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Exhibit No.:

Issue(s): Off-System Non-Firm Sales
Witness: Ted Robertson
Type of Exhibit: Direct
Sponsoring Party: Public Counsel
Case Number: ER-2007-0291
Date Testimony Prepared: July 24, 2007

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

TED ROBERTSON

Submitted on Behalf of the Office of the Public Counsel

KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Case No. ER-2007-0219

NP

** ____ ** Denotes "Highly Confidential" Information that has been redacted

July 24, 2007

Case No(s) ER 2007-0291
Date 10 1 07 Rptr MV

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of the Application of Kansas City)	·
Power & Light Company for Approval to Make) (Case No. ER-2007-0291
Certain Changes in its Charges for Electric	j -	
Service to Implement its Regulatory Plan)	

AFFIDAVIT OF TED ROBERTSON

STATE OF MISSOURI)	
)	SS
COUNTY OF COLE)	

Ted Robertson, of lawful age and being first duly sworn, deposes and states:

- 1. My name is Ted Robertson. I am a Public Utility Accountant for the Office of the Public Counsel.
- 2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my direct testimony consisting of pages 1 through 20.
- 3. I hereby swear and affirm that my statements contained in the attached testimony are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Ted Robertson, C.P.A.
Public Utility Accountant III

Subscribed and sworn to me this 24th day of July 2007.

NOTARY OF MIT

JERENE A. BUCKMAN My Commission Expires August 10, 2009 Cole County Commission #05754036

Jerene Buckman Notary Public

My commission expires August 10, 2009.

1 DIRECT TESTIMONY 2 3 TED ROBERTSON 4 5 KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 6 CASE NO. ER-2007-0291 7 8 9 1. INTRODUCTION 10 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS. 11 Α. Ted Robertson, PO Box 2230, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102-2230. 12 13 Q. BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY? 14 Α. I am employed by the Missouri Office of the Public Counsel (OPC or Public 15 Counsel) as a Public Utility Accountant III. 16 17 Q. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF YOUR CURRENT DUTIES AT THE OPC? 18 Under the direction of the OPC Chief Public Utility Accountant, Mr. Russell W. Α. 19 Trippensee, I am responsible for performing audits and examinations of the 20 books and records of public utilities operating within the state of Missouri. 21 22 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND OTHER 23 QUALIFICATIONS. 24 I graduated in May, 1988, from Missouri State University in Springfield, Missouri, Α. 25 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Accounting. In November of 1988, I 26 passed the Uniform Certified Public Accountant Examination, and I obtained

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Certified Public Accountant (CPA) certification from the state of Missouri in 1989. My CPA license number is 2004012798.

- Q. HAVE YOU RECEIVED SPECIALIZED TRAINING RELATED TO PUBLIC UTILITY ACCOUNTING?
- Α. Yes. In addition to being employed by the Missouri Office of the Public Counsel since July 1990, I have attended the NARUC Annual Regulatory Studies Program at Michigan State University, and I have also participated in numerous training seminars relating to this specific area of accounting study.
- HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THE MISSOURI PUBLIC Q. SERVICE COMMISSION (COMMISSION OR MPSC)?
- Yes, I have testified on numerous issues before this Commission. Please refer Α. to Schedule TJR-1, attached to this testimony, for a listing of cases in which I have submitted testimony.

PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY 11.

- WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY? Q.
- I am sponsoring the Public Counsel's position regarding Kansas City Power & A. Light Company's (KCPL or Company) ratemaking treatment of non-firm offsystem sales and ratepayers credits associated with the net margin achieved that

 exceeds the baseline amount included in rates. In the testimony to follow, I will provide an overview of the current ratemaking treatment of the net margin along with OPC recommendations regarding:

- 1. The annual baseline level of non-firm off-system sales margin to include in the calculation of the cost of service for the instant case.
- 2. The calculation and tracking of the amount of non-firm off-system sales margin in excess of the baseline amount that should be credited to ratepayers.
- 3. The interest rate that should be applied to the excess of non-firm offsystem sales margin achieved that exceeds the baseline amount included in KCPL's cost of service.
- 4. The calculation of the interest amount associated with the excess non-firm off-system sales margin that should be credited to ratepayers.
- 5. The method and timing for returning any excess margin (with interest).

III. OFF-SYSTEM NON-FIRM SALES

- Q. WHAT IS THE CURRENT RATEMAKING TREATMENT OF NON-FIRM OFF-SYSTEM SALES?
- A. In Case No. ER-2006-0314 the Commission authorized a mechanism, proposed by KCPL, whereby it would set the Company's rates by using the 25th percentile of expected non-firm off-system sales in the revenue requirement. In addition, KCPL is to book any amount exceeding the 25th percentile as a regulatory liability, with said liability to flow back to ratepayers in the next rate case. Commission

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authorization of the original mechanism is stated on page 33 of the Case No. ER-2006-0314 Report and Order as:

The Commission finds that the competent and substantial evidence supports KCPL's position, and finds this issue in favor of the alternative KCPL sponsored in which it would agree to book any amount over the 25th percentile as a regulatory liability, and would flow that money back to ratepayers in the next rate case, with a corresponding regulatory asset account for KCPL to book any amount below the 25th percentile to be recovered in the next rate case.

Subsequent to its issuing the Report And Order, the Commission modified its original position by eliminating the "regulatory asset" authorization from the mechanism. Beginning on page 2 of its Order Regarding Motions For Rehearing, the Commission stated,

Furthermore, the Commission reconsiders its off-systems sales decision, in which it allowed KCPL to put the projected 25th percentile from KCPL witness Schnitzer's curve into revenue requirement. Depending upon actual 2007 actual [sic] non-firm off-system sales, the Commission's Report and Order required KCPL to establish either a regulatory asset account to recover any deficit from that 25th percentile from ratepayers, or a regulatory liability account to return the surplus over that 25th percentile to ratepayers. Upon reviewing the motions for rehearing from Praxair and OPC, and KCPL's response, the Commission concludes that the regulatory asset mechanism could provide a disincentive to KCPL to make off-system sales up to the 25th percentile, which could result in rates that are not just and reasonable to the detriment of Missouri ratepayers. Therefore, the Commission will no longer

1 allow KCPL to use the regulatory asset mechanism described in its 2 December 21, 2006 Report and Order, but will continue to require KCPL to book any amounts above the 25th percentile as a 4 regulatory liability. Relying upon the same rationale as it did in its 5 Report and Order, the Commission still concludes that the trued-up, 6 25th percentile amount of non-firm, off-system sales from KCPL 7 witness Schnitzer's curve is the appropriate amount off-systems 8 sales to include in revenue requirement. 9 10 11 Q. WAS THE 2006 NET MARGIN FOR NON-FIRM OFF-SYSTEM SALES HIGHER 12 THAN THE BASELINE INCLUDED IN KCPL CASE NO. ER-2006-0314? 13 A. Yes. Company's response to MPSC Staff Data Request No. 206 identifies that 14 the actual 2006 net margin was approximately ** _____ ** the 15 baseline amount included in KCPL Case No. ER-2006-0314. 16 17 Q. IS IT EXPECTED THAT THE 2007 NET MARGIN FOR NON-FIRM OFF-SYSTEM 18 SALES WILL EXCEED THE BASELINE INCLUDED IN ITS RATES IN KCPL CASE 19 NO. ER-2006-0314? 20 Based on the net margin KCPL earned in 2006 and the amount of non-firm offsystem sales revenue Company has budgeted for 2007, I believe that it is likely that 21 22 it will. However, the actual determination of the net margin earned in 2007 is 23 unknown at this time since the year is only a little more than half completed. 24

1		In regard to the actual margins earned in 2007, Company's response to MPSC Staff
2		Data Request No. 206 states, in part,
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4 5 6 7 8		**
9		However, the data request response also identifies that the budgeted non-firm off-
10		system net margin for 2007 is approximately ** ** the same budgeted
11	:	revenue was for 2006. This indicates to me that the Company expected 2007
12		revenues to not vary significantly from 2006.
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14	Q.	DOES PUBLIC COUNSEL BELIEVE THAT THE LEVEL OF NON-FIRM OFF-
15		SYSTEM SALES MARGIN INCLUDED IN KCPL'S COST OF SERVICE SHOULD
16		BE INCREASED IN THE INSTANT CASE?
17	A.	Yes. It is Public Counsel's belief that the 25th percentile baseline margin authorized
18		in KCPL Case No. ER-2006-0314 is not a fair and reasonable representation of the
19		non-firm off-system sales margin Company is likely to achieve on a going-forward
20		basis. In years 2004, 2005 and 2006, the net margins achieved were **
21		**, ** **, ** **, and ** **, respectively. Whereas,
22		the median net margin for years 2007 and 2008, as identified by the Company in its
23		Case Nos. ER-2006-0314 and ER-2007-0291 workpapers, is expected to

approximate ** _____ ** and ** _____ **, respectively. Given the level of historical margin actually earned in recent years and expected in the near future, Public Counsel does not believe that the 25th percentile baseline margin is a reasonable compromise between the risk and harm to which Company and ratepayers are subjected.

- Q. WHY DID THE COMMISSION AUTHORIZE THE UTILIZATION OF THE 25TH
 PERCENTILE BASELINE FOR NET MARGIN?
- A. On page 35 of its <u>Report And Order</u>, KCPL Case No. ER-2006-0314, the Commission, cognizant of what was at stake, stated:

What is at stake here is the importance to KCPL of a certain level of non-firm, off-system sales put into revenue requirement versus the importance of that same level of non-firm, off-system sales to Missouri ratepayers.

The language in the Report And Order goes on to state that the Commission authorized the 25th percentile baseline because it believed ratepayers, in the short term, are not harmed due to the fact any sales over the baseline will be flowed back to them and that the damage to KCPL, in the event it did not achieve the baseline, could be more disastrous than any benefit the might accrue to ratepayers by authorizing a higher baseline.

Q.

DO YOU AGREE WITH THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSIONS REGARDING ITS

AUTHORIZATION OF THE 25TH PERCENTILE BASELINE FOR NET MARGIN?

A. No. Given the historical evidence regarding the actual net margins achieved, plus, Company testimony of expected future net margins, I believe that the Commission has lowered the risk to which KCPL is exposed to a level that is far too low. In fact, the Commission recognized the Company's admission of the low risk on page 34 of the Report And Order, KCPL Case No. ER-2006-0314, where it states,

...Mr. Giles, admits, given the fairly substantial chance that KCPL will meet or exceed that 25th percentile, there are a number of ways to account for KCPL's relatively low risk for non-firm off-system sales...

Furthermore, I believe the Commission also erred in its conclusion regarding the level of harm to be experienced by ratepayers. For example, I can think of, and will discuss in the following testimony, several instances whereby ratepayers are harmed by the utilization of a baseline net margin set at the 25th percentile even with the use of a regulatory liability mechanism.

Q. DOES KCPL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT INCENTIVE TO GO BEYOND A BASELINE LEVEL IF THE EXCESS MARGIN IS TO BE CREDITED ENTIRELY TO RATEPAYERS?

A. No. Public Counsel believes that Company's incentive is unreasonably limited by the utilization of the 25th percentile baseline margin. There may be a small incentive to exceed the 25th percentile due to an immediate cash flow benefit for Company in the short-term. However, that benefit would be offset by any refund of the excess margin it has to credit back to ratepayers in the future. Besides, the utility likely already has in place a cadre of financing resources for the normal utility investments or costs this additional cash flow would support.

Furthermore, if every dollar of additional non-firm off-system sales margin above the baseline is to be refunded to ratepayers, Company may perceive higher levels of margins to be contrary to its interest because they would help parties argue in future cases for a higher baseline or normalized amount.

- Q. WILL RATEPAYERS BE CREDITED WITH INTEREST ON NET MARGINS ABOVE THE BASELINE?
- A. The mechanism to flow back excess margins to ratepayers has yet to be defined. If this mechanism is not constructed properly, the harm to ratepayers would be significant. If interest is not applied to excess margins achieved, Company will benefit from receiving higher retail rates from customers upon which no utility investment or expense is associated. In essence, Company will have had the use of a cost-free source of funds provided by ratepayers.

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Historically, the proper regulatory ratemaking for a cost-free source of funds is to treat the amount either as a reduction from a utility's rate base or to calculate and add interest for credit to ratepayers. Ratepayers are in fact being harmed because they are forced to pay the higher retail rates and they are also being subjected to unnecessary risk because the mechanism for calculating and paying interest on the cost-free funds provided by ratepayers is unknown.

- Q. DOES THE COMMISSION'S AUTHORIZATION OF A "TRACKER MECHANISM"

 INCREASE THE PROBABILITY THAT INTERGENERATIONAL INEQUITY WILL

 OCCUR?
 - Yes. Every day that the workings of the tracker mechanism are left undefined increases the risk that current ratepayers who leave the system will not receive credits for excess margins achieved by KCPL. The Commission's decision to reduce KCPL's risk, by using such a low percentile for a baseline margin, has increased the harm to these ratepayers by forcing them to pay higher retail rates with no assurance of future offsetting credits. In addition, depending on when credits are returned to ratepayers, it is possible that ratepayers who did not provide cost-free funds to the utility may themselves be provided with credits which they do not deserve. Public Counsel does not believe that increasing the harm to one group of ratepayers while benefiting another, who deserve no benefit, just so KCPL's risk

can be lowered to a level which it agrees has a fairly substantial (75%) chance of being met or exceeded is not a reasonable policy.

- Q. WHAT LEVEL OF NON-FIRM OFF-SYSTEM SALES MARGIN SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN KCPL'S COST OF SERVICE ON A GOING-FORWARD BASIS?
- A. Public Counsel is acutely aware of, and shares, the Commission's concern that KCPL's operations not be unduly burdened while it is in the current construction mode. In fact, this was the reason why Public Counsel helped construct and agreed upon the regulatory plan that was approved by the Commission in KCPL Case No. EO-2005-0329. However, it is our belief that a baseline net margin set at the 25th percentile is unreasonably low in light of the extensive risk-sharing between ratepayers and shareholders that has already been effectuated in the KCPL regulatory plan.

In Case No. ER-2006-0314, OPC recommended exposing rate payers and shareholders to equal amounts of risk by setting the baseline at the 50th percentile level. The Commission rejected the OPC position even though the net margins actually achieved by the Company during the years 2004 through 2006 far exceeded the 25th percentile baseline the Commission ultimately authorized for year 2007. Thus, in order to more fairly allocate the associated risks involved and to create incentive for the Company to seek and achieve a level of sales margins that

1		is not based on an abnormally low level of likely outcomes, Public Counsel
2		recommends that the baseline going forward be increased slightly and set at the
3		40 th percentile level forecasted by the Company for year 2008. Company's updated
4		April forecast workpaper identifies the amount associated with the 40 th percentile as
5		being, 1) ** ** the 25 th percentile amount authorized in the
6		last rate case and 2) approximately ** ** the actual net margin earned
7		in year 2006.
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9	Q.	HOW SHOULD THE NON-FIRM OFF-SYSTEM SALES NET MARGIN THAT
10		EXCEEDS THE BASELINE AMOUNT INCLUDED IN RATES BE CALCULATED
11		AND TRACKED?
12	A.	There are any number of ways to calculate when the baseline and excess net
13	<u></u>	margin were earned and how the balances are to be tracked. The following are just
14		a few of the ways that Public Counsel has discussed amongst ourselves,
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16		Weighted monthly by revenues.
17		2. Evenly allocated month by month.
18		3. Average of single year.
19	i i	4. Annual amount.
20		5. Cumulative until and after baseline is met.
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The issue here is not so much the determination of the total annual net margin earned, but when it was earned over the course of the year and how it is to be tracked. This is important because if interest is to be accrued on the excess net margin, the time period in which it was earned and when it is finally credited back to ratepayers directly impacts the calculation of margins and interest. Since the Commission has not specified a methodology for the calculation of the excess margin, interest or the credit of the balance back to ratepayers, it is up to the parties to propose a reasonable solution.

Q. HOW DOES PUBLIC COUNSEL PROPOSE TO CALCULATE AND TRACK EXCESS MARGIN AND INTEREST EARNED ON THE BALANCES?

A. In the interest of making the process as simple and as fair as possible, Public

Counsel proposes that interest associated with excess margins be calculated by

treating the balance as if it was earned on an even monthly basis over the course of
the year and then applying an appropriate interest rate to each month's balance for
the period from when it was earned until it is credited back to ratepayers. To

1. Total annual net margin = \$36. 22 2. Annual baseline margin = \$12.

Data:

illustrate.

- 3. Excess margin = \$24 (\$36 minus \$12).

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4. \$24 divided by 12 = \$2 represents excess margin earned per month.

Interest Calculation:

		Months Outstandin	Months	Interest
Period	\$	g	Factor	10%
1	2	12	1.00	0.20
2	2	11	0.92	0.18
3	2	10	0.83	0.17
4	2	9	0.75	0.15
5	2	8	0.67	0.13
6	2	7	0.58	0.12
7	2	6	0.50	0.10
8	2	5	0.42	0.08
9	2	4	0.33	0.07
10	2	3	0.25	0.05
11	2	2	0.17	0.03
12	2	1	0.08	0.02
	Total Inter	est		\$1.40

Note: Example assumes a 10% interest rate for illustration purposes only. Also, the excess net margin and interest is credited to ratepayers very near the end of the year. If the credit period extends past year-end the interest earned would continue to accrue until the credits are completed.

Q. WHY DOES PUBLIC COUNSEL BELIEVE THE ABOVE RECOMMENDATION IS **REASONABLE?**

As I stated in the prior Q&A, in the interest of simplicity I believe that this Α. methodology is easy to understand, requires less aggregation of supporting material which would require further analysis, and could result in credits being returned to

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ratepayers quicker. Furthermore, because the excess margin revenues are in fact represented by the higher retail rates being paid by ratepayers over the entire course of the year, I believe that the matching of the revenue source with the period earned is more appropriately aligned.

- Q. SHOULD THE TRACKER MECHANISM BE SYMMETRICAL IN THAT THE OPPORTUNITY EXISTS FOR KCPL TO BOOK EITHER A REGULATORY ASSET OR A REGULATORY LIABILITY IN THE EVENT THAT THE NET MARGIN ACTUALLY ACHIEVED DOES NOT EQUAL THE BASELINE AMOUNT INCLUDED IN THE DETERMINATION OF RATES?
- Α. No, it should not be symmetrical. The Commission's decision in its Order Regarding Motions For Rehearing, Case No. ER-2006-0314, eliminated the regulatory asset authorized in the original Report And Order, Case No. ER-2006-0314. By eliminating the possibility of Company booking a regulatory asset for any portion of the baseline net margin not achieved, the Commission provided the utility's management with an incentive to, at a minimum, achieve the baseline.
- Q. IS THERE A SIGNIFICANT RISK THAT THE COMPANY WILL NOT ACHIEVE THE 40TH PERCENTILE BASELINE PROPOSED BY PUBLIC COUNSEL?
- Α. Though the possibility exists, history shows that the Company has earned and will most likely continue to earn a level of net margin that exceeds the amount Public

- Q. SHOULD INTEREST BE ADDED TO THE REGULATORY LIABILITY OWED TO RATEPAYERS?
- A. Yes. The Commission's Report And Order, Case No. ER-2006-0314, did not specifically state that interest would be added to excess net margin revenues; however, Public Counsel believes if interest is not added to net margins subject to refund, Company will have had free use of ratepayer provided funds for the period(s) it had the monies in its possession. To not apply interest to the regulatory liability amount(s) to be credited to ratepayers would be a grossly unfair position since ratepayers have been paying the higher rates associated with the non-firm offsystem sales net margin not included in KCPL's cost of service in Case No. ER-2006-0314.

Q. WHAT IS AN APPROPRIATE INTEREST RATE TO APPLY TO THE NON-FIRM

OFF-SYSTEM SALES NET MARGIN THAT EXCEEDS THE BASELINE AMOUNT

INCLUDED IN RATES?

A. The determination of an appropriate interest rate can be quite subjective and open to considerable debate and negotiation; however, the fact of the matter is that the Company actually has the excess net margin revenues in its possession and would

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have, or should have, applied them towards an investment to maximize their earnings potential prior to them being credited back to ratepayers. Examples, of likely interest rates that could be utilized would include the Company's weighted cost of capital (WROR), its current allowance for funds used during construction rate (AFUDC), its short-term debt rate and, as in the case of customer deposits, a rate equaling the recent prime rate+1.

- Q. HOW ARE THE AFOREMENTIONED RATES OF INTEREST NORMALLY UTILIZED?
 - Each of the aforementioned rates of interest have specific purposes to which they are normally are applied. For example, both the WROR and the AFUDC rates are intricately intertwined with the long-term, rate base type, investments of the utility. Whereas, the short-term debt rate is often applicable to investments or costs of a shorter time period. Furthermore, short-term debt is included in the determination of the AFUDC rate utilized for long-term investments and usually supports investments or costs that are awaiting aggregation to a level economic to finance at long-term debt rates. Once the refinancing occurs it is thereafter incorporated into the WROR rate. While the utilization of an interest rate consisting of a recent prime rate+1 and applied to customer monies being utilized cost-free by utilities has been accepted ratemaking policy in Missouri for a number of years.

- Q. WHAT INTEREST RATE DOES PUBLIC COUNSEL RECOMMEND BE APPLIED TO ANY EXCESS NON-FIRM OFF-SYSTEM NET MARGINS ACHIEVED?
 - Public Counsel recommends that a prime+1 interest rate be utilized in the calculation of interest on the annual excess net margin amount because of the nature and source of the margin revenues. These revenues represent a cost-free source of funds that are not likely to be used to support long-term investments of the utility. They do represent collections from ratepayers which, like customer deposits, are to be returned or credited to them within a reasonable time. Therefore, I believe that the application of a prime+1 interest rate to the excess net margin amount supports the Commission's historical ratemaking treatment for these types of funds.
- Q. HOW AND WHEN SHOULD ANY EXCESS MARGIN REVENUES, AND
 INTEREST, ASSOCIATED WITH RATES DETERMINED IN KCPL CASE NO. ER2006-0314 BE RETURNED TO RATEPAYERS?
- A. It is Public Counsel's recommendation that any excess margin revenues and interest associated with rates authorized in KCPL Case No. ER-2006-0314 be calculated and returned to ratepayers as soon as possible after the conclusion of calendar year 2007.

- Q. DOES THE PUBLIC COUNSEL'S RECOMMENDATION FOR THE PROPSED REFUND DIFFER FROM THAT ORDERED BY THE COMMISSION IN KCPL CASE NO. ER-2006-0314?
- A. Yes. The Commission's <u>Report And Order</u> in the case stated that any money booked to the regulatory liability would flow back to ratepayers in the next rate case; however, the determination of the excess margin revenues, if any, are not likely to occur before the conclusion of the instant case.

Public Counsel believes that it would be premature to determine an amount in this case to return to ratepayers and that waiting until KCPL's next rate case (tentatively scheduled to be filed in Spring 2008) to receive refunds would be too long since it would, 1) exacerbate the intergenerational inequity effect, 2) leave customers burdened with the impact of risk transfer, and 3) substantially increase the amount of interest to be included in the refund amount.

- Q. DOES PUBLIC COUNSEL RECOMMEND SIMILAR TREATMENT OF ANY
 REFUNDS THAT RESULT FROM RATES DETERMINED IN THE INSTANT AND
 FUTURE KCPL RATE CASES?
- A. Yes. As long at the Commission maintains its current policy for including KCPL's non-firm off-system sales in rates, any excess margin revenues, and interest,

should be flowed back to ratepayers as soon as possible after the end of each 1 calendar year.

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- DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY? 4 Q.
 - Yes, it does. A.

CASE PARTICIPATION OF TED ROBERTSON

Company Name	Case No.
Missouri Public Service Company	GR-90-198
United Telephone Company of Missouri	TR-90-273
Choctaw Telephone Company	TR-91-86
Missouri Cities Water Company	WR-91-172
United Cities Gas Company	GR-91-249
St. Louis County Water Company	WR-91-361
Missouri Cities Water Company	WR-92-207
Imperial Utility Corporation	SR-92-290
Expanded Calling Scopes	TO-92-306
United Cities Gas Company	GR-93-47
Missouri Public Service Company	GR-93-172
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company	TO-93-192
Missouri-American Water Company	WR-93-212
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company	TC-93-224
Imperial Utility Corporation	SR-94-16
St. Joseph Light & Power Company	ER-94-163
Raytown Water Company	WR-94-211
Capital City Water Company	WR-94-297
Raytown Water Company	WR-94-300
St. Louis County Water Company	WR-95-145
United Cities Gas Company	GR-95-160
Missouri-American Water Company	WR-95-205
Laclede Gas Company	GR-96-193
Imperial Utility Corporation	SC-96-427
Missouri Gas Energy	GR-96-285
Union Electric Company	EO-96-14
Union Electric Company	EM-96-149
Missouri-American Water Company	WR-97-237
St. Louis County Water Company	WR-97-382
Union Electric Company	GR-97-393
Missouri Gas Energy	GR-98-140
Laclede Gas Company	GR-98-374
United Water Missouri Inc.	WR-99-326
Laclede Gas Company	GR-99-315
Missouri Gas Energy	GO-99-258
Missouri-American Water Company	WM-2000-222
Atmos Energy Corporation	WM-2000-312
UtiliCorp/St. Joseph Merger	EM-2000-292
UtiliCorp/Empire Merger	EM-2000-369
Union Electric Company	GR-2000-512
St. Louis County Water Company	WR-2000-844
Missouri Gas Energy	GR-2001-292
UtiliCorp United, Inc.	ER-2001-672
Union Electric Company	EC-2002-1
Empire District Electric Company	ER-2002-424

Schedule TJR-1.1

CASE PARTICIPATION OF TED ROBERTSON

Company Name	Case No.
Missouri Gas Energy	GM-2003-0238
Aquila Inc.	EF-2003-0465
Aquila Inc.	ER-2004-0034
Empire District Electric Company	ER-2004-0570
Aquila Inc.	EO-2005-0156
Aquila, Inc.	ER-2005-0436
Hickory Hills Water & Sewer Company	WR-2006-0250
Empire District Electric Company	ER-2006-0315
Central Jefferson County Utilities	WC-2007-0038
Missouri Gas Energy	GR-2006-0422
Central Jefferson County Utilities	SO-2007-0071
Aquila, Inc.	ER-2007-0004
Laclede Gas Company	GR-2007-0208
Kansas City Power & Light Company	ER-2007-0291