Exhibit No.: Issue(s): Witness/Type of Exhibit: Sponsoring Party: Case No.:

Rate of Return Burdette/Direct Public Counsel GR-98-374

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

MARK BURDETTE

AUG 1 4 1998
Service Commission

Submitted on Behalf of the Office of the Public Counsel

LACLEDE GAS COMPANY

Case No. GR-98-374

August 14, 1998

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of Laclede Gas Company's) Tariff Sheets Designed to Increase Rates) for Gas Service Provided to Customers in) the Missouri Service Area of the Company)	Case No. GR-98-374
AFFIDAVIT OF MA	RK BURDETTE
STATE OF MISSOURI)	
COUNTY OF COLE) ss	
Mark Burdette, of lawful age and being first duly s	worn, deposes and states:
1. My name is Mark Burdette. I am a Financia	al Analyst for the Office of the Public Counsel.
 Attached hereto and made a part hereof fo pages 1 through 23 and Schedules MB-1 through MB-23. 	r all purposes is my direct testimony consisting of
3. I hereby swear and affirm that my statement correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Ma	Ministry Attended testimony are true and which the attached testimony are true and the attached testimony are true and the attached testimony are true and the attached testimony are true attached to the attached testimony are attached to the attached testimony attached testimony are attached testimony attached testimon
Subscribed and sworn to me this 14th day of August, 19	98.
	Macy S. Koestner tary Rublic

My commission expires August 20, 2001.

1		DIRECT TESTIMONY
2		OF
3		MARK BURDETTE
4		LACLEDE GAS COMPANY
5		CASE NO. GR-98-374
6		
7		INTRODUCTION
8	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
9	Α.	Mark Burdette, P.O. Box 7800, Ste. 250, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102-7800.
10	Q.	BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?
11	A.	I am employed by the Office of the Public Counsel of the State of Missouri (OPC or Public
12		Counsel) as a Public Utility Financial Analyst.
13	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND.
14	A.	I received a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering from the University of Iowa in
15		Iowa City, Iowa in May 1988. I received a Master's in Business Administration with an
16		emphasis in Finance from the University of Iowa Graduate School of Management in
17		December 1994.
18		Additionally, I have been awarded the professional designation Certified Rate of
19		Return Analyst (CRRA) by the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts. This
20		designation is awarded based upon work experience and successful completion of a written
21		examination.
22 23	Q.	HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED TESTIMONY BEFORE THE MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION?
24	A.	Yes.

1	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS TESTIMONY?
2	Α.	I will present a cost-of-capital analysis for the Laclede Gas Company (Laclede, the
3		Company). I will recommend and testify to the capital structure, embedded cost rates, fair
4		return on common equity, and weighted average cost of capital that should be allowed in this
5		proceeding.
6	Q.	HAVE YOU PREPARED SCHEDULES IN SUPPORT OF YOUR TESTIMONY?
7	A.	Yes. I have prepared an analysis consisting of 23 Schedules that is attached to this testimony
8		(MB-1 through MB-23). This analysis was prepared by me and is correct to the best of my
9		knowledge and belief.
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11		SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
12 13	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR FINDINGS CONCERNING THE OVERALL COST OF CAPITAL FOR THE LACLEDE GAS COMPANY.
14	A.	Laclede Gas Company should be allowed an overall return of 8.80% on its net original cost
15		rate base. This return has been determined using Laclede's capital structure at 30 June 1998.
16	Q.	PLEASE PROVIDE BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON LACLEDE GAS COMPANY.
17	Α.	From the Laclede Gas Company's 1997 Annual Report to Shareholders:
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27		Laclede Gas Company is a public utility engaged in the retail distribution of natural gas. The Company serves an area in eastern Missouri, with a population of approximately 2.0 million, including the City of St. Louis, St. Louis County, and parts of eight other counties. As an adjunct to its gas distribution business, the Company operates underground natural gas storage fields and is engaged in the transportation and storage of liquid propane. Since 1968, the Company has also made investments in some non-utility businesses as part of a diversification program. Selected five year historical financial data for Laclede is shown on Schedule MB-1.
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Ī **CAPITAL STRUCTURE** 2 Q. HOW IS LACLEDE GAS COMPANY CURRENTLY CAPITALIZED? 3 A. At 30 June 1998, Laclede's capital structure consisted of 52.66% common equity, 0.39% 4 preferred stock, 35.37% long term debt, and 11.58% short term debt. This capital structure 5 was utilized for calculations and is shown on schedule MB-2. 6 Q. IS THE CURRENT CAPITAL STRUCTURE CONSISTENT WITH HOW LACLEDE 7 HAS BEEN CAPITALIZED IN THE PAST? 8 A. Generally, yes. Not including short term debt, Laclede's end-of-year common equity level 9 over the past 5 years has averaged 57.3% (see Schedule MB-3). For comparison purposes, 10 the current capital structure, not including short term debt, contains 59.56% common equity 11 (Schedule MB-2). The common equity ratio has been variable over the past five years, 12 ranging from a high of 61.6% in 1997 to a low of 53.1% in 1993. Absent short term debt, 13 Laclede's capital structure tends to have a higher common equity ratio than the comparison 14 LDCs, and the current capital structure continues that trend. 15 Q. HOW DOES LACLEDE'S CURRENT CAPITAL STRUCTURE COMPARE WITH 16 OTHER GAS DISTRIBUTION UTILITIES? 17 A. Laclede has a higher common equity ratio than the Value Line average for LDCs, and a 18 correspondingly lower ratio of long term debt. According to Value Line Composite 19 Statistics, the common equity ratio for Natural Gas (Distribution) companies has averaged 20 48.4% for the years 1994 through 1997 (the years data are available, see Schedule MB-3). 21 Over these same years, Laclede's common equity ratio has averaged 58.4%. The 47 Natural 22 Gas Distribution and Integrated Natural Gas Companies covered by C.A. Turner Utility

Reports have an average common equity ratio of 48%.

This higher level of common equity for Laclede indicates a relatively lower level of financial risk due to capital structure for Laclede's shareholders than the average LDC covered by Value Line and C.A. Turner.

- Q. HOW DOES LACLEDE'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE COMPARE WITH THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF YOUR GROUP OF COMPARISON COMPANIES?
- A. As shown on Schedule MB-3, over the past five years Laclede has had a higher common equity ratio than the average for the ten comparison companies. The range has tended to broaden in the past five years, but remains variable. A higher common equity ratio tends to indicate a relatively lower level of financial risk due to capital structure for Laclede's shareholders as compared to the group of ten comparison LDCs.
- Q. COULD YOU DEFINE RISK AND EXPAND ON THE CONCEPT OF RISK?
- A. Yes. Risk can be defined as the possibility that actual earnings from an asset or an investment may differ from expected earnings. The wider the range of possible earnings, the greater the risk associated with that asset or investment.

Total risk can be divided into two categories: business risk and financial risk.

Business risk is the uncertainty (variability) associated with earnings due to fundamental business conditions faced by the company, such as cyclical markets, weather-sensitive sales, changing technology, unforeseen events, or competition. Business risk is the inherent riskiness of a firm's assets if that firm uses no financial leverage (i.e. no debt in the firm's capital structure) because every dollar earned is available to common shareholders. In other words, business risk is not connected to the way the firm finances its assets.

Financial risk is the uncertainty associated with earnings available to common shareholders due to debt and/or preferred stock being used to finance the firm's assets. This additional risk stems from the fact that cash flows to common shareholders are subordinate to a firm's required debt service (i.e. a firm must pay its debt service and any preferred

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1 dividends before it can pay common dividends.) From a common shareholder's perspective, 2 a firm with less debt and preferred stock in its capital structure has fewer bills to pay before 3 it can allocate earnings to common dividends, and is therefore less risky. PLEASE SHOW THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE THAT YOU RECOMMEND. 4 Q. 5 A. I recommend the following capital structure be used in this proceeding: 6 **Percent** 7 Common Equity 52.66% 8 Preferred Stock 0.39% 9 Long term debt 35.37% 10 Short term debt 11.58% 11 12 DO YOU HAVE SPECIFIC CRITERIA TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO INCLUDE Q. 13 SHORT TERM DEBT IN A COMPANY'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE? 14 Yes. When determining whether to include short term debt, I consider the level of short term A. 15 debt in the capital structure (less construction work in progress (CWIP) amounts) and 16 whether the level of short term debt is consistent. Laclede not only has a significant portion 17 of it's capital structure as short term debt (11.58%, Schedule MB-2) on 30 June 1998, but 18 maintains that significant level throughout the year (as opposed to having just a couple of 19 months with a short term debt balance.) IS THERE SUPPORT IN FINANCIAL LITERATURE FOR INCLUSION OF SHORT 20 Q. 21 TERM DEBT CAPITAL STRUCTURE? 22 A. Yes. Standard & Poor's Corporate Finance Criteria states; 23 Scasonal, self-liquidating debt is excluded from the permanent debt amount. but this situation is rare - with the exception of certain gas utilities. Given 24 25 the long life of almost all utility assets, short-term debt may expose these companies to interest-rate volatility, remarketing risk, bank line backup risk, 26 27 and regulatory exposure that cannot be readily offset. The lower cost of 28 short-term obligations (assuming a positively sloped yield curve) is a 29 positive factor that partially mitigates the risk of interest-rate volatility. As 30 a rule of thumb, a level of short-term debt that exceeds 10% of total capital

is cause for concern.

As shown on Schedule MB-2 (and calculated on Schedule MB-6), Laclede's short term debt 1 2 made up 11.58% of the capital structure on 30 June 1998, and is therefore appropriately 3 included. 4 5 **EMBEDDED COST RATES** WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE EMBEDDED COST RATE FOR LACLEDE'S 6 Q. 7 PREFERRED STOCK? 8 A. The embedded cost rate is 4.96% for Laclede's preferred stock. Calculation of the embedded 9 cost of preferred stock is shown on Schedule MB-4. 10 Q. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE EMBEDDED COST RATE FOR LACLEDE'S LONG TERM DEBT? 11 12 A. The embedded cost rate is 7.77% for Laclede's long term debt. Calculation of the embedded cost of long term debt is shown on Schedule MB-5. 13 14 Q. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE EMBEDDED COST RATE FOR LACLEDE'S SHORT **TERM DEBT?** 15 16 A. The embedded cost rate is 5.70% for Laclede's short term debt as of 30 June 1998. 17 Calculation of the embedded cost of short term debt is shown on Schedule MB-6. 18 19 **COST OF COMMON EQUITY** WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED COST OF COMMON EQUITY FOR LACLEDE? 20 Q. 21 A. Laclede Gas Company should be allowed a return on common equity of 10.2%. This return 22 on common equity was determined using the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method and is 23 based on a dividend yield of 5.67% and a sustainable growth rate of approximately 4.5%.

assumptions:

- 1) A constant rate of growth,
- 2) The constant growth will continue for an infinite period,
- 3) The dividend payout ratio remains constant,
- 4) The discount rate must exceed the growth rate, and
- 5) The stock price grows proportionately to the growth rate.

Although all of these assumptions do not always hold in a technical sense, the relaxation of these assumptions does not make the model unreliable.

The DCF model is based on two basic financial principals. First; the current market price of any financial asset, including a share of stock, is equivalent to the value of all expected future cash flows associated with that asset discounted back to the present at the appropriate discount rate. The discount rate that equates anticipated future cash flows and the current market price is defined as the rate of return or the company's cost of equity capital.

Cash flows associated with owning a share of common stock can take two forms: selling the stock and dividends. Just as the current value of a share of stock is a function of future cash flows (dividends), the *future* price of the stock at any time is also a function of future dividends. When a share of stock is sold, what is given up is the right to receive all future dividends. Therefore, the DCF model, using expected future dividends as the cash flows. is appropriate regardless of how long the investor plans to hold the stock. Determination of a holding period and an associated terminal price is unnecessary. The irrelevance of investors' time horizons is emphasized by Brealey and Myers:

How far out could we look? In principle the horizon period H could be infinitely distant. Common Stocks do not expire of old age. Barring such corporate hazards as bankruptcy or acquisition, they are immortal. As H approaches infinity, the present value of the terminal price ought to approach zero.... We can, therefore, forget about the terminal price entirely and express today's price as the present value of a perpetual stream of cash dividends. (Principles of Corporate Financing, Fourth Edition, page 52).

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The other basic financial principal on which the DCF is grounded is the "time value of money." Investors view a dollar received today as being worth more than a dollar received in the future because a dollar today can immediately be invested. Therefore, future cash flows are discounted. The rate used by investors to discount future cash flows to the present is the discount rate or opportunity cost of capital.

DETERMINATION OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH

- Q. TO WHAT DOES THE GROWTH COMPONENT OF THE DCF FORMULA REFER?
- A. The growth rate variable, g, in the traditional DCF model is the dividend growth rate investors expect to continue into the *indefinite future* (i.e., the <u>sustainable</u> growth rate).
- Q. HOW IS THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE DETERMINED?
- A. The sustainable growth rate is determined by analyzing historical and projected financial and economic information for the Company. A variety of growth rate parameters and calculation methods are sometimes used by analysts to measure and forecast growth.
- Q. COULD YOU DESCRIBE THE VARIOUS PARAMETERS AND METHODS WHICH CAN BE USED TO CALCULATE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH?
 - Yes. Methods sometimes used for determining the investor-expected sustainable growth rate utilized in the DCF model include: 1) historical growth rates, and 2) analysts' projections of expected growth rates. Three commonly-employed historic growth parameters are: 1) carnings per share (EPS), 2) dividends per share (DPS), and 3) book value per share (BVPS). Additionally, analysts' projections of future growth in earnings per share, dividends per share, and book value per share are sometimes used as an estimate of the sustainable growth rate.

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As a matter of completeness, I utilized all of the above-mentioned techniques for measuring growth in order to calculate a sustainable growth rate.

Q. DID YOU USE ANY OTHER METHODS OF CALCULATING GROWTH?

Yes, I did. I calculated both historical and projected retention growth. It is important to recognize the fundamentals of long-term investor-expected growth when developing a sustainable growth rate. Future dividends will be generated by future earnings and the primary source of growth in future earnings is the reinvestment of present earnings back into the firm. This reinvestment of earnings also contributes to the growth in book value. Furthermore, it is the carned return on reinvested earnings and existing capital (i.e., book value) that ultimately determines the basic level of future cash flows. Therefore, one proxy for the future growth rate called for in the DCF formula is found by multiplying the future expected carned return on book equity (r) by the percentage of earnings expected to be retained in the business (b). This calculation, known as the "b*r" method, or retention growth rate, results in one measure of the sustainable growth rate called for in the Discounted Cash Flow formula. While the retention growth rate can be calculated using historic data on carnings retention and equity returns, this information is relevant only to the extent that it provides a meaningful basis for determining the future sustainable growth rate. Consequently, projected data on earnings retention and return on book equity are generally more representative of investors' expectations.

Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE THAT ILLUSTRATES THE FUNDAMENTALS OF RETENTION GROWTH AS A PROXY FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH?

Yes. To better understand the principles of sustainable growth, it is helpful to compare the growth in a utility's cash flows to the fundamental causes of growth in an individual's passbook account. For an individual who has \$1,000 in a passbook account paying 5.0% interest, carnings will be \$50 for the first year. If this individual leaves 100% of the earnings

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in the passbook account (retention ratio equals 100%), the account balance at the end of the first year will be \$1,050. Total earnings in the second year will be \$52.50 (\$1,050 x 5.0%), and the growth rate of the account in year two is 5.0% [100%(b) x 5%(r)]. On the other hand, if the individual withdraws \$30 of the earnings from the first year and reinvests only \$20 (retention ratio equals 40%) earnings in the second year will be only \$51.00 (\$1,020 x 5.0%), with growth equaling 2.0% [(\$1,020-\$1,000)/\$1,000 = 2.0% = 40%(b) x 5%(r)]. In both cases, the return, along with the level of earnings retained, dictate future earnings.

These exact principles regarding growth apply to a utility's common stock. When carnings are retained, they are available for additional investment and, as such, generate future growth. When carnings are distributed in the form of dividends, they are unavailable for reinvestment in those assets that would ultimately produce future growth. Either way, for both a utility's common stock or an individual's passbook account, the level of earnings retained, along with the rate of return, determine the level of sustainable growth.

Q. ARE THERE ANY OTHER FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE INVESTOR-EXPECTED SUSTAINABLE GROWTH?

Yes. Stock financing will cause investors to expect additional growth if a company is expected to issue new shares at a price above book value. The excess of market price over book value would benefit current shareholders, increasing their per share book equity. Therefore, if stock financing is expected at prices above book value, shareholders will expect their book value to increase, and that adds to the growth expectation stemming from earnings retention, or "b*r" growth. A more thorough explanation of "external" growth is included in Appendix (I). This external growth factor has been included in all historic and projected retention growth rate calculations for the group of comparable utilities.

1 2	Q.	DID YOU EXCLUDE ANY OF YOUR CALCULATED GROWTH RATES FROM THE DETERMINATION OF AVERAGES?
3	Α.	Yes, I did. I excluded any negative growth rates from my calculations.
4		Also, I excluded any compound earnings per share (EPS) growth rates which
5		included a year when the payout ratio was greater than one (the dividend paid out was greater
6		than carnings for that year.) In those circumstances, the calculated compound growth rate
7		was artificially high. Any particular growth rate excluded from calculations is shown in
8		italics on Schedules MB-9-19.
9 10	Q.	IS THE HISTORIC GROWTH RATE IN DIVIDENDS PER SHARE AN APPROPRIATE PROXY FOR DETERMINING THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE?
11	Α.	Not usually. The historic growth rate in dividends per share will tend to overstate
12		(understate) the sustainable growth rate when the dividend payout ratio has increased
13		(decreased) over the measurement period. For an extended discussion and illustration of this
14		phenomenon, please see Appendix I.
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16	SU	STAINABLE GROWTH FOR LACLEDE AND THE COMPARISON COMPANIES
17 18	Q.	WHAT GROWTH RATE DO YOU CONSIDER TO BE REFLECTIVE OF THE INVESTOR-EXPECTED GROWTH FOR LACLEDE GAS COMPANY?
19	A.	Based on the growth rate calculations for Laclede and the comparison group, I believe a
20		sustainable growth rate of 4.0% to 5.0% is a reasonable representation of investors'
21		expectations for Laclede's sustainable growth rate. I chose a value in the middle of this
22		range (approximately 4.5%), which I consider generous to the Company.
23 24	Q.	WHAT GROWTH RATE PARAMETERS HAVE YOU EXAMINED IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH INVESTOR-EXPECTED GROWTH FOR LACLEDE?
25	A.	The following growth parameters have been reviewed for Laclede: 1) my calculations of
26		historic compound growth in earnings, dividends, and book value based on data from Value

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Line: 2) average of five-year and ten-year historic growth in EPS, DPS, and BVPS; 3) projected growth rate in EPS, DPS, and BVPS; 4) historic retention growth rate; and 5) projected retention growth rate.

As mentioned previously, for completeness all of the above-mentioned techniques for measuring growth were utilized in order to calculate a sustainable growth rate.

- Q. DID YOU RELY ON DATA FROM LACLEDE ONLY TO ARRIVE AT A RECOMMENDATION OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH?
- A. No. I analyzed a group of utilities with similar characteristics and risk profiles to Laclede to provide some insight as to the reasonableness of the sustainable growth rate calculated for Laclede.

Appendix G, attached to this testimony, describes the selection criteria used to develop a group of LDCs with risk characteristics similar to those of Laclede. The following companies met the selection criteria: 1) AGL Resources, Inc. (AGL, ticker ATG); 2) Bay State Gas Company (Bay State, ticker BGC); 3) Connecticut Energy Corporation (Conn. Energy, ticker CNE): 4) CTG Resources, Inc. (CTG, ticker CTG); 5) Indiana Energy, Inc.(Indiana, ticker IEI); 6) New Jersey Resources Corp. (NJR, ticker NJR); 7) Northwest Natural Gas Co.(NWNG, ticker NWNG); 8) Peoples Energy Corporation (Peoples, ticker PGL): 9) Picdmont Natural Gas Company (Picdmont, ticker PNY); and 10) Washington Gas Light Company (WGL, ticker WGL). Schedule MB-7 shows my comparison companies, the selection criteria, and a list of risk measures. Schedules MB-9-19 contain growth rate calculations for Laclede and the group of comparison companies. These calculations are summarized on Schedule MB-8.

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- Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN IN MORE DETAIL HOW THE HISTORIC GROWTH RATES OF EARNINGS, DIVIDENDS, AND BOOK VALUE WERE DETERMINED.
- A. Historic rates of growth in earnings per share (EPS), dividends per share (DPS), and book value per share (BVPS) were analyzed using two methods. First, compound growth rates were calculated for five-year periods ending 1995, 1996, and 1997. These three five-year compound growth rates were then averaged and are labeled "Ave. Compound Gr." on line 16 of Schedules MB-9-19.

The second measure of historic growth was taken from Value Line. The historic rates of growth furnished by Value Line are included in this analysis because:

- 1) The Value Line growth rates are readily available for investor use;
- 2) The Value Line rates of growth reflect both a five-year and ten-year time frame; and
- 3) The Value Line rates are measured from an average of three base years to an average of three ending years, smoothing the results and limiting the impact of nonrecurring events.

The Value Line growth rates are found on line 19 of Schedules MB-9-19.

- Q. PLEASE DISCUSS YOUR ANALYSIS OF PROJECTED GROWTH RATE DATA.
 - Projected growth rates in EPS, DPS, and BVPS were taken from Value Line and are found on line 30 of Schedules MB-9-19. Projected growth in EPS was also taken from Zack's Analyst Watch. Inc., and is listed on line 33. Zack's "gathers data from more than 2,500 security analysts at 210 brokerage firms who make 15,000 earnings per share and Buy/Hold/Scll ratings revisions each week," and this information is available to the average investor. The projected growth in EPS found on line 36 of Schedules MB-9-19 is the average of earnings growth projections furnished by Value Line and Zack's. Value Line's projected growth in dividends and book value are listed again on line 36.

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Q. PLEASE DISCUSS YOUR ANALYSIS OF HISTORIC AND PROJECTED RETENTION GROWTH RATES.

Historic retention growth was determined using the product of return (r) and retention rate (b) for the years 1993-97, and the average was calculated (line 10). The projected retention growth data, found on Schedules MB-9-19 lines (25-27), is based on information from Value Line. Projected retention growth was calculated for 1998, 1999, and the period 2001-03. An average of these three growth rates was calculated and compared to the growth rate for the 2001-03 period alone. The *larger* value, either the average of the three values or the 2001-03 rate. was utilized as the projected retention growth rate. For all industry companies, the projected retention growth rate which appears on line 30 of the appropriate schedule is either the three-time-period average or the 2001-03 projection, whichever was largest.

Investors' expectations regarding growth from external sources (i.e. sales of additional stock at prices above book value) has been included in the determination of both historic and projected growth (lines 13 and 33, respectively).

- Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR HISTORIC AND PROJECTED GROWTH RATE ANALYSIS FOR LACLEDE GAS COMPANY.
- A. The following table outlines the results of the analysis of growth rates for Laclede found on Schedule MB-9. The high growth rate is 7.00% (Value Line historic EPS) and the low growth rate is 1.22% (compound DPS). The overall average of all analyzed growth rates for Laclede is 3.35%.

Growth rate summary for Laclede:

EPS	DPS	<u>BVPS</u>
3.39%	1.22%	3.45%
7.00%	2.00%	2.75%
3.14%	2.50%	3.50%
Historic	Projected	
3.51%	4.38%	
	3.39% 7.00% 3.14% Historic	3.39% 1.22% 7.00% 2.00% 3.14% 2.50% Historic Projected

expectations for Laclede's sustainable growth rate.

DIVIDEND YIELDS FOR LACLEDE AND THE COMPARISON COMPANIES

- Q. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE DIVIDEND YIELD TO USE IN THE DCF?
- A. The appropriate dividend yield to use in the DCF is the *expected* dividend yield calculated from a current stock price. I chose to use the estimated 1999 dividends (from Value Line) for my calculations. For Laclede and all ten comparison companies, the expected 1999 dividend is either the same as or larger than the 1998 dividend. Using the 1998 dividend (or a combination of 1998 and 1999) would lower the calculated yield or leave it unchanged.
- Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR CALCULATION OF THE DIVIDEND YIELD.
- A. Dividend yield is equal to the expected dividend divided by stock price. Schedule MB-20 shows the average stock prices for a recent six-week period, the expected 1999 dividends (as taken from Value Line), and the calculation of the dividend yields for Laclede and the group of comparison companies.

I used a six-week period for determining the average stock price because I believe that period of time is long enough to avoid daily fluctuations and recent enough so that the stock price captured is representative of current expectations. The stock price for each company is the average of the Friday closing price from 7/2/98 through 8/7/98. This time period accurately reflects investor's current expectations for the companies' stock. Non-current stock prices simply do not capture investor's current expectations and are inappropriate to use in the DCF. Stock prices and dividends from, for example, 1996, are irrelevant to the dividend yield portion of a DCF analysis performed in 1998.

- Q. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE DIVIDEND YIELD FOR LACLEDE?
- A. The dividend yield for Laclede is 5.67%, based on expected 1999 dividend of \$1.35 and Laclede's average stock price of \$23.800. Laclede's average stock price calculation is shown on Schedule MB-20.

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group:

following table shows the average high and low cost of common equity for my comparable

1 2 3		Dividend Yield Growth Cost of Equity Low 4.80% 2.49% 7.90% High 4.80% 6.55% 11.96%
4		The average DCF cost of common equity for the group is 9.56%.
5 6 7	Q.	DOES THE COST OF EQUITY CALCULATED FOR YOUR COMPARISON GROUP SUPPORT THE REASONABLENESS OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR LACLEDE?
8	A.	Yes, I believe the cost of equity calculated for my comparison group supports my
9		recommendation for Laclede. The group of LDCs in my comparison group are similar in
10		risk to Laclede. In general, the growth rate averages for the comparison group are higher
11		than those for Laclede. However, Laclede's dividend yield is 83 basis points (0.83%) greater
12		than the average for the group.
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14		CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
15 16	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL YOU USED TO SUBSTANTIATE YOUR RECOMMENDED RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY.
17	Α.	The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is described by the following equation:
18		$K = Rf + \beta(Rm - Rf)$
19		where.
20		K = the cost of common equity for the security being analyzed,
21		Rf = the risk free rate,
22		β = bcta = the company or industry-specific beta risk measure,
23		Rm = market return, and
24		(Rm - Rf) = market premium.
25		The formula states that the cost of common equity is equal to the risk free rate of interest,
26		plus, beta multiplied by the difference between the return on the market and the risk free rate
27		(the market premium).
11		19

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The formula says that the cost of common equity is equal to the risk free rate plus some proportion of the market premium - that proportion being equal to beta. The market overall has a beta of 1.0. Firms with beta less than 1.0 are assumed to be less risky than the market: firms with beta greater than 1.0 are assumed to be more risky than the market. The appropriate beta to use in the CAPM formula is the beta that represents the risk of the company (or project) being analyzed. Laclede Gas Company's beta is 0.55. Beta for my group of comparison companies ranges from 0.50 to 0.85, with an average of 0.66. Gas utilities are generally viewed as relatively safe investments, and this is reflected in beta values below 1.0.

- Q. DO YOU SUBSCRIBE TO THE CAPM AS AN ACCURATE MEASURE OF MARKET-BASED COST OF EQUITY?
- A. I believe the CAPM and its dependence on the single risk measure, beta has limitations in its ability to accurately take into account the risk factors faced by a company, and therefore that company's cost of equity. However, some investors continue to rely on the CAPM.

 Therefore, I included the analysis as a check on and to provide support for my DCF analysis.
- Q. HOW DID YOU ARRIVE AT THE VALUES OF THE RISK FREE RATE AND THE MARKET RETURN (OR MARKET PREMIUM) USED IN YOUR ANALYSIS?
 - The risk free rate I utilized for my CAPM analysis (6.0%) is near the current rate on the U.S. Government's 30-year Treasury Bond (5.7%) as reported by the Value Line Investment Survey. July 30, 1998. Value Line also reports a 13-week range for the 30-year bond of 5.6 6.0%. Therefore, I chose to use 6.0%, which is within that range and slightly above the current rate. It would not be unreasonable to use a risk free rate of 5.8% or even the current 5.7%, which would *lower* the CAPM-calculated costs of equity.

The 7.3% value I used for the market premium (Rm-Rf) is equal to the market premium calculated by Ibbotson and Associates, calculated using arithmetic means.

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Q. WHAT DOES YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS SHOW?

As can be seen on Schedule MB-22, I performed a CAPM analysis on Laclede and the group of ten comparison LDCs. The CAPM cost of common equity for Laclede is 10.02%. The average CAPM cost of common equity for the group is 10.78%, with a high of 12.21% and a low of 9.65%.

Given the CAPM's reliance on the single risk-measure beta, I believe this analysis lends support to and shows the reasonableness of my recommended cost of common equity of 10.2% for Laclcdc. The average beta for the group is 0.66, which is greater (and indicates relatively greater risk as measured by beta) than Laclede's beta of 0.55, and leads directly to the greater cost of equity calculated for the group.

Ì WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL 2 WHAT OVERALL. OR WEIGHTED AVERAGE, COST OF CAPITAL IS INDICATED Q. 3 BY YOUR ANALYSIS? 4 The weighted average cost of capital I calculated for Laclede is 8.80%. This is based on a A. 5 10.2% return on equity, 4.96% embedded cost of preferred stock, 7.77% embedded cost of 6 long-term debt, and a 5.70% embedded cost of short term debt. The capital structure 7 contains 52.66% common equity, 0.39% preferred stock, 35.37% long-term debt, and 11.58% short term debt. The WACC calculation is shown on Schedule MB-23. 8 9 WHAT PRE-TAX COVERAGE RATIO IS IMPLIED BY YOUR RECOMMENDATION? Q. 10 A. Based on a WACC of 8.80% and an assumed tax factor of 1.6296 (from Staff), the pre-tax 11 coverage ratio (for both long AND short term debt) is approximately 3.58 times. The pre-tax 12 coverage ratio for long term debt only is 4.43 times. The derivation of pre-tax coverage is 13 shown on Schedule MB-23. 14 DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY? Q. 15 Yes, it does. A.

A.

APPENDIX A

DEVELOPMENT & PURPOSES OF REGULATION

Q. WHY ARE PUBLIC UTILITIES REGULATED?

The nature of public utility services generally requires a monopolistic mode of operation. Only a limited number of companies (and quite often only one) are normally allowed to provide a particular utility service in a specific geographic area. Public utilities are often referred to as "natural" monopolies; a state created by such powerful economies of scale or scope that only one firm can or should provide a given service. Even when a utility is not a pure monopoly, it still has substantial market power over at least some of its customers.

In order to secure the benefits arising from monopolistic-type operations, utilities are generally awarded an exclusive franchise (or certificate of public convenience) by the appropriate governmental body. Since an exclusive franchise generally protects a firm from the effects of competition, it is critical that governmental control over the rates and services provided by public utilities is exercised. Consequently, a primary objective of utility regulation is to produce market results that closely approximate the conditions that would be obtained if utility rates were determined competitively. Based on this competitive standard, utility regulation must: 1) secure safe and adequate service; 2) establish rates sufficient to provide a utility with the opportunity to cover all reasonable costs, including a fair rate of return on the capital employed; and 3) restrict monopoly-type profits.

APPENDIX B

CALCULATION OF THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL

- Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL IS USED IN TRADITIONAL RATEMAKING AND HOW IT IS DERIVED.
- A. The basic standard of rate regulation is the revenue-requirement standard, often referred to as the rate base-rate of return standard. Simply stated, a regulated firm must be permitted to set rates which will cover operating costs and provide an opportunity to earn a reasonable rate of return on assets devoted to the business. A utility's total revenue requirement can be expressed as the following formula:

$$R = O + (V - D + A)r$$

where R = the total revenue required,

O = cost of operations,

V = the gross value of the property,

D = the accrued depreciation, and

A = other rate base items,

r = the allowed rate of return/weighted average cost of capital.

This formula indicates that the process of determining the total revenue requirement for a public utility involves three major steps. First, allowable operating costs must be ascertained. Second the net depreciated value of the tangible and intangible property, or net investment in property, of the enterprise must be determined. This net value, or investment (V - D), along with other allowable items is referred to as the rate base. Finally, a "fair rate of return" or weighted average cost of capital (WACC) must be determined. This rate, expressed as a percentage, is multiplied by the rate base. The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is applied to the rate base (V-D+A) since it is generally recognized the rate

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base is financed with the capital structure and these two items are normally similar in size.

The allowed rate of return, or WACC, is typically defined as follows:

$$r = i(D/C) + l(P/C) + k(E/C)$$

where i = embedded cost of debt capital,

D = amount of debt capital,

1 = embedded cost of preferred stock,

P = amount of preferred stock,

k = cost of equity capital,

E = amount of equity capital, and

C = amount of total capital.

This formula indicates that the process of determining WACC involves separate determinations for each type of capital utilized by a utility. Under the weighted cost approach, a utility company's total invested capital is expressed as 100 percent and is divided into percentages that represent the capital secured by the issuance of long-term debt, preferred stock, common stock, and sometimes short-term debt. This division of total capital by reference to its major sources permits the analyst to compute separately the cost of both debt and equity capital. The cost rate of each component is weighted by the appropriate percentage that it bears to the overall capitalization. The sum of the weighted cost rates is equal to the overall or weighted average cost of capital and is used as the basis for the fair rate of return that is ultimately applied to rate base.

APPENDIX C

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ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF REGULATION

3 4 Q. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR RATE BASE-RATE OF RETURN REGULATION.

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Rate base-rate of return regulation is based, in part, on basic economic and financial theory that applies to both regulated and unregulated firms.

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Although it is well recognized that no form of economic regulation can ever be a perfect substitution for competition in determining market prices for goods and services, there is nearly unanimous acceptance of the principle that regulation should act as a substitute for competition in utility markets. (Parcell, The Cost of Capital Manual p.1-4).

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It is the interaction of competitive markets forces that holds the prices an unregulated firm can charge for its products or services in line with the actual costs of production. In fact,

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competition between companies is generally viewed as the mechanism that allows consumers

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to not only purchase goods and services at prices consistent with the costs of production but

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also allows consumers to receive the highest quality product. Since regulated utilities are

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franchised monopolies generally immune to competitive market forces, a primary objective of

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utility regulation is to produce results that closely approximate the conditions that would

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exist if utility rates were determined in a competitive atmosphere.

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Under basic financial theory, it is generally assumed the goal for all firms is the

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maximization of shareholder wealth. Additionally, capital budgeting theory indicates that, in

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order to achieve this goal, an unregulated firm should invest in any project which, given a

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certain level of risk, is expected to earn a rate of return at or above its weighted average cost

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of capital.

Competition, in conjunction with the wealth maximization goal, induces firms to

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increase investment as long as the expected rate of return on an investment is greater that the

cost of capital. Competitive equilibrium is achieved when the rate of return on the last investment project undertaken just equals the cost of capital. When competitive equilibrium is achieved, the price ultimately received for goods or services reflects the full costs of production. Therefore, not only does competition automatically drive unregulated firms to minimize their capital costs (investment opportunities are expanded and competitive position is enhanced when capital costs can be lowered), it also ensures that the marginal return on investment just equals the cost of capital.

Given that regulation is intended to emulate competition and that, under competition, the marginal return on investment should equal the cost of capital, it is crucial for regulators to set the authorized rate of return equal to the <u>actual</u> cost. If this is accomplished, the marginal return on prudent and necessary investment just equals cost and the forces of competition are effectively emulated.

l APPENDIX D 2 LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR A FAIR RATE OF RETURN 3 Q. IS THERE A JUDICIAL REQUIREMENT RELATED TO THE DETERMINATION OF 4 THE APPROPRIATE RATE OF RETURN FOR A REGULATED UTILITY? 5 A. Yes. The criteria established by the U.S. Supreme Court closely parallels economic thinking 6 on the determination of an appropriate rate of return under the cost of service approach to 7 regulation. The judicial background to the regulatory process is largely contained in two 8 seminal decisions handed down in 1923 and 1944. These decisions are, 9 Bluefield Water Works and Improvement 10 Company v. Public Service Commission, 11 262 U.S. 679 (1923), and 12 13 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 14 591 (1944) 15 16 In the Bluefield Case, the Court states, 17 A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on 18 the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public 19 equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are 20 attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but has no constitutional 21 22 right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable 23 enterprises or speculative ventures. The return should be reasonably 24 sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility, and 25 should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain 26 and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the 27 proper discharge of its public duties. A rate of return may be reasonable at 28 one time, and become too high or too low by changes affecting opportunities for investment, the money market, and business conditions generally. 29 30 31 Together. Hope and Bluefield have established the following standards, 32 1). A utility is entitled to a return similar to that available to other enterprises with 33 similar risks: 34 2). A utility is entitled to a return level reasonably sufficient to assure financial 35 soundness and support existing credit, as well as raise new capital; and

3). A fair return can change along with economic conditions and capital markets. Furthermore, in <u>Hope</u>, the Court makes clear that regulation does not guarantee utility profits and, in <u>Permian Basin Area Rate Cases</u>, 390 US 747 (1968), that, while investor interests (profitability) are certainly pertinent to setting adequate utility rates, those interests do not exhaust the relevant considerations.

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APPENDIX E

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REGULATION IN MISSOURI

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WHAT IS THE ORIGIN AND RATIONALE FOR THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC Q. UTILITIES IN THE STATE OF MISSOURI?

A. All investor owned public utilities operating in the state of Missouri are subject to the Public Service Commission Act, as amended. The Public Service Commission Act was initially passed by the Forty-Seventh General Assembly on April 15, 1913. (Laws of 1913 pp.557-651, inclusive).

In State ex rel Kansas City v. Kansas City Gas Co. 163 S.W. 854 (Mo.1914), the case of first impression pertaining to the Public Service Commission Act, the Missouri Supreme Court described the rationale for the regulation of public utilities in Missouri as follows:

That act (Public Service Commission Act) is an elaborate law bottomed on the police power. It evidences a public policy hammered out on the anvil of public discussion. It apparently recognizes certain generally accepted economic principles and conditions, to wit: That a public utility (like gas, water, car service, etc.) is in its nature a monopoly; that competition is inadequate to protect the public, and, if it exists, is likely to become an economic waste; that regulation takes the place of and stands for competition: that such regulation to command respect from patron or utility owner, must be in the name of the overlord, the state, and, to be effective. must possess the power of intelligent visitation and the plenary supervision of every business feature to be finally (however invisible) reflected in rates and quality of service. (Kansas City Gas Co. at 857-58).

The General Assembly has determined that the provisions of the Public Service Commission Act "shall be liberally construed with a view to the public welfare, efficient facilities and substantial justice between patrons and public utilities" (See: 386,610 RSMo 1978). Pursuant to the above legislative directive, when developing the cost of equity capital for a public utility operating in Missouri, it is appropriate to do so with a view toward the public

welfare; giving the utility an amount that will allow for efficient use of its facilities and the proper balance of interests between the ratepayers and the utility.

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APPENDIX F

A.

MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO ILLUSTRATION

Q. COULD YOU PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE ILLUSTRATING THE IMPORTANCE OF MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIOS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL?

Yes. Assume that a utility's equity has a book value of \$10 per share and that, for simplicity, this utility pays out all its carnings in dividends. If regulators allow the utility a 12% return, investors will expect the company to earn (and pay out) \$1.20 per share. If investors require a 12% return on this investment, they will be willing to provide a market price of \$10 per share for this stock (\$1.20 dividends/\$10 market price = 12%). In that case, the allowed/expected return is equal to the cost of capital and the market price is equal to the book value.

Now, assume the investors' required return is 10%. Investors would be drawn to a utility stock in a risk class for which they require a 10% return but was expected to pay out a 12% return. The increased demand by investors would result in an increase in the market price of the stock until the total share yield equaled the investors' required return. In our example, that point would be \$12 per share (\$1.20 dividends/\$12 market price = 10%). As such, the allowed/expected return (12%) is greater than the required return (10%) and the per share market price (\$12/share) exceeds book value (\$10/share), producing a market-to-book ratio greater than one (\$12/\$10 = 1.20). Consequently, when the market-to-book ratio for a given utility is greater than one, the earned or projected return on book equity is greater than the cost of capital.

1 APPENDIX G 2 DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPARISON GROUP PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU DEVELOPED A GROUP OF GAS UTILITIES WITH 3 Q. FINANCIAL RISK CHARACTERISTICS SIMILAR TO MGE. 4 5 The following selection criteria have been used to develop a group of comparable gas A. 6 utilities: 7 1). Publicly traded company; 8 2). No Missouri-regulated operations; 9 3). Greater than 85% of total revenues from regulated sales of gas; 10 4). Total capitalization less than 1.5 billion: 11 5). Standard & Poor's Bond Rating of at least A-: 12 6). Covered by Value Line; 13 The following companies met the selection criteria: 1) AGL Resources, Inc. (AGL, ticker 14 ATG): 2) Bay State Gas Company (Bay State, ticker BGC); 3) Connecticut Energy 15 Corporation (Conn. Energy, ticker CNE); 4) CTG Resources, Inc. (CTG, ticker CTG); 5) 16 Indiana Energy, Inc. (Indiana, ticker IEI); 6) New Jersey Resources Corp. (NJR, ticker NJR); 17 7) Northwest Natural Gas Co.(NWNG, ticker NWNG); 8) Peoples Energy Corporation 18 (Peoples, ticker PGL): 9) Piedmont Natural Gas Company (Piedmont, ticker PNY); and 10) 19 Washington Gas Light Company (WGL, ticker WGL). 20 Q. HAVE YOU MADE ANY RISK EVALUATIONS FOR THE COMPARISON GROUP? 21 A. Yes. As shown on Schedule MB-2, I have examined several measures that typically act as 22 indicators of relative risk. 23 The beta coefficient: 24 Fixed charge coverage: 25 Value Line Safety rating:

Bond Rating from Standard & Poor's; İ 2 Average common equity ratio; 3 Value Line Financial Strength. Also, many of the selection criteria also act as risk measures, such as the level of revenues 4 5 from regulated gas operations. 6 Q. WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM THIS ANALYSIS? 7 Generally, the level of overall, or total, risk for the industry companies is representative of A. 8 the risks faced by Laclede as a regulated natural gas distributor.

APPENDIX H

2

EFFICIENT NATURE OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS

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A.

IS THE DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL INHERENTLY CAPABLE OF ADJUSTING FOR THE LEVEL OF REAL OR PERCEIVED RISKINESS TO A GIVEN SECURITY?

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every risk variable facing an individual firm has on the cost of equity capital to that firm.

Yes. It is impossible for any one analyst to systematically interpret the impact that each and

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Fortunately, this type of risk-by-risk analysis is not necessary when determining the

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appropriate variables to be plugged into the DCF formula.

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As stated earlier, the DCF model can correctly identify the cost of equity capital to a

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firm by adding the current dividend yield (D/P) to the correct determination of investor-

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expected growth (g). Thus, the difficult task of determining the cost of equity capital is made

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easier, in part, by the relative ease of locating dividend and stock price information and the

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efficient nature of the capital markets.

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Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THAT STATEMENT.

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The DCF model is based on the assumption that investors (1) calculate intrinsic values for

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stocks on the basis of their interpretation of available information concerning future cash

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flows and risk. (2) compare the calculated intrinsic value for each stock with its current

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market price, and (3) make buy or sell decisions based on whether a stock's intrinsic value is

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greater or less than its market price.

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the marginal investor will a stock be demanded by that investor. If a stock sells at a price

Only if its market price is equal to or lower than its intrinsic value as calculated by

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significantly above or below its calculated intrinsic value, buy or sell orders will quickly push

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the stock towards market equilibrium. The DCF model takes on the following form when

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used by investors to calculate the intrinsic value of a given security,

$$P^{=}D/k-g$$

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where P^= the intrinsic value of the security,

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D = the current dividend,

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g = the expected growth rate, and

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k = the required return on the security

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Since the required rate of return for any given investor is based on both the perceived

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riskiness of the security and return opportunities available in other segments of the market, it

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can be easily demonstrated that when perceived riskiness is increased, the investors' required

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return is also increased and the market value of the investment falls as it is valued less by the

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marginal investor. Returning to the form of the DCF model used to determine the cost of

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k = D/P + g

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we see that the required return rises as an increase in the perceived risk associated with a

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given security drives the price down. Within this context, the DCF formula incorporates all

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known information including information regarding risks, into the cost of equity capital

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calculation. This is known as the "efficient market" hypothesis.

17 18 Q. IS THE "EFFICIENT MARKET" HYPOTHESIS SUPPORTED IN THE FINANCIAL LITERATURE?

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Α.

Yes. Modern investment theory maintains that the U.S. capital markets are efficient and, at

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any point in time, the prices of publicly traded stocks and bonds reflect all available

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information about those securities. Additionally, as new information is discovered, security

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prices adjust virtually instantaneously. This implies that, at any given time, security prices

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reflect "real" or intrinsic values. This point is further clarified by Brealey and Myers in

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Principles of Corporate Finance, Fourth Edition:

When economists say that the security market is efficient, they are not talking about whether the filing is up-to-date or whether the desktops are tidy. They mean that information is widely and cheaply available to investors and that all relevant and ascertainable information is already reflected in security prices. (pg. 290)

Suppose, e.g., that you wish to sell an antique painting at an auction but you have no idea of its value. Can you be sure of receiving a fair price? The answer is that you can if the auction is sufficiently competitive. In other words, you need to satisfy yourself that it is to be properly conducted (that includes no collusion among bidders), that there is no substantial cost involved in submitting a bid, and that the auction is attended by a reasonable number of skilled potential bidders, each of whom has access to the available information. In this case, no matter how ignorant you may be, competition among experts will ensure that the price you realize fully reflects the value of the painting.

In just the same way, competition among investment analysts will lead to a stock market in which prices at all times reflect true value. But what do we mean by *true value*? It is a potentially slippery phrase. True value does not mean ultimate *future* value -- we do not expect investors to be fortune-tellers. It means an equilibrium price which incorporates *all* the information available to investors at that time. That was our definition of an efficient market. (pg. 293-294)

APPENDIX I

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DETERMINATION OF RETENTION (BR + SV) GROWTH & SUSTAINABLE GROWTH VS. EARNINGS AND DIVIDEND GROWTH RATES

Q. PREVIOUSLY YOU STATED THAT IT IS CRITICAL TO UNDERSTAND THE SOURCES OF GROWTH WHEN DEVELOPING A SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE RECOMMENDATION. PLEASE PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE THAT ILLUSTRATES HOW SUSTAINABLE GROWTH IS MEASURED.

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A.

9 illustration that shows how expected growth is measured. To do this, assume that a 10

of growth.

hypothetical utility has a first period common equity, or book value per share of \$20.00; the

investor-expected return on that equity is 12 percent; and the stated company policy is to pay

To understand how investors develop a growth rate expectation, it is helpful to look at an

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out 50 percent of carnings in dividends. The first period earnings per share are expected to

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be \$2.40 (\$20 per share book equity x 12% equity) and the expected dividend is \$1.20. The

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amount of carnings not paid out to shareholders (\$1.20), referred to as retained earnings, raises the book value of the equity to \$21.20 in the second period. The following table

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continues the hypothetical for a three-year period and illustrates the underlying determinants

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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Gr. Book Value \$20.00 \$21,20 \$22.47 6.00% Equity Return 12% 12% 12% Earnings/Sh. \$2.40 \$2.54 \$2,67 6.00% Payout Ratio 50% 50% 50% Dividend/Sh. \$1.20 \$1.27 \$1.34 6.00%

As can be seen, earnings, dividends, and book value all grow at the same rate when the payout ratio and return on equity remain stable. Moreover, key to this growth is the amount of carnings retained or reinvested in the firm and the return on equity.

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Letting "b" equal the retention ratio of the firm (or 1 minus the payout ratio) and letting "r" equal the firm's expected return on equity, the DCF growth rate "g" (also referred to as the sustainable growth rate) is equal to their product, or

g = br.

As shown in the example, the growth rate for the hypothetical company is 6.00 percent (12%) ROE x 50% payout ratio).

Dr. Gordon has determined that this equation embodies the underlying fundamentals of growth and, therefore, is a primary measure of growth to be used in the DCF model (Gordon, The Cost of Capital to a Public Utility, 1974, p.81). It should be noted, however, Dr. Gordon's research also indicates that analysts' growth rate projections are useful in estimating investors' expectations. As a result, analysts' published growth rate projections. along with other historic and projected growth rates, are considered in this analysis for the purpose of reaching an accurate estimation of the expected sustainable growth rate.

- Q. CAN THE RETENTION GROWTH RATE MODEL BE FURTHER REFINED IN ORDER TO BEST REPRESENT INVESTORS' EXPECTATIONS?
- A. Yes. The above hypothetical example does not allow for the existence of external sources of equity financing (i.e., sales of common stock). Stock financing will cause investors to expect additional growth if the company is expected to issue additional shares at a market price which exceeds book value.

The excess of market value over book value per share would benefit current shareholders by increasing their per share equity value. Therefore, if the company is expected to continue to issue stock at a price that exceeds book value per share, the shareholders would continue to expect their book value to increase and would add that growth expectation to that stemming from the retention of earnings, or internal growth.

On the other hand, if a company is expected to issue new common equity at a price below book value, that would have a negative effect on shareholders' current growth rate expectations. Finally, with little or no expected equity financing or a market-to-book ratio at or near one, investors would expect the long-term sustainable growth rate for the company to equal the growth from earnings retention.

Dr. Gordon identifies the growth rate which includes both expected internal and external financing as,

$$g = br + sv$$

where, g = DCF expected growth rate,

r = return on equity,

b = retention ratio,

v = fraction of new common stock sold that accrues to the current shareholder,

s = funds raised from the sale of stock as a fraction of existing equity.

Additionally,

v = I - BV/MP

where.

MP = market price,

BV = book value.

The second term (sv), which represents the external portion of the expected growth rate, does not normally represent a major source of growth when compared to the expected growth attributed to the retention of earnings. For example, the FERC Generic Rate of Return Model estimates the (sv) component in the range of 0.1% to 0.2%. However, I have used this equation as the basis for determining sustainable growth for the comparable group.

- Q. IS HISTORIC OR PROJECTED GROWTH IN EARNINGS OR DIVIDENDS APPROPRIATE FOR DETERMINING THE DCF GROWTH RATE?
- A. No. not always. As I have stated, growth derived from earnings or dividends alone can be unreliable for ratemaking purposes due to external influences on these parameters such as changes in the historic or expected rate of return on common equity or changes in the payout ratio. An extended example will demonstrate this point.

If we take the example above and assume that, in year two, the expected return on equity rises from 12 percent to 15 percent, the resulting growth rate in earnings and dividends per share dramatically exceeds what the company could sustain indefinitely. The error that can result from exclusive reliance on earnings or dividends growth is illustrated in the following table:

•	Ycar I	Year 2	Year 3	<u>Gr.</u>
Book Value	\$20.00	\$21.20	\$22.79	6.75%
Equity Return	12%	15%	15%	
Earnings/Sh.	\$2.40	\$3.18	\$3.42	19.37%
Payout Ratio	50%	50%	50%	
Dividends/Sh.	\$1.20	\$1.59	\$1.71	19.37%

Due to the change in return on equity in year two, the compound growth rate for dividends and earnings is greater than 19 percent, which is the result only of a short-term increase in the equity return rather than the intrinsic ability of the firm to grow continuously at a 19 percent annual rate.

For year one, the sustainable rate of growth (g=br) is 6.00 percent, just as it was in the previous example. On the other hand, in years two and three, the sustainable growth rate increases to 7.50 percent. (15% ROE x 50% retention rate = 7.50%). Consequently, if the utility is expected to continually earn a 15 percent return on equity and retain 50 percent of earnings for reinvestment, a growth rate of 7.50 percent would be a reasonable estimate of

the long-term sustainable growth rate. However, the compound growth rate in earnings and dividends, which is over 19 percent, dramatically exceeds the actual investor-expected growth rate.

As can be seen in the hypothetical, the 19 percent growth rate is simply the result of the change in return on equity from year one to year two, not the firm's ability to grow sustainably at that rate. Consequently, this type of growth rate cannot be relied upon to accurately measure investors' sustainable growth rate expectations. In this instance, to rely on either earnings or dividend growth would be to assume the return on equity could continue to increase indefinitely. This, of course, is a faulty assumption; the recognition of which emphasizes the need to analyze the fundamentals of actual growth.

- Q. IS HISTORIC GROWTH IN DIVIDENDS AN ACCURATE INDICATOR OF INVESTORS' GROWTH EXPECTATIONS WHEN THE HISTORICAL PAYOUT RATIO HAS BEEN ERRATIC OR TRENDED DOWNWARD OVER TIME?
- A. As stated, no. It can also be demonstrated that a change in our hypothetical utility's payout ratio makes the past rate of growth in dividends an unreliable basis for predicting investor-expected growth. If we assume the hypothetical utility consistently earns its expected equity return but in the second year changes its payout ratio from 50 percent to 75 percent, the resulting growth rate in dividends far exceeds a reasonable level of sustainable growth.

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Gr.
Book Value	\$20.00	\$21.20	\$21.84	4.50%
Equity Return	12%	12%	. 12%	
Earnings/Sh.	\$2.40	\$2.54	\$2.62	4.50%
Payout Ratio	50%	75%	75%	
Dividends/Sh.	\$1.20	\$1.91	\$1.97	28.13%

Although the company has registered a high dividend growth rate (28.13%), it is not representative of the growth that could be sustained, as called for in the DCF model. In actuality, the sustainable growth rate (br) has declined due to the increased payout ratio. To

utilize a 28 percent growth rate in a DCF analysis for this hypothetical utility would be to assume that the payout ratio could continue to increase indefinitely and lead to the unlikely result that the firm could consistently pay out more in dividends than it earns. The problems associated with sole reliance on historic dividend growth has been recognized in the financial literature. According to Brigham and Gapenski,

If carnings and dividends are growing at the same rate, there is no problem, but if these two growth rates are unequal, we do have a problem. First, the DCF model calls for the expected dividend growth rate. However, if EPS and DPS are growing at different rates, something is going to have to change: these two series cannot grow at two different rates indefinitely (Intermediate Financial Management, p.145).

Laclede Gas Company Historical Financial Information

	<u>1997</u>		<u>1995</u>			Average	
Return on Equity	12.40%	12.60%	10.70%	10.90%	12.00%	11.72%	
Earnings per share	\$ 1.84	\$ 1.87	\$ 1.27	\$ 1.42	\$ 1.61	\$ 1.60	
Dividends per share	\$ 1.30	\$ 1.26	\$ 1.24	\$ 1.22	\$1.215	\$ 1.247	
Payout Ratio	70.65%	67.38%	97.64%	85.92%	75.47%	79.41%	
Book Value per share	\$ 14.26	\$ 13.72	\$ 13.05	\$ 12.44	\$ 12.19	\$ 13.13	

Source: Laclede Gas Company 1997 Annual Report to Shareholders Value Line Investment Survey; OPC data requests 2011, 2012.

Laclede Gas Company Capital Structure

	As of 6/30/98						
	Amount	<u>Percent</u>					
Common Stock Equity	\$265,414,384	52.66%					
Preferred Stock	\$ 1,960,000	0.39%					
Long Term Debt	\$178,278,724	35.37%					
Short Term Debt	\$ 58,385,011	11.58%					
	\$504,038,119	100.00%					

No Short Term Debt For Historical Comparison Purposes Only

	Jun-98					
	Without Short Term Debt					
	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>				
Common Stock Equity	\$265,414,384	59.56%				
Preferred Stock	\$1,960,000	0.44%				
Long Term Debt	<u>\$178,278,724</u>	<u>40.00%</u>				
	\$445,653,108	100.00%				

Source: Schedules MB-3, MB-4, MB-5, OPC data request 2001.

BURDETTE - DIRECT
GR-98-374 Laclede Gas Company

Percent Common Equity for Laclede and Comparison Group - No short term debt Value Line Investment Survey Composite Index

	<u> 1997</u>	<u> 1996</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1993</u>	Average
AGL Resources Inc.	45.9%	48.9%	47.6%	45.8%	53.1%	48.3%
Bay State Gas Company	50.0%	53.1%	51.8%	52.3%	51.9%	51.8%
Connecticut Energy Corp.	51.9%	49.9%	52.4%	51.2%	45.2%	50.1%
CTG Resources, Inc.	57.0%	55.2%	49.8%	47.3%	45.9%	51.0%
Indiana Energy	65.0%	62.5%	61.4%	63.1%	61.1%	62.6%
New Jersey Resources	47.1%	45.8%	41.0%	42.0%	42.6%	43.7%
Northwest Natural Gas	49.0%	52.8%	50.3%	45.1%	45.0%	48.4%
People's Energy Corp.	42.4%	43.6%	49.2%	49.4%	45.7%	46.1%
Piedmont Natural Gas Co.	52.4%	49.7%	49.6%	49.1%	50.6%	50.3%
Washington Gas Light Company	<u>56.2%</u>	<u>59.4%</u>	<u>58.9%</u>	<u>56.7%</u>	<u>54.8%</u>	<u>57.2%</u>
Comparables Average	51.7%	52.1%	51.2%	50.2%	49.6%	51.0%
Laclede Gas Company	61.6%	57.1%	59.3%	55.5%	53.1%	57.3%
Laclede Gas Company	61.6%	57.1%	59.3%	55.5%		58.4%
Value Line Composite Index Natural Gas (Distribution)	49.6%	49.1%	47.4%	47.6%		48.4%

Source: Value Line Investment Survey

Laclede Gas Company Embedded Cost of Preferred Stock

		Coupon	Dividend
<u>Issue:</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Rate</u>	Requirement
5.00% Series B	\$1,797,250	5.00%	\$89,863
4.56% Series C	\$162,750	4.56%	\$7,421
TOTAL:	\$1,960,000		\$97,284

Amount Outstanding \$1,960,000 Dividend Requirement: \$97,284

Embedded Cost Rate: 4.96%

Source: Company response to OPC data request 2003

Laciede Gas Company Embedded Cost of Long Term Debt

Description:	Issue Date	Maturity Date	Principal Original Issue	Amount Outstanding	Interest Rate	Annual Interest	1	Annual mortization Issuance Expenses sents/Prems.		Jnamortized Issuance Expense isents/Prems.	Annual Cost	Carrying Value	Embedded Cost Rate
6.25% Series	05/01/93	05/01/03	\$25,000,000	\$25,000,000	6.25%	\$1,562,500	\$	41,902	S	216,496	\$1,604,402	\$24,783,504	6.47%
8.5% Series	11/15/89	11/15/04	25,000,000	25,000,000	8.50%	\$2,125,000	\$	23,295	\$	156,273	\$2,148,295	\$24,843,727	8.65%
8.625% Series	05/15/91	05/15/06	40,000,000	40,000,000	8.63%	\$3,450,000	\$	47,280	\$	388,093	\$3,497,280	\$39,611,907	8,83%
7.50% Series	11/01/92	11/01/07	40,000,000	40,000,000	7.50%	\$3,000,000	\$	40,487	\$	391,372	\$3,040,487	\$39,608,628	7.68%
6.50% Series	11/15/95	11/15/10	25,000,000	25,000,000	6.50%	\$1,625,000	\$	13,441	\$	170,817	\$1,638,441	\$24,829,183	6.60%
6.50% Series	10/16/97	10/15/12	25,000,000	25,000,000	6.50%	\$1,625,000	\$	34,067	\$	398,225	\$1,659,067	\$24,601,775	6.74%
Reacquired LTD							\$	208,330	\$	829,362			
TOTAL:			\$180,000,000	\$180,000,000	• •	\$13,387,500	\$	200,473 \$408,803	\$	1,721,276 \$2,550,638	\$13,587,973	\$178,278,724	

Total Cost: \$13,796,303
Total Carrying Value: \$178,278,724

Embedded Cost Rate: 7.77%

Source: Response to OPC data request No. 2002

BURDETTE - DIRECT GR-98-374 Laclede Gas Company

Laclede Gas Company
Embedded Cost of Short Term Debt through 6/30/98

	Wtd. Avg.		Yea	r ended	Year	ended		
	Effective	Balance		Dec-97		Jun-98		
	Interest	Outstanding	Dec-97	Weighted	Jun-98	Weighted		Balance
	<u>Rate</u>	End of Month	Weight	Cost	Weight	Cost	CWIP	less CWIP
Jan-97	5.321%	\$100,500,000	12.75%	0.679%			\$ 4,089,687	\$96,410,313
Feb-97	5.430°°	\$ 83,000,000	10.53%	0.572%			\$ 3,819,625	\$79,180,375
Mar-97	5.467%	\$ 56,000,000	7.11%	0.389%			\$ 3,649,772	\$52,350,228
Apr-97	5.611° o	\$ 40,000,000	5.08%	0.285%			\$ 4,075,934	\$35,924,066
May-97	5.614°°	\$ 31,500,000	4.00%	0.224%			\$ 4,064,843	\$27,435,157
Jun-97	5.668° o	\$ 34,500,000	4.38%	0.248%			\$ 5,472,559	\$29,027,441
Jul-97	5.650°°	\$ 43,000,000	5.46%	0.308%	5.44%	0.31%	\$ 5,845,332	\$37,154,668
Aug-97	5.624°°	\$ 55,500,000	7.04%	0.396%	7.02%	0.39%	\$ 6,459,514	\$49,040,486
Sep-97	5.636%	\$ 74,000,000	9.39%	0.529%	9.36%	0.53%	\$ 4,895,437	\$69,104,563
⊖લ-97	5.641%	\$ 70,500,000	8.95%	0.505%	8.91%	0.50%	\$ 6,590,149	\$63,909,851
Nov-97	5.728°6	\$ 97,000,000	12.31%	0.705%	12.26%	0.70%	\$ 6,339,125	\$90,660,875
Dec-97	5.867°°	\$102,500,000	13.01%	0.763%	12.96%	0.76%	S 7,364,543	\$95,135,457
	•	\$ 788,000,000	100.00%	5.603%	•			
Average M	onthly Lev	\$ 65,666,667		Aver	age Monthly	y Level less	CWIP (1997):	\$60,444,457
Jan-98	5.797%	\$ 89,500,000			11.31%	0.66%	\$ 7,266,124	\$82,233,876
Feh-98	5.630%	\$ 63,500,000			8.03%	0.45%	\$ 7,197,007	\$56,302,993
Mar-98	5.647%	\$ 34,500,000			4.36%	0.25%	\$ 7,337,487	\$27,162,513
Apr-98	5.643°°	\$ 33,000,000			4.17%	0.24%	\$10,580,902	\$22,419,098
May-98	5.631°6	\$ 63,000,000			7.96%	0.45%	\$ 8,482,186	\$54,517,814
Jun-98	5.652%	\$ 65,000,000			8.22%	0.46%	\$12,022,064	\$52,977,936
	•	\$ 791,000,000			100.00%	5.70%		
Average Month	ıly Level (\$ 65,916,667	A	verage Mont	hly Level l	ess CWIP ((ending 6/98):	\$58,385,011

Source: Company response to OPC data request 2004

Comparison Companies

C.A. Turner Utility Reports - June 1998: Statistical Information Natural Gas Distribution and Integrated Natural Gas Companies

			% Rev		Payout	Dividend		Common	Missouri
	<u>Public</u>	Revenue	<u>Gas</u>	<u>S&P</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>Yield</u>	MTB	Equity	Reg.?
AGL Resources Inc.	yes	\$1,310.3	100.0%	A-	0.84	5.5%	1.75	42.0%	No
Bay State Gas Company	yes	\$ 489.9	100.0%	Α	0.87	4.2%	2.12	42.0%	No
Connecticut Energy Corp.	yes	\$ 253.6	100.0%	Α	0.79	4.9%	1.61	51.0%	No
CTG Resources, Inc.	yes	\$ 308.7	94.0%	A٠	0.56	4.3%	1.66	35.0%	No
Indiana Energy	yes	\$ 475.9	100.0%	AA-	0.60	4.1%	2.29	56.0%	No
New Jersey Resources	yes	\$ 728.3	81.0%	A+	0.71	4.6%	2.23	43.0%	No
Northwest Natural Gas	yes	\$ 363.1	97.0%	Α	0.72	4.6%	1.71	43.0%	No
People's Energy Corp.	yes	\$1,128.9	100.0%	AA-	0.84	5.4%	1.68	56.0%	No
Piedmont Natural Gas Co.	yes	\$ 776.2	100.0%	Α	0.65	4.0%	2.15	52.0%	No
Washington Gas Light Company	yes	\$1,078.3	100.0%	AA-	0.64	<u>4.6</u> %	1.86	<u>50.0</u> %	No
Average		\$ 691.3	97.2%	A/A-	0.72	4.6%	1.91	47.0%	
Laclede		\$ 608.6	100.0%	AA-	0.78	5.7%	1.56	46.0%	

Value Line Investment Survey

	Fixed Charge			Financial	
	<u>Beta</u>	Coverage	Timeliness	Strength	Safety
AGL Resources Inc.	0.70	2.80	4	B+	2
Bay State Gas Company	0.50	3.03	-	B++	2
Connecticut Energy Corp.	0.65	2.77	4	B++	2
CTG Resources, Inc.	0.55	3.51	4	B+	2
Indiana Energy	0.70	4.62	4	Α	2
New Jersey Resources	0.60	3.32	3	B++	2
Northwest Natural Gas	0.65	2.48	4	B++	2
People's Energy Corp.	0.85	5.00	5	Α	1
Picdmont Natural Gas Co.	0.60	3.81	3	B++	2
Washington Gas Light Company	0.75	<u>4.31</u>	<u>5</u>	A	1
Average	0.66	3.57	4.00	B++/A	2
Laclede	0.55	2.91	4	A	1

Source: C.A. Turner Utility Reports June 1998, Value Line Investment Survey

BURDETTE - DIRECT GR-98-374 Lactede Gas Company

Summary and Ranges - Growth for Comparison Companies

Historic Growth	Retention	Calculate	d Compou	nd Growth		Value Lin	e [
<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>br + sv</u>	<u>EPS</u>	DPS	<u>BVPS</u>	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS
Laclede Gas Company	3.51%	3.39%	1.22%	3.45%	7.00%	2.00%	2.75%
AGL Resources Inc.	3.21%	5.80%	0.72%	2.20%	4.25%	2.50%	3.00%
Bay State Gas Company	2.90%	5.27%	2.89%	3.68%	3.25%	4.00%	4.75%
Connecticut Energy Corp.		4.33%	0.98%	4.42%	4.25%	1.25%	4.00%
CTG Resources, Inc.	3.02%	1.17%	1.15%	3.88%	0.75%	1.50%	4.00%
Indiana Energy	5.25%	10.10%	3.79%	5.08%	7.00%	4.50%	5.50%
New Jersey Resources	3.83%	6.23%	0.70%	2.09%	9.50%	2.25%	3.75%
Northwest Natural Gas	5.15%	0.29%	1.00%	5.04%	7.75%	1.50%	4.25%
People's Energy Corp.	3.59%	8.46%	1.12%	2.55%	3.00%	2.50%	3.00%
Picdmont Natural Gas Co.	5.47%	7.92%	6.02%	6.25%	7.50%	6.00%	6.25%
Washington Gas Light Company	4.27%	<u>8.36%</u>	1.67%	5.11%	5.50%	2.50%	4.00%
Average	4.07%	5.79%	2.00%	4.03%	5.28%	2.85%	4.25%

Projected Growth	Retention	Value Line / Zack's			
<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>br + sv</u>	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>	
Laclede Gas Company	4.38%	3.14%	2.50%	3.50%	
AGL Resources Inc.	4.14%	4.02%	1.50%	4.50%	
Bay State Gas Company	4.26%	7.67%	3.50%	5.00%	
Connecticut Energy Corp.	4.23%	5.67%	4.00%	4.00%	
CTG Resources, Inc.	6.84%	6.17%	•	3.00%	
Indiana Energy	6.11%	6.07%	3.50%	5.00%	
New Jersey Resources	7.07%	6.74%	3.50%	6.00%	
Northwest Natural Gas	5.92%	5.26%	2.00%	5.00%	
People's Energy Corp.	5.44%	4.80%	2.00%	4.50%	
Piedmont Natural Gas Co.	6.72%	7.42%	4.50%	6.00%	
Washington Gas Light Company	5.32%	5.25%	3.00%	5.50%	
Average	5.61%	5.90%	3.06%	4.85%	

Overall			Hi/Low	
<u>Average</u>	Low*	High	Average	<u>Median</u>
3.35%	1.22%	7.00%	4.11%	3.39%
3.26%	0.72%	5.80%	3.26%	3.21%
4.29%	2.89%	7.67%	5.28%	4.00%
3.74%	0.98%	5.67%	3.32%	4.04%
3.15%	0.75%	6.84%	3.79%	3.01%
5.63%	3.50%	10.10%	6.80%	5.25%
4.70%	0.70%	9.50%	5.10%	3.83%
3.92%	0.29%	7.75%	4.02%	5.00%
3.72%	1.12%	8.46%	4.79%	3.00%
6.37%	4.50%	7.92%	6.21%	6.25%
4.59%	1.67%	8.36%	5.01%	5.11%
4.34%	1.71%	7.81%	4.76%	4.27%
	3.35% 3.26% 4.29% 3.74% 3.15% 5.63% 4.70% 3.92% 3.72% 6.37% 4.59%	Average Low* 3.35% 1.22% 3.26% 0.72% 4.29% 2.89% 3.74% 0.98% 3.15% 0.75% 5.63% 3.50% 4.70% 0.70% 3.92% 0.29% 3.72% 1.12% 6.37% 4.50% 4.50% 1.67%	Average Low* High 3.35% 1.22% 7.00% 3.26% 0.72% 5.80% 4.29% 2.89% 7.67% 3.74% 0.98% 5.67% 3.15% 0.75% 6.84% 5.63% 3.50% 10.10% 4.70% 0.70% 9.50% 3.92% 0.29% 7.75% 3.72% 1.12% 8.46% 6.37% 4.50% 7.92% 4.59% 1.67% 8.36%	Average Low* High Average 3.35% 1.22% 7.00% 4.11% 3.26% 0.72% 5.80% 3.26% 4.29% 2.89% 7.67% 5.28% 3.74% 0.98% 5.67% 3.32% 3.15% 0.75% 6.84% 3.79% 5.63% 3.50% 10.10% 6.80% 4.70% 0.70% 9.50% 5.10% 3.92% 0.29% 7.75% 4.02% 3.72% 1.12% 8.46% 4.79% 6.37% 4.50% 7.92% 6.21% 4.59% 1.67% 8.36% 5.01%

Note: Negative growth rates are not included in averages and are excluded from determination of "Low".

Source: Schedules MB-10-19

Discounted Cash Flow Growth Parameters

Laclede Gas Company

	<u> </u>	Compound (<u>l</u>
					Retention	Equity	Growth
	Historic Data	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)
1	1991	1.28	1.20	11.83	0.063		
2	1992	1.17	1.20	11.79	-0.026		
3	1993	1.61	1.22	12.19	0.242	13.20%	3.20%
4	1994	1.42	1.22	12.44	0.141	11.30%	1.59%
5	1995	1.27	1.24	13.05	0.024	9.20%	0.22%
6	1996	1.87	1.26	13.72	0.326	13.60%	4.44%
7	1997	1.84	1.30	14.26	0.293	12.90%	3.79%
8							
9	Cor	npound Gro	with Rates			Ave. Internal	
10	91-95	-0.20%	0.82%	2.48%		Growth (br):	2.65%
11							
12	92-96	12.44%	1.23%	3.86%		ADD: External	
13						Growth (sv):	0.86%
14	93-97	3.39%	1.60%	4.00%			
15						Historic	
16	Ave.Compound Gr.	3.39%	1.22%	3.45%		"br + sv" Gr.	<u>3.51%</u>
17							
18	Value Line	EPS	DPS	BVPS			
19	Historic Gr.	7.00%	2.00%	2.75%			
20	(Avg of 5 and 10 yr if bo	oth are available	e)				
21							
22	<u>P</u>	rojected Gr	owth				
23					Retention	Equity	Growth
24	Projections	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)
25	1998 est'd	\$1.50	\$1.32	\$14.45	0.120	10.50%	1.26%
26	1999 cst'd	1.90	1.35	14.90	0.289	13.00%	3.76%
27	01-03 est'd	2.15	1.45	16.65	0.326	13.00%	4.23%
28							
29	Value Line					Projected	
30	Proj'd Growth	4.50%	2.50%	3.50%		Growth (br):	4.23%
31							
32	Zack's 5 ут.					ADD: External	
33	Proj'd Growth	1.77%				Growth (sv):	0.15%
34							
35	Average					Projected	
36	Proj'd Growth	3.14%	<u>2.50%</u>	3.50%		"br + sv" Gr.	4.38%

Note: Negative (b*r) growth is not included in retention growth averages.

SOURCE: The Value Line Investment Survey, C.A. Turner Utility Reports - June 1998

Discounted Cash Flow Growth Parameters

AGL Resources, Inc.

		Compound Growth Retention Growth				<u>h</u>	
					Retention	Equity	Growth
	Historie Data	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>	Ratio (b)	Retum (r)	(b*r)
1	1991	1.04	1.02	9.42	0.019		
2	1992	1.13	1.03	9.70	0.088		
3	1993	1.08	1.04	9.90	0.037	10.80%	0.40%
4	1994	1.17	1.04	10.19	0.111	11.30%	1.26%
5	1995	1.33	1.04	10.12	0.218	12.50%	2.73%
6	1996	1.37	1.06	10.56	0.226	12.10%	2.74%
7	1997	1.37	1.08	10.99	0.212	11.30%	2.39%
8							
9	Cor	npound Gro	owth Rates			Ave. Internal	
10	91-95	6.34%	0.49%	1.81%		Growth (br):	1.90%
H							
12	92-96	4.93%	0.72%	2.15%		ADD: External	
13						Growth (sv):	1.31%
14	93-97	6.13%	0.95%	2.65%			
15	,					Historic	
16	Ave.Compound Gr.	5.80%	<u>0.72%</u>	2.20%		"br + sv" Gr.	3.21%
17							
18	Value Line	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS			
19	Historic Gr.	4.25%	2.50%	3.00%			
20	(Avg of 5 and 10 yr. if bo	th are availabl	e)				
21							
22	<u> P</u>	rojected Gi	owth				
23					Retention	Equity	Growth
24	Projections	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)
25	1998 est'd	\$1.20	\$1.08	\$11.25	0.100	10.50%	1.05%
26	1999 est'd	1.30	1.08	11.55	0.169	11.00%	1.86%
27	01-03 est'd	1.65	1.15	13.65	0.303	12.00%	3.64%
28							
29	Value Line					Projected	
30	Proj'd Growth	3.50%	1.50%	4.50%		Growth (br):	3.64%
31					•		
32	Zack's 5 yr.					ADD: External	
33	Proj'd Growth	4.53%				Growth (sv):	0.51%
34						210 101/1	0.0170
35	Average					Projected	
36	Proj'd Growth	4.02%	1.50%	4.50%		"br + sv" Gr.	4.14%
	2 - 1 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 -	· · · · · · · · ·	410070	7100/0		UL USY UL	7.1770

Note: Negative (b*r) growth is not included in retention growth averages.

SOURCE: The Value Line Investment Survey, C.A. Turner Utility Reports - June 1997

Discounted Cash Flow Growth Parameters

Bay State Gas Company

	!	Compound	Growth			L		
					Retention	Equity	Growth	
	Historic Data	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)	
1	1991	1.32	1.31	13.60	0.008			
2	1992	1.41	1.36	14.90	0.035			
3	1993	1.75	1.40	15.52	0.200	11.10%	2.22%	
4	1994	1.85	1.44	16.20	0.222	11.20%	2.48%	
5	1995	1.71	1.48	16.46	0.135	10.40%	1.40%	
6	1996	2.00	1.52	16.98	0.240	11.70%	2.81%	
7	1997	1.85	1.56	17.35	0.157	10.60%	1.66%	
8								
9	Con	npound Gro	owth Rates			Ave. Internal		
10	91-95	6.69%	3.10%	4.89%		Growth (br):	2.11%	
Ħ								
12	92-96	9.13%	2.82%	3.32%		ADD: External		
13						Growth (sv):	0.78%	
14	93-97	1.40%	2.74%	2.83%				
15						Historic		
16	Ave.Compound Gr.	5.27%	<u>2.89%</u>	<u>3.68%</u>		"br + sv" Gr .	<u>2.90%</u>	
17								
18	Value Line	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>				
19	Historic Gr.	3.25%	4.00%	4.75%				
20	(Avg of 5 and 10 yr af bo	th are availabl	e)					
21								
22	<u>P</u>	rojected Gi	rowth					
23					Retention	Equity	Growth	
24	Projections	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)	
25	1998 est'd	\$1.70	\$1.62	\$17.75	0.047	9.50%	0.45%	
26	1999 est'd	1.95	1.68	18.30	0.138	11.00%	1.52%	
27	01-03 cst'd	2.65	1.88	20.50	0.291	13.00%	3.78%	
28								
29	Value Line					Projected		
30	Proj'd Growth	9.50%	3.50%	5.00%		Growth (br):	3.78%	
31								
33	Zack's 5 yr.					ADD: External		
33	Proj'd Growth	5.83%			•	Growth (sv):	0.48%	
34								
35	Average					Projected		
36	Proj'd Growth	<u>7.67%</u>	<u>3.50%</u>	5.00%		"br + sv" Gr.	<u>4.26%</u>	

Note: Negative (b*r) growth is not included in retention growth averages.

SOURCE: The Value Line Investment Survey, C.A. Turner Utility Reports - June 1997

Discounted Cash Flow Growth Parameters

Connecticut Energy Corporation

	9	Compound	Growth			Retention Growth	
					Retention	Equity	Growth
	- <u>Historic Data</u>	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)
1	1991	1.38	1.24	12.49	0.101		
2	1992	1.43	1.26	12.80	0.119		
3	1993	1.50	1.28	13.33	0.147	11.00%	1.61%
4	1994	1.58	1.30	14.45	0.177	10.20%	1.81%
5	1995	1.60	1.30	14.84	0.188	10.70%	2.01%
6	1996	1.70	1.31	15.31	0.229	11.00%	2.52%
7	199 7	1.81	1.32	15.76	0.271	11.40%	3.09%
8							
9	Con	npound Gro	owth Rates			Ave. Internal	
10	91-95	3.77%	1.19%	4.40%		Growth (br):	2.21%
11						,	
12	92-96	4.42%	0.98%	4.58%		ADD: External	
13						Growth (sv):	1.83%
14	93-97	4.81%	0.77%	4.28%			
15	,					Historic	
16	Ave.Compound Gr.	4.33%	0.98%	4.42%		"bt + sv" Gr.	4.04%
17	_						
18	Value Line	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS			
19	Historic Gr.	4.25%	1.25%	4.00%			
20	(Avg of 5 and 10 yr if bo	th are availabl	e)				
21							
22	<u>P</u>	rojected Gr	owth				
23					Retention	Equity	Growth
24	Projections	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)
25	1998 est'd	\$1.85	\$1.34	\$17.05	0.276	11.00%	3.03%
26	1999 est'd	2.00	1.40	17.65	0.300	11.50%	3.45%
2"	01-03 est'd	2.40	1.68	19.60	0.300	12.00%	3.60%
28							
29	Value Line					Projected	
30	Proj'd Growth	6.00%	4.00%	4.00%		Growth (br);	3.60%
31	-						
32	Zack's 5 yr.					ADD: External	
33	Proj'd Growth	5.33%				Growth (sv):	0.63%
3.1							0.0570
35	Average					Projected	
36	Proj'd Growth	5.67%	<u>4.00%</u>	4.00%		"br + sv" Gr.	4.23%
	Elajo Citarili	210.70	1100 70	4.00/0		Or I SY Or.	7.23 70

Note: Negative (b*r) growth is not included in retention growth averages.

SOURCE: The Value Line Investment Survey, C.A. Turner Utility Reports - June 1997 Zack's Analyst Watch

Discounted Cash Flow Growth Parameters

CTG

	Compound Growth				Retention Growth		
					Retention	Equity	Growth
	Historic Data	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(p*t)
1	1991	1.44	1.40	12.77	0.028		
2	1992	1.75	1.44	13.26	0.177		
3	1993	1.76	1.46	14.29	0.170	12.30%	2.10%
4	1994	1.85	1.48	14.62	0.200	12.60%	2.52%
5	1995	1.52	1.48	15.12	0.026	10.10%	0.27%
6	1996	1.82	1.50	15.90	0.176	10.90%	1.92%
7	1997	1.60	1.52	15.89	0.050	10.00%	0.50%
8							
9	<u>Cor</u>	npound Gro	owth Rates			Ave. Internal	
10	91-95	1.36%	1.40%	4.31%		Growth (br):	1.46%
11							
12	92-96	0.99%	1.03%	4.64%		ADD: External	
13						Growth (sv):	1.56%
1.4	93-97	-2.35%	1.01%	2.69%			
15	•					Historic	
16	Ave.Compound Gr.	1.17%	<u>1.15%</u>	3.88%		"br + sv" Gr.	3.02%
17							
18	Value Line	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>			
19	Historic Gr.	0.75%	1.50%	4.00%			
20	(Avg of 5 and 10 yr if bo	th are availabl	e)				
21							
22	<u>P</u>	rojected Gr	<u>owth</u>				
23					Retention	Equity	Growth
24	Projections	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)
25	1998 est'd	\$1.80	\$1.00	\$14.25	0.444	13.00%	5.78%
26	1999 cst'd	2.05	1.00	14.65	0.512	13.00%	6.66%
27	01-03 est'd	2.40	1.20	18.40	0.500	13.00%	6.50%
28							
29	Value Line					Projected	
30	Proj'd Growth	6.50%	-3.50%	3.00%		Growth (br):	6.50%
31	<u></u>				•		
32	Zack's 5 yr.					ADD: External	
33	Proj'd Growth	5.83%				Growth (sv):	0.34%
34							310 170
35	Average					Projected	
36	Proj'd Growth	<u>6.17%</u>	=	3.00%		<u>"br + sv" Gr.</u>	6.84%

Note: Negative (b*r) growth is not included in retention growth averages.

SOURCE: The Value Line Investment Survey, C.A. Turner Utility Reports - June 1997 Zack's Analyst Watch

Schedule MB 13

Discounted Cash Flow Growth Parameters

Indiana Energy, Inc.

	Compound Growth				Retention Growth			
					Retention	Equity	Growth	
	Historic Data	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>	Ratio (b)	Retum (r)	(p*t)	
1	1991	1.11	0.92	9.97	0.171			
2	1992	1.16	0.96	10.22	0.172			
3	1993	1.28	0.99	11.52	0.227	10.90%	2.47%	
4	1994	1.53	1.02	12.03	0.333	12.70%	4.23%	
5	1995	1.46	1.07	12.44	0.267	11.70%	3.13%	
6	1996	1.87	1.11	13.18	0.406	14.20%	5.77%	
7	1997	1.91	1.15	12.96	0.398	14.80%	5.89%	
8	•							
9	Cor	npound Gro	wth Rates			Ave. Internal		
10	'91-95	7.09%	3.85%	5.69%		Growth (br):	4.30%	
11								
12	'92-96	12.68%	3.70%	6.57%		ADD: External		
13						Growth (sv):	0.95%	
14	93-97	10.52%	3.82%	2.99%				
15	•					Historic		
16	Ave.Compound Gr.	10.10%	<u>3.79%</u>	<u>5.08%</u>		"br + sv" Gr.	<u>5.25%</u>	
17								
18	Value Line	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS				
19	Historic Gr.	7.00%	4.50%	5.50%				
20	(Avg of 5 and 10 yr if bo	oth are available	:)					
21								
22	<u>P</u>	rojected Gr	<u>owth</u>					
23					Retention	Equity	Growth	
24	Projections	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)	
25	1998 est'd	\$1.80	\$1.20	\$13.55	0.333	13.00%	4.33%	
26	1999 est'd	2.10	1.24	14.35	0.410	14.00%	5.73%	
27	01-03 est'd	2.45	1.38	17.25	0.437	14.00%	6.11%	
28								
29	Value Line					Projected		
30	Proj'd Growth	6.00%	3.50%	5.00%		Growth (br):	6.11%	
31								
32	Zack's 5 yr.					ADD: External		
33	Proj'd Growth	6.13%				Growth (sv):	0.00%	
3-1	-							
35	Average					Projected		
36	Proj'd Growth	<u>6.07%</u>	3.50%	<u>5.00%</u>		"br + sv" Gr.	<u>6.11%</u>	

Note: Negative (b*r) growth is not included in retention growth averages.

SOURCE: The Value Line Investment Survey, C.A. Turner Utility Reports - June 1997

Discounted Cash Flow Growth Parameters

New Jersey Resources Corp.

	Compound Growth				Retention Growth			
					Retention	Equity	Growth	
	Historic Data	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)	
1	1991	0.83	1.50	12.85	-0.807			
2	1992	1.64	1.52	14.16	0.073			
3	1993	1.72	1.52	14.72	0.116	11.50%	1.34%	
4	1994	1.89	1.52	14.46	0.196	12.90%	2.53%	
5	1995	1.93	1.52	14.55	0.212	13.10%	2.78%	
6	1996	2.06	1.55	15.15	0.248	13.50%	3.34%	
7	1997	2.22	1.60	15.57	0.279	14.30%	3.99%	
8								
9	Cor	npound Gro	wth Rates			Ave. Internal		
10	91-95	23.49%	0.33%	3.15%		Growth (br):	2.80%	
11								
12	92-96	5.87%	0.49%	1.70%		ADD: External		
13						Growth (sv):	1.04%	
14	'93-97	6.59%	1.29%	1.41%				
15						Historic		
16	Ave.Compound Gr.	6.23%	0.70%	<u>2.09%</u>		<u>"br + sv" Gr.</u>	3.83%	
17								
18	Value 1.ine	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS				
19	Historic Gr.	9.50%	2.25%	3.75%				
20	(Avg of 5 and 10 yr if bo	oth are availabl	e)					
21								
22	<u>P</u>	rojected Gr	owth					
23					Retention	Equity	Growth	
24	Projections	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)	
25	1998 est'd	\$2.35	\$1.64	\$15.85	0.302	15.00%	4.53%	
26	1999 cst'd	2.50	1.70	16.85	0.320	14.50%	4.64%	
27	01-03 est'd	3.30	1.90	21.40	0.424	15.00%	6.36%	
28								
29	Value Line					Projected		
361	Proj'd Growth	9.00%	3.50%	6.00%		Growth (br):	6.36%	
31						<u> </u>	0.5070	
32	Zack's 5 yr.					ADD: External		
33	Proj'd Growth	4.48%				Growth (sv):	0.70%	
34						210 (31).	0.7070	
35	Average					Projected		
36	Proj'd Growth	6.74%	3.50%	6.00%		"br + sv" Gr.	7 0704	
	1 tojo vitoviii	<u> </u>	2,30 70	0.00 /0		or + sy or.	<u>7.07%</u>	

Note: Negative (b*r) growth is not included in retention growth averages.

SOURCE: The Value Line Investment Survey, C.A. Turner Utility Reports - June 1997 Zack's Analyst Watch

Schedule MB 15

Discounted Cash Flow Growth Parameters

Northwest Natural Gas Company

	Compound Growth					Retention Growth		
					Retention	Equity	Growth	
	Historic Data	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)	
1	1991	0.67	1.13	12.23	-0.687			
2	1992	0.74	1.15	12.41	-0.554			
3	1993	1.74	1.17	13.08	0.328	13.20%	4.32%	
4	1994	1.63	1.17	13.63	0.282	11.80%	3.33%	
5	1995	1.61	1.18	14.55	0.267	10.90%	2.91%	
6	1996	1.97	1.20	15.37	0.391	12.70%	4.96%	
7	1997	1.76	1.21	16.02	0.313	11.00%	3.44%	
8								
9	Cor	npound Gro	wth Rates			Ave. Internal		
10	91-95	24.51%	1.09%	4.44%		Growth (br):	3.79%	
11								
12	92-96	27.73%	1.07%	5.49%		ADD: External		
13						Growth (sv):	1.36%	
14	93-97	0.29%	0.84%	5.20%		-		
15	,					Historic		
16	Ave.Compound Gr.	0.29%	1.00%	<u>5.04%</u>		"br + sv" Gr.	5.15%	
17	•							
18	Value Line	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS				
19	Historic Gr.	7.75%	1.50%	4.25%				
20	(Avg of 5 and 10 yr. if bo	xh are available	e)					
21								
22	<u>P</u>	rojected Gr	<u>owth</u>					
23					Retention	Equity	Growth	
24	Projections	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS	Ratio (b)	Retum (r)	(b*r)	
25	1998 est'd	\$1.70	\$1.22	\$17.20	0.282	9.50%	2.68%	
26	1999 est'd	2.10	1.24	18.00	0.410	11.50%	4.71%	
2"	01-03 est'd	2.45	1.35	20.75	0.449	12.00%	5.39%	
28								
29	Value Line					Projected		
30	Proj'd Growth	5.50%	2.00%	5.00%		Growth (br):	5.39%	
31								
32	Zack's 5 yr.					ADD: External		
33	Proj'd Growth	5.01%				Growth (sv):	0.54%	
34							•••	
35	Average					Projected		
36	Proj'd Growth	<u>5.26%</u>	2.00%	5.00%		"br + sv" Gr.	<u>5.92%</u>	

Note: Negative (b*r) growth is not included in retention growth averages.

SOURCE: The Value Line Investment Survey, C.A. Turner Utility Reports - June 1997 Zack's Analyst Watch

Schedule MB 16

Discounted Cash Flow Growth Parameters

People's Energy Company

	Compound Growth				Retention Growth		
					Retention	Equity	Growth
	Historic Data	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(<u>b*r)</u>
1	1991	2.05	1.71	16.95	0.166		
2	1992	2.06	1.76	17.72	0.146		
3	1993	2.11	1.78	18.02	0.156	11.70%	1.83%
4	1994	2.13	1.80	18.39	0.155	11.60%	1.80%
5	1995	1.78	1.80	18.38	-0.011	9.70%	-0.11%
6	1996	2.96	1.82	19.49	0.385	15.20%	5.85%
7	1997	2.81	1.87	20.43	0.335	13.70%	4.58%
8	No.						
9	Cor	npound Gro	owth Rates			Ave. Internal	
10	91-95	-3.47%	1.29%	2.05%		Growth (br):	3.52%
11							
12	92-96	9.49%	0.84%	2.41%		ADD: External	
13						Growth (sv):	0.07%
14	93-97	7.43%	1.24%	3.19%			
15	•					Historic	
16	Ave.Compound Gr.	8.46%	1.12%	2.55%		<u>"br + sv" Gr.</u>	3.59%
17							
18	Value Line	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS			
19	Historic Gr.	3.00%	2.50%	3.00%			
20	(Avg of 5 and 10 yr af bo	th are availabl	e)				
21							
22	<u>P</u>	rojected Gi	owth				
23					Retention	Equity	Growth
24	Projections	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)
25	1998 est'd	\$2.30	\$1.91	\$20.85	0.170	11.00%	1.87%
26	1999 est'd	2.65	1.95	21.60	0.264	12.50%	3.30%
27	01-03 cst'd	3.30	2.08	25.10	0.370	13.00%	4.81%
28							
29	Value Line					Projected	
36	Proj'd Growth	4.50%	2.00%	4.50%		Growth (br):	4.81%
31						· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
32	Zack's 5 yr.					ADD: External	
33	Proj'd Growth	5.09%				Growth (sv):	0.64%
3.1							
35	Average					Projected	
36	Proj'd Growth	4.80%	<u>2.00%</u>	4,50%		"br + sv" Gr.	<u>5.44%</u>

Note: Negative (b*r) growth is not included in retention growth averages.

SOURCE: The Value Line Investment Survey, C.A. Turner Utility Reports - June 1997 Zack's Analyst Watch

Discounted Cash Flow Growth Parameters

Piedmont Natural Gas Company

						Retention Growth	<u>1</u>
					Retention	Equity	Growth
	Historic Data	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)
1	1991	0.89	0.87	9.65	0.022		
2	1992	1.40	0.91	10.27	0.350		
3	1993	1.45	0.95	10.90	0.345	13.20%	4.55%
4	1994	1.35	1.01	11.36	0.252	11.80%	2.97%
5	1995	1.45	1.09	12.31	0.248	11.40%	2.83%
6	1996	1.67	1.15	13.07	0.311	12.60%	3.92%
7	1997	1.85	1.21	13.90	0.346	13.10%	4.53%
8							
9	<u>Cor</u>	npound Gro	wth Rates			Ave. Internal	
10	91-95	12.98%	5.80%	6.28%		Growth (br):	3.76%
11							
12	92-96	4.51%	6.03%	6.21%		ADD: External	
13						Growth (sv):	1.71%
14	93-97	6.28%	6.23%	6.27%			
15	,					Historic	
16	Ave.Compound Gr.	<u>7.92%</u>	6.02%	<u>6.25%</u>		"br + sv" Gr.	5.47%
17							
18	Value Line	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS			
19	Historic Gr.	7.50%	6.00%	6.25%			
20	(Avg of 5 and 10 yr if bo	nh are availabl	e)				
21							
22	<u>P</u>	rojected Gr	owth				
23					Retention	Equity	Growth
24	Projections	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)
25	1998 est'd	\$1.95	\$1.28	\$14.65	0.344	13.50%	4.64%
26	1999 est'd	2.10	1.35	15.40	0.357	13.50%	4.82%
27	01-03 est'd	2.55	1.50	18.55	0.412	14.00%	5.76%
28							
29	Value Line					Projected	
30	Proj'd Growth	7.50%	4.50%	6.00%		Growth (br):	5.76%
31							
32	Zack's 5 yr.					ADD: External	
33	Proj'd Growth	7.33%				Growth (sv):	0.95%
34							
35	Average					Projected	
36	Proj'd Growth	7.42%	4.50%	6.00%		<u>"br + sv" Gr.</u>	6.72%
		<u></u>					

Note: Negative (b*r) growth is not included in retention growth averages.

SOURCE: The Value Line Investment Survey, C.A. Turner Utility Reports - June 1997 Zack's Analyst Watch

Schedule MB 18

Discounted Cash Flow Growth Parameters

Washington Gas Light Company

	Compound Growth				Retention Growth			
					Retention	Equity	Growth	
	Historie Data	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)	
1	1991	1.14	1.05	9.63	0.079			
2	1992	1.27	1.07	10.66	0.157			
3	1993	1.31	1.09	11.04	0.168	11.70%	1.96%	
4	1994	1.42	1.11	11.51	0.218	12.20%	2.66%	
5	1995	1.45	1.12	11.95	0.228	12.00%	2.73%	
6	1996	1.85	1.14	12.79	0.384	14.40%	5.53%	
7	1997	1.85	1.17	13.48	0.368	13.70%	5.04%	
8								
9			owth Rates			Ave. Internal		
10	'91-95	6.20%	1.63%	5.54%		Growth (br):	3.58%	
11								
12	92-96	9.86%	1.60%	4.66%		ADD: External		
13						Growth (sv):	0.68%	
14	'93-97	9.01%	1.79%	5.12%				
15	•					Historic		
16	Ave.Compound Gr.	<u>8.36%</u>	<u>1.67%</u>	<u>5.11%</u>		<u>"br + sv" Gr.</u>	4.27%	
1.								
18	Value Line	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS				
19	Historic Gr.	5.50%	2.50%	4.00%				
20	(Avg of 5 and 10 yr if bo	th are availabl	le)					
21								
22	<u>P</u>	rojected Gi	<u>rowth</u>					
23					Retention	Equity	Growth	
24	Projections	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS	Ratio (b)	Return (r)	(b*r)	
25	1998 est'd	\$1.65	\$1.20	\$13.95	0.273	12.00%	3.27%	
26	1999 est'd	2.00	1.23	14.90	0.385	13.50%	5.20%	
27	01-03 est'd	2.35	1.40	17.65	0.404	13.00%	5.26%	
28								
29	Value Line					Projected		
30	Proj'd Growth	5.50%	3.00%	5.50%		Growth (br):	5.26%	
31								
32	Zack's 5 yr.					ADD: External		
33	Proj'd Growth	4.99%				Growth (sv):	0.07%	
34							3.01.74	
35	Average		•			Projected		
36	Proj'd Growth	5.25%	<u>3.00%</u>	<u>5.50%</u>		"br + sv" Gr.	<u>5.32%</u>	

Note: Negative (b*r) growth is not included in retention growth averages.

SOURCE:

The Value Line investment Survey, C.A. Turner Utility Reports - June 1997

BURDETTE - DIRECT
GR-98-374 Laclede Gas Company

Historical Stock Prices and Calculation of Expected Dividend Yield

	Fri	Fri	Fri	Fri	Fri	Fri	
Laclede Gas Company	7/2/98	7/10/98	<u>7/17/98</u>	<u>7/24/98</u>	<u>7/31/98</u>	8/7/98	Average
Close	\$ 24.875	\$ 24.5 00	\$ 24.625	\$ 23.563	\$ 23.313	\$ 23.000	\$ 23.800
					_•.		
	Fri	Thu	Fri	Fri	Fri	Fri	
	<u>7/2/98</u>	<u>7/10/98</u>	<u>7/17/98</u>	7/24/98	<u>7/31/98</u>	8/7/98	<u>Average</u>
AGL Resources Inc.	\$20.3125	\$19.7500	\$19.6875	\$18.9375	\$18.8125	\$19,0000	\$19.2375
Bay State Gas Company	\$ 38.2500	\$ 38.1875	\$38.8750	\$38.5625	\$38.6250	\$38.9375	\$38.6375
Connecticut Energy Corp	\$27.6875	\$28.8750	\$29.1250	\$29.0000	\$25.6250	\$25.5625	\$27.6375
CTG Resources, Inc.	\$23.7500	\$23.5000	\$23.2500	\$23.3750	\$23.1875	\$23.3750	\$23.3375
Indiana Energy	\$ 30.2500	\$ 29.2500	\$29.5000	\$29.9375	\$27.5000	\$28.8125	\$29.0000
New Jersey Resources	\$ 35.9375	\$ 34.1875	\$ 34.1875	\$ 34.2500	\$34.2500	\$34.0000	\$ 34.1750
Northwest Natural Gas	\$ 27.6250	\$ 26.8750	\$ 26.7500	\$26.6562	\$26.2500	\$26.8750	\$26.6812
People's Energy Corp.	\$ 37.6875	\$ 35.8750	\$ 36,0000	\$ 35.0625	\$35.0000	\$35.7500	\$35.5375
Piedmont Natural Gas Co.	\$ 34.0000	\$ 32.6875	\$ 32.1875	\$29.8750	\$29.1250	\$ 30.2500	\$ 30.8250
shington Gas Light Company	\$ 27.3750	\$ 25.0000	\$25.8125	\$ 24.5625	\$23.7500	\$ 24.8750	\$24.8000

Current and Expected Dividends and Dividend Yields

Laclede Gas Company	Average Stock Price \$ 23.800		1999 Expected Dividend \$ 1.35		Expected Dividend Yield 5.67%	
AGL Resources Inc.	\$	19.238	\$	1.08	5.61%	
Bay State Gas Company	\$	38.638	\$	1.68	4.35%	
Connecticut Energy Corp.	\$	27.638	\$	1.40	5.07%	
CTG Resources, Inc.	\$	23.338	\$	1.00	4.28%	
Indiana Energy	\$	29.000	\$	1.24	4.28%	
New Jersey Resources	\$	34.175	\$	1.70	4.97%	
Northwest Natural Gas	\$	26.681	\$	1.24	4.65%	
People's Energy Corp.	\$	35.538	\$	1.95	5.49%	
Piedmont Natural Gas Co.	\$	30.825	\$	1.35	4.38%	
shington Gas Light Company	\$	24.800	\$	1.23	4.96%	
Average	\$	28.987	\$	1.387	4.80%	

Source: Value Line Investment Survey; Wall Street Journal.

BURDETTE - DIRECT
GR-98-374 Laclede Gas Company

DCF Cost of Common Equity Calculations for Laclede and Comparison Group

	Dividend	Growth		Cost o	f Equity
•	<u>Yield</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
Laclede Gas Company	5.67%	1.22%	7.92%	6.89%	13.59%
(using Laclede's Overall Average Growth)	5.67%	3.7	76%	9.4	13%
Recommended growth rate range	5.67%	4.00%	5.00%	9.67%	10.67%
	Dividend	Gro	wth	Cost of	f Equity
Comparison Group	Yield	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	Low	<u>High</u>
AGL Resources Inc.	5.61%	0.72%	5.80%	6.33%	11.41%
Bay State Gas Company	4.35%	2.89%	7.67%	7.23%	12.01%
Connecticut Energy Corp.	5.07%	0.98%	5.67%	6.04%	10.73%
CTG Resources, Inc.	4.28%	0.75%	6.84%	5.03%	11.12%
Indiana Energy, Inc.	4.28%	3.50%	10.10%	7.78%	14.37%
New Jersey Resources	4.97%	0.70%	9.50%	5.68%	14.47%
Northwest Natural Gas	4.65%	0.29%	7.75%	4.93%	12.40%
Piedmont Natural Gas Co.	5.49%	1.12%	8.46%	6.61%	13.94%
Providence Energy Corp.	4.38%	4.50%	7.92%	8.88%	12.30%
Washington Gas Light Company	4.96%	1.67%	8.36%	<u>6.63%</u>	<u>13.32%</u>
Average	4.80%	1.71%	7.81%	6.52%	12.61%
Overall average for comparison group:					6%

Source: Schedules MB-8, MB-20

Capital Assest Pricing Model Cost of Common Equity (Ke)

Formula: Ke = Rf + beta(Rm - Rf)

Risk Free Rate (Rf) = 6.00% Market Premium (Rm - Rf) = 7.30%

		CAPM
	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Ke</u>
Laclede Gas Company	0.55	10.02%
AGL Resources Inc.	0.70	11.11%
Bay State Gas Company	0.50	9.65%
Connecticut Energy Corp.	0.65	10.75%
CTG Resources, Inc.	0.55	10.02%
Indiana Energy, Inc.	0.70	11.11%
New Jersey Resources	0.60	10.38%
Northwest Natural Gas	0.65	10.75%
Piedmont Natural Gas Co.	0.85	12.21%
Providence Energy Corp.	0.60	10.38%
Washington Gas Light Company	<u>0.75</u>	<u>11.48%</u>
Average	0.66	10.78%

Risk Free Rate as Reported by Value Line Selection and Opinion (7/30/98)

		13-week
<u>Security</u>	7/30/98	<u>range</u>
30-year Treasury Bond yield	5.70%	5.6-6.0%

Source: Value Line Investment Survey: Ibbotson and Associates

Laclede Gas Company Weighted Average Cost of Capital

				Weighted
	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent</u>	Cost Rate	<u>Cost</u>
Common Stock Equity	\$265,414,384	52.66%	10.20%	5.37%
Preferred Stock	\$1,960,000	0.39%	4.96%	0.02%
Long Term Debt	\$178,278,724	35.37%	7.77%	2.75%
Short Term Debt	\$58,385,011	11.58%	5.70%	0.66%
-	\$504,038,119	100.00%	-	8.80%

Weighted Average Cost of Capital: 8.80%

Pre-Tax Interest Coverage

		Pre-tax	
	Weighted	Weighted	Tax
	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Cost</u>	Factor:
Common Stock Equity	5.37%	8.75%	1.6296
Preferred Stock	0.02%	0.03%	
Long Term Debt	2.75%	2.75%	
Short Term Debt_	0.66%	0.66%	
Total	8.80%	12.19%	

Pre-tax weighted cost: 12.19% Cost of Debt: 3.41%

Pre-Tax Interest Coverage (Long term and Short term debt): 3.58 times
Pre-Tax Interest Coverage (Long term debt only): 4.43

Pre-Tax Interest Coverage calculated as follows: After-tax costs of common equity and preferred stock were grossed up by the tax rate to arrive at pre-tax weighted costs. Total pre-tax weighted cost of capital was then divided by cost of long and short term debt to calculate number of times total pre-tax return covered debt expense.

Source: Schedules MB-2, MB-4-6, MB-21.