in the next case. Again, you can see that 8 there's no consideration as to whether other expenses have decreased to compensate for this increased expense. fact, the utility may be overearning, but still is allowed 10 to track a single expense item. 11 12 For instance, a utility may refinance their debt and cause a situation in which they are immediately 13 overearning. Despite their overearnings, the utility is 14 15 permitted to track the single expense, pull them into the next rate case and recover them. 16 17 The next -- the final mechanism used to shift risk to the ratepayers is an accounting 18 authorization. This is not much like an AAO. Where the 19 AAO is designed to address a single nonrecurring item, 20 21 this accounting authorization is designed to be an everyday authorization to carry an expense from out of the 22 test year and hold it for later recovery. 23 Let's look at some of the mechanisms that 24 Ameren already has in place, mechanisms they've already 25

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- 1 convinced you to put into place to reduce their risk and
- 2 push that onto ratepayers.
- 3 Foremost, Ameren has a fuel adjustment
- 4 clause. This allows Ameren to automatically increase
- 5 rates to account for any increase in fuel expense. Over
- 6 50 percent of Ameren's expense portfolio is protected.
- 7 They may increase rates to account for fuel costs while
- 8 simultaneously overearning on the rest of their cost
- 9 portfolio.
- 10 In addition, Ameren has tracker mechanisms
- 11 to protect it from increase in the following expenses:
- 12 Vegetation management, infrastructure inspections, MEEIA
- 13 costs, energy efficiency costs, renewable energy standard
- 14 costs, pensions and other post employment benefits.
- 15 Through these trackers, Ameren has lost all
- 16 incentive to minimize its costs. If these costs go up
- 17 because of disinterest, Ameren doesn't care. They will
- 18 recover on an exact dollar for dollar basis any increase
- 19 in these costs.
- 20 So now that we know what Ameren currently
- 21 has, what more do they want? Remember, Ameren's rates
- 22 even if you accept Staff's position on every issue, will
- 23 have increased by 40.27 percent in the last five years.
- 24 Still again, Ameren has overearned over the last 12-month
- 25 period.

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1	Nevertheless, ameren wants more. Ameren
2	wants you to continue with all the previous mechanisms
3	that have been discussed, and Ameren wants more. Ameren
4	wants you to expand the fuel adjustment clause. Ameren
5	now wants to be to be allowed to automatically adjust
6	rates to pass through any increases in transmission cost.
7	Typically, Ameren could simply time their
8	rate cases to account for these predictable cost
9	increases. Instead, Ameren wants to be able to
10	automatically pass through these costs, while Ameren
11	continues to overearn, they will also be allowed to
12	automatically pass through a single expense without any
13	consideration of their overearnings.
14	If adopted, the magnitude of Ameren's rate
15	increases will simply get larger. Ameren still wants
16	more. Ameren wants you to implement another tracker.
17	Ameren wants a storm tracker. Ameren also wants a
18	transmission cost tracker. This is troublesome because it
19	will lead to greater opportunity for overearnings. Worse
20	still, Ameren did not even propose this mechanism in its
21	initial filing. None of the parties were prepared to
22	address this issue. Now the Commission has allow Ameren
23	to raise this issue through sur-surrebuttal. This
24	mechanism minimizes the Missouri ratemaking process and is
25	procedurally unfair.

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1	Ameren still wants more. While overearning
2	in this case and despite a 40 percent rate increase over
3	the last five years, Ameren wants plant in service
4	accounting as well. As defined in Ameren's testimony,
5	this will take expenses from the pass into the test year
6	and allow Ameren to collect these costs.
7	What is the bottom line of this case?
8	Ameren wants to continue to be allowed to overearn. If
9	wants to implement mechanisms that increase the
10	probability of them over earning. Simultaneously, Ameren
11	wants to shift the entire risk of cost increases. But
12	despite the significant reduction in risk, Ameren does not
13	want to lower its return on equity. In fact, in this case
14	Ameren wants you to raise its return on equity from 10.2
15	to 10.5 percent.
16	Ameren wants this return despite the fact
17	that KCP&'s witness in another pending case recently said
18	a 9.8 percent return is reasonable, a comparable company
19	I'll tell you.
20	In order to paint the recommendation as
21	reasonable, Ameren wants you to look backwards. Ameren
22	wants you to go back two years. Truth is, capital is
23	getting cheaper, cheaper than it has been two years ago.
24	Your ROE authorization reflects today, not two years ago.
25	Also, Ameren theorizes that the ROE should

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1	go up because they haven't been earning any their on
2	equity. This theory is self-perpetuating. Ameren
3	theorizes that you authorize a 10.2 percent ROE, and for
4	certain periods they didn't earn it. Therefore, you need
5	to give them 10.15 percent. Well, guess what's going to
6	happen in the next case. They won't meet it for certain
7	periods, and they're going to request you to move it up to
8	10.8 percent. This is a self-perpetuating prophecy and
9	leads to ever increasing return on equity.
10	Finally, what is the bottom line of this
11	case? Enough is enough. You can see that Ameren rates
12	have increased 40.27 percent over the last five years, and
13	over that same period of time the economy hasn't
14	progressed and folks are falling farther and farther
15	behind.
16	The Commission can't control many of these
17	factors, but it can control the mechanisms it gives Ameren
18	to bring certain costs into future cases. With that in
19	mind, we'd ask you, no new trackers, no expansion of the
20	FAC, no special accounting treatment, and simply reduce
21	Ameren's return on equity and send them home. Thank you.
22	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Any questions?
23	Commissioner Kenney?
24	QUESTIONS BY COMMISSIONER KENNEY:
25	Q. Thank you, Mr. Woodsmall. Let me ask you

Page 241 about the trackers and see. Is it MECG's position that 2 trackers are illegal or that it reduces the company's risk 3 and there should be a corresponding reduction in ROE? MR. WOODSMALL: Certainly the latter. 4 5 reduce risk, and there should definitely be a reduction in Illegal? Possibly, depending on how they're 6 7 implemented because they allow for retroactive ratemaking. 8 You set rates at a certain level, and the Missouri Supreme Court has said that the utility bears the risk that those rates are not sufficient. If you then go back and tell 10 11 the ratepayers the rates on this particular item weren't 12 sufficient, you need to pay for, yeah, that's retroactive 13 ratemaking. 14 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: The final question I have is, will there be testimony that quantifies the 15 reduction in risk that corresponds with any of the 16 17 trackers that Ameren is either proposing or already has? 18 MR. WOODSMALL: Probably not explicitly. The mechanisms that Ameren currently has is reflected in 19 their risk portfolio, so will be baked into the current 20 21 return on equity recommendations. If you give additional tracker mechanisms, that will reduce risk and should have 22 a corresponding reduction in return on equity. 23 24 I don't know if Mr. Gorman or any of the

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other witnesses quantified that, what the reduction in

25

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1	risk would be of giving a storm tracker or getting a
2	transmission tracker.
3	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Thank you.
4	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. For MDNR?
5	MS. BLUME: MDNR does not have an opening
6	statement.
7	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. KCPL.
8	MR. DORITY: Judge, the KCPL companies
9	waive opening statement, and your Honor, I would also
10	request permission to be excused periodically throughout
11	the hearing, with the understanding, of course, we would
12	waive the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.
13	JUDGE WOODRUFF: You are granted that
14	permission.
15	MR. DORITY: Thank you.
16	JUDGE WOODRUFF: The other parts were
17	Missouri Retailers and the unions, and they've already
18	been excused. So that is the end of the opening
19	statements. It's also time for lunch. So we'll take a
20	break now and we'll come back at one o'clock.
21	(A BREAK WAS TAKEN.)
22	JUDGE WOODRUFF: We're back from the lunch
23	break, and the first witness has taken the stand.
24	Mr. Baxter, if you'd raise your right hand.
25	MR. BYRNE: Your Honor, before we start, I

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1	have a clarification from this morning. I guess I know
2	the Commission has been pretty liberal in allowing parties
3	to cite things in their opening statement that aren't in
4	the record, and I don't really object to that, but this
5	morning we were talking a little bit about the return on
6	equity that was filed by Kansas City Power & Light Company
7	Greater Missouri Operations in their rate case, and I just
8	want to make sure that the record reflects the correct
9	information because I don't think it does right now.
10	On September 12th, Samuel C. Hattaway filed
11	testimony on behalf of Kansas City Power & Light Greater
12	Missouri Operations, and his revised recommended return on
13	equity was 10.3 percent, and I think there were references
14	to other numbers that were not his revised recommendation
15	in opening statements.
16	MR. MILLS: I think it was Mr. Woodsmall,
17	and I think he referenced Mr. Hattaway's range, which goes
18	down to 9.8.
19	MR. BYRNE: Mr. Hattaway does not sponsor a
20	range in his testimony. He did different kinds of
21	analyses. One of the two kinds of analyses produced a
22	result in that range, but that was not his recommendation.
23	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Nothing of what was said
24	in the opening statements is, of course, evidence, so
25	MR. BYRNE: I just don't want

1	Page 244
1	JUDGE WOODRUFF: You've made your
2	statement. All right. Back to Mr. Baxter.
3	(Witness sworn.)
4	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. You may
5	inquire.
6	WARNER BAXTER testified as follows:
7	DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BYRNE:
8	Q. Could you please state your name.
9	A. My name is Warner Baxter.
10	Q. And by whom are you employed, Mr. Baxter?
11	A. Ameren Missouri.
12	Q. In what capacity?
13	A. I am of the president and chief executive
14	officer.
15	Q. And are you the same Warner Baxter who
16	caused to be filed in this case direct testimony that's
17	been marked Exhibit 1 and surrebuttal testimony that's
18	been marked Exhibit 2?
19	A. I did.
20	Q. And do you have any corrections to that
21	testimony?
22	A. I do. From my direct testimony, on
23	pages 13 and 14, I prepared two charts related to the
24	earned return on equity and allowed return on equity.
25	Those charts were updated and amended in my surrebuttal

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1	testimony, and they're reflected on Schedules WLB-ES1 and
2	Schedule WLB-ES2. The original charts had a few errors,
3	which I point out in my surrebuttal testimony, and it's
4	reflected in the footnote there.
5	Q. Okay. And as corrected, are the answers
6	contained in your prefiled direct and surrebuttal
7	testimony true and correct to the best of your knowledge
8	and belief?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. And if I were to ask you the same questions
11	contained in that prefiled testimony here today when
12	you're under oath, would your answers be the same?
13	A. They would.
14	MR. BYRNE: Your Honor, I'd offer
15	Exhibits 1 and 2 and tender Mr. Baxter for
16	cross-examination.
17	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Exhibits 1 and 2 have been
18	offered. Any objections to their receipt?
19	Hearing none, they will be received.
20	(AMEREN EXHIBIT NOS. 1 AND 2 WERE MARKED
21	AND RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE.)
22	JUDGE WOODRUFF: For cross-examination, we
23	begin with looking around to see who's actually here.
24	Looks like AARP is the first one on the list that's
25	actually here. Mr. Coffman, did you have any questions?

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1	MR. COFFMAN: No questions, your Honor.
2	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Barnes-Jewish?
3	MS. LANGENECKERT: No questions.
4	JUDGE WOODRUFF: MIEC?
5	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. VUYLSTEKE:
6	Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Baxter. How are you?
7	A. Good afternoon, Ms. Vuylsteke.
8	Q. Mr. Baxter, is it correct that the primary
9	thrust of your testimony is that Ameren has not been
10	earning its authorized return on equity?
11	A. That is one of the discussions in my
12	testimony, but I wouldn't say it's necessarily the primary
13	thrust.
14	Q. Would you say it is a major point of your
15	testimony?
16	A. I think that there's several major points
17	to my testimony.
18	Q. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt, but
19	is return on equity and your belief that Ameren is failing
20	to earn its authorized return on equity a point in your
21	testimony?
22	A. It is.
23	Q. And do you agree when the Commission do
24	you agree with this statement, that when the Commission
25	makes a finding of ROE in a rate case, that the Commission

	Page 247
1	generally has stated that the ROE it utilized was in the
2	zone of reasonableness?
3	A. I don't know.
4	Q. Do you agree that when the Commission sets
5	rates using a particular ROE, that it is giving the
6	utility an opportunity to earn its ROE rather than
7	guaranteeing it?
8	A. I believe that no. I don't believe that
9	establishing any of the regulatory policies is a guarantee
10	of ROE. We are simply looking for a reasonable
11	opportunity to earn a fair return on equity.
12	Q. Do you agree that a utility has a
13	management responsibility to manage its affairs to provide
14	safe, adequate and reliable service to its customers?
15	A. Yes. We have a responsibility to provide
16	safe and adequate service, and certainly reliability is
17	part of that.
18	Q. Would you agree that if a utility even
19	perceives and even if it perceives that it is not going to
20	earn its authorized return, that the utility is not
21	justified in reducing expenses and capital outlays if
22	doing so would interfere with its ability to provide safe,
23	adequate and reliable service?
24	A. I believe the standard that we have to hold
25	to is safe and adequate service, and we will always make

Page 248 the necessary investments and take the necessary 2 procedures to provide safe and adequate service. 3 And at any given point in time, would you agree that Ameren Missouri will have a number of capital 4 5 projects that it could pursue but not all of them are necessary to be pursued immediately and perhaps some not 6 7 at all? Ms. Vuylsteke, so are you -- is your 8 question whether there's certain projects which -- did you 9 10 say that are necessary? I'm sorry. 11 Sure. Let me -- I think it's a double Q. 12 question. Let me simplify. 13 Α. Maybe break it down in two. 14 Q. Sure. 15 Α. Maybe I can take it that way. 16 Q. Sure. At any given point in time, would 17 you agree that Ameren Missouri will have a number of 18 capital projects that it could pursue? 19 Α. Yes. 20 And would you agree that not all of those Q. 21 capital projects that it could pursue are necessary to be 22 pursued immediately?

pursue immediately to provide safe and adequate service.

Those projects would not be necessary to

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Α.

I agree with that.

23

24

25

Page 249 1 Q. And is it possible that there are capital 2 projects that you could pursue but that you don't need to 3 pursue? Α. So Ms. Vuylsteke, if you could tell me, 4 5 what do you mean by need to pursue? What context are you saying? What's the standard that I'm trying to uphold to? 6 7 The standard to meet Ameren's duty to Q. 8 provide safe and reliable and adequate service that not every -- would you agree that not every capital project 10 must be pursued in order to meet that duty? In order to provide safe and adequate 11 Α. 12 service, I agree that not every project has to be pursued 13 today to pursue safe and adequate service. I agree with 14 that. 15 Okay. If you could go ahead and refer with Q. me to your surrebuttal testimony. 16 17 Α. Yes. And I'm referring to your Schedule ES4 of 18 Q. 19 your surrebuttal. 20 Α. ES4? 21 Q. Correct. Yes, I'm there. 22 Α. 23 Okay. And the title of that schedule is Q. 24 Accounts for Unusual Items 2011 to 2012. Does that mean

that the effect of unusual items was removed from the ROE

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1 calculation?

- 2 A. Yes, that's correct, Ms. Vuylsteke. If
- 3 you -- my surrebuttal testimony points out the items which
- 4 have been removed from that calculation. They include
- 5 things like the Taum Sauk disallowance. They include
- 6 things like the FAC disallowance. They include things
- 7 like the Entergy adjustment. Yes, those things have been
- 8 removed.
- 9 Q. Do you agree that when looking at a
- 10 utility's earnings from a regulatory perspective, that it
- 11 is a fair -- that it is fair and appropriate to remove
- 12 unusual items like the Taum Sauk disallowance and the
- ordered refund of the fuel adjustment dollars that
- 14 resulted from the finding of imprudence?
- 15 A. No, I do not. I think when you -- I think
- 16 the schedule that I prepared before are those types of
- 17 things which investors look to in terms of determining
- 18 whether a utility has a fair opportunity to earn their
- 19 fair return, a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair
- 20 return. Because capital is deployed for all those other
- 21 expenditures, and so I believe investors and others would
- 22 look at the reported financial statements. We simply made
- 23 some of these adjustments because I believe it was
- 24 Mr. Bosch had raised some of those in his testimony,
- 25 saying, well, obviously we would be overearning if we made

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- 1 those adjustments.
- 2 And I think that shows that's simply not
- 3 the case not only on a weather normalized basis, which is
- 4 the one you're pointing out there, but even if you took
- 5 the effect of extreme -- excuse me -- that is not weather
- 6 normalized, but if you took it on a weather normalized
- 7 basis, obviously the earned ROE is even lower.
- 8 Q. So is it fair to say, Mr. Baxter, do you
- 9 believe that it is not fair and appropriate to remove
- 10 those items?
- 11 A. For the analysis that I'm preparing and the
- 12 points that I'm trying to make, I believe that the
- 13 schedules, they certainly tell a story which is consistent
- 14 with my story that we consistently are unable to earn our
- 15 allowed return on equity under the existing Missouri
- 16 framework. That is entirely consistent with the schedules
- 17 that you see preceding that, which is ES1 and ES2, which
- 18 shows the actual earned returns.
- 19 And so I think those schedules all tell the
- 20 same story, and actually ES1 and ES2 could very well be
- 21 the two schedules that investors would look at more
- 22 readily.
- Q. Thank you, Mr. Baxter. Now, I'd like to
- 24 turn to the issue of incentive compensation awards, and if
- 25 I could, I'd like to go ahead and hand you the definitive

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- 1 proxy statement. We have multiple copies for the various
- 2 parties.
- JUDGE WOODRUFF: Do you want to mark this
- 4 as an exhibit?
- 5 MS. VUYLSTEKE: Yes, we'd like to mark this
- 6 as --
- JUDGE WOODRUFF: Be 525.
- 8 (MIEC EXHIBIT NO. 525 WAS MARKED FOR
- 9 IDENTIFICATION.)
- 10 BY MS. VUYLSTEKE:
- 11 Q. And if I could go ahead and I would like to
- 12 refer you to page 65 of the proxy statement.
- 13 A. Yes. I'm there.
- 14 Q. And, Mr. Baxter, I note that there is a
- 15 reference to 120 percent of target for incentive
- 16 compensation, and I was wondering if you could explain
- 17 **that**.
- 18 A. I'm sorry. You're on page 65 and you're
- 19 talking about 120 percent of targeted. Could you show me
- where that's at, please?
- 21 Q. Sure. There's an explanation of various
- 22 targets.
- 23 A. I'm not sure I see where you're pointing
- 24 out the 120 percent.
- Q. Okay. If you go -- I'm sorry. I was going

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- 1 to ask you to explain the target and then refer back to
- 2 page 5. You see an outline of various targets, there's a
- 3 base incentive compensation. Could you explain -- could
- 4 you explain the incentive compensation that's laid out on
- 5 page 65 of the testimony of the proxy statements where you
- 6 are referring to a compensation structure that allows for
- 7 a base and a target?
- 8 A. So are you wanting me to try and explain
- 9 this chart here on page 65, is that what you're asking me
- 10 to do?
- 11 Q. Correct.
- 12 A. Well, so what this -- what this says is
- 13 that at the beginning of each year our board of directors
- 14 establishes an earnings per share target for all of Ameren
- 15 Corporation. That's Ameren EPS. And based upon how the
- 16 company performs compared to that earnings per share
- 17 determines whether you receive any incentive compensation.
- 18 It can go from as low as zero up to 150 percent, depending
- 19 upon where you land.
- 20 And then as a result of that incentive
- 21 compensation, it isn't formulaic. That means that you
- 22 have to perform as an individual. And so consequently,
- 23 the board of directors has the ability to, even though the
- 24 formula would say an individual would get XYZ because of
- 25 where they fell on the chart, they could give them as low

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- 1 as zero percent or minus 50 percent of their base award up
- 2 to more than 50 percent. And then ultimately that results
- 3 in your incentive payout is capped at 200 percent of
- 4 target no matters what happens.
- 5 Q. And then -- Mr. Baxter, thank you for that
- 6 explanation. And then if you would refer to page 5 of the
- 7 same document.
- 8 A. Okay. I have now read it. Thank you.
- 9 Q. And first of all, Mr. Baxter, could you
- 10 tell me, did the board approve the incentive compensation
- 11 that's outlined on page 5?
- 12 A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And could you say what the incentive
- 14 compensation is for you that was set?
- 15 A. I can. It is back on page 76, and it's
- 16 outlined there what the -- so to help everybody with a lot
- 17 of numbers, you have the salary, which reflects the base
- 18 salary, which is the only portion which is reflected in
- 19 rates, and then it reflects the stock award, which is our
- 20 long-term incentive awards, which is not reflected in
- 21 rates. And then you see the non-equity incentive
- 22 compensation. That represents the short-term incentive
- 23 compensation which is cash, and that too is not reflected
- 24 in rates.
- 25 O. Do Ameren executives receive incentive

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- 1 awards for meeting earnings per share targets if the
- 2 earnings are poor?
- 3 A. So tell me how you define poor,
- 4 Ms. Vuylsteke.
- 5 Q. Well, I would ask you, Mr. Baxter, to tell
- 6 me what you think meeting your earnings per share target
- 7 means and whether -- what poor would mean in that context.
- 8 A. Well, let me say this. As I said before,
- 9 the board establishes targets, and so they establish a
- 10 minimum threshold, they establish a target, and they
- 11 establish a maximum threshold. So the board establishes
- 12 those targets, what they believe are appropriate to pay
- 13 incentive compensation. If you fall within the minimum or
- 14 the maximum, you're eliqible, not quaranteed, eliqible to
- 15 receive incentive compensation. That's how the incentive
- 16 compensation works. If you receive below that minimum,
- 17 then you get zero. It doesn't matter if you were a star
- 18 performer that year, you get zero.
- 19 Q. And you receive -- Mr. Baxter, if you
- 20 receive 100 percent, what does the board mean by target
- 21 and getting 100 percent?
- 22 A. You know, the board makes that decision
- 23 independently utilizing an independent board of directors
- 24 which establish those, and then it seeks approval from the
- 25 board of directors as well as using an independent

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1	advisor, and they look at what they believe is an
2	appropriate target to be established for our company to
3	establish what they believe are appropriate goals for the
4	company.
5	Q. Mr. Baxter, is exceeding target considered
6	poor?
7	A. In what context? I'm trying to understand
8	poor.
9	Q. In the context of your incentive
10	compensation.
11	A. I think if you exceed target, you have the
12	ability to earn more under the incentive compensation
13	program than you would if you were at target and you would
14	have the ability to earn more than if it was at minimum.
15	Q. And, Mr. Baxter, do you agree and do you
16	believe that Missouri regulatory mechanisms have improved
17	since 2007?
18	A. Yes.
19	Q. I just have a couple more questions,
20	Mr. Baxter.
21	A. I'm sorry. Are you done with the proxy
22	statement?
23	Q. I am. Thank you very much. I apologize.
24	Mr. Baxter, do you know what the materiality level is for
25	your outside auditors and experts?

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1	A. I do not.
2	Q. Do you know what the materiality limit is
3	for expense?
4	A. I do not.
5	Q. And do you know what the materiality limit
6	is for capital excuse me the materiality level is
7	for capital?
8	A. Make sure I understand. So you say
9	materiality level. Can you define for me what you mean by
10	that in terms of an independent accountant?
11	Q. Well, Mr. Baxter, weren't you at Price
12	Waterhouse? Aren't you an accountant?
13	A. I am indeed.
14	Q. How would you define materiality?
15	A. Well, materiality levels go into a lot of
16	different things. So when you're actually doing an audit
17	you think about materiality levels in terms of the kinds
18	of testing that you're going to do. That's one kind of
19	materiality. You think about materiality levels in terms
20	of whether you have to have any change to financial
21	statements. That's another materiality level. You have
22	material levels in terms of disclosures. So which one are
23	you referring to?
24	Q. Disclosure.
25	A. Disclosure. I don't know that one either.

Page 258 1 Q. Mr. Baxter, do you think that your witness 2 Lynn Barnes would know that? 3 Α. I don't know. MS. VUYLSTEKE: No further questions. 4 5 Thank you. 6 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Did you wish to offer 525, 7 the proxy statement? MS. VUYLSTEKE: Yes, I would. Thank you. 8 JUDGE WOODRUFF: 525 has been offered. Any 9 objections to its receipt? 10 11 (No response.) 12 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Hearing none, it will be 13 received. 14 (MIEC EXHIBIT NO. 525 WAS RECEIVED INTO 15 EVIDENCE.) 16 JUDGE WOODRUFF: For further 17 cross-examination, then, I skipped over DNR. Did DNR have 18 any questions? DNR? 19 MR. LOWERY: They're not here. JUDGE WOODRUFF: They're not here. I'm 20 21 sorry. I guess I didn't skip over them. 22 And OPC? 23 MR. MILLS: Just very briefly. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MILLS: 24 25 Mr. Baxter, do you agree that the question Q.

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- 1 of whether rates are just and reasonable should be looked
- 2 at from the perspective of the customer as well as from
- 3 the company?
- 4 A. I think just and reasonable rates should be
- 5 looked at from all perspectives, including the customer,
- 6 including shareholders, including frankly many others in
- 7 the state of Missouri. So all those things should be
- 8 looked at.
- 9 Q. And in deciding on a level of a rate
- 10 increase in this case, how do you suggest that the
- 11 Commission take into -- take into account the customers'
- 12 perspective?
- 13 A. You know, it's hard to say just exactly
- 14 how they should take into account, but the reason we have
- 15 12 public hearings is so you can hear from the customers.
- 16 And so that should be one of many factors, as well as
- 17 factors in terms of what the state needs for safe,
- 18 reliable service and infrastructure, in terms of what
- 19 should be appropriate rates and returns, the opportunity
- 20 to earn a fair return on investments. Those are all
- 21 factors. You know, it's ultimately up to the Commission
- 22 in terms of how they rate that.
- Q. My question is, how should the Commission
- 24 take into account the customers' perspective when they're
- 25 talking about dollars and cents in terms of a rate

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- 1 increase?
- 2 A. I think the Commission should take into
- 3 account certainly matters that were not only just stated
- 4 at the public hearings, but I think other matters which
- 5 customers always talk about, that their top priority has
- 6 been and continues to be reliability. That too needs to
- 7 be factored in to the decision-making.
- 8 Q. And can you point to me any point in any of
- 9 the local public hearings in which any of the customers
- said that the thing that they want most is reliability?
- 11 A. Are you talking about on the public record
- 12 or are you talking about just in the public hearings in
- 13 general?
- 14 Q. I'm talking about in the record in this
- 15 case from all of those 12 local public hearings you just
- 16 talked about.
- 17 A. I can't point to a specific instance. What
- 18 I can say is that --
- 19 Q. Well, you don't have to say any more
- 20 because you can't say the answer to my question.
- 21 A. I cannot.
- 22 Q. So going back to my original question, how
- 23 in determining the amount of the rate increase in this
- 24 case should the Commission take into account the
- 25 customers' perspective?

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1	A. I can't speak for the Commission. I think
2	it's ultimately going to be the Commission's decision, but
3	I do believe that the Commission should listen to the
4	record that was or pay attention to the record that was
5	made in the public hearings. But I think that goes beyond
6	just what was heard and discussed at the public hearings.
7	Q. Would the proposal made by Public Counsel
8	witness Barbara Meisenheimer be an appropriate way to take
9	into account the public testimony?
10	A. I believe the Commission should take into
11	account all items that are on the record in this case,
12	absolutely. Hers would be one piece of testimony as well
13	as all of our company witnesses as well.
14	Q. So you agree with me?
15	A. Yes.
16	MR. MILLS: That's all I have. Thank you.
17	JUDGE WOODRUFF: For Staff?
18	MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Judge. I have an
19	exhibit, Staff 237, and I've reached an agreement with the
20	company that they will stipulate to the admission of this,
21	and this is the pleading, the company's response to
22	Staff's motion to declassify, and attached to that is the
23	quarterly financial surveillance monitoring report that I
24	referred to in my opening statement and that I believe
25	Mr. Woodsmall referred to as well. So based on the

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1	stipulation with the company, I will offer this at this
2	time.
3	(STAFF EXHIBIT NO. 237 WAS MARKED FOR
4	IDENTIFICATION.)
5	JUDGE WOODRUFF: 237 has been offered. Any
6	objection to its receipt?
7	MR. BYRNE: None, your Honor.
8	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Hearing none, it will be
9	received.
10	(STAFF EXHIBIT NO. 237 WAS RECEIVED INTO
11	EVIDENCE.)
12	MR. THOMPSON: Thank you very much. I have
13	no questions for you, Mr. Baxter.
14	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Then we'll come up for
15	questions from the Bench, beginning with the Chairman.
16	QUESTIONS BY CHAIRMAN GUNN:
17	Q. Good afternoon.
18	A. Good afternoon.
19	Q. I just want to clarify a couple of things
20	that you said. So you testified that after since 2007,
21	the regulatory structure and regulatory environment in
22	Missouri, you believe there's been an improvement?
23	A. Absolutely.
24	Q. And what year did you first receive the
25	fuel adjustment clause?

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1	A. Chairman Gunn, I believe it was in 2009,
2	but I may not be exactly right. It was I could
3	Q. After 2007?
4	A. It was after 2007, that's correct.
5	Q. And vegetation management tracker, that was
6	after 2007?
7	A. I don't recall if that was a result or
8	incorporated in the 2007 case or the next one. It was
9	early in that period of time. I just simply don't recall.
10	Q. Was it before or after the three major
11	storm incidents?
12	A. It was after that. That I do know.
13	Q. All right. That's all the questions I have
14	on that, but I'd like you to so the lawyers in their
15	opening presentation showed the chart which showed that
16	there wasn't earning. It was weather normalized, so you
17	didn't see any particular month that was done. But yet to
18	Kevin I would just like to have this explained where
19	the actual earned return on equity for the last 12 months
20	is 10.53.
21	A. So, Chairman Gunn, a couple of things I
22	would point to maybe to help. If you look at the
23	Schedule ES2, this is in my surrebuttal testimony, it does
24	show one month where there's no weather impacts that shows
25	that we earned above our allowed return.

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1	Now, the schedule, the surveillance report,
2	which is prepared for the Commission, is prepared by Gary
3	Weiss, who I know will be up here a little bit later.
4	That report reflects does not include things like the
5	Taum Sauk disallowance. So the schedules that you saw
6	Mr. Lowery show a little bit earlier reflected the Taum
7	Sauk disallowance.
8	And so in June that 10.53 percent does not
9	include the Taum Sauk disallowance, but it does include
10	things like extreme weather that we had, as well as the
11	refund from Entergy is included in those two numbers, and
12	so that was included in that June 2012 12 months ended
13	surveillance report. Does that help or does that confuse?
14	Q. It helps, but what it sounds like was
15	presented was an adjusted chart to demonstrate that you
16	didn't earn above the ROE, but when you have a nonadjusted
17	surveillance report, you get 10.54?
18	A. So, Chairman, let I hear the question.
19	And I said before, I believe it was Ms. Vuylsteke, it was
20	my perspective that the chart that we present is the
21	proper chart in terms of all the adjustments from a
22	reported basis.
23	But having said that, if you look back at
24	my schedules that I prepared in my surrebuttal testimony,
25	there are two of them there, and we've taken out three

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- 1 adjustments in those schedules. One includes the Taum
- 2 Sauk disallowance. One includes the FAC disallowance,
- 3 meaning that we added that back in, and the third one was
- 4 the Entergy adjustment. And either on a weather
- 5 normalized basis or reflecting weather, 100 percent, we do
- 6 not earn our allowed return throughout the entire year of
- 7 2012.
- 8 So we tried to address allegations that we
- 9 were trying to not fully reflect these unusual items.
- 10 We've indeed reflected those.
- 11 O. One of the statements that was made in the
- 12 opening statements is that you would see -- if the
- 13 regulatory compact wasn't broken, you would see peaks and
- 14 valleys in terms of -- in terms of earnings. Well, under
- 15 certain charts without weather normalization, you do see
- some of those, correct?
- 17 A. Very few times you do. The answer is yes.
- 18 The answer is yes. The answer is yes.
- 19 Q. You do see them?
- 20 A. We do.
- 21 Q. And so if you do see those, then how can it
- 22 be that it is a structural issue, that it is a regulatory
- 23 structural issue if you can, in fact, earn above your
- 24 authorized ROE on an occasional basis?
- 25 And I don't know that it's fair to say,

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- 1 well, the weather gets hotter, which means we have people
- 2 using electricity more and, therefore, we're going to take
- 3 that out and not take it into account. You're not taking
- 4 into account the factor that allows you to make more
- 5 money, and yet you are -- you are taking into account the
- 6 months where you don't make more money because people use
- 7 less electricity.
- 8 So it just -- it seems to me that by
- 9 disregarding the factors that allow you to make more money
- 10 which shows that you're not earning your authorized ROE
- doesn't really reflect that there is a structural
- 12 institutional problem with the opportunity to earn ROE,
- 13 because if that was the case, then it wouldn't matter
- 14 whether you were making more money in the hot -- in the
- 15 hot months.
- A. Mr. Chairman, can I respond?
- 17 **O. Sure.**
- 18 A. And so from my perspective, when you look
- 19 at a regulatory framework, you shouldn't rely on weather
- 20 to bail you out or to ultimately cripple you, right?
- 21 Weather will be what it will be. And so what we did in
- 22 the same way in both positive and negative, we prepared a
- 23 chart that took the effects of weather entirely out, both
- 24 good and bad. And the simple answer is that we've never,
- 25 never for five years earned our allowed ROE. Even when

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- 1 you took the extreme weather patterns in there, we earned
- 2 it 15 percent of the time.
- 3 But to your point that it goes up and down,
- 4 yes, but it's only because of weather, is my point. When
- 5 I look at this systematic problem, if I can talk a little
- 6 bit about that. Would you mind?
- 7 Q. Let me push back a little bit on what you
- 8 just said.
- 9 A. Okay.
- 10 Q. Because if what we are talking about is an
- institutional structural inability for you to earn your
- 12 ROE, then you shouldn't be able to earn that under any
- 13 circumstances and that is not the case. The point is that
- 14 when you do have weather, and you call it extreme, but
- 15 we've had 100 degree weather. I don't know what the --
- 16 11 days of 100 degree weather, but over a period of time
- 17 and in the chart in the last case, you demonstrated that
- 18 you were able to earn on certain months over your -- over
- 19 your ROE. That is in the last case. That's before this
- 20 summer. That's before the drought. That's before all
- 21 that stuff.
- 22 And so I guess what I'd like you to explain
- is, is that if it is only -- which is what the lawyers
- 24 said, that it was the regulatory framework and this
- 25 Commission, which everything that I've read from Wall

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- Street says that the Commission's last four rate cases
- 2 have been constructive. You yourself said that it has
- 3 been improved since 2007, the regulatory framework. So
- 4 the regulatory framework in Missouri has only gotten
- 5 better since 2007.
- But the claim now is that, well, the only
- 7 reason why you haven't been able to earn the ROE is
- 8 because this Commission plus the regulatory framework.
- 9 There are no other external factors that cause you to have
- 10 the inability to earn the ROE. That is what was said. If
- 11 that's the case, then how come you've been able to earn
- 12 over your authorized ROE in several different months?
- 13 A. Chairman, let me try to address that in
- 14 several instances. No. 1, we're not throwing tomatoes at
- 15 this Commission --
- 16 Q. I'm not saying you are.
- 17 A. -- just to be clear. But what I'm saying
- 18 is that I believe -- because I think the Commission has
- 19 taken some very proactive and appropriate steps since 2007
- 20 to address known issues and circumstances, and we
- 21 appreciate that, and the regulatory environment has
- 22 improved. What you're suggesting is that despite --
- 23 despite the fact that we've had five rate increases and
- 24 we've had -- despite -- not five. Five rate filings and
- 25 four rate increases. Despite the fact that we've taken

Page 269 significant sums of money out of our business and over 2 \$300 million we've reduced our expenditures and we've 3 reduced head count nearly 10 percent since 2009, you would think that with revenues going up and costs going down 4 5 that that gap would be meaningfully narrowed. 6 But the reality is, is that it isn't, and I 7 think it isn't -- it is the framework which causes the problem because of changes in circumstances. And so as a 8 result -- you know, so when I see the systemic problem, when I see system -- when I see every utility in this 10 state coming in for several rate increases -- and I can 11 12 speak for our company. We've had cost increases, 13 significant cost increases. 14 And when I see the fact that we still cannot earn our allowed ROE, even on a weather normalized 15 basis, only very occasionally, not weather normalized 16 17 without taking out weather, that to me says we've got to step back and say we have an issue. 18 19 Because the results of that is that when 20 you don't -- when you have that excessive regulatory lag, 21 and that's what I'm talking about is excessive regulatory lag, you don't have cash flows, right? We've had negative 22 free cash flow in excess of a billion dollars over the 23 24 last several years. Not each year, but it accumulates and ultimately drives us to have to reduce expenditures for 25

Page 270 good projects which I believe are in the best interests of 1 2 the state and its customers. 3 What we're trying to do in this case is to maintain the good things that this Commission has done 4 over the last several years. We appreciate that. What 5 we're trying to do is make an incremental step with plant 6 7 in service accounting and the storm tracker to try and -it's not going to necessarily solve the problem, but it 8 will promote the investment that we think is necessary. 10 And I guess that's part of what my question Q. 11 is, is in the last rate case, what was not -- what was not 12 done by this -- by the rate case order? I mean, you're 13 seeing -- if it is truly a regulatory framework issue and 14 it is not anything else, it's not the fact that the 15 economy was in a free fall in 2008, it's not the fact that 16 usage has gone down, it's not any of those factors, it is 17 merely the regulatory framework, then what is it that -then how do we know that what this Commission does -- if 18 we were to award you a tracker, if we were give that to 19 20 you, how do we know that it's going to make a difference? 21 Is it -- are we going to know that only if 22 you have to file a rate case in the next year or in the next -- but we can't solve some of these other issues that 23 24 you're saying are systemic to the regulatory framework. I agree, Chairman, and so what we're asking 25 Α.

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- 1 you to do is within your jurisdiction. We know you can't,
- 2 for instance, give us a forward test year for capital
- 3 additions. That would violate the CWIP standard. We know
- 4 you can't give us CWIP. We know you can't give us a rider
- 5 mechanism.
- 6 So what we're asking the Commission to do
- 7 is do things within their power, and tracker is one of
- 8 those things.
- 9 Q. And we have to make the assumption that
- 10 your operations, merely because you have -- you have
- 11 declining costs, that your operation is running
- 12 efficiently to the point that, again, it is not a factor
- in not earning the authorized ROE?
- 14 A. So, Chairman Gunn, I'm not up here to tell
- 15 you that we have our operations perfect, you know.
- 16 Frankly, I tell our people every day, we have to get
- 17 better every day. That's what we need to do, and we are
- 18 trying to do that, trying to get better every day.
- 19 And so does management have a
- 20 responsibility? You bet we do. But the problem that I'm
- 21 seeing is that the gap is so big that what we're trying to
- 22 do -- I don't think this plant in service accounting is
- 23 automatically going to solve everything, but it's a step
- 24 in the right direction. Your hands are tied in some
- 25 respects. You can only do so much.

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1	But I do believe that we are we are
2	operating in an effective way. And so what evidence do
3	you have to say? You don't have to trust me. You can
4	look at third parties. We just received the best award
5	that you can get in the fossil plant industry in our
6	Labadie and Rush Island plants, that it wasn't just about
7	the equipment availability, which was very good, but it
8	was about cost, and you put those two things together, out
9	of 500 plants, they were one and two.
10	You look at our Callaway operating plant,
11	it has run continuously for two cycles. That is
12	extraordinary in the nuclear industry. And customers
13	benefit from that, because when Callaway's humming our
14	costs are low, and that gives us more off-system sales
15	that we can sell out into the market. And you can see
16	that we're taking actions on reducing costs by voluntary
17	severance programs, by continuing to drive costs down, and
18	so there is external evidence.
19	Q. That you're reducing cost. What I'm asking
20	you is, do you believe that the company's operation in any
21	way contributes to not being able to earn your authorized
22	ROE?
23	A. Commissioner
24	Q. That was the contention in the opening
25	statement. I'm asking you to verify that, that

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1	A. Chairman, can we do better in terms of
2	trying to earn our allowed ROE? We can always do better,
3	but we alone within our company cannot solve that earnings
4	gap. We cannot solve that, because we simply have to
5	provide safe and adequate service, and so the problem that
6	we have to make sure we provide safe and adequate service,
7	which our customers frankly expect higher, they expect
8	higher than adequate. We have to make investments.
9	And so those investments that we make, 700
10	million just since the last rate case, are serving
11	customers today, and we're losing money on those
12	investments. We're losing money because they've gone into
13	rate base. They're depreciating. We're losing that cost
14	of capital. That's happening.
15	We have a witness in this case, Ms. Barnes,
16	who said that since the last rate case we will have lost
17	nearly \$40 million by the time rates go into effect just
18	by putting in assets that are helping customers today to
19	provide the safe not just safe and adequate service
20	because we're providing more than that.
21	Mr. Lowery showed the fact that we have
22	reliability which is among the best in the industry. It's
23	in the top 25 percent. So can we be the top? Sure, we
24	can. We're not the top but we're not but we're not
25	falling short in terms of trying to deliver what our

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- 1 customers' expectations are.
- 2 Q. I just have two more questions. The first
- 3 is that you will agree that -- or would you agree that
- 4 regulatory lag is a part of the regulatory compact?
- 5 A. Yes, I agree.
- 6 Q. Regulatory lag because of the nature of the
- 7 regulation is a part of this and is expected, and if you
- 8 were to eliminate it entirely, it would upset the normal
- 9 regulatory compact?
- 10 A. Chairman, I believe some level of
- 11 regulatory lag is appropriate. The problem that we have
- 12 is excessive regulatory lag.
- 13 Q. Now, my last question is, is if this
- 14 Commission were to grant plant in service, would that
- 15 substantially reduce your risk?
- 16 A. Would it substantially reduce our risk
- 17 compared to our peers? No. No, it would not. No, it
- 18 would not. Because our peers have other mechanisms in
- 19 place that help them address regulatory lag. They have
- 20 forward test years. They have rider mechanisms. They
- 21 have formulaic rates. These things that you can't do, I
- 22 know, and so that's why we propose plant in service
- 23 accounting as a proxy because we know what you can and
- 24 can't do. They have CWIP.
- 25 Q. But that's not going to substantially

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- 1 reduce your risk?
- 2 A. It will not substantially -- it will reduce
- 3 our risk. It will absolutely reduce our risk. But
- 4 compared to our peers, I don't think it reduces them at
- 5 all. I think it tries to get us more in line with where
- 6 they're at.
- 7 CHAIRMAN GUNN: Thank you, Mr. Baxter. I
- 8 don't have any more.
- 9 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Jarrett?
- 10 QUESTIONS BY COMMISSIONER JARRETT:
- 11 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Baxter.
- 12 A. Good afternoon.
- 13 Q. I have a few questions. I wanted to start
- off, you had an exchange with Mr. Mills about the local
- 15 public hearings and what you heard from customers, and you
- 16 began to talk about reliability as being an issue. Has it
- 17 been your experience that customers are concerned about
- 18 reliability as well as price?
- 19 A. Absolutely. In fact, Commissioner Jarrett,
- 20 our customers time and time again -- because we talk to
- 21 our customers. We have -- we do studies. We do focus
- 22 groups. And their number one priority has been and will
- 23 continue to be reliability. Does price matter? You bet.
- 24 But reliability is number one.
- 25 Q. And you were here during the opening

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- 1 statements this morning, weren't you?
- 2 A. I was.
- 3 Q. I know at least a couple of the attorneys
- 4 referenced the 1990s and the 2000s referencing that Ameren
- 5 actually earned in excess of their allowed ROE. Do you
- 6 remember --
- 7 A. I do remember that.
- 8 Q. Has the utility industry and the markets
- 9 and the economy changed since the 1990s and early 2000s?
- 10 A. The simple answer to that is yes, and I
- 11 would like to make sure I go back and talk about the chart
- 12 that was prepared, because that chart was misleading and
- 13 wrong. But let me answer your second question first, your
- 14 question, and then I'll go back and talk about that chart.
- 15 In terms of what's happened in the 1990s,
- 16 2000s compared to today, this is one of the reasons that
- 17 we're talking about plant in service accounting, because
- 18 back in the day in the 1990s, what was happening is that
- 19 we were putting infrastructure -- we had pretty much the
- 20 same regulatory framework back then. We were putting in
- 21 infrastructure just like we are today. That
- 22 infrastructure we were putting in was there to really help
- 23 load growth.
- In many respects it was before the '90s.
- 25 It was the '70s, in the '80s, because we had customer

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- 1 load. We had customers who were putting in air
- 2 conditioning, and so we put in investments which were
- 3 going up, but we also had revenue-producing customers,
- 4 right, just not because of rate base but simply because of
- 5 usage were going up. And so the regulatory framework was
- 6 adequate at the time. We had revenues going up, we had
- 7 costs going up, and so the regulatory lag thing wasn't as
- 8 much of an issue.
- 9 What's happened since then I would say are
- 10 two or three things. No. 1, those same systems and
- 11 infrastructure that we put in back in the '60s, '50s,
- 12 '70s, those are aging. Those are still the same systems
- 13 that are serving our customers today in many respects.
- 14 They're aging, so we have to put more investment in there.
- The second thing, which I know we've talked
- 16 about at this Commission before, is that our mandates have
- 17 gone up significantly, mandates for environmental,
- 18 mandates for renewable, mandates for even transmission and
- 19 even, you know, mandates just for just general
- 20 liabilities. Not whining. It's just reality.
- 21 So costs are going up. They were going up
- 22 this way. Now they're going up this way. What has
- 23 happened from a customer usage standpoint is that it is at
- 24 best flat and maybe going up a little bit, and the
- 25 customer usage is not for new business. It's primarily

Page 278 they're staying flat, and the investments we're making 1 2 today are for those mandates in aging infrastructure. 3 So that's why we're having a bigger disconnect than what we had perhaps decades ago. Hence 4 5 the reason why there has been a significant change and hence the reason why, as we look at the needs for the 6 7 state of Missouri and the need for investments, you know, 8 we need to find a solution to the regulatory framework to make incremental difference so we can make those good discretionary investments for our customers. 10 If I could address your statement about our 11 12 earnings back in the day, back in the 1990s, I believe it was Ms. Vuylsteke, she presented a chart, and I was the 13 controller back then. I have to admit, I was struck by 14 15 the chart in terms of what our earned ROEs were back then. Because keep in mind, this chart starts in 1996, goes from 16 1995 to 2007. 17 18 What you have to keep in mind, what this 19 Commission did not know is that back in 1995 to 2001 and 20 2002, we had an alternative rate regulation plan in place 21 that, frankly, most of the people in this room sat around

And that alternative regulation plan was

the table and shook hands, said this is what we were going

such that, that you -- that as we had earnings between

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to do, and it was approved by the Commission.

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- 1 certain levels, we would then keep them up to a certain
- 2 level, between -- and that was 12.6. Cost of capital was
- 3 meaningfully different back then -- up to 12.6, and then
- 4 between 12.6 and I think it was 14, we'd share 50 percent
- 5 as an example, and above 14, we gave 100 percent of those
- 6 earnings back, 100 percent.
- 7 And so when I look at this schedule and I
- 8 see that we had earned ROEs back then that were, it looks
- 9 like 15, 20, they didn't take in effect the credits that
- 10 we gave back to the customers.
- 11 And so our -- we didn't over -- number one,
- 12 it's impossible to overearn when everyone has agreed to a
- 13 deal. We all said this is how it's going to be. And then
- 14 secondly, I think this chart is misleading. I don't
- 15 think. I know it is.
- 16 And then thirdly, beyond that, so after we
- 17 got done with this alternative rate regulation plan, some
- 18 of these same people in the room agreed to another deal
- 19 between 2002 to '05 that said, this is how we're going to
- 20 implement rates. There was a moratorium. There was
- 21 actually rate reduction. And we moved forward. Again, no
- 22 one could allege overearning because this is the deal that
- 23 we entered into. And so when you look at this chart, we
- 24 weren't trying to hoodwink the Commission. The simple
- 25 answer is that those were deals that we struck and we

Page 280 agreed on and moved on. 1 2 So now we have a different time that we're 3 trying to talk about from 2007, and so I just want to make sure I address that because I think folks may think that 4 5 we were earning 20 percent. That wasn't happening. No 6 way. 7 Well, thank you for that. Now I want to Q. 8 get back to what we were talking about, some of the changes between that time and this time, and you mentioned 10 several of them. Renewables, we have renewable energy 11 standards now. That is different from the old time? 12 Absolutely. 13 Q. Bigger emphasis on demand response and 14 energy efficiency where maybe in the 1990s, 1980s, there 15 wasn't any emphasis on that. It was just to provide more 16 power, more power, use more power and really no emphasis 17 on energy efficiency, which lowers your chance to earn revenue because you're not selling as much power? 18 19 Well, that is exactly right, because what's Α. not reflected in rates today -- and obviously we're real 20 21 pleased with what the Commission did with our energy efficiency MEEIA filing -- is the issue of, as customer 22 23 usage goes down, we lose the revenues or fixed costs 24 associated with those. And so as that has actually

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happened here in the early 2000s, we started seeing more

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- 1 efficient use. When I said customer usage is going down
- 2 for a variety of reasons, it's because of the economy but
- 3 also because of energy efficiency.
- 4 Q. Another issue is transmission with the
- 5 renewable standards now. They built out of transmission
- 6 from west to the east to get to the wind power. That's
- 7 another big factor.
- 8 A. That's right. So, Commissioner, even more
- 9 recently there's been a significant level of transmission
- 10 expenditures just within the last year that are mandated
- in terms of meeting NERC, North American Energy Reliance
- 12 Council standards, so they just continue to increase as
- 13 well.
- 14 Q. So if I understand your testimony and your
- direct and your surrebuttal, you're basically saying
- 16 there's a new paradigm now, that times have changed from
- 17 what they were before, and we're not going to go back to
- 18 those old days, we're operating under a new environment,
- 19 all of these other issues that have developed in the last
- 20 10, 15 years. Would that be accurate?
- 21 A. It would be.
- 22 Q. And if I understand your testimony
- 23 correctly is that, given that new paradigm, you're asking
- 24 the Commission to look at some innovative ways to more
- 25 closely match the costs so that the company has a better

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- opportunity to earn -- a reasonable opportunity to earn
- 2 its allowed ROE?
- 3 A. That's correct, Commissioner Jarrett, but I
- 4 want to say one more thing to that. This isn't all about
- 5 the company and the shareholders, in my opinion. I
- 6 believe this plant in service accounting proposal is as
- 7 much about what's the right thing to do for our customers,
- 8 because I believe that if customers believe, and they do,
- 9 that reliability is the top property, and we are having to
- 10 defer and/or eliminate good discretionary reliability
- 11 projects to meet their expectations, we want to make some
- 12 of those investments.
- 13 I'm not suggesting it's just going to be a
- 14 flood of those, but we want to make some of those
- 15 investments because reliability is not only good for our
- 16 customers in that regard because we meet their number one
- 17 priority, but better to move some of those investments
- 18 today and do those investments sooner than later when you
- 19 have interest rates at perhaps historic lows.
- 20 And so as opposed to deferring these things
- 21 out many, many years when they ultimately have to become
- 22 done, you move them up and customers can benefit from
- 23 that. And so you put those things together and then you
- 24 think about the state of Missouri. All right? The state
- 25 of Missouri wants reliable infrastructure to attract

Page 283 business and, of course, they want to have reasonable 2 rates. 3 This plant in service accounting proposal I don't believe is going to have a significant impact on 4 5 rates. Will they potentially have them go up? Maybe, but if we wait and do some of these infrastructure investments 6 7 later when interest rates are higher, it could actually be 8 more costly to customers to do some of those things. 9 And I know the arguments that the -- that Q. the consumer -- Office of the Public Counsel and some of 10 11 the consumer groups are making, and they make some valid 12 points about the fact that doing this would be an increase 13 to them. But on the other hand, you also have to look at 14 things like rate shock, where some of these mechanisms may 15 be a leveling out. There may be increases, but they're 16 step increases rather than one big increase at the next 17 rate case. Is that beneficial to customers? Commissioner, I think you hit the nail 18 Α. right on the head there. Because what ends up happening 19 is when you have a rate case, you have to try and get all 20 21 these investments in during your cutoff period. Otherwise you're going to have this significant regulatory lag. 22 think plant in service accounting would give you the 23 ability to smooth out some of these investments because 24

you're not worrying about those losses between rate cases,

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1	right?
2	And then which customers, as I heard them,
3	they understand the cost issue, and I understand that many
4	of them, one penny is too much. But for others, you know,
5	reliability is a top property. They want to try and find
6	a way to smooth. This is why I think the Commission is
7	looking at the rate stabilization plan or this docket. I
8	get that. This is one mechanism. This is not going to
9	solve all that, but this is a mechanism which will be
10	absolutely consistent with what you just said.
11	Q. Would you agree with the statement that if
12	you have regulatory lag in an era of rising costs, does
13	that negatively affect your borrowing power?
14	A. Yes.
15	Q. And how does it?
16	A. Simply put, when you have regulatory lag
17	during rising costs, especially in Missouri where you
18	establish rates based on historical costs, and so if you
19	have rising costs, whether it be one, two, three, five
20	percent and your rates are based on historical cost, then
21	simply you are incurring more losses.
22	And so consequently, having a regulatory
23	framework which addresses more costs which are more, I
24	would say, attuned to the costs that you're going to
25	incur, whether it be well, I know we can't do forward

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- 1 test year, but that's why you see some of those entities
- 2 with forward test year or rider mechanisms, they generally
- 3 have a more favorable regulatory plan working from a
- 4 credit perspective, which is important. It has an impact
- 5 on your borrowing costs.
- 6 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: I don't think I have
- 7 any more questions, Mr. Baxter. Thank you.
- JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Kenney?
- 9 QUESTIONS BY COMMISSIONER KENNEY:
- 10 Q. Mr. Baxter, thank you. I have a few more
- 11 questions.
- 12 A. Great.
- 13 Q. Maybe. I want to take a step back and make
- 14 sure that we address some threshold issues, because when
- we use the term regulatory framework and regulatory
- 16 compact, I want to make sure that we all have the same
- 17 understanding of what those phrases actually mean.
- 18 A. I'll do my best to try and clarify from my
- 19 perspective.
- 20 Q. Let me ask you about the regulatory
- 21 compact. I'll tell you what I think it is. You tell me
- 22 if you agree or disagree. It's an understanding that a
- 23 monopoly, a natural monopoly utility that provides an
- 24 essential service will agree to regulation by a public
- 25 utility commission, by the state, in exchange for being

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- 1 able to operate in a monopoly territory without any
- 2 competition. That's it?
- 3 A. Well, I think that's part of the compact.
- 4 The other part of the compact is, by so doing, by
- 5 agreeing -- because we have an obligation to serve under
- 6 that compact. So with that obligation to serve, we have
- 7 to have the ability to recover our prudently incurred
- 8 costs and to have a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair
- 9 return on our investments. So that compact --
- 10 Q. I think we basically have the same
- 11 understanding.
- 12 A. Yes. I just wanted to make sure there's
- 13 the other piece to it.
- 14 Q. And that part's important, the reasonable
- opportunity to earn a fair return. And you were here when
- 16 Mr. Lowery gave his opening statement. So you heard me
- 17 ask him this question. Part of Ameren's argument is that
- 18 it has consistently under-earned at least since 2008,
- 19 right?
- 20 A. '07, yes.
- 21 Q. 2007. And that consistent and persistent
- 22 under-earning is a result of outdated regulatory
- 23 framework; is that correct?
- A. I think that's certainly a major
- 25 contributor, yes.

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- Q. Okay. Therefore, and I -- this is the
- 2 question I think that I have. Does the persistent and
- 3 consistent under-earning, does that in and of itself
- 4 demonstrate that the regulatory framework is somehow
- 5 broken?
- 6 A. I think that's a strong indicator, but,
- 7 Commissioner, I think there are other things that tell me
- 8 why the framework is broken.
- 9 Q. Okay. What are those other things?
- 10 A. The first thing is that over these last
- 11 five years, you haven't just seen our company but every
- 12 electric utility in the state come in consistently for
- 13 rate increases and been granted rate increases, various
- 14 sizes. But so that's number one. So all things being
- 15 equal, you're seeing revenues going up.
- 16 Secondly, I can speak for my company, and
- 17 that's probably true for the others, but I can speak for
- 18 my company. I know that during this period of time we
- 19 have been on a cost reduction effort both in operating
- 20 expenditures and capital expenditures. So all things
- 21 being equal, revenues are going up, you're bringing costs
- down, you should be making meaningful if not significant
- 23 progress on this challenge.
- Yet at the same time I look at the charts
- 25 and I still see systemic under-earning, both on a --

Page 288 without factoring out weather and factoring out weather, 2 which you can't in my opinion judge a regulatory framework 3 based on weather. Weather should just be factored out. And so in that case what it says is that --4 that you probably have a problem. And the reason why 5 that's a problem, it isn't just about shareholders. 6 7 Shareholders matter, right? So do customers and so does the state of Missouri. 8 9 And so when you have that, you have these -- you don't have cash flows, right, which you have 10 11 to have the cash ultimately to do your investments. And 12 if you have less cash, then ultimately it means you're having to make less investments, and I know we're having 13 to because of the -- to try and align our spend with the 14 regulatory framework, we're having to defer and eliminate 15 good products, which I think is inconsistent with what is 16 17 good. 18 Q. But don't public utilities traditionally 19 have negative cash flows just by virtue of the business 20 model? I mean, there's a lag between the time that you 21 provide the service and the time that you collect from the 22 customers for the service? 23 Α. Commissioner, we do. I think when you look

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you. It's been in excess of a billion, approaching

at the size of negative free cash flow is what concerns

24

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- 1 \$2 billion up here at a time.
- 2 Q. So let me go back to what you were saying
- 3 earlier. You were looking at this chart, MPG21.
- 4 A. Yes.
- 5 Q. And you were explaining that from '95 to
- 6 2001, I think you said, the company was operating under an
- 7 alternative regulatory plan?
- A. That's correct.
- 9 Q. And then that ended in 2001; is that right?
- 10 A. You know, so Commissioner, I think that
- 11 the -- it ended in 2001. I think it actually -- it wasn't
- 12 on a calendar year.
- 13 **Q.** Okay.
- 14 A. I believe it was on a fiscal year. So I'm
- 15 not sure if it actually ended in fiscal 2002. I remember
- 16 those -- that period of time is when it was generally in
- 17 place.
- 18 Q. And you said that back then you had -- you
- 19 were making investments and -- but you had increased
- 20 customer demands, which was helping with the negative free
- 21 cash flow issue.
- 22 A. And so, Commissioner, probably the reality
- 23 is many of those increases in investments were probably
- 24 even made before even the '90s that I was talking about.
- 25 Because if you think about when air conditioning load was

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1	coming on and the robust it was probably even earlier,
2	the '70s; '60s, '70s. So when we talk about aging
3	infrastructure, it even goes back further than that.
4	The 90s were a little bit of a different
5	period, I would say. The '90s was a period where you saw
6	from my perspective a couple of things that happened. I
7	should have mentioned this to Commissioner Jarrett. What
8	you saw were a couple of things with that. Now, you
9	obviously continued to get efficiencies from technology.
10	You also saw significant decreases in our
11	fuel cost because we switched over some of our fuel costs
12	from the Illinois basin into the Powder River Basin. All
13	of those were around the early '90s time period, including
14	then, of course, you had more robust customer growth. You
15	still had customer growth going on, to be clear.
16	Q. So even if you go back to the '70s and
17	there's an increase in infrastructure investment in the
18	'70s, and still you have the increased customer load
19	because you've got air conditioning, et cetera?
20	A. Well, the infrastructure we were building
21	was for more customer load.
22	Q. In anticipation of that additional
23	customer?
24	A. Yeah, trying to stay in front of it. Not
25	only anticipation. In fact, it was reality. It was both.

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- 1 Q. Then are the problems of today more
- 2 attributable to the regulatory framework or just the
- 3 vagaries of the business cycle and the decreased customer
- 4 load?
- 5 A. You know, Commissioner, I think it's both.
- 6 Right? I think as Commissioner Jarrett pointed out, we
- 7 have a different paradigm today. Things have changed, and
- 8 that's no fault of the Commission. It's no fault, you
- 9 know, in many respects of the legislators. It's just
- 10 things have changed.
- 11 And so what has happened over the last
- 12 several years is what I said. The aging infrastructure is
- 13 certainly more meaningful today than it was back in the
- 14 '70s, because it's 40 years old. We have mandates which
- 15 have skyrocketed, and you have now customer usage, loads
- 16 flattish. And so economic conditions changed.
- 17 And so what we're suggesting is that, okay,
- 18 what we need to do is try and make a change, not a leap,
- 19 but an incremental change. I think this Commission,
- 20 frankly, since 2007 has recognized that things change in
- 21 business and changes need to be made.
- 22 The fuel adjustment clause is a great
- 23 example. We have fuel costs skyrocketing. The
- 24 Legislature and the Commission implemented the fuel
- 25 adjustment clause.

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1 Q. And part of the fuel adjustment clause was 2 not solely to help the business, but to help customers 3 mitigate against shock from spiking fuel costs? Α. That's exactly right. So similarly if you 4 5 think about pension and employee benefits, those two are 6 uncontrolled because there's so much driven by interest 7 rates and investment returns. And the Commission said, that's significant, we need to put in a tracker. And the 8 same thing with the reliability. I think Chairman Gunn 10 was talking about the issues we had back in 2006. We need to do something about reliability even more. We're going 11 12 to give you a tracker. And those were good policies. 13 They weren't -- they weren't regulatory things. They weren't just for the shareholder. They were 14 15 for the customer and the state. And so when we bring forth this storm tracker and this plant in service 16 17 accounting thing, it's in that same spirit that we bring those forth. 18 19 So the regulatory compact allows the Q. 20 utility to operate its franchise in a monopoly area free 21 from competition, and the public utility commission 22 ostensibly is supposed to act as a proxy for compensation? 23 Α. Yes, in terms of how they establish rates, the public utility commission, as well as I guess the 24 framework itself, acts as a proxy. 25

Page 293 1 Q. And in a competitive environment, one of 2 the things that would prevent a business from making risky 3 business decisions is the existence of a competitor who may or may not be able to provide the same product at a 4 5 better price? 6 I'm sorry, Commissioner. You said would Α. 7 not make a risky investment because the competitor --8 Q. Yeah. There are market forces in a 9 competitive environment that prevent a competitive business or a business operating in a competitive 10 environment for making overly risky business decisions? 11 12 That's true. And I guess the converse would be true as well, where they may make overly 13 aggressive decisions because they're trying to do 14 15 something that may not work out. It works both ways. 16 We've seen it. 17 Ο. And so in the regulated environment, the prospect of not being able to recover for a particular 18 investment that the company has made, that risk keeps --19 20 and that lag keeps the regulated entity from making overly 21 risky business decisions, right? You know, Commissioner, I'm not so sure 22 that we're talking about risky business decision. I'm 23 talking about the investments we're making. They're not

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designed to be sort of risky.

24

Page 294 1 Q. No. I'm --2 Α. They're designed to be --I'm just trying to make the point, because 3 Q. I know I'm not intimating the need of the business 4 5 decisions that we're talking about or that we have talked about are risky. What I'm trying to make sure that I 6 7 comprehend and make sure to properly capture in this 8 discussion is the purpose of regulatory lag, and the time frame that is built in to regulatory process is there by necessity. I want to get at what that necessity actually 10 11 is. 12 And so, Commissioner, I'm not here to say 13 we have to eliminate regulatory lag. That's -- what I'm saying we have to eliminate is excessive regulatory lag. 14 15 But before we talk about excessive Q. 16 regulatory lag, I think it's -- it's necessary to 17 determine the point of regulatory lag, period. I don't think we can comprehend what excessive actually is if we 18 don't first comprehend what the purpose of that regulatory 19 20 lag is. 21 Α. I understand. 22 Q. So I'm trying to get at, what is the 23 purpose of regulatory lag? I think in point, one of the purposes of 24 Α. regulatory lag is to provide appropriate incentives for 25

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- 1 the company to make sure that they operate their company
- 2 efficiently and effectively. I agree with that.
- 3 Q. And would you agree, though, that the delay
- 4 in the time the investment is made and the time that you
- 5 come in to the public utility commission for approval of
- 6 that investment, the prospect of not being able to recover
- 7 that, that risk that's built into the process is there by
- 8 design?
- 9 A. I'm not so sure if the concept of
- 10 regulatory lag applies the same to investments as it does
- 11 perhaps to operating expenditures. Because if you think
- 12 about it, it is -- it is a little troubling to me that we
- 13 put an investment into service that's serving customers
- 14 tomorrow and we're beginning to lose money on that
- 15 investment and the cost of capital almost immediately.
- 16 Q. Well, then how soon should you be able to
- 17 start recovering -- because really what you're talking
- 18 about is the cost of capital. So you borrow money to do a
- 19 plan, and you've got to pay the interest on that loan
- 20 right away, right?
- 21 A. Well, it's more than that, Commissioner.
- 22 It's the depreciation.
- 23 Q. And depreciation expense?
- 24 A. Yeah. We put a 1,000 -- a \$1,000 piece of
- 25 equipment in and it's a ten-year period of equipment, on

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1	day one, you know, that we're losing the depreciation. So
2	we'll never really fully recover that asset and the cost
3	of capital.
4	Q. So in the regulatory model that Ameren
5	would design, how quickly would you be able to recover? I
6	guess that's the point.
7	A. From my perspective, again, it's because of
8	the change in paradigms is one of the reasons we're
9	talking about this. When you had in the past regulatory
10	lag with customer usage and revenues going under,
11	regulatory lag in the favorable way was helping mitigate
12	this other. The change in paradigm is what's causing the
13	problem.
14	So right now we have investments are still
15	needed and, in fact, the investments are growing, and what
16	we don't have is that offset from the one piece of
17	regulatory lag which historically has benefitted the
18	company, and that is customer growth.
19	And so what we're simply asking to do is
20	say, let's recognize that and let's make a change that
21	that will not only certainly benefit the company but I
22	believe will benefit the customers because these
23	discretionary investments can then be made.
24	Q. I think I understand. There's nothing
25	inherently wrong with the regulatory framework. It's

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- 1 changed circumstances in the form of decreased customer
- 2 load growth?
- 3 A. I see where you're coming from. I think
- 4 that if the same regulatory framework, right, was okay
- 5 back in the '70s, right, and that was because we had a
- 6 different circumstance, I think the regulatory framework
- 7 today, but just because you have a different paradigm
- 8 doesn't mean then the regulatory framework shouldn't be
- 9 modified, right?
- 10 So it's the same thing when we didn't have
- 11 a fuel adjustment clause. People said, well, the
- 12 regulatory framework wasn't the problem. It really
- 13 ultimately became a problem because of changes in
- 14 circumstances. Does that make sense?
- 15 Q. I think so. I think so. But I still think
- 16 that it seems that what we're talking about is not
- 17 necessarily a flaw in the regulatory framework but, I
- 18 mean, if customer growth was -- if customer growth stayed
- 19 the same, then we wouldn't be even -- if we had demand
- 20 providing cash flows and ameliorating the negative cash
- 21 flow problem, then we wouldn't be having this
- 22 conversation?
- 23 A. That's right. That may be true, but I
- 24 think what's different even today, Commissioner, is that
- 25 in the past where I said we have had demands from

Page 298 customers going up and the infrastructure we're putting in 2 is to serve that new demand, we could still have that 3 going on. But what you also have today are all these 4 5 other mandates for environmental for -- and so I would tell you that that would probably still put pressure on 6 7 it. Now, whether we have to do plant in service accounting, I don't know. I can only tell you what we see 8 9 today. 10 I want to go back to this discussion of Q. 11 under-earnings, and I think the phrase in and of itself, 12 under-earnings implies that there's some expectation that 13 you're going to earn at your allowed ROE. Is that --14 Commissioner, you know --Α. 15 Is that implicit in the whole phrase, Q. 16 under-earnings? 17 There is never -- it is not my position that we have a guarantee. We were simply looking for a 18 reasonable opportunity to earn our fair return. And I'm 19 20 not going to go through again. We believe the regulatory 21 framework systemically does not provide us that reasonable opportunity. In general, I do believe that if you had --22 all things being equal and you had allowed ROE and you had 23 24 the framework and normal business operations, you would be

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hovering up and down, up and down on that allowed ROE.

Page 299 That would be perfect. Right? Or perfect, that's not 2 right. That's not the right word. But that would be a 3 normal pattern. We haven't seen that obviously. 4 Q. Well, even if you -- well, okay. I want to 5 go to MPG21. You said it was misleading, and I want to make sure I don't interpret it incorrectly. If we look at 6 7 '95 to 2002 was the alt reg plan. What was going on in 8 2003? 9 You know, Commissioner, I honestly don't I know -- I simply don't know what that -- but I do 10 know. 11 know that my sense is that there was a special aberration 12 that could have been -- I believe we had a one-time refund 13 associated with a coal settlement or lawsuit with one of our suppliers that was meaningful around that time. I 14 15 don't know if that's doing that, but I know that was around then, that we had a big refund as a result of that. 16 17 Ο. And then we look in the 2008, 2009 and '10, '08 and '09 are below 10 percent while the authorized ROEs 18 are above 10, 10.2 maybe, and in 2002 you get above there? 19 20 You know, Commissioner, I'm not sure 21 what -- in 2010, you know, my data stands. I stand by the 22 data that I presented in my testimony. 23 Q. I guess what I'm getting at, how do we know 24 that some of this is just not the vagaries of the business

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cycle? What's 2015 going to look like?

Page 300 If we both knew that, right? Commissioner, 1 Α. 2 we can't predict the future. All I can tell you is what I 3 And so these -- well, and so just because you implement a plant in service tracker doesn't mean that we 4 5 can -- it doesn't mean it's going to be in place for the next two years. That's not my position. It would be 6 7 sticking our heads in the sand just as much to say, well, it's done and we should never look back. 8 9 It's hard to undo these things once we put Q. 10 them in place, though, isn't it? But the Commission has every ability to do 11 Α. 12 so. And so as I come here, I believe the plant in service 13 accounting approach is a tool that's available to the Commission. Right. We can't do some of the other things 14 15 because it's not within your jurisdiction. And so the Commission has the ability to decide -- say five years 16 17 from now the business cycle has changed. We can all sit there and say, yep, it's time to do something different. 18 19 You would be amenable to -- and this is Q. 20 maybe not a fair question. Would you be amenable to some 21 type of out of the box mechanism like the plant in service 22 accounting with built-in automatic sunset so that we're 23 not dependent upon the vagaries of a new commission? 24 Α. You know, Commissioner, so I think as we --

I characterize this in my testimony that plant in service

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- 1 accounting is an out of the box mechanism. I agree with
- 2 that. I think the fact that you-all are talking about the
- 3 low income rate docket is out of the box. I think
- 4 your rate stabilization, I think it's a good idea. We
- 5 should -- just because we're a regulated enterprise and
- 6 you regulate that enterprise doesn't mean we shouldn't
- 7 step out of the box to try and solve what I think are real
- 8 problems.
- 9 Because I agree with what many folks said
- 10 earlier today, that this isn't just about numbers, what we
- do here, what you-all do isn't about just pushing numbers
- 12 around and worrying about rate increases. You establish
- 13 policy, and what you do and what you don't do has policy
- 14 implications from an energy perspective. That I strongly
- 15 believe.
- 16 Q. What's the relationship between earnings
- 17 per share and ROE? Because you were having a discussion
- 18 about your proxy statement and what the earnings per share
- 19 were. And so your earnings per share are some amount
- 20 compared to your shares of stock, I'm assuming.
- 21 A. That's right. So it's your net income
- 22 divided by the shares outstanding. So the shares
- 23 outstanding we look at are Ameren Corporation. We look at
- 24 earnings per share. Even when you look at the quarterly
- 25 releases, you don't see an earnings per share number for

Page 302 Missouri. 1 2 Q. Right. 3 Because we have one shareholder, Ameren Corporation. So our net income is basically the same. 4 5 when you look at our releases, you don't see us talking about net income. So we've been talking about return on 6 7 equity, which is a proxy for earnings per share, relatively speaking. 8 9 Q. If you have X amount of dollars per share, 10 though, that indicates that the company's generating a 11 profit, right? Is that right? 12 Α. I'm sorry? 13 Q. If you are earning -- and I think the proxy 14 limit's like 2-something per share. 15 There's a profit, yes. Α. 16 Q. There's a profit. 17 Α. Absolutely. Absolutely. 18 And we were talking about earlier -- and I Q. 19 don't know if it was in opening statements or not, but we 20 were talking earlier about appropriate proxy groups for 21 determining ROE, and we're supposed to be looking at ROE, 22 supposed to earn something compared to a comparable 23 company of similar risk. 24 Do you think, given that, that we are limited to only looking at regulated vertically integrated 25

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- 1 utilities or would we look at other companies that are
- 2 similar risk?
- 3 A. Commissioner, I'm not a return on equity
- 4 expert, but let me say this. What's different about us
- 5 and everyone else is that we have an obligation to serve,
- 6 and so I heard Mr. --
- 7 Q. Does that make you more or less risky?
- 8 A. Well, if we're saying about -- if you're
- 9 saying that a company has this level of risk and no
- 10 obligation to serve and we have the same level of risk and
- 11 have an obligation to serve, our risk is higher.
- 12 Q. But that company doesn't have guaranteed
- 13 customer base and franchises protected by power of the
- 14 state.
- 15 A. Then we must have different risks.
- 16 **Q.** Okay.
- 17 A. That's the point. I think there's a reason
- 18 why --
- 19 Q. But not necessarily greater or lesser, just
- 20 different?
- 21 A. Well, yeah. So I -- so I gave you an
- 22 example. I think it's difficult to look to competitive
- 23 companies and say they're the same because we have an
- 24 obligation to serve and that's why we're all here.
- 25 CHAIRMAN GUNN: I don't have any further

Page 304 1 questions. 2 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 3 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Stoll, do you have any questions? 4 5 COMMISSIONER STOLL: Yes. 6 OUESTIONS BY COMMISSIONER STOLL: 7 Just one line of questioning. 8 statement was made, I believe by Mr. Thompson in the opening statements regarding the sharing mechanism and 10 what would cause Ameren to have more skin in the game, so 11 to speak. What do you see as the company's current 12 incentive to reduce fuel costs and purchased power costs? Thank you, Commissioner. And so there's 13 several incentives, but I tell you the most important 14 15 incentive that we have is that fuel adjustment clause is a privilege and not a right. And so every time we come here 16 17 asking for the fuel adjustment clause, we have to ask for permission to get that reinstated. And if we operate our 18 plants certainly imprudently, but that's probably not even 19 the right word, but if we stuck our head in the sand and 20 21 said the fuel adjustment clause, you know, we would be at risk that not only would you reduce the percentage but 22 you'd take it away. 23 I think the evidence is clear that since 24 25 our last rate case, what we have done has actually

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- 1 improved the level of operations comparatively. We just
- 2 announced the other day, you heard me say before that our
- 3 two biggest coal-fired plants, Labadie and Rush Island,
- 4 received the best out of 500 plants. The best. And it
- 5 wasn't just cost. It was reliability. Puts the whole
- 6 thing together. Labadie just two years ago received that
- 7 same award from a different organization.
- 8 And so from my perspective, Commissioner,
- 9 there is, if anything, you know, our level of service and
- 10 our level of making sure we're doing the right thing for
- 11 customers has done nothing but get better since the last
- 12 rate case, and we can always do better. But there's
- 13 absolutely no evidence in the record that says we're
- 14 falling down on the job.
- 15 Q. Hopefully I'm asking this the right way.
- 16 Right now, since the sharing mechanism is 95 percent and
- 5 percent, what effect would an 85/15 have, I quess, in
- using this mechanism for the fuel adjustment?
- 19 A. So, Commissioner, I don't know if I know
- 20 the right number. I know that Ms. Barnes will be up here
- 21 later. I believe if we would have an 85/15 versus 95/5
- 22 from our last case, it would have been tens of millions of
- 23 dollars of losses that we would have endured. I think if
- 24 you move from a 95/5 to 85/15, it's akin to a
- 25 disallowance.

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1	So what I mean by that is the fuel costs
2	that we have, they're not only known and measurable,
3	they're locked in. They're beyond our control. They're
4	happening. And to move that 95/5 to 85/15, it's a penalty
5	for no other reason.
6	And I think the second thing you have to
7	keep in mind is that virtually all utilities in the
8	country have a fuel adjustment clause, and the vast
9	majority of them don't have any share. It's 100 percent
10	pass-through. It's for the same reasons we've been
11	talking about. It's because they're volatile, they're
12	unpredictable and beyond our control.
13	So if the Commission would change the
14	sharing percentage from 95/5 to 85/15, not only would it
15	be akin to a disallowance, it would have a meaningful
16	reaction from investors and credit rating agencies that
17	say that the Commission has now created a greater level of
18	risk, and it would be a big deal.
19	COMMISSIONER STOLL: Okay. Thank you.
20	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. We'll move to
21	questions for recross based on questions from the Bench,
22	and beginning with AARP?
23	MR. COFFMAN: No questions, your Honor.
24	JUDGE WOODRUFF: And for Barnes-Jewish?
25	MS. LANGENECKERT: No.

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1	JUDGE WOODRUFF: MIEC?
2	MS. VUYLSTEKE: Yes, I have a few
3	questions. First I'd like to distribute MIEC Exhibit 526.
4	(MIEC EXHIBIT NO. 526 WAS MARKED FOR
5	IDENTIFICATION.)
6	RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. VUYLSTEKE:
7	Q. Okay. Mr. Baxter, now, you had discussed
8	earlier a concern that you had regarding regulatory lag in
9	your discussion with several of the Commissioners, and you
10	had stated the concern that Missouri regulatory procedures
11	allow costs to be increased after the test year when rates
12	are in effect; is that correct?
13	A. That certainly is one of the concerns.
14	Q. And does that concern affect or involve
15	your ability to earn your authorized return, in your
16	opinion?
17	A. Yes.
18	Q. And is it possible, in your opinion, that
19	costs can decrease compared to the test year used to set
20	rates which could offset some of the cost increases that
21	you're concerned about?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. Now, in this case, is it true that your
24	true-up period ended on July 31st, 2011?
25	A. Yes.

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- Q. And I refer you now to the financial news
- 2 release which I just distributed as MIEC 526, and is it
- 3 correct that this -- this financial news release was
- 4 issued on September 6th, 2012?
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. Now, is it true, pursuant to this financial
- 7 release, that Ameren Missouri issued \$485 million worth of
- 8 bonds in September of this year at an interest rate of
- 9 **3.9 percent?**
- 10 A. One correction is Ameren Missouri. So,
- 11 yes, we did.
- 12 O. Ameren Missouri. And is it true that
- 13 Ameren Missouri announced in this news release that it
- 14 would use the proceeds of this September bond issue to
- 15 refinance embedded debt securities with interest rates
- ranging from 6 percent to 6.7 percent?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. And is it true that --
- 19 A. Excuse me. It wasn't just 6 to 6.7. I
- 20 believe that you see down there that some of them go down
- 21 as low as 5 percent, 5.1 percent.
- 22 Q. Okay. Thank you for the correction. And
- 23 since this refinancing occurred after the true-up date in
- 24 this case, is it true that Ameren Missouri will retain the
- 25 savings from this debt refinancing until its next rate

Page 309 1 case? 2 Α. Yes. 3 Q. And I just want to confirm, subject to check, that this announcement was issued 37 days beyond 4 5 the true-up? 6 Α. Yes. 7 MS. VUYLSTEKE: And I -- so I completed that line of questioning regarding this exhibit, and I 8 would move to have this entered into the record. 10 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. 526 has been offered. Any objections to its receipt? 11 12 (No response.) 13 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Hearing none, it will be 14 received. (MIEC EXHIBIT NO. 526 WAS RECEIVED INTO 15 EVIDENCE.) 16 17 BY MS. VUYLSTEKE: 18 I apologize, Mr. Baxter. I'd like to go Q. 19 ahead and refer now to a different subject of discussion 20 between you and the Commissioners, and this is regarding 21 the frequency of rate cases, and I believe that was a discussion with Commissioner Jarrett. 22 23 Α. Yes. 24 Okay. Now, wouldn't you agree that KCPL Q. 25 committed to file periodic rate cases as a part of its

			Page 310
1	compreh	ensive	energy plan?
2		Α.	To the best of my knowledge, I believe that
3	to be co	orrect.	
4		Q.	And is it true, to the best of your
5	knowled	ge, bot	h KCPL and Empire added new generation
6	within f	the las	t two years?
7		Α.	I believe that to be correct, yes.
8		Q.	And now I'd like to refer you to the often
9	discuss	ed MPG2	1 chart, and I have a copy of it if you
10	don't ha	ave it	right in front of you.
11		Α.	Oh, yes.
12		Q.	And in your discussion with several of the
13	Commiss	ioners,	you discussed the earned return and
14	discuss	ed over	earnings and under-earnings, and is it true
15	that th	is sche	dule says is entitled earned return on
16	equity?		
17		Α.	It does say that at the top.
18		Q.	Is there any reference to overearnings?
19		Α.	Are you referring to the schedule, whether
20	there's	the wo	rd overearning on this schedule?
21		Q.	Correct.
22		Α.	No, I don't see it.
23		Q.	But you believe that somehow that this has
24	been cha	aracter	ized as an overearning?
25		Α.	I believe in the opening statement I may

	Page 311
1	have mischaracterized. I thought that was the implication
2	that during the period of time prior to 2007, I thought
3	the company was doing very well, and I thought the
4	statement was made overearning, but I may have
5	misunderstood compared to the latter one.
6	Q. Would you agree that this schedule
7	demonstrates earnings in excess of your authorized return?
8	A. No.
9	Q. Would you agree that it demonstrates your
10	earned return on equity?
11	A. No, because I don't believe it reflects the
12	credits that we kick back to customers. I mean, our
13	actual earned return is lower if you reflect the credits
14	back to customers. If you had a cap during the EARP, that
15	anything above 14 percent went back to customers
16	100 percent, mathematically you can't be having earned
17	returns above 14 percent.
18	So I don't know the basis of this, but I
19	know there was a cap. And the only thing I'm certain
20	about is there were a lot of audits during that period of
21	time. I'm pretty sure that we didn't have 20 percent in
22	1999.
23	Q. So just to confirm, your opinion is that
24	this chart does not reflect your earned return on equity
25	during this time period?

	Page 312
1	A. To the best of my knowledge, our actual
2	return on equity when you factor out the credits under the
3	EARP was not 20 percent and because the credits went back
4	to customers.
5	Q. Mr. Baxter, have any of Ameren's witnesses
6	filed any rebuttal to this chart?
7	A. I don't know. I don't know.
8	Q. Moving on to a different topic. You
9	mentioned in response to questions from Commissioner
10	Kenney a coal refund in 2003; is that correct?
11	A. I did. What I told Commissioner Kenney is
12	that I know that happened around then, and he was asking a
13	question whether that was I think the Commissioner was
14	asking me what happened. And I was speculating honestly.
15	I know it happened during that period. I don't know if
16	that's actually the driver.
17	Q. Did you, Mr. Baxter, refund did Ameren
18	Missouri refund that amount to ratepayers?
19	A. I don't believe so, no.
20	MS. VUYLSTEKE: No further questions.
21	Thank you.
22	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Public Counsel?
23	MR. MILLS: Yeah. I'm going to have to ask
24	questions on that chart, too.
25	RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MILLS:

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- 1 Q. So at least with respect for the period of
- time on MPG-21, the years in which the EARP was in effect,
- 3 your position is that the chart would more accurately show
- 4 the blue line level at 14 percent, right?
- 5 A. I think it would actually be somewhere
- 6 between that red line and 14 percent, I think our --
- 7 because you were sharing before. So if you recall, that
- 8 there was up to -- up to 12.6 there was no sharing. And
- 9 then there was a sharing of 15 percent. There were
- 10 different degradations, and then you got 100 percent of it
- 11 back. So you actually did some sharing before 14 percent.
- 12 I think it's somewhere in that ballpark.
- 13 Q. But at no point during that plan did Union
- 14 Electric ever earn below the 12.6 sharing percentage?
- 15 A. I don't believe that to be the case.
- 16 Q. And, in fact, if you were to extend this
- 17 chart earlier in time, would there not be another perhaps
- 18 ten years or more in which Ameren did not file any rate
- 19 increase cases?
- 20 A. I believe that's true. I think what, in
- 21 fact, happened is that there were a series of rate
- 22 decreases during that entire time.
- Q. So that if you extended this chart earlier
- 24 in time, it would show for the majority of the time that
- 25 Ameren was earning at or above its authorized rate of

Page 314 1 return? 2 MR. BYRNE: I'm going to object. Calls for 3 speculation. 4 MR. MILLS: It only calls for speculation 5 if he doesn't know the answer. 6 THE WITNESS: I don't know. I don't know 7 what it looked like. JUDGE WOODRUFF: Just a moment. I'll 8 overrule the objection. Now you can answer. 10 THE WITNESS: I don't know. BY MR. MILLS: 11 12 Q. All right. In any event, you -- the 13 company did not file any rate increase cases throughout all of the '90s and most of the '80s? I don't recall rate increase cases were 15 Α. filed. I do recall that there were rate decreases and 16 17 that's it. 18 MR. MILLS: That's all the questions I 19 have. 20 JUDGE WOODRUFF: For Staff? 21 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. THOMPSON: 22 23 Q. Mr. Baxter, directing your attention once again to chart MPG-21, you recall, do you not, there was a 24 Staff overearnings complaints filed, I believe, in 2000; 25

Page 315 isn't that correct? I know there was an Complaint case filed 3 sometime around that. I don't know if it was 2000. But you agree there was a Staff 4 Q. 5 overearnings complaint? I believe that to be true. 6 Α. 7 Which resulted in credits flowing back to Q. 8 ratepayers; isn't that correct? 9 In 2000, is that the question? 10 I believe in 2000 or first in 2000. Do you Q. recall that it was in 2000? 11 12 I don't recall if there -- I don't know what you mean by credits flowing back to customers. 13 14 Q. Money. 15 Are you talking about --Α. 16 Q. Money. 17 Α. Are you talking about a base rate reduction, talking about credits? It's a term of art. 18 19 Q. It is a term of art. And would you agree 20 with me that there was a Staff overearnings complaint and 21 that it resulted in some sort of financial benefits or 22 reparation to the customers? 23 I recall again a case being filed. I don't Α. remember the ultimate result, but it was in that period of 24 time. I do recall that. It was around the -- again, the 25

Page 316 EARP or toward the culmination. 2 Q. Okay. Very good. 3 MR. THOMPSON: May I approach? JUDGE WOODRUFF: You may. 4 5 BY MR. THOMPSON: 6 I'm going to hand you what we marked as Q. 7 Staff Exhibit 237, and there was -- you gave some answers 8 that I thought when you were responding to Chairman Gunn that perhaps called into question that document. So let 10 me ask you first of all if you recognize that. 11 Α. I personally do not. I have not seen this 12 before. 13 Q. You have never seen it? 14 Α. No. 15 Q. Well, who is Wendy Tatro? 16 She is an attorney for Ameren Missouri. Α. 17 Ο. Okay. And if you would look at the third page of that document, and do you recognize that page? 18 19 Α. I do. 20 You've seen that before? Q. 21 Α. I have seen a page like it, yes. 22 Q. A page like it? 23 Α. Sure. 24 Q. Okay. Do you have any reason to suppose 25 that that page is false or untrue?

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1	A. No.
2	MR. THOMPSON: Okay. That's all my
3	questions. Thank you. If I could recover that.
4	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right.
5	MR. THOMPSON: All my questions on that, I
6	should say.
7	JUDGE WOODRUFF: I was about to shut you
8	down.
9	BY MR. THOMPSON:
10	Q. Would you agree with me, Mr. Baxter, that
11	at the present time Ameren Missouri finds itself in a
12	situation where load growth is flat or slight?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. And would you agree with me that Ameren
15	Missouri finds itself in a situation where it is suffering
16	the financial effects of increased mandates?
17	A. Yes.
18	Q. And would you agree with me that Ameren
19	Missouri finds itself in a circumstance where it is
20	required to invest in infrastructure because that
21	infrastructure is aging and not because it is facilitating
22	load growth?
23	A. We the answer is, required is only to
24	the extent we need to provide safe and adequate service.
25	Beyond that, then so to the extent we have to provide

Page 318 safe and adequate service, that would be required. Beyond that is discretionary, and we do make some of those 3 incremental discretionary expenditures as well. Okay. But you would agree that some of 4 Q. 5 your infrastructure investment is essentially required or 6 mandatory? 7 Α. Yes. 8 Q. Because otherwise safe and adequate service would be compromised? 10 Α. Yes. MR. THOMPSON: Okay. And that's all the 11 12 questions I have. Thank you. 13 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 14 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Redirect? 15 MR. BYRNE: Yes, your Honor. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BYRNE: 16 17 Ο. I guess maybe we ought to start with MPG-21, which everyone has asked you about and I think I 18 19 will as well. I think in response to one of the questions 20 from the Commission, you testified that this chart is 21 misleading. Can you tell me what part of it's misleading 22 or if all of it's misleading? Well, so, Mr. Byrne, certainly the periods 23 Α. of time during the -- frankly during -- I'm not sure that 24 the basis beyond 2007. Certainly the chart that says it 25

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- 1 was earned return on equity, it says that was our actual
- 2 earned returned. Anything that suggests that especially
- 3 during the EAR period where we gave back credits, that was
- 4 not our actual earned return on equity.
- 5 Q. So you're saying that line is inaccurate
- 6 for those periods?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. Okay. How about after the 2007, is it
- 9 inaccurate after that?
- 10 A. It certainly appears to be inconsistent
- 11 with the charts that I presented. So to what extent it is
- 12 inaccurate, I don't quite understand 2010, but it may be a
- 13 point in time. I simply don't know. So I would tend to
- 14 think it is inaccurate, but I don't know.
- 15 Q. Okay. And to the extent that it refers to
- 16 periods, when was the period that the EARP was in force?
- 17 A. It was from 19 -- from what I recall, it
- 18 was 1995 to 2001. And you have to keep in mind, that was
- 19 on sort of a fiscal year, and I believe it was June or
- 20 July, and so it may have actually finished in June of 2001
- 21 and maybe fiscal years June of 2002, but it was in that
- 22 same period.
- Q. If that line -- during that period of time,
- 24 if the line on this chart was not written in a misleading
- 25 way, where would the blue line be or what range would the

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- 1 blue line be in?
- 2 A. If you look at the red line and if you
- 3 could envision in your head where 14 percent would be, and
- 4 if you drew a line cross there, you would find those
- 5 earnings to be hovering somewhere between the red line
- 6 and that line I just told you, a green line, let's call
- 7 it, to -- that's where it would be hovering in between.
- 8 Q. Okay. But it wouldn't always be at
- 9 14 percent or would it?
- 10 A. I don't -- no. I'm not sure it would
- 11 ever be at 14 percent because you started sharing between
- 12 12.6 and 14. So mathematically, if you give everything
- 13 above 14 percent, you've got to be in between.
- 14 Q. So it couldn't -- so mathematically it
- couldn't be as high as 14 percent; is that correct?
- 16 A. That's correct. I believe that to be
- 17 right.
- 18 Q. Okay. And, you know, those numbers that
- 19 you're talking about, I guess the red line -- I can't
- 20 tell, maybe it's a 12 percent or something. And you're
- 21 talking about line at 14 percent. Those seem high by
- 22 modern standards in terms of equity costs. Can you
- 23 explain that?
- 24 A. Well, I think again -- and I believe it was
- 25 with Commissioner Jarrett, you had a different period of

	Page 32
1	time back then. You had a different cost of capital. And
2	so when that was established back then, it was done
3	because all the parties around the table here said, this
4	is what we think should be the appropriate cost of capital
5	and return, and here's the way we're going to do it, and
6	so it was a different time. So while it may seem high
7	compared to current times, it wasn't high during that
8	time.
9	Q. Given the fact that the returns are subject
10	to the EARP agreement, which my understanding was approved
11	by the Commission; is that true?
12	A. Absolutely.
13	Q. Okay. Is it possible that Ameren Missouri
14	over-earned during the period that the EARP was in effect?
15	A. No.
16	Q. Thank you. I Mr. Thompson handed you a
17	Staff exhibit, and I'm not sure what number it is.
18	MR. BYRNE: Do you know, Mr. Thompson?
19	MR. THOMPSON: 237.
20	MR. BYRNE: 237. Can I hand that to him
21	again?
22	MR. THOMPSON: You may.
23	BY MR. BYRNE:
24	Q. Mr. Thompson gave you 237 and asked you to
25	look at page 3. Do you recall that?

	Page 322
1	A. I do.
2	Q. And on page 3, there's a it shows a
3	well, what is page 3, if you could just tell me that?
4	A. It is titled I'm sorry. I was trying
5	it says highly confidential, but this is public
6	information, so we're okay. Because it's for the
7	12 months ending June 30, so we're okay. So it's
8	financial surveillance, capital structure and rate of
9	return.
10	Q. And what cost of common equity does it show
11	on that chart on that page?
12	A. 10.2 percent.
13	Q. And
14	A. The overall cost of capital, is that what
15	you're referring to?
16	Q. Yeah. That's overall cost of capital?
17	A. Yes.
18	Q. So what does it show for the actual?
19	A. The actual earned return on equity says it
20	was 10.53 percent.
21	Q. I think that's been referred to that
22	10.53 percent was referred to in some of the attorneys'
23	opening statements. Why is that 10.53 percent not the
24	same as the information on your chart?
25	A. From what I understand is that there are

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- 1 two things which are different. One, I believe I was
- 2 talking to Chairman Gunn, is the Taum Sauk disallowance.
- 3 Right. I think this does not reflect the Taum Sauk
- 4 disallowance. And then the second one is the --
- 5 Q. So just to stop for a second, this is -- so
- 6 then this is adjusted, what's shown on the surveillance
- 7 report is adjusted to exclude the Taum Sauk disallowance?
- 8 A. That's correct. That's correct.
- 9 Q. So it's not the actual -- it's not what
- 10 actually happened, it's an adjustment from what actually
- 11 happened; is that correct?
- 12 A. That's correct. So my chart reflects the
- 13 actual reported financial results. This is an adjustment
- 14 that excludes the Taum Sauk disallowance. And that is the
- only difference that I'm aware of between what I report
- 16 versus this chart.
- 17 Q. Okay. Okay. Thank you. I guess I'll take
- 18 that back before we lose it. Thank you, Mr. Baxter.
- 19 At the very beginning of your
- 20 cross-examination, Ms. Vuylsteke asked you if showing the
- 21 under-earnings was the primary point of your testimony,
- 22 and I think -- I think you said, well, I had several
- 23 primary points, and you were about to, I think, explain
- 24 them when you were cut off. So on redirect I'll ask you,
- 25 what are the other primary points of your testimony?

Page 324 Well, I think there's several primary 1 Α. 2 points to my testimony. I think that when you step back 3 and you look at this, this is not just about earned versus allowed return on equity. This is about things we've been 4 5 talking about here for the last hour or two. It's about 6 important policies that we need to be thoughtful about in 7 the state of Missouri. 8 So from my perspective, my main point in my 9 testimony is, No. 1, we need to make sure that we continue to have constructive and appropriate and consistent 10 regulatory policies put in place that support investment 11 12 in the state of Missouri. 13 MR. MILLS: I'm going to object to this as being beyond the scope of cross-examination. By 14 15 definition Ms. Vuylsteke asked him about that one particular point. The reason that she did not ask him 16 17 about the other points is because she didn't ask him about the other points. This is by definition asking about 18 something that is outside the scope of cross-examination. 19 20 MR. BYRNE: She asked him what the primary 21 point of his testimony was and he tried to tell her several primary points. Then she limited him to the one 22 that she wanted to talk about. I think it's fair to ask 23 him about the ones she doesn't want to talk about. 24 25 JUDGE WOODRUFF: I'll sustain the

Page 325 objection. Continue. 1 2 MR. BYRNE: I'm sorry? 3 THE COURT: I sustained the objection. 4 MR. BYRNE: I'm sorry. 5 BY MR. BYRNE: 6 Q. All right. Let me ask you this. 7 Ms. Vuylsteke, you were talking about removing certain 8 items from your -- certain major items in some of your charts, and I think in particular you talked about 10 removing the effect of the Taum Sauk disallowance and the 11 FAC disallowance and I think the Entergy refund. Can you 12 explain, when you say you removed them from the chart, 13 what does that mean exactly? And so what that means by, when you look at 14 Α. the charts and, Mr. Byrne, I'm referring now to charts 15 from my surrebuttal testimony, ES3 and ES4. And so when 16 17 you think about the three things that you just mentioned, Taum Sauk, the FAC matter and Entergy, removing both the 18 Taum Sauk and the FAC matters will then result in our 19 20 earned return reported on this schedule to be higher than 21 it actually was for GAAP reporting purposes. And conversely, on Entergy it would go the 22 opposite way. It would -- our actual earned return would 23 24 be higher, from financial reporting purposes would be higher than what's reflected on this schedule. 25

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1	The combination of all those things are the
2	results here. One has weather factored out of it and one
3	leaves weather in it.
4	Q. Okay. Mr. Mills asked you some questions,
5	I think it was about Ms. Meisenheimer's testimony. Do you
6	recall those questions?
7	A. I do.
8	Q. And I think I'm afraid the record might not
9	be perfectly clear. At first Mr. Mills asked you if you
10	supported Ms. Meisenheimer's recommendation, and then I
11	think you ended up saying the Commission should take all
12	the witnesses' testimony into account. Do you recall
13	that?
14	A. I do.
15	Q. Can you explain, are you supporting
16	Ms. Meisenheimer's recommendation or suggesting the
17	Commission take all
18	A. To be clear, it's the latter. The
19	Commission should take all pieces of testimony into
20	consideration. If I misspoke and said that I read and
21	support Ms. Meisenheimer's testimony would be I spoke
22	in error.
23	Q. In response to some questions from
24	Commissioner Gunn, I think or Chairman Gunn, I think
25	Chairman Gunn suggested that if on occasion the company

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- 1 could earn above its authorized return because of hot
- weather, then that suggested that the regulatory framework
- 3 was not broken. Do you recall that line of questioning?
- 4 A. I recall that.
- 5 Q. Do you agree with that or not?
- 6 A. No, I don't. I think the best way to -- or
- 7 the appropriate way to assess a regulatory framework is on
- 8 a weather normalized basis, because weather can't be there
- 9 to save you if you have a systemic inability to earn your
- 10 allowed return. Sometimes weather works to our advantage,
- 11 but I think that even with weather, it really hasn't
- 12 happened much. It's 15 percent of the time. I think the
- 13 best way to look at a regulatory framework is to look at
- 14 it without weather. And I think I told the Chairman that
- 15 as well.
- 16 Q. Can extreme weather also hurt the company's
- 17 earnings?
- 18 A. Well, weather goes both ways. Weather can
- 19 be hot and -- well, depends on what season, right. If
- 20 you're in the summer and you have a mild summer, that goes
- 21 negative. If you have a warm summer, it goes the other
- 22 way. So it can actually go the other way. And so as I
- 23 think I told the Chairman and others, this takes both the
- 24 pluses and the minuses out of it.
- 25 Q. I think on a couple of occasions in

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- 1 response to questions from Commissioner Kenney you talked
- 2 about regulatory lag and then sometimes you talked about
- 3 excessive regulatory lag. And I think you said regulatory
- 4 lag is -- can be a good thing but excessive regulatory
- 5 last is a bad thing. Why do you think excessive
- 6 regulatory lag is a bad thing?
- 7 A. I think there's several reasons. Number
- 8 one is, I think from a customer perspective, I think we've
- 9 been talking this is all about the shareholders. I think
- 10 excessive regulatory lag hurts the customers as much as
- 11 the shareholder. Because if you have excessive regulatory
- 12 lag, that means ultimately you have less cash flows
- 13 available to your business.
- 14 And consequently, you have less cash flows
- 15 to not only invest, but if you have a framework which says
- 16 to invest is ultimately going to cause you more losses
- 17 between rate cases for investments, what that drives you
- 18 to do is provides you a disincentive to make proactive
- 19 investments into your -- for discretionary items that are
- 20 going to help reliability.
- 21 And -- and customers say their top priority
- 22 is reliability, and so they want more reliable service,
- 23 not less. And so -- and I think it was with -- I believe
- 24 it was maybe Commissioner Jarrett, I said that certainly
- 25 if you're able to move some of those good discretionary

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- 1 investments up during this time when you have low interest
- 2 rates, you actually may have meaningful benefits for
- 3 customers in the long run.
- 4 So excessive regulatory lag is not good for
- 5 customers, and certainly from the shareholder perspective,
- 6 I think we all have spoken quite a bit about the
- 7 disadvantages of excessive regulatory log. I think at the
- 8 end of the day, the state is hurt by that because
- 9 investments at the end of the day help reliability, but
- 10 investments also do one more thing. They're able to
- 11 sustain and create new jobs. That's all part of it. Now,
- 12 I'm not suggesting that's what the sole purpose is, but
- 13 that is a natural result of that.
- 14 Q. In response to a couple of questions, you
- 15 discussed in general terms environmental mandates that the
- 16 company is facing. Do you recall that?
- 17 A. I do.
- 18 Q. And do you think you could give me a couple
- 19 of examples of what kind of environmental mandates we are
- 20 facing?
- 21 A. Simple answer is yes. So when you think
- 22 environmental regulation, I put them in three buckets.
- 23 Maybe there's four. You have air quality, and those are
- things that we're dealing with with the sulfur dioxide,
- 25 nitrogen oxide and all those other types of things. You

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- 1 have water, which are meaningful issues. You have ash.
- 2 And then sometimes people can say air quality is climate
- 3 or not. You can put them in a fourth category.
- 4 But at the bottom line you have at least
- 5 those four, and under each one of those categories you
- 6 have a series of regulations which are significant, some
- 7 of which we're already complying with. I think someone
- 8 earlier talked about the scrubber project that we
- 9 implemented at the Sioux power plant. That was to comply
- 10 with those regulations. But there's more to come.
- 11 There's more to come.
- 12 The most significant one is the one that
- 13 deals with mercury and air toxic standard. And we're
- 14 going to be spending hundreds of millions of dollars
- 15 coming up in the future to deal with particulate matter at
- 16 our power plant. And that's a big deal.
- 17 Q. Mr. Baxter, I think in response to a
- 18 question from Commissioner Jarrett you mentioned that
- 19 plant in service accounting would have little impact on
- 20 rates. Do you recall that?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. Can you explain why it has little impact on
- 23 rates?
- A. Well, we've done an analysis, and if we
- 25 would have had plant in service accounting in place since

Page 331 our last rate case -- and so this is if you cut off the 2 period from March of '11 and you cut those plants in 3 service all the way to December of '12, it would have had the impact on our revenue requirement of \$6 million, and 4 5 when you put that for the average residential customer, it's less than one penny per day. 6 7 Why is the rate impact so little? Q. 8 Simply put, even though you have -- and so the amount of money that impacted us, the lost revenues 10 and return was close to \$40 million. When you put that in rate base and you recover that over 20, 30, 40 years, the 11 12 impact on customers is much less, is much less. 13 Q. Commissioner Jarrett asked you a question 14 about transmission expenditures. Do you recall that? 15 Α. I do. 16 Q. And in this case, one of the big issues is 17 either whether the transmission expenditures should be tracked in the FAC or a tracker. The company's position 18 is it should be tracked. Why does the company believe 19 20 those costs should be tracked? 21 Α. Well, I think -- first and foremost, I 22 think the company believes it's absolutely appropriate to keep it in the FAC, because my perspective is that those 23 24 costs, the benefits from a transmission system at MISO,

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all those benefits are flowing to customers through

25

24	they weren't in the tracker or the FAC?
23	Q. Would we be able to recover those costs if
22	uncontrollable.
21	because these are significant, known, volatile,
20	agencies and others would absolutely perceive it as that,
19	regulatory framework. And investors, credit rating
18	significant step backwards from my perspective in the
17	out of the FAC and not give us a tracker, that is a
16	One thing I do know is this. To take it
15	tracker that is put together appropriately.
14	issues that were raised. And, of course, it has to be a
13	FAC. But we're willing to accept that because of certain
12	is going to be extended out more than they would be in an
11	good, frankly gives us more risk. Certainly our cash flow
10	would accept it to go in a tracker, and a tracker isn't as
9	But we have said in our testimony that we
8	that an FAC is the appropriate way.
7	the right place for us to be. And so I firmly believe
6	MISO, and this Commission has agreed that that MISO is
5	uncontrollable. We have to pay the bill to be a member of
4	earlier, these are not only significant, they're
3	I think as Commissioner Kenney said
2	it's totally appropriate.
1	$$\operatorname{\textit{Page}}\xspace$ off-system sales and the like through the FAC. I think

If they went up between rate cases, no.

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Α.

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- 1 Q. When you were talking about plant in
- 2 service accounting with I think perhaps Commissioner Gunn,
- 3 I think you talked about it in two ways. One way was as a
- 4 shifting of risk away from the company and to the
- 5 customers, but then you also talked about it in terms of
- 6 recovering costs and being able to recover costs that you
- 7 otherwise couldn't recover. What's the right way to think
- 8 about it? Is it recovering costs that couldn't otherwise
- 9 be removed or changing the risk?
- 10 A. Well, I think it is clearly about more than
- 11 just even recovering costs. This is clearly about
- 12 recovering costs that are prudently incurred that are
- 13 serving customers. Otherwise we're losing money for every
- 14 investment we make between rate cases. It's just a loss.
- 15 And so it is, No. 1, about doing that, but it's also -- it
- 16 isn't about shifting risk.
- 17 I mean, this is -- this is not about
- 18 finding ways to put more on our ratepayers. The bottom
- 19 line is that what we're trying to do is put a policy in
- 20 place that's going to be win-win for all stakeholders,
- 21 customers, shareholders and the state of Missouri. That's
- 22 what the objective is.
- 23 Q. You were asked in response to questions
- 24 from Commissioner Stoll about switching from the 95/5
- 25 sharing mechanism to the 85/15 sharing mechanism that

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- 1 Staff and perhaps others are recommending in this case,
- 2 and I think basically you said it's tantamount to a
- 3 disallowance. And do you have any idea of what the
- 4 magnitude of the disallowance would be under 95/5 versus
- 5 **85/15?**
- 6 A. Mr. Byrne, I don't know a specific number,
- 7 but it would be in the tens of millions from what I
- 8 recollect.
- 9 Q. How many times higher would the
- 10 disallowance be of prudently incurred fuel costs if there
- 11 was an 85/15 sharing versus 95/5?
- 12 A. Ask the question again, please.
- 13 Q. If we had to bear 15 percent of the cost
- 14 instead of 5 percent, how many times higher would that be?
- 15 A. Okay. Math. Three times.
- 16 MR. BYRNE: All right. Thank you,
- 17 Mr. Baxter.
- JUDGE WOODRUFF: Mr. Baxter, you can step
- 19 down. You are excused.
- THE WITNESS: Thank you, Judge.
- 21 JUDGE WOODRUFF: We'll take a break before
- 22 the next witness. Before everybody leaves, I do want to
- 23 note that it looks like we're probably not going to get to
- 24 all the witnesses today. We'll have to run over into
- 25 tomorrow. So during the break get amongst yourselves and

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1	determine if there's any other witnesses on the list who
2	go down beyond Mr. Reed that need to testify today, won't
3	be available tomorrow.
4	We'll take a break and come back at
5	3:30.
6	(MIEC EXHIBIT NOS. 500, 501 AND 502 AND
7	AMERENUE EXHIBIT NOS. 3 AND 4 WERE MARKED FOR
8	IDENTIFICATION.)
9	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Let's come to order,
10	please. All right. We're back from break. As I
11	indicated before break, it looks like we're not going to
12	be able to finish this issue today, and Mr. Reed has
13	already taken the stand. Is there anyone else on the list
14	for today who needs to testify today that can't come back
15	tomorrow?
16	MR. LOWERY: I don't believe so, your
17	Honor.
18	MR. DOWNEY: Did you mention Brosch?
19	JUDGE WOODRUFF: I did not mention
20	Mr. Brosch.
21	MR. DOWNEY: Mike Brosch needs to be taken
22	today.
23	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Let's do Mr. Reed.
24	MR. MILLS: For what it's worth, I think
25	many of us expect that the next witnesse will go faster

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1	than the first one.
2	MR. LOWERY: Promises, promises.
3	JUDGE WOODRUFF: We'll see where we're at.
4	(Witness sworn.)
5	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you much. You may
6	proceed.
7	JOHN REED testified as follows:
8	DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. LOWERY:
9	Q. Would you please state your name for the
10	record.
11	A. My name is John J. Reed.
12	Q. Mr. Reed, did you cause to be prepared for
13	filing in this docket direct and rebuttal testimonies
14	which have been premarked as Exhibits 3 and 4?
15	A. Yes, I did.
16	Q. And, Mr. Reed, if I were to well, first
17	of all, do you have any corrections to any of those
18	testimonies?
19	A. I have just a few for my direct. These are
20	corrections and updates that reflect more recent testimony
21	filed by the company. The first is on page 5 at line 14.
22	The numbers there 8 out of 54. It should now read 9 out
23	of 62 based on the updated evidence of Mr. Baxter.
24	Q. Okay. Any others?
25	A. Yes. Three others. On page 7, line 19,

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1	the 10.75 percent ROE should now be 10.50 percent. The
2	third is at page 21. This is a correction. Line 4, there
3	should be a T at the end of consistent. And last, on
4	page 27, line 11, again the 46 out of 54 should be now
5	53 out of 62.
6	Q. Any other corrections?
7	A. No. That's it.
8	Q. With those corrections, if I were to ask
9	you the same questions that are posed in those two pieces
10	of testimony, would your answers be the same?
11	A. Yes, they would.
12	Q. And are those answers true and correct to
13	the best of your knowledge and belief?
14	A. Yes, they are.
15	MR. LOWERY: With that, your Honor, I'd
16	offer Exhibits 3 and 4 and tender Mr. Reed for
17	cross-examination.
18	JUDGE WOODRUFF: 3 and 4 have been offered.
19	Any objections to their receipt?
20	(No response.)
21	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Hearing none, they will be
22	received.
23	(AMERENUE EXHIBIT NOS. 3 AND 4 WERE
24	RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE.)
25	JUDGE WOODRUFF: For cross-examination,

	D 440
1	Page 338 looks like AARP is the first one here.
2	MR. COFFMAN: No questions.
3	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. And MIEC?
4	MR. DOWNEY: Yes, a few.
5	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. DOWNEY:
6	Q. Mr. Reed, I'm Ed Downey and I represent
7	Missouri Industrial Energy Consumers. I wasn't paying
8	attention. Have you been here most of the afternoon?
9	A. Yes, I have been.
10	Q. Okay. So you've heard the testimony this
11	afternoon?
12	A. Yes, I heard Mr. Baxter's testimony.
13	Q. Did you also hear the opening statements
14	this morning?
15	A. Yes, I did.
16	Q. Can you sum up in one sentence what the
17	theme is of your testimonies?
18	A. I would say that a one-sentence summary is
19	that there are, in fact, structural changes that are
20	needed to make the regulatory model in Missouri
21	compensatory and consistent with the regulatory compact,
22	and those are needed to ensure that the utility is
23	provided with a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair
24	return on and of its capital.
25	Q. I think you did it in one sentence. It was

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 9/27/2012 Page 339 a long sentence, but it was one. 2 So you believe the, I'm going to call it the regulatory framework should be modified in some 3 4 respects? Yes, to reflect change to the circumstances 5 Α. 6 in the utility industry and to continue to be consistent 7 with the objectives of regulation. 8 Q. And you either have proposed changes or support changes, specific changes in that regard, right? 10 Yes. My evidence specifically speaks to Α. two, the plant in service accounting and the storm 11 12 tracker. 13 And those two proposals will increase 14 revenue for the company, right? 15 Α. Not necessarily. They will -- the storm tracker is two way. It could increase or decrease revenue 16 17 for the company. The plant in service accounting will in 18 a traditional period of time increase revenue. 19 Q. Okay. So the PISA will increase revenues 20 for the company, that proposal?

- 21 Α. Yes.
- 22 Q. And income?
- 23 Α. Yes.
- 24 Q. Okay. And do you agree that if it does
- 25 increase revenue and does increase income, it will

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- 1 increase rates for ratepayers?
- 2 A. Yes, with one clarification. Technically
- 3 plant in service accounting isn't ratemaking. It's simply
- 4 creating a deferral for the consideration of a recovery in
- 5 a later period of time. So it doesn't in and of itself
- 6 increase revenues or increase rates, but all other things
- 7 being equal, it would lead to higher rates if, in fact,
- 8 those amounts are put into rates at that later date.
- 9 Q. All right. And you agree that the
- 10 regulatory approaches that the Commission employs need to
- 11 strike a balance between the interests of the utility
- 12 shareholders and the ratepayers?
- 13 A. Yes. I think that's part of being just and
- 14 reasonable.
- 15 Q. Okay. And that making adjustment to the
- 16 regulatory framework, particularly something like the PISA
- 17 proposal, involves a careful balancing of those interests?
- 18 A. Yes, I can accept that.
- 19 Q. Okay. Do you agree -- first of all, did
- you read Mr. Brosch's testimony?
- 21 A. Yes, I did.
- 22 Q. Okay. And you agree with Mr. Brosch that
- 23 the Commission has, in fact, already adopted a number of
- 24 cost recovery mechanisms that reduce what you-all refer to
- 25 as regulatory lag?

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1	A. It has adopted some mechanisms that should
2	reduce regulatory lag, and some of them have been unused
3	and ineffective, yes. But yes, I think its intent was to
4	reduce regulatory lag.
5	Q. And so the Commission has already taken
6	some steps and you heard about that in the opening
7	statements and during the give and take this afternoon
8	with Mr. Baxter?
9	A. Yes, I did.
10	Q. Okay. And are you advocating for such
11	measures?
12	A. Two specifically, yes.
13	Q. Okay. And to support your position on
14	those two matters, you rely on historical earnings data
15	that is reported in Mr. Baxter's testimony and in
16	Mr. Weiss' testimony?
17	A. Yes, I do rely on those data.
18	Q. Okay. And tell the Commission what GAAP
19	is, G-A-A-P.
20	A. Generally accepted accounting principles.
21	Q. Okay. And did each of those witnesses,
22	Weiss and Baxter, look at the actual returns on equity
23	using GAAP?
24	A. I can't speak to what they looked at.
25	Those questions really should go to them. I can speak to

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- 1 what's in their exhibits that are attached to their
- 2 testimony, and those reflect in some cases GAAP and some
- 3 cases a regulatory accounting model.
- Q. Okay. In a regulatory accounting model,
- 5 would you include expenses that are disallowed by the
- 6 Commission?
- 7 A. No. If you're trying to focus on the delta
- 8 between the authorized return or earnings and the earned
- 9 return, you, in a regulatory accounting model, would not
- 10 include expenses or capital that have been disallowed by
- 11 the Commission.
- 12 Q. All right. And do you know whether some of
- 13 the figures that you relied on from Mr. Weiss and Mr.
- 14 Baxter were run on this regulatory basis of accounting?
- 15 A. They were looked -- they looked at it both
- 16 ways, with and without those regulatory adjustments.
- 17 Q. Under GAAP, a disallowed expense, an
- 18 expense disallowed by the Commission would still be
- 19 counted towards calculation of the return on equity,
- 20 right?
- 21 A. Yes, it would still be counted as an
- 22 expense on the income statement prepared according to
- 23 GAAP.
- Q. Okay. And did you also read the testimony
- of Mr. Gorman?

Page 343 Α. Yes, I did. 1 2 Okay. And you would agree that both Q. 3 Mr. Brosch and Mr. Gorman believe that you should calculate the ROE based on what I think Mr. Brosch 4 5 referred to as regulatory accounting? 6 Yes, I recall that statement. Α. 7 And do you -- okay. And they are of the Q. 8 opinion that the return should be figured that way, correct? 10 Α. Mr. Brosch and Mr. Gorman, is that who you 11 mean by they? 12 Q. Yes. 13 Α. Yes, that is their position. 14 Q. Can you think of any particular disallowed 15 expenses that would be considered under the GAAP approach 16 that wouldn't be considered under the regulatory approach? 17 Yes. I'm aware that there were fuel adjustment clause expenses that were disallowed by this 18 19 Commission in the past four years, and as I said, the company looked at its earnings both with and without that 20 21 item being included. 22 Q. And would the Taum Sauk disallowed expense 23 be another example? Yes. As I recall, that was an \$89 million 2.4 Α.

disallowance, and that's another example where the company

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- 1 looked at that both ways.
- 2 Q. And I don't profess to know too much about
- 3 this, but was there a disallowance for something called
- 4 incentive compensation?
- 5 A. That's my understanding is that there has
- 6 been, yes.
- 7 Q. And you disagree with Brosch and Gorman on
- 8 when you should use the regulatory approach to accounting
- 9 to measure ROE; is that correct?
- 10 A. I think we have a limited disagreement
- 11 there. What I've said is investors look at the actual
- 12 earnings and the process by which the company got there.
- 13 Investors are fully capable of understanding earnings that
- 14 are inflated or deflated by, for example, abnormal
- 15 weather. When it comes to the effect of disallowances,
- 16 investors view that as being part of the regulatory
- 17 process and typically say, I'm concerned about the overall
- 18 level of earnings, and if the Commission continually
- 19 disallows cost, that's something that reduces the earnings
- 20 as I perceive them.
- 21 I don't have a problem looking at them both
- 22 ways. So I think the company has put forth exhibits that
- 23 make the same point essentially, which is a chronic
- 24 inability to earn the authorized level of earnings. And
- 25 that's true regardless of whether one includes or excludes

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- 1 those regulatory adjustments from the earnings
- 2 calculation.
- 3 Q. Perhaps I missed this, but weren't you in
- 4 your testimony critical of Mr. Brosch for suggesting the
- 5 ROE should be calculated on a regulatory basis?
- 6 A. Critical may be the wrong word. I
- 7 commented that investors typically look at the actual
- 8 earnings and then adjust for items such as weather and
- 9 other items that are nonrecurring. But as I just said, I
- 10 am fully confident this Commission can look at the numbers
- 11 with and without those regulatory adjustments. The
- 12 conclusion is the same.
- 13 Q. Which did you recommend to the Commission
- 14 that they use?
- 15 A. In my direct evidence, I looked at the
- 16 information put forth by Mr. Baxter, which did not account
- 17 for those regulatory disallowances. In my reply evidence,
- 18 I looked at both again based upon the tables put forth by
- 19 Mr. Baxter which looked at it both ways.
- 20 Q. Let's focus on your direct. Okay?
- 21 A. Certainly.
- 22 Q. In your direct -- and maybe you won't agree
- 23 with these exact words, but your direct basically indicts
- 24 the regulatory framework in Missouri. And maybe you don't
- 25 like the word indict.

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1	A. I certainly don't like the word indict.
2	What I've said is there is a systematic bias in the
3	regulatory framework in Missouri as it applies to current
4	and projected conditions in the utility market. It is not
5	a level playing field. And I want to make it clear, it's
6	not a matter of risk, because it's been characterized as
7	the company is seeking to offset risk. Risk is a
8	variability. We don't have variability here. What we
9	have is a persistent, a chronic and material level of
10	earnings that are inadequate based upon the cost of
11	capital.
12	So having earnings that are persistently
13	below what are deemed to be reasonable levels based on the
14	cost of capital is not a matter of risk. It's a matter of
15	earnings being inadequate. So I don't view that as an
16	indictment of Missouri, of the framework or of this
17	Commission. I view it as the need, as I said, to update
18	the framework to reflect new conditions in the utility
19	marketplace.
20	Q. Okay. So the the existing framework is
21	not sufficient and you need to update; that's what you're
22	suggesting?
23	A. Yes, I do believe.
24	Q. Rather than indicting it?
25	A. I do believe it needs updating, yes.

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- 1 Q. Okay. And in your direct, you were
- 2 focusing on ROEs as a support for your position that the
- 3 framework needs updating?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 5 Q. The ROEs you were looking at were based on
- 6 GAAP accounting, correct? We're talking about your
- 7 direct.
- 8 A. The ROEs in terms of earned returns on
- 9 equity did reflect the numbers in Mr. Baxter's table,
- 10 which at that time were just the GAAP accounting numbers,
- 11 yes.
- 12 Q. Okay. So as we've already established,
- 13 those figures included expenses that were disallowed by
- 14 the Commission, and yet you're citing the resulting ROEs,
- 15 including those expenses, as a basis for updating the
- 16 regulatory framework in your direct; is that correct?
- 17 A. Not entirely. First, let me correct a
- 18 statement I made earlier. The tables that Mr. Baxter
- 19 sponsored initially and in reply don't fully reflect GAAP.
- 20 They do -- or they are weather normalized. Weather
- 21 normalization is not a GAAP procedure. It is a regulatory
- 22 procedure.
- 23 But with that correction, I should say that
- 24 the numbers I used in my direct, which were taken from
- 25 Mr. Baxter's tables, reflect in my opinion the way the

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1	financial market looks at the earnings of the company. So
2	they are that mix of GAAP numbers adjusted for abnormal
3	weather.
4	Q. You would agree, would you not, that simply
5	because a utility does not earn its authorized return on
6	equity doesn't necessarily mean that the regulatory
7	environment is to blame?
8	A. That's correct. It's not necessarily to
9	the blame of the regulatory environment or even an
10	indication it needs to be updated. However, a chronic and
11	material level of inadequate earnings in this case is the
12	product of an outdated regulatory construct.
13	Q. Do you know what the current authorized
14	return on equity is for Ameren?
15	A. I believe it's 10.2 percent.
16	Q. That's correct. And you've heard a lot of
17	discussion today about a report that Ameren submitted
18	recently for a 12-month period ending June of 2012?
19	A. I presume you're referring to the
20	surveillance report. I have heard that discussion.
21	Q. Okay. And do you recall what Ameren
22	reported its ROE to be in that report?
23	A. Again, on a GAAP and a basis that does not
24	exclude recurring items, it was reported to be 10.53.
25	Q. Okay. And that's higher than 10.2?

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1	A. Yes.
2	MR. DOWNEY: Thank you. Nothing further.
3	JUDGE WOODRUFF: For Public Counsel?
4	MR. MILLS: No questions.
5	JUDGE WOODRUFF: For Staff?
6	MR. THOMPSON: No questions. Thank you.
7	JUDGE WOODRUFF: We'll come up for those
8	from the Commission.
9	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: No questions. Thank
10	you.
11	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Kenney?
12	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Just a couple.
13	QUESTIONS BY COMMISSIONER KENNEY:
14	Q. Good evening. Good afternoon. How are
15	you?
16	A. I'm great.
17	Q. You made a statement, I think, that the
18	regulatory framework needs to be updated, and I think I'm
19	quoting you, so that it's consistent with the objectives
20	of regulation?
21	A. That's correct.
22	Q. What are those objectives of regulation as
23	you see them?
24	A. First, to establish just and reasonable
25	rates, and in so doing balance the interests of consumers

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1	and investors and those that are committing to provide a
2	public service. In doing that, as you've heard the term
3	and I think as you have used the term regulatory compact
4	implies that in consideration for providing capital and
5	assets dedicated to public service, that a utility is
6	provided with a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair
7	return on its invested capital and return of its invested
8	capital.
9	Q. You said a reasonable opportunity to earn,
10	right?
11	A. To earn a fair return, yes.
12	Q. And do you think there's something
13	inherently flawed about the regulatory framework that we
14	have that denies the reasonable opportunity portion of
15	that phrase?
16	A. I think under current and projected
17	circumstances, the answer is yes. And I want to
18	acknowledge what you said earlier, which is a structure
19	that can work in one time frame as times change may become
20	unworkable. And I think that's what's happened here with
21	regard to changes in what drives revenue requirements and
22	what's driving investments currently.
23	We don't have a mechanism currently that
24	will enable the company prospectively, and that has been
25	my focus, to have a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair

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1	return because of the fact that most of the investments
2	being made are not revenue-producing investments, unlike
3	the past when that model operated differently.
4	Q. Because the investments in infrastructure
5	that are being made are not investments in
6	revenue-producing infrastructure, which is distinguishable
7	from the time frame I think that Mr. Baxter was talking
8	about in the '70s when you were building plants to keep up
9	with increased load; is that what you mean?
10	A. Yes. What's been referred to as growth
11	investments versus infrastructure replacement investments.
12	Q. So now you're making investments as we
13	see that the state is requiring that renewable energy
14	standard. You have environmental obligations from the
15	federal government. Those aren't revenue-producing
16	infrastructure investments?
17	A. That's correct. What was originally a
18	self-sustaining model or a self-correcting model where
19	revenue growth matched growth in revenue requirements has
20	now become one in which there's a mismatch because of the
21	different purpose for which investments are being made.
22	Q. So then what you're really talking about is
23	a fundamental structural change in the regulatory
24	framework?
25	A. I think I would begin by saying a

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- 1 fundamental structural change in the regulatory market
- 2 which should be accompanied by a change in the regulatory
- 3 framework, yes.
- 4 Q. Is that something that is appropriately
- 5 done in the context of a rate case or is that something
- 6 that should be done in a holistic fashion either in the
- 7 General Assembly or someplace else? Because what you're
- 8 talking about isn't peculiar to Ameren, isn't peculiar to
- 9 this -- if we accept what you're saying as accurate, it's
- 10 not peculiar to Ameren, it's not peculiar to this
- 11 particular rate case then?
- 12 A. It may or may not be common with other
- 13 electric utilities. Typically gas utilities are in a bit
- 14 different structure. But let me limit my discussion to
- 15 electric utilities. I would not deny that that change in
- 16 structure could be accommodated through a legislative
- 17 approach, which would enable forward-looking test years or
- 18 the inclusion of CWIP in rate base for more adjustment
- 19 mechanisms.
- 20 However, the company has chosen to put
- 21 forth a set of options here that's fully within the
- 22 Commission's purview now that will at least make major
- 23 strides toward eliminating the problem. I don't think
- 24 it's going to fully address the issue of regulatory lag or
- 25 earnings attrition, and my sense is the Commission doesn't

Page 353 want to fully address the issue of regulatory lag that is 2 corrected. 3 But what the company has put forth is a set of options that are within the Commission's authority, as 4 5 I understand it, and that will be a major step forward in achieving a workable solution. I want to make it clear 6 7 that not every company is affected the same way and not 8 every jurisdiction is affected the same way by this change in regulation. What's unique is we do have these mandates in Missouri and we have a framework that takes a lot of 10 11 the options off the table. 12 So the options that other states have used such as forward-looking test years and CWIP in rate base 13 and interim rates and large number of riders and cost 14 recovery mechanisms aren't on the table in Missouri, so we 15 have to resort to more what are being called out of the 16 17 box solutions. It's all to achieve the same results, and other states have achieved that end result of still 18 providing a fair opportunity to earn a reasonable return. 19 Here the solution sets different, so the solutions that 20 21 are being offered are different. 22 Q. Okay. So plant in service accounting and 23 the storm tracker and the -- those are the two, two of the 24 mechanisms that we've been discussing most recently to

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deal with regulatory lag and earnings attrition.

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- 1 to ask about regulatory lag and the traditional regulatory
- 2 compact. Do you acknowledge or do you accept the notion
- 3 that some amount of regulatory lag is a necessary part of
- 4 the existing regulatory compact?
- 5 A. No. I don't accept that it's necessary. I
- 6 would accept that it is a common side effect of the form
- 7 of cost based regulation used in the U.S. Some
- 8 commissions use indexed accounting or indexed ratemaking
- 9 whereby, in fact, there is absolutely no regulatory lag.
- 10 But I would accept that in the U.S. most of the form of
- 11 cost-based regulation includes an element of regulatory
- 12 lag, but I don't think it's a necessary part of the
- 13 regulatory compact.
- 14 Q. So would you do away with cost of service
- 15 regulation altogether?
- 16 A. No, not at all. I think it is workable. I
- 17 think it can be improved, and I think as we've seen for
- 18 now 114 years of experience in the U.S., it can provide
- 19 that reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return.
- 20 Currently in these circumstances I don't think it is.
- 21 Q. But you would advocate for mechanisms that
- 22 would completely remove all regulatory lag?
- A. No. I think that's very much a policy
- 24 question that each commission has to address for itself.
- 25 As I've said, some commissions, including the FERC, have

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1	gone to cost of service tariffs that provide a lower risk
2	model and a lower return model and establish true-ups
3	every quarter or every year for the revenue requirement.
4	Each Commission addresses on their own whether or not they
5	think that level of risk and return is appropriate.
6	Here I think the Commission has indicated
7	it believes having the company have some skin in the game
8	is appropriate and through regulatory lag you can help to
9	achieve that. That doesn't mean that the results should
10	not continue to provide the utility with a reasonable
11	opportunity to earn that fair return, and I think it can
12	be modified to provide that.
13	Q. But you don't you don't distinguish
14	between regulatory lag and excessive regulatory lag.
15	You're saying that regulatory lag is not necessary. I
16	mean, we can have it if we want it for some policy
17	consideration, but it's not a necessary part of the
18	regulatory compact?
19	A. I am saying it's not a necessary part of
20	the regulatory compact, and what I've said is when it
21	becomes excessive, it effectively undermines the
22	regulatory compact.
23	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Okay. All right.
24	That's all I have. Thank you.
	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Stoll?

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1	COMMISSIONER STOLL: I have no questions.
2	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Anyone wish to recross?
3	MIEC? Public Counsel?
4	MR. MILLS: No, thank you.
5	MR. THOMPSON: No, thank you.
6	MR. THOMPSON: Redirect?
7	REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. LOWERY:
8	Q. Mr. Reed, I think Mr. Downey asked you
9	about the balance, whether or not there needs to be a
10	balance between shareholders and customers. Do you recall
11	that?
12	A. I do.
13	Q. Do you have an opinion regarding where that
14	balance lies in the current environment and the
15	perspective environment that you expect to see for Ameren
16	Missouri in Missouri?
17	A. If the results of regulation is, and I
18	think it is here, is that the company is unable to have a
19	reasonable opportunity to earn its cost of capital, then I
20	think that balance has swung too much in favor of keeping
21	rates low at the expense of being compensatory to
22	investors for the capital they've committed to the
23	company.
24	So it is a balance, but typically that
25	balance is achieved through establishing a cost of capital

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- 1 and rate of return for the company that is compensatory
- 2 and nothing more. When you then detract from that and
- 3 have an environment in which you can't even earn that cost
- 4 of capital, that has shifted the balance to make an
- 5 imbalance, in my opinion.
- 6 Q. I think Mr. Downey also asked you whether
- 7 or not you agreed the Missouri Commission had taken some
- 8 steps to address some of these issues, and I think you
- 9 said that you recognize that some steps had been taken.
- 10 Do you have an opinion about whether those steps that have
- 11 been taken are adequate?
- 12 A. I do. My opinion is clearly for the past
- 13 five years they've not been adequate, and even with good
- 14 intentions, some of those mechanisms have proven to be
- 15 unworkable and unused, such as the environmental cost
- 16 recovery mechanism. But based upon the persistent and
- 17 material level of earnings that are well below the
- 18 authorized level, I think it's clear that those steps have
- 19 not been enough to adapt to the new market for utility
- 20 capital.
- Q. Mr. Downey asked -- also asked you a number
- of questions about charts that were in your direct
- 23 testimony and whether they've been looked at on a GAAP
- 24 basis or a non-GAAP basis.
- 25 Did you -- in the course of your work on

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- 1 this case, did you look at earnings, actual earnings
- versus allowed returns on a non-GAAP basis for things like
- 3 Taum Sauk, the FAC disallowance, et cetera?
- 4 A. Yes. Exhibits ES1 through ES4, which were
- 5 sponsored by Mr. Baxter, look at it both ways and with and
- 6 without weather normalization. And again, I think it's
- 7 appropriate that the entirety of that evidence be in front
- 8 of the company. I've offered my view as to how I think
- 9 financial investors look at it, but I have no problem with
- 10 the Commission looking at both ways. The conclusion is
- 11 the same. There is still a persistent, a chronic
- 12 inability to earn the authorized level under the current
- 13 regulatory structure in Missouri.
- 14 Q. Commissioner Kenney asked you about whether
- 15 or not perhaps there's a structural or fundamental change
- 16 to the regulatory framework that perhaps needs to be made.
- 17 Do you have an opinion regarding whether the Commission
- 18 should implement changes to that structure to the extent
- 19 it can, even if it can't completely change the structure
- in ways that you might think would be appropriate?
- 21 A. I certainly think it's -- it is appropriate
- 22 to have essentially a continuous improvement process. No
- 23 one is looking for this Commission to solve all of the
- 24 problems prospectively because we can't even tell what's
- 25 needed prospectively with certainty. What we can say is

Page 359 there is now a five-year track record as to how the 2 existing model works or doesn't work. And it should do, 3 in my opinion, what it can to restore the balance between the interests of investors and ratepayers. 4 5 Q. And finally Commissioner Kenney asked you whether you advocated eliminating all regulatory lag and 6 7 you said, I believe, that you thought that was a policy 8 issue that each state commission needed to make. Do you recall that? 10 I did, yes. Α. 11 Do you have an opinion about whether the Q. 12 choice a commission makes on that issue, whether to eliminate all regulatory lag or not, can have consequences 13 for customers? 14 15 Certainly. Under the basic standard of Α. capital attraction, if an investment opportunity in one 16 17 state is less attractive than investments elsewhere, then capital is going to be attracted to the higher return on a 18 risk-adjusted basis opportunity. So customers can be 19 20 affected by reduced access to capital, by an aversion to 21 making investments by utilities, and by the consequences of that in terms of reliability. 22 I've certainly seen that in my 36 years of 23 experience in the utility industry where deferred 24 investments and voided investments have led to a material 25

		Page 360
1	reduction in re	liability of electric and gas systems, much
2	to the detrimen	t of customers.
3		MR. LOWERY: Thank you, Mr. Reed. That's
4	all the question	ns I have, your Honor.
5		JUDGE WOODRUFF: Then, Mr. Reed, you can
6	step down and y	ou are excused.
7		THE WITNESS: Thank you.
8		JUDGE WOODRUFF: Let's go ahead and bring
9	Brosch up then.	
10		(Witness sworn.)
11		JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. You may
12	inquire.	
13	MICHAEL L. BROS	CH testified as follows:
14	DIRECT EXAMINAT	ION OF MR. DOWNEY:
15	Q.	For the record, his testimony is included
16	in Exhibits MIE	C 0501 to 0503. Please state your name.
17	Α.	Michael L. Brosch.
18	Q.	And your business address?
19	Α.	P.O. Box 481934, Kansas City, Missouri.
20	Q.	And by whom are you employed?
21	Α.	By Utilitech Incorporated.
22	Q.	And why are you here today?
23	Α.	I'm representing MIEC and have been
24	involved in a r	eview of Ameren Missouri's rate
25	application. I	'm sponsoring testimony responding to some

Page 361 of the issues raised in that application. 2 Q. And is that testimony MIEC Exhibit 501 3 through 503? JUDGE WOODRUFF: If I can interrupt. I 4 5 have as 500, it's his HC direct, 501 is his NP direct, and 502 is his surrebuttal. 7 BY MR. DOWNEY: 8 Q. I stand corrected. For the record, it's 500 through 502. 10 I have that before me. Α. 11 Okay. Great. And are you the person that Q. 12 prepared that testimony? I am. 13 Α. 14 Q. And do you have any corrections to that 15 testimony? 16 Yes. I'm aware of one correction in the Α. 17 direct at page 30, line 21. I would delete the word not. 18 Any other corrections? Q. 19 None I'm aware of. Α. 20 Okay. As corrected, if I were to ask you Q. 21 the questions in that testimony today under oath, would 22 your answers be the same? 23 Α. They would, yes. MR. DOWNEY: At this time I'd offer 24 Exhibits 500 through 502 and tender the witness for cross. 25

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1	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Exhibits 500,
2	501 and 502 have been offered. Any objections to their
3	receipt?
4	(No response.)
5	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Hearing none, they are
6	received.
7	(MIEC EXHIBIT NOS. 500, 501 AND 502 WERE
8	RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE.)
9	JUDGE WOODRUFF: For cross-examination,
10	begin with Public Counsel.
11	MR. MILLS: No questions.
12	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Staff?
13	MR. THOMPSON: No questions.
14	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Ameren?
15	MR. LOWERY: No questions.
16	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Questions from the Bench
17	then, Commissioner Jarrett?
18	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: I won't start. No
19	questions.
20	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Kenney?
21	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: No, thank you.
22	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Stoll?
23	COMMISSIONER STOLL: No questions.
24	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Well, that was
25	quick then. No questions from the Bench. No need for

		Page 363
1	recross, no r	edirect. You may step down.
2		THE WITNESS: Thank you.
3		JUDGE WOODRUFF: We'll go back to
4	Mr. Weiss.	
5		(AMERENUE EXHIBIT NOS. 5 AND 6 WERE MARKED
6	FOR IDENTIFIC	ATION.)
7		(Witness sworn.)
8		JUDGE WOODRUFF: You may inquire.
9	GARY WEISS te	stified as follows:
10	DIRECT EXAMIN	ATION BY MR. BYRNE:
11	Q.	Good afternoon, Mr. Weiss.
12	Α.	Good afternoon.
13	Q.	Could you please state your name for the
14	record.	
15	Α.	My name is Gary S. Weiss, W-E-I-S-S.
16	Q.	And by whom are you employed, Mr. Weiss?
17	Α.	I am employed by Ameren Missouri.
18	Q.	And in what capacity?
19	Α.	I'm manager of regulatory accounting.
20	Q.	And are you the same Gary S. Weiss that
21	caused to be	filed in this case direct testimony that's
22	been marked a	s Exhibit UE Exhibit No. 5 and rebuttal
23	testimony tha	t's been marked as UE Exhibit No. 6?
24	Α.	Yes, I am.
25	Q.	And do you have any corrections to that

	Page 364
1	testimony at this time?
2	A. No, I don't.
3	Q. And if I was to is the information
4	contained in that prefiled testimony true and correct to
5	the best of your knowledge and belief?
6	A. Yes, it is.
7	Q. And if I were to ask you the same questions
8	contained on Exhibit 5 and 6 here today when you're under
9	oath, would your answers be the same?
10	A. Yes, they would.
11	MR. BYRNE: Your Honor, I would offer
12	Exhibits 5 and 6 and tender Mr. Weiss for
13	cross-examination.
14	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Exhibits 5 and 6 have been
15	offered. Any objection to their receipt?
16	(No response.)
17	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Hearing none, they will be
18	received.
19	(AMERENUE EXHIBIT NOS. 5 AND 6 WERE
20	RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE.)
21	JUDGE WOODRUFF: For cross-examination
22	beginning with MIEC.
23	MR. DOWNEY: No cross.
24	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Public Counsel?
25	MR. MILLS: No questions for Mr. Weiss.

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1	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Staff?
2	MR. THOMPSON: Judge, let me just make for
3	sure. Mr. Weiss is here only for policy questions, is
4	that right, and will be back for other issues?
5	JUDGE WOODRUFF: That's my understanding.
6	MR. THOMPSON: I have no policy questions
7	for Mr. Weiss. Thank you.
8	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Questions from the Bench,
9	Commissioner Jarrett?
10	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: I have no policy
11	questions either. Thank you.
12	QUESTIONS BY COMMISSIONER KENNEY:
13	Q. I don't have any policy questions but,
14	Mr. Weiss, somebody said that you prepared this, though,
15	right?
16	A. Yes, I did.
17	Q. We're not going to talk about this today
18	then, right? Is that part of the policy discussion or no?
19	A. I certainly can.
20	Q. You did prepare this, because Mr. Baxter
21	was asked some questions about it, and he said that you'd
22	be the better person to answer.
23	A. That's correct.
24	Q. So do you have it in front of you? I guess
25	it's part of Staff's Exhibit 237.

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1	A. I've got the main page with me.
2	Q. Okay. So on the top overall cost of
3	capital, the 10.2 common equity, that's what we authorized
4	in the last rate case?
5	A. That is correct.
6	Q. And then down here the 10.53 is what was
7	actually earned?
8	A. For that particular time frame, yes.
9	Q. And that
10	A. Follow
11	Q. Go ahead.
12	A. Following the directions we had for
13	preparing that report.
14	Q. What's that mean, following the directions
15	that you had from whom or
16	A. No. It's the you know, in developing
17	these jurisdictional reports, on the first two pages it
18	details you what information is to be provided, and it's
19	based on the operating expenses and investments as
20	recorded on the books of the company. And then you come
21	down your operating income divided by your rate base, that
22	gives your overall return, and then you back into your
23	return on equity. That's what we were doing here with
24	this report.
25	Q. Okay. So that's for the 12-month period

Page 367 ending June 30th, 2011. So the 12-month period beginning 2 June 30th, 2011 through June 30th, 2012? 3 It would be May through June, yes. May through June? 4 Q. Α. Yes. Thanks. Q. 7 Α. Again, that data's not weather normalized or anything else. It's purely per book numbers. 8 Q. Purely what? Purely per book numbers, just as they 10 Α. 11 appear on the books. 12 So explain that to me so I can understand Q. 13 that, the distinction between this 10.53 percent and weather normalized number or what was on Mr. Baxter's 14 15 chart that's attached to his testimony. Do you have the other pages of that 16 Α. 17 surveillance report? 18 Q. Of the surveillance report? 19 Yes. Α. 20 I only have what was attached as the Q. 21 exhibit to the motion or Ameren's response to the motion to declassify. So the only thing that I have, it's from 22 Staff's Exhibit 237, page 2 of that. 23 24 Α. Okay. 25 Is there another page to this? I'm Q.

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- 1 assuming there's a page 1, but I don't have it.
- 2 A. I don't either, but I can walk you through
- 3 what's different on this report versus what shows up on
- 4 the charts we prepared for Mr. Baxter.
- 5 **Q.** Okay.
- 6 A. In arriving at -- like I talked about, in
- 7 arriving at this 10.53 earned ROE, we had an operating
- 8 income on the books of \$556.8 million. But for
- 9 Mr. Baxter's charts, we backed out the impact of the Taum
- 10 Sauk writeoff, which had a net after-tax impact of
- 11 55.7 million. So that lowered the operating income down
- 12 to 501.1 million, which when you divided by the same rate
- 13 base lowered the return down from 10.53 to 8.85 percent.
- 14 O. So that \$55.7 million attributable to Taum
- 15 Sauk, that's excised out from the operating income on
- 16 Mr. Baxter's chart represents almost, what was it, 1.78,
- 17 **1.68** percent?
- 18 A. That was the impact.
- 19 Q. And that's the only difference?
- 20 A. That's correct.
- 21 Q. What gets reported to the SEC for purposes
- 22 of like financials that are filed with the SEC, the 10.53
- 23 **or the 8.85?**
- 24 A. Probably neither. That's where the
- 25 distinction of how we do the report for the jurisdictional

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1	filing differs. The SEC report goes down to the net
2	income level, and I think you've heard the term above and
3	below the line. The SEC takes all the below the line
4	items in consideration, too, which we do not on the
5	jurisdictional report.
6	Q. So what would the what percentage would
7	be reflected in a report filed with the SEC? I guess an
8	annual report or proxy statement or quarterly statement,
9	so for that same time period, what would be reflected in
10	the report to the SEC, if you know?
11	A. I really don't know.
12	Q. Would it be more or less than the 10.53?
13	A. I think it would be less.
14	Q. Would it be more or less than the 8.85?
15	A. I truthfully think it would be between the
16	8.85 and the 10.53.
17	Q. Okay. Can you like somewhere like
18	9. something or 10.2? Let me ask you a different question.
19	Strike that.
20	Would it be more or less than the 10.2 ROE
21	that's authorized by the Commission?
22	A. I really have no way of estimating that.
23	I'm sorry, but I have nothing with me that I can look at.
24	MR. BYRNE: Commissioner, would you like us
2.5	to it's a publicly available document.

1		Page 370 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Right. That's what
2	I'm thinking.	What would it be?
3		MR. BYRNE: I don't have it. I don't know
4	what it is. Y	ou can find it?
5		THE WITNESS: We can get it, right.
6	BY COMMISSIONE	R KENNEY:
7	Q.	It's something that would have been filed
8	with the annua	l report, right?
9	Α.	Right. This would have been June, so it
10	would have bee	n the 10Q for June, yeah.
11	Q.	You probably would have had a hand in
12	preparing that	, right?
13	Α.	No. I don't get involved with that. I do
14	the jurisdicti	onal regulatory but not the SEC reporting.
15	Q.	Too many numbers floating around?
16	Α.	Right.
17		COMMISSIONER KENNEY: All right. I don't
18	have any other	questions. Thank you.
19		JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Stoll?
20		COMMISSIONER STOLL: No questions.
21		JUDGE WOODRUFF: I do have one clarifying
22	question.	
23	QUESTIONS BY J	UDGE WOODRUFF:
24	Q.	You've been several people have talked
25	about the Taum	Sauk writeoff. I assume that is the

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- decision that the Commission made last year to deny
- 2 allowing certain Taum Sauk rebuild costs into the rate
- 3 base. Is that what we're talking about?
- 4 A. That is correct.
- 5 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. Just want to be
- 6 clear on that. Okay. Any recross based on those
- 7 questions from the Bench?
- 8 MR. DOWNEY: Briefly.
- JUDGE WOODRUFF: Start with MIEC. You're
- 10 up.
- 11 RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. DOWNEY:
- 12 Q. Mr. Weiss, isn't it true that your
- 13 surveillance report that Commissioner Kenney was asking
- 14 you about does not include any of the \$300-plus million
- 15 that Ameren is seeking in this rate case, is not included
- 16 in revenue or income?
- 17 A. That's correct. The surveillance report is
- 18 purely per book.
- MR. DOWNEY: Thank you.
- JUDGE WOODRUFF: Public Counsel.
- 21 RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MILLS:
- 22 Q. Yeah. Mr. Weiss, maybe I'm -- I need to
- 23 have you go over for me again exactly the difference
- 24 between the 10.53 reflected on the Staff exhibit and the
- 25 8.85. Tell me again how that difference is accounted for.

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1	A. It's the reduction in the operating income
2	of 55.7 million for the Taum Sauk writeoff after the
3	impact of taxes. So if you reduce the operating income by
4	55.7 million and divide by the same rate base, you get a
5	lower overall return, which then translates into an
6	overall lower return on equity.
7	Q. And in what you're talking about
8	Missouri jurisdictional rate base?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. And your testimony is that a change of
11	\$55 million in income divided by your Missouri
12	jurisdictional rate base translates into a rate of return
13	difference of almost 200 basis points?
14	A. That's what the calculation shows if we do
15	the calculations the way we have to do them on the
16	surveillance report.
17	Q. What is your Missouri jurisdictional rate
18	base?
19	A. I think on the June surveillance report, it
20	was 6.8 billion.
21	Q. 6.8 billion?
22	A. Uh-huh.
23	Q. And what was your net operating income?
24	A. As I if you want the reported net
25	operating income was 556.8 million.

Page 373 1 Q. And is that -- is that figure with or 2 without the 55 from Taum Sauk? 3 That has not been adjusted for Taum Sauk. That is the way it was reported without the Taum Sauk 4 5 impact. 6 Okay. So if you take \$55 million off of Q. 7 that, that's the way you say that you get from 8.85 to 8 10.53? 9 It's the other way around. You go from 10.53 down to the 8.85. You take it away. 10 11 Okay. I'm going to have to get those Q. 12 figures out on a calculator because that does not seem right to me, but if that's your testimony, we will take 13 14 that and we'll figure it out. 15 MR. MILLS: That's all the questions I

- 16 have.
- 17 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I hate to beat this
- dead horse, but it's interesting, and it's confusing. 18
- 19 FURTHER QUESTIONS BY COMMISSIONER KENNEY:
- 20 So the \$55.7 million is removed from the Q.
- 21 556.8 million in operating income, right?
- 22 That's correct. Α.
- 23 Which is the numerator? Q.
- 24 Right. Α.
- 25 Q. The denominator is the Missouri

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1	jurisdictional rate base, which is 6.8 billion?
2	A. Right.
3	Q. And the rate base is the plant in service,
4	that's all the things that are going to serve customers?
5	A. It is the mainly plant in service less your
6	deferred income taxes.
7	Q. Included in the value of Missouri
8	jurisdictional rate base would be Taum Sauk, right?
9	A. No. It was removed from our books.
10	Q. So is it in the 10.53 calculation where
11	you've got 556, \$556.8 million worth of operating income,
12	that presumably includes \$55.7 million attributable to
13	Taum Sauk, right?
14	A. Well
15	Q. The numerator, right?
16	A. The net operating income, the Taum Sauk
17	writeoff was below the line, so it did not impact on our
18	books the operating income. That's why it was 55.6.
19	Q. So it's in that calculation that arrives
20	that gets you to the 10.53, it's still there?
21	A. Right.
22	Q. Divided by rate base?
23	A. That's correct.
24	Q. And so the \$6.8 billion rate base figure is
25	the same in the calculation that includes the 55.7 for

Page 375 Taum Sauk and the 501 million that doesn't include the 55.7 for Taum Sauk? 3 Α. That's correct. 4 Q. The denominator doesn't change? 5 Α. That's correct. 6 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: All right. Thank 7 you. JUDGE WOODRUFF: MIEC, Public Counsel want 8 to jump back in after that? 10 MR. MILLS: I do. FURTHER RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MILLS: 11 12 So how do you get to either 8.85 or 10.53 Q. 13 from the 6 billion and the 500-some million? There 14 obviously are some intermediate steps there. 15 Let's just start with the information that Α. Kevin put in the record as an exhibit. 16 17 Q. Okay. 18 You divide 556,765 by the 6,753,411, and Α. you get 8.4 percent overall return. 19 20 Okay. And that's towards the lower Q. 21 right-hand -- the bottom of the lower right-hand column on Exhibit -- Staff Exhibit 237, correct? That's the 8.24? 22 23 That is correct. Α. 24 Okay. Q. 25 Then you take the 8.24, you subtract out Α.

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- 1 the weighted cost of long-term debt, subtract out the cost
- of the preferred stock, that gives you 5.42. Then you
- 3 divide that by the common equity ratio of 51.54 and that
- 4 gives you the 5.-- 10.52 or 10.53.
- 5 Q. Can you do that same calculation with the
- 6 55 approximate million of Taum Sauk taken out?
- 7 A. 4 now becomes 7.42. Subtract out the same
- 8 two items, the long-term debt and the preferred stock
- 9 weighted cost gives 4.6, divided by the same .5144 gives
- 10 8 -- I get 8.93. I must have miscalculated, but I do get
- 11 8.93. I get 8.93, so the calculation's slightly off.
- 12 MR. MILLS: Thank you for walking me
- 13 through the calculation. That's helpful. That's all the
- 14 questions I have.
- JUDGE WOODRUFF: For Staff.
- 16 RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. THOMPSON:
- 17 Q. Mr. Weiss, you're aware that Staff
- 18 Exhibit 237 and this page that we've been examining was
- 19 filed by the company in response to Staff's motion to
- 20 declassify a portion of John Cassidy's testimony that was
- 21 highly confidential and a schedule that that testimony was
- 22 based on. Did you know that?
- 23 A. I heard that, yes.
- Q. You heard that?
- 25 A. I was aware of that.

Page 377 1 Q. You were aware of that. Okay. 2 schedule was an earlier version of this financial 3 surveillance report; is that not correct? Α. That is correct. 4 5 Q. And in filing this version, the company 6 explained that it had determined that the earned return on 7 equity reported in the surveillance reports was inaccurate 8 and was stated incorrectly and, in fact, you prepare those reports, right? 10 That is correct. Α. 11 So you're intimately familiar with whatever Q. 12 the error was and the correction that was made, correct? Yes, I am. 13 Α. 14 Q. Okay. Now, you would agree with me, would 15 you not, that the ROE figure attached to Mr. Cassidy's testimony and which is still highly confidential is higher 16 17 than the figure on this public document, is it not? It's higher but it's incorrect. 18 Α. 19 Q. I understand it's incorrect. I just want 20 at this point to establish that it is, in fact, higher, 21 right? 22 That is correct. Α. 23 Q. Okay. What is the nature of the correction 24 that you made to produce this now accurate document?

You're going to love this. Okay.

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Α.

25

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1	Q. I hope I will.
2	A. Okay. As I explained to the Commissioner,
3	we have above the line and below the line expenses and
4	above the line stops at operating income.
5	Q. Correct.
6	A. So for when they recorded the Taum Sauk
7	writeoff, the expense adjustment went below the line, the
8	\$90 million. However, the income tax impact was recorded
9	above the line, and so we had a mismatch of having part
10	above the line and part below the line. And the part
11	above the line should not have been there and it
12	overstated our return because it reduces the income taxes
13	by some, I don't know, \$40 million.
14	Q. So let me make sure I understand you. The
15	correction was limited to moving some income tax from
16	above the line to below the line?
17	A. That is correct.
18	Q. It had nothing to do with removing Taum
19	Sauk?
20	A. No. The adjustment was made to correctly
21	reflect Taum Sauk as we should have been on our books.
22	Q. Okay. Now, what about incentive
23	compensation and bonuses, are those above the line or
24	below the line?
25	A. They're above the line.

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- 1 Q. They're above the line. Okay. Do you know
- 2 how many basis points are attributable to those?
- 3 A. No, I do not.
- 4 MR. THOMPSON: No more questions. Thank
- 5 you.
- JUDGE WOODRUFF: Redirect.
- 7 MR. BYRNE: Sorry.
- 8 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BYRNE:
- 9 Q. Okay. Mr. Weiss, let me ask you this: You
- 10 said -- in response recently to Mr. Thompson, you said the
- 11 correction you made was to move income tax associated with
- 12 Taum Sauk from above the line to below the line. Isn't it
- 13 really an income tax benefit that moved from above the
- 14 line to below the line when you made the correction or am
- 15 I not thinking about that right? Isn't it the income tax
- 16 deduction associated with Taum Sauk writeoff that you
- 17 moved from above the line to below the line?
- 18 A. That's right. The impact of the writeoff.
- 19 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Mr. Byrne, you need to
- 20 turn your microphone on.
- 21 MR. BYRNE: I'm not sure that's going to
- 22 help.
- 23 BY MR. BYRNE:
- Q. Okay. I want to try to understand what's
- in this 10.53 percent versus what the company has reported

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- 1 on its charts at 10.53 percent. Let's talk about the
- 2 10.53 percent on page 2 of the Staff exhibit. My
- 3 understanding is the 10.53 percent pretends like the Taum
- 4 Sauk disallowance was never made; is that true?
- 5 A. That is correct, because it was recorded
- 6 below the line, so it should not have impacted the above
- 7 the line information that we report on the surveillance
- 8 report.
- 9 Q. Okay. So the difference between this
- 10 10.53 percent that appeared on the surveillance report and
- 11 financial reporting is you added back in the disallowance
- 12 of Taum Sauk and the tax effect of that; is that correct?
- 13 A. That is correct.
- 14 Q. Okay. Then my understanding is this
- 15 10.53 percent is also not weather normalized; is that
- 16 correct?
- 17 A. That is correct.
- 18 Q. Okay. And then it's my understanding that
- 19 there was a refund that the company received from Entergy
- 20 that's been an issue in this case. Do you know about
- 21 that?
- 22 A. Yes, I do.
- Q. And it's my -- is it correct -- and I don't
- 24 know for sure. Is it correct that the Entergy refund
- 25 would be included in the revenues that make up this

Page 381 10.53 percent? 2 Α. That is correct. 3 Ο. Okay. And there was also another disallowance that we've been kicking around, and that's 4 5 the FAC disallowance that the Commission ruled on in the not too distant past. Does that disallowance come into 6 7 play here at all or was that previous to this? I think it expired by this time. 8 9 Q. Okay. So if I want to -- so this 10 10.5 percent which is for June, the 12 months ended 11 June 30th, 2012, take a look at the chart we have on 12 WLB-ES3, if you have it. I'll give it to you if you 13 don't. Do you have Mr. Baxter's surrebuttal testimony? 14 I do. Α. 15 Okay. And he shows -- he has a return that Q. 16 he shows for the same period, right, for June 30th, 2012, 17 right? 18 That is correct. Α. 19 Q. Okay. And -- but that's a lot lower, 20 That like looks like 9.5 percent or so. right? I can't 21 tell what the number is. It's just on a bar chart. 22 Α. Which -- which bar chart are you looking 23 at? 24 Q. I'm looking at WLB-ES3. 25 Okay. Α.

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- Q. And it says, reflects two rate changes
- 2 weather normalized, accounts for unusual items. Do you
- 3 see that?
- 4 A. Yes, I do.
- 5 Q. Okay. So what I'm trying to understand is,
- 6 why does that one show like 9.5 percent versus 10.53? And
- 7 I think I have an idea, but let's see if I'm right. One
- 8 is this chart is weather normalized, whereas the page in
- 9 the Staff exhibit is not weather normalized. Is that one
- 10 difference?
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. Okay. I think -- and they both pretend
- 13 like the Taum Sauk disallowance never occurred, right, so
- 14 they are the same in that respect; is that true?
- 15 A. Correct.
- 16 Q. Okay. But the WLB-ES3 also takes out the
- one time refund from Entergy; is that true?
- 18 A. That's true.
- 19 Q. Okay. Are those all the differences
- 20 between the 10.53 percent that's shown on the surveillance
- 21 report that's in the Staff exhibit and the 9.5 percent or
- 22 so that's shown on Mr. Baxter's WLB-ES3 or are there more
- 23 differences?
- 24 A. No. Both of them had the FAC writeoff
- 25 removed. So that's no different.

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1	Q. And it was probably past the time anyway,
2	wasn't it?
3	A. Right.
4	Q. Didn't you just testify?
5	A. Right.
6	Q. But if it wasn't past the time, then
7	both
8	A. Right.
9	Q they both would have treated the FAC
10	writeoff the same; is that correct?
11	A. That's correct.
12	Q. So are you agreeing with me, the only
13	differences between the 10.53 and the about 9.5 on
14	Schedule WLB-E3 are WLB-ES3 is weather normalized? That's
15	one difference. The Entergy refund is taken out of the
16	June 2012 figure on WLB-ES3, right?
17	A. Correct.
18	Q. And that's it? Is that the difference?
19	A. Well, we have the eliminates the Taum
20	Sauk writeoff.
21	Q. But both of them, it's not a difference
22	because they both pretend like the Taum Sauk writeoff
23	never occurred, right?
24	A. You're talking about 10.53, that is
25	correct.

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1	Q. Okay. So those are all the differences
2	A. Right.
3	Q between those two figures?
4	A. That's correct.
5	MR. BYRNE: All right. Thank you.
6	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Then,
7	Mr. Weiss, you can step down. Let's go ahead and call
8	Mr. Brubaker.
9	MR. THOMPSON: Judge, if I could, how many
10	more do you plan to go for today?
11	JUDGE WOODRUFF: That depends on you guys.
12	I assume Mr. Gorman will not be testifying today, and then
13	we've Ms. Kliethermes and Ms. Meisenheimer. Does anybody
14	have any extensive cross of them?
15	MR. LOWERY: Judge, the company is not
16	going to have any questions of any witnesses unless by
17	some chance there's something the Commission asks that we
18	feel like we need to ask a question. We don't have any
19	we don't have any want to ask any questions.
20	JUDGE WOODRUFF: I anticipate then we'll
21	probably finish all three of them. We'll see how it's
22	going.
23	(Witness sworn.)
24	(MIEC EXHIBIT NOS. 503, 504, 505 AND 506
25	WERE MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

Page 385 MAURICE BRUBAKER testified as follows: 1 2 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. VUYLSTEKE: 3 Mr. Brubaker, would you please state your name and business address for the record. 4 5 Α. Yes. It's Maurice Brubaker. My address is 16690 Swingley Ridge Road, Chesterfield, Missouri 63017. 6 7 And by whom are you employed and in what Q. 8 capacity? 9 As president of Brubaker & Associates. 10 Are you the same Maurice Brubaker that Q. 11 filed the revenue requirement testimony marked as MIEC 12 Exhibits 503 and 505 and rate design revenue allocation 13 and cost of service -- yes, cost of service testimony 14 marked as MIEC 504 and 506? 15 Α. Yes. And is the information contained in those 16 Q. 17 exhibits true to the best of your knowledge and belief? It is. 18 Α. 19 Q. If I were to ask you the questions that are 20 contained in those exhibits here today, would your answers 21 be the same? 22 Yes, they would. Α. 23 MS. VUYLSTEKE: Your Honor, I would offer 24 Exhibits 503 through 506 into the record and tender Mr. Brubaker for cross-examination. 25

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1	JUDGE WOODRUFF: 503, 504, 505 and 506 have
2	been offered. Any objections to their receipt?
3	MR. LOWERY: No objection.
4	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Hearing no objections,
5	they will received.
6	(MIEC EXHIBIT NOS. 503 THROUGH 506 WERE
7	RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE.)
8	JUDGE WOODRUFF: For cross-examination,
9	beginning with Public Counsel.
10	MR. MILLS: No questions.
11	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Staff?
12	MR. THOMPSON: I understand Mr. Brubaker
13	will be back for rate design cross-examination; is that
14	correct?
15	JUDGE WOODRUFF: That's my understanding.
16	MR. THOMPSON: Then I have no policy
17	questions for Mr. Brubaker. Thank you.
18	JUDGE WOODRUFF: For Ameren?
19	MR. LOWERY: With the same caveat, I have
20	no policy questions either.
21	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Jarrett?
22	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: I have no policy
23	questions either.
24	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Kenney?
25	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: No, thanks.

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1	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Stoll?
2	COMMISSIONER STOLL: No questions, your
3	Honor.
4	JUDGE WOODRUFF: And I have no questions.
5	So no need for recross or redirect and, Mr. Brubaker, you
6	can step down.
7	Next name on the list is Mr. Gorman. I
8	assume he'll be testifying later when he testifies on ROE;
9	is that correct?
10	MR. DOWNEY: That's correct. That is on
11	the 5th.
12	MR. LOWERY: Judge, the counsel were just
13	speaking, and as far as we're concerned we can excuse
14	those witnesses and their testimony can come into the
15	record unless, of course, the Commissioners have questions
16	for Ms. Kliethermes or Ms. Meisenheimer.
17	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Would Commissioners have
18	any questions?
19	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: No.
20	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: No, thanks.
21	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. Let's go ahead and
22	get their testimony in, then.
23	MR. THOMPSON: The only testimony that
24	Ms. Kliethermes has, Judge, is she contributed to the
25	Staff's revenue requirement cost of service report.

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1	Generally we offer that at the end of the case after all
2	the contributors have testified.
3	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Let's do
4	Ms. Meisenheimer.
5	MR. MILLS: Do you want me to offer all of
6	her testimony? Her policy testimony isn't it's
7	generally limited to her direct revenue requirement, which
8	is Exhibit 402.
9	JUDGE WOODRUFF: So you're going to offer
10	402?
11	MR. MILLS: Yeah.
12	JUDGE WOODRUFF: 402 has been offered. Any
13	objection to its receipt?
14	(No response.)
15	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Hearing none, it will be
16	received.
17	(OPC EXHIBIT NO. 402 WAS RECEIVED INTO
18	EVIDENCE.)
19	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. I believe that
20	takes care of today, then. And
21	MR. MITTEN: Your Honor, before we go off
22	the record, I have one matter I'd like to bring before the
23	Commission.
24	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Come up to the microphone.
25	MR. MITTEN: It has to do with the

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1	discovery order that you issued on August 31st. I still
2	haven't received from MIEC the information that you
3	ordered them to provide me in that order.
4	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. Do you have a
5	response?
6	MS. VUYLSTEKE: Your Honor, I would ask
7	Mr. Mitten to explain exactly what information he ${\tt I}$
8	want to make sure I understand what information exactly he
9	says he didn't receive to be absolutely sure. We
10	discussed that
11	MR. MITTEN: In your August 31 order, you
12	said the Commission will direct Noranda to provide copies
13	of all annual and multi-year budgets and financial
14	projections that Noranda has prepared for the New Madrid
15	smelter that encompasses any of the years 2012 through
16	2015. I can show you the response that I received, which
17	doesn't even come close to complying with that.
18	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right.
19	MS. VUYLSTEKE: Your Honor, first of all, I
20	provided to Mr. Mitten the response that my client gave me
21	after reviewing the order and my advice that they respond.
22	And they did respond and they provided a schedule, and I
23	have no additional information to provide, and I am
24	providing what my client has given to me to provide. I
25	would also add that the schedule that has been provided in

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Fax: 314,644,1334

- 1 response to this question is very similar to in detail and
- 2 in scope, it seems, to the responses that we received from
- 3 Ameren to our questions asking for their 2012 budgets.
- 4 But regardless of the differences, that is
- 5 the information that my client has provided in response to
- 6 that question, and I have no additional information to
- 7 provide.
- 8 MR. MITTEN: Judge, I'll be happy to show
- 9 you the information that Ameren Missouri has provided to
- 10 MIEC with respect to its 2012 budgets and also its
- 11 projections through 2016 and let you compare it with the
- 12 response that I received from Noranda, and you can tell me
- 13 if they're similar in any regard.
- 14 MS. VUYLSTEKE: I would add, your Honor, I
- 15 don't think the litmus test for this is whether they are
- 16 the same. I just noted that they're not very different in
- 17 their scope. They're both just a few pages, but
- 18 nevertheless, that that is all I have to provide,
- 19 regardless of the fact that they may -- there may be
- 20 differences in the schedules.
- 21 JUDGE WOODRUFF: I don't know that we need
- 22 to have this discussion on the record. We can take it up
- 23 again tomorrow if we need to. At this point we'll deal
- 24 with it in just a moment here. I want to go off the
- 25 record.

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1	I wanted to be sure and clear up what we're
2	going to be doing tomorrow first. My understanding is the
3	advertising and dues issues have been resolved and so
4	we'll be doing cash working capital tomorrow; is that
5	correct?
6	Mr. MILLS: That is not necessarily my
7	understanding. It has been reported to me that the
8	company and the Staff have come to a settlement agreement
9	on a number of the issues. I have not seen that, and I
10	don't know whether or not once it is filed as a
11	Stipulation & Agreement, whether or not I will object to
12	it.
13	I'm certainly not I'm not at this point
14	saying we need to hear the dues and donations issue
15	tomorrow, but I don't want, first, the fact that the
16	jointly filed revised procedural schedule was purportedly
17	on behalf of all the parties and the fact that we're not
18	planning to do dues and donations tomorrow, I don't want
19	that to be construed somehow as a waiver of my possibility
20	to object to a settlement once one is put before me.
21	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Well, we will be here
22	tomorrow morning and I guess we'll see at that point who's
23	here to testify. At this point we're looking at cash
24	working capital for sure.
25	MR. THOMPSON: That's correct, Judge.

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1	MR. MILLS: Judge, all I'm suggesting is we
2	may have to come back around and do some issues that are
3	supposedly settled depending on what the settlement looks
4	like. I'm not suggesting that we need to do them
5	tomorrow.
6	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay.
7	MR. BYRNE: And also, Judge, our
8	recommendation is not to push anything forward but try
9	cash and working capital tomorrow, but we also are
10	continuing to engage in discussions and can use the time
11	fruitfully that isn't in the hearing room.
12	JUDGE WOODRUFF: We'll begin at 8:30 then
13	with cash working capital.
14	MR. MITTEN: Judge, there's one additional
15	issue. Earlier this week Mr. Robertson had asked that his
16	witness be taken out of time and that she go on first
17	tomorrow, Ms. Morgan. I don't know how that issue was
18	every resolved. Mr. Robertson is not here. So I don't
19	know whether that's a current request or whether he has
20	abandoned that.
21	JUDGE WOODRUFF: That would appear to be
22	abandoned since that issue was not on the schedule for
23	tomorrow.
24	MR. THOMPSON: No. We discussed taking
25	Ms. Morgan out of order because she's a rate design

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1	witness but will not be available on the 11th of October.
2	At this point, rather than move entire issues around, it
3	seemed easiest to take witnesses out of order, if
4	necessary. Staff, for example, has a witness that will
5	have to be taken out of order at some point because she's
6	also not available that week.
7	So we had indicated to Mr. Robertson, of
8	course, we would allow his witness to appear out of order,
9	and the discussion was that it would be, in fact,
10	tomorrow. So in the spirit of what you said, Judge, I
11	think if Ms. Morgan shows up to testify, off we go.
12	MR. MITTEN: That's fine.
13	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. All right.
14	Anything else we need to take up before we go off the
15	record?
16	All right. With that we are adjourned
17	until testimony morning at 8:30.
18	(OPC EXHIBIT NOS. 400 THROUGH 408 WERE
19	MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION BY THE REPORTER.)
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2	CERTIFICATE
3	STATE OF MISSOURI)
) ss.
4	COUNTY OF COLE)
5	I, Kellene K. Feddersen, Certified
6	Shorthand Reporter with the firm of Midwest Litigation
7	Services, do hereby certify that I was personally present
8	at the proceedings had in the above-entitled cause at the
9	time and place set forth in the caption sheet thereof;
10	that I then and there took down in Stenotype the
11	proceedings had; and that the foregoing is a full, true
12	and correct transcript of such Stenotype notes so made at
13	such time and place.
14	Given at my office in the City of
15	Jefferson, County of Cole, State of Missouri.
16	
17	Kellene K. Feddersen, RPR, CSR, CCR
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