Exhibit No.:

Issue: Witness:

Type of Exhibit: Sponsoring Party: Case No.:

Response to Conditions Gerald T. McNeive, Jr. Surrebuttal Testimony Laclede Gas Company

GM-2001-342

7 2001 JUN

LACLEDE GAS COMPANY

Missouri Public Service Commission

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

GERALD T. MCNEIVE, JR.

June 2001

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of the Application of Laclede Gas Company for an Order Authorizing Its Plan to Restructure Itself Into a Holding Company, Regulated Utility Company, and Unregulated Subsidiaries.)	Case No. GM-2001-342	
AFFI	DAVI	<u>T</u>	

STATE OF MISSOURI)
CITY OF ST. LOUIS)

Gerald T. McNeive, Jr., of lawful age, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:

- 1. My name is Gerald T. McNeive, Jr. My business address is 720 Olive Street, St. Louis, Missouri 63101; and I am Senior Vice President Finance & General Counsel of Laclede Gas Company.
- 2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my surrebuttal testimony, consisting of pages 1 to 32, inclusive.
- 3. I hereby swear and affirm that my answers contained in the attached testimony to the questions therein propounded are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Gerald T. McNeive, Jr.

Patricia P. Licks

Subscribed and sworn to before me this $2^{\frac{7}{4}}$ day of June, 2001.

PATRICIA P. HICKS
Notary Public — Notary Seal
STATE OF MISSOURI
City of St. Louis
My Commission Expires: June 27, 2002

1 2		SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF GERALD T. MCNEIVE, JR.
3	Q.	What is your name and address?
4	A.	My name is Gerald T. McNeive, Jr. and my business address is 720 Olive Street,
5		St. Louis, Missouri 63101.
6	Q.	Are you the same Gerald T. McNeive, Jr. who previously caused prepared direct
7		testimony to be filed in this proceeding?
8	A.	Yes, I am.
9		PURPOSE OF SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY
10	Q.	What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony?
11	A.	The purpose of my surrebuttal testimony is to summarize where we are in seeking
12		to resolve the outstanding issues regarding condition and restriction proposals by
13		the Commission Staff ("Staff") and the Office of the Public Counsel ("OPC").
14	Q.	Please summarize where you believe the case rests currently.
15	A.	The Staff and the OPC between them have produced approximately nineteen
16		conditions or restrictions which they are urging must be approved by the
17		Commission, otherwise the restructuring may be detrimental to the public and
18		should not be approved. The Company has essentially agreed to the substance of
19		eight of the conditions, offered a reasonable solution for two more, and objected
20		strenuously to the remaining one regarding the limitation on business. The
21		Company is agreeable in principle to one of the eight other restrictions, is seeking
22		to resolve some remaining differences on the cost allocation manual, but frankly,
23		believes the remainder of the Staff and OPC restrictions are extremely speculative
24		in nature, premature and otherwise lacking in reason and supporting evidence.

1 Q. Please continue.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Also, I address a number of points raised in the rebuttal testimony submitted in A. this case by Ronald L. Bible and Stephen M. Rackers on behalf of the Staff and by Mark Burdette, Ryan Kind and Russell W. Trippensee on behalf of the OPC. My testimony will focus primarily on the various conditions and/or restrictions that these witnesses have recommended be adopted by the Commission in connection with any approval of the Company's proposed corporate restructuring ("Proposed Restructuring). Specifically, I will advise the Commission of those conditions recommended by Staff and OPC that the Company believes are reasonable and are willing to accept without substantive modification. I will also address certain other conditions that the Company would be willing to accept with certain reasonable modifications that Laclede believes are necessary and appropriate. Finally, I will discuss the solutions for two remaining conditions and the Company's absolute opposition to one particular condition and other restrictions that have been proposed by these parties and explain why such remaining conditions and restrictions are not warranted, feasible, rely on speculation, are premature or are otherwise unreasonable, or, in at least one case not legally permissible given existing statutory limitations on the Commission's jurisdiction over non-utility activities. Additionally, for the Commission's convenience, I have included as Schedule 1 to my surrebuttal testimony, a listing of the various eleven financial conditions, as well as a non-financial condition denominated Staff Condition No. 12 (generally regarding merger with or acquisition by other holding companies, which is addressed in the "Other

- 1 Restrictions" portion of this testimony), that have been proposed by these parties, 2 together with a brief summary of the Company's response or position on each one. 3 The remaining eight or so "other restrictions" are addressed in testimony. 4 Q. Is surrebuttal testimony also being submitted by another Company witness? 5 A. Yes, Patricia A. Krieger. 6 **GENERAL COMMENTS** 7 Q. Before addressing the specific conditions and restrictions that have been proposed 8 by Staff and OPC, do you have any general comments regarding their rebuttal 9 testimony. 10 A. Yes. Throughout various portions of their testimony, the witnesses for both Staff 11 and OPC have raised the specter that customers may be detrimentally affected by 12 the Proposed Restructuring. They suggest that such a result is *possible* because 13 the Proposed Restructuring will enable the Laclede Group, Inc. and its various 14 companies to engage in certain activities beyond the Commission's jurisdiction 15 that potentially could result in unacceptable risks or costs being imposed on 16 Laclede Gas Company's utility customers. Apparently, most of the conditions 17 proposed by Staff and OPC are motivated by a perceived need to address these 18 perceived concerns. 19 Are the concerns raised by Staff and OPC justified? Q. 20 While Staff and OPC have raised a number of legitimate issues that should and A. 21 will be addressed by the Company, they have also proposed several measures that
 - Proposed Restructuring will not have a detrimental impact on Laclede's utility

go far beyond anything that it is required or appropriate to ensure that the

22

23

customers. I think it is important for the Commission to recognize that the various examples of potentially detrimental activity given by Staff and OPC in support of many of their recommendations all involve utilities other than Laclede. Moreover, most of these activities have little to do with, and certainly cannot be attributed to, the specific changes in corporate structure that Laclede has proposed in its Application. To the contrary, virtually every activity cited by these witnesses could have occurred, and in many cases did occur, in the absence of a holding company structure. Under such circumstances, there is simply no basis for suggesting that there is some inherent, absolute risk for utility ratepayers in the modest changes that Laclede has proposed to make to its corporate structure. In fact, just the opposite is true.

12 Q. Please explain.

Α.

As pointed out in Laclede's Application and in the Company's direct testimony in this case, Laclede Gas Company currently conducts and, for many decades has conducted, unregulated activities through various unregulated subsidiaries which are wholly owned by the Company. In the past, these activities have included, among others, marketing insurance products, selling gas to larger customers on a deregulated basis, installing swimming pools, investing in real estate, savings and loan investment, participating in the exploration and production of natural gas, producing television commercials and manufacturing personalized statuary. Throughout this period, these activities have, by and large, been conducted without any regulatory oversight or supervision of any kind by the Commission other than that required in the normal ratemaking process to ensure that the risks

and costs of these activities are not borne by the Company's utility customers.

Like other Missouri utilities with subsidiaries involved in unregulated activities,

Laclede was not required to seek approval from the Commission to engage in
these activities, as Staff and OPC have proposed it be required to do in the future
as a condition for approving the Proposed Restructuring. Nor was Laclede
required to guarantee that these subsidiaries would maintain a certain capital
structure or to guarantee its own credit ratings as Staff and OPC would have the
Company do as part of their proposed conditions. Moreover, the Company was
not required to maintain a Cost Allocation Manual, provide explicit guarantees
that it would hold its ratepayers harmless from these activities, or make explicit
provisions for access to information concerning its subsidiaries in order for them

- Q. Has any evidence been presented in the rebuttal testimony of either Staff or OPC that would indicate that the Company's utility customers have been detrimentally affected by the Company's historical involvement in these unregulated activities?
- 16 A. No. Despite the historical absence of any of the conditions or restrictions
 17 proposed by Staff and OPC in this case, there has been absolutely no evidence
 18 introduced by these parties that would indicate that the Company's unregulated
 19 activities have harmed its utility customers.
- 20 Q. Why is this significant in your view?

to engage in such activities.

A. I believe it is significant for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that Laclede
and its subsidiaries have a long track record of being able to engage in
unregulated activities in a manner that does not put its regulated customers at risk

or expose them to the type of concerns raised by Staff and OPC in their rebuttal testimony. In the final analysis, it is this kind of long-standing record of responsible stewardship of a company's financial resources that provides the Commission with one of the best assurances it can possibly have that a particular utility, such as Laclede, will not engage in activity that could lead to the potential results cited by Staff and OPC. Second, the absence of any demonstrated harm to ratepayers from the Company's prior involvement in unregulated activities strongly suggests that existing statutory and regulatory protections already in place provide sufficient protection in this regard.

A.

Α.

- But isn't Mr. Bible correct when he claims at page 2 of his rebuttal testimony that Laclede's Proposed Restructuring, as set forth in the Company's Application, will have a detrimental impact on Laclede's customers, in that, absent the insulating conditions, business and financial risk of the unregulated operations will be transferred to Laclede Gas Company.
- No. The actual approval of the Proposed Restructuring by the Commission transfers no risk, either business or financial, to the regulated utility. As I just discussed, Laclede currently owns and operates, directly or indirectly, six (6) subsidiaries that engage in a variety of businesses. If the Application is approved, Laclede intends to "dividend" those subsidiaries up to the holding company and away from the regulated gas company. Thus, contrary to Mr. Bible's view, if the Application is approved, the only business and financial risk in existence today as a result of the Company's unregulated activities will be shifted *away* from the ownership of the regulated utility to that of the unregulated holding company. As

a result, the Proposed Restructuring will provide more, rather than less, legal and operational protection for the Company's regulated operations by better ensuring that the business risk of the unregulated operations of the Laclede Group, Inc. and its subsidiaries will not be transferred to Laclede Gas Company's utility operations. The separation that provides for this reduction in risk is a positive benefit to the Company's ratepayers, a fact that has been completely overlooked by both Staff and OPC.

A.

- Q. Will other business and financial risks eventually increase due to the approval of the Proposed Restructuring?
 - There is certainly no basis for making such an assumption now, and perhaps there never will be. Mr. Bible's testimony suggests that absent the imposition of his proposed financial conditions contemporaneous with a restructuring approval, there will be an immediate, detrimental impact on Laclede's customers because there is automatically a transfer of such risks to the regulated utility. However, as I previously discussed, it is not the restructuring approval that creates and transfers risk. Rather it is the subsequent activities of the Laclede Group and/or its subsidiaries that may, in the future, create other business and financial risk, which risks will be owned in the first instance by the particular subsidiary, and secondarily by the subsidiaries' parent, the Laclede Group. There is no particular reason to believe, however, that these activities will be any riskier than those unregulated activities the Company has previously engage in or, for that matter, create any more risk than the Company already faces in its regulated distribution business.

Q. Why do you say that?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

A.

While Mr. Burdette states at page 3 of his rebuttal testimony that the Proposed Restructuring creates a "potential detriment" because the unregulated parent company would be free to participate in risky, unregulated operations, he goes on to note that this will occur only to the extent that any new ventures are more risky than the gas distribution business. However, as Mr. Burdette's statement implies, there may indeed be new ventures less risky than Laclede's distribution business. Certainly, the risks faced by Laclede on the distribution side of its regulated business have increased in recent years, as evidence by the generally reduced income levels that have been earned by the Company's over that period, even with its incentive plan earnings added in. When combined with the additional risks that the Company has faced in connection with recovering the gas supply and other costs it incurs to provide regulated services, it is certainly not difficult to conceive of scenarios where other lines of business would be no more risky, and perhaps less risky, than the Company's regulated business operations. Following Mr. Burdette's observations, a successful new venture, particularly one with risk characteristics equivalent to what the regulated distribution business has proven to be during the past decade, could likely contribute to an overall strengthening of Laclede's financial position. While Mr. Burdette seems to imply that approving the restructuring application without conditions would be "potentially" "...adding a second bullet while playing Russian roulette...." He has left us to wonder as to the identity of the "potential" first bullet in the gun.

1 Q. Doesn't a holding company structure with "potentially" riskier ventures add a
2 new type of risk and therefore require new risk solutions, such as the

3 "conditions"?

A.

- A. Not necessarily. As I previously discussed, the type of business and financial risks that Messrs. Bible and Burdette describe are not new. Regulated utility companies in Missouri, such as Laclede, have long been permitted by law to conduct unregulated businesses, not subject to Commission regulation, so long as their operations are substantially kept separate from the utility business (Section 393.140(12) RSMo). Thus, these types of risk have been with us for some time in one degree or another, and the legal framework that permits them to cohabit side by side with a regulated utility also contains the means to protect the regulated utility's customers from such risks.
- Q. Do you mean that the existing Public Service Commission law already provides "conditions" to protect the regulated utility and its customers?
 - In very fundamental ways, yes. The Public Service Commission law authorizes the Commission and its agent to ask questions of regulated utilities and inquire as to its business practices. The same section that recognizes the legitimacy of unregulated businesses being owned and operated by a regulated utility, also recognizes the power of the Commission to inquire into and apportion the capital, earnings, debts and expenses fairly and justly between the regulated and the unregulated. The Commission has long recognized the need to examine intercompany and affiliated transaction and protect the regulated entity from inappropriate cost shifting. The courts have approved the Commission's use of

hypothetical capital structures to protect the interests of utility customers where the facts required. The Missouri Supreme Court has judicially approved the Commission's action in halting reductions in the unearned surplus account of a regulated company by distribution to its shareholders where facts warranted. Moreover, Missouri statute does not permit a regulated utility to guarantee debts for either itself or for an affiliate company that are payable at periods of more than twelve months after the date thereof. If the existing legal framework is adequate to protect the regulated entity and its customers, why is Laclede willing to accept in one form or another the overwhelming majority of the conditions proposed by Staff and OPC? From the very beginning of this process, the Company has indicated that the Proposed Restructuring is in no way designed to detract from the Commission's existing powers to protect ratepayers from any costs or risks associated with the Company's unregulated activities. As a result, the Company has no objection to any condition which is reasonably designed to accomplish that goal as part of the existing legal framework of protections or as a reasonable clarification or extension thereof. On the other hand, the Company does not believe that it can or should be required to accept conditions or restrictions that would expand the Commission's powers over unregulated activities well beyond the bounds of what is currently permitted by Missouri law, nor can it agree to conditions that would require the Company to satisfy requirements that may be impossible to meet for

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Q.

A.

reasons beyond the Company's control. These criteria, and these criteria alone,

1 have governed the Company position regarding the acceptance, modification or 2 rejection of the conditions and restrictions proposed by Staff and OPC. 3 RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDED CONDITIONS Q. Would you briefly describe the kind of conditions and restrictions that Staff and 4 5 OPC have proposed in their rebuttal testimony? Although the corporate restructuring proposed by the Company does not involve 6 A. 7 any acquisition or transfer of utility assets and will not result in any change in the 8 terms and conditions of utility service provided by Laclede, Staff and OPC have 9 nevertheless proposed a broad array of conditions and restrictions. Indeed, in 10 many respects, the conditions and restrictions proposed by these parties are far 11 more elaborate and, in some cases, far more burdensome than those they have 12 recommended in cases where there actually was a change in utility ownership or a 13 material alteration in existing utility operations. 14 What matters do these conditions seek to address? Q. In general, these conditions relate to so-called "insulating" requirements that are 15 A. 16 presumably designed to insulate the regulated utility from the business and financial risk of the unregulated subsidiaries of the holding company. 17 18 Which of the conditions proposed by Staff and OPC are acceptable to Laclede? Q. 19 With the exception of Staff and OPC Condition No. 1, which we believe should A. 20 be rejected by the Commission and Condition Nos. 7 and 8, which the 21 Commission has power during rate cases to deal with, the Company is willing to 22 accept the other conditions with some modifications. Laclede has advised the

Staff and the OPC that it has accepted Condition Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 10 without

23

substantive modification. The few slight modifications made were to make the conditions consistent with applicable Missouri statute (Condition Nos. 2 and 3); to accurately describe the manner of certain calculations (Condition No. 5); to clarify consistent with discussions with Staff and OPC (Condition No. 6); and to make consistent with normal business practice and reservation of rights (Condition No. 10). Schedule No. 1 reflects Staff and OPC's Condition Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 10 side by side with those proposed by Laclede.

8 Q. What about the remaining six proposed conditions?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

A.

Staff and OPC Condition No. 4 seeks the Laclede Group Inc.'s agreement to maintain its common equity at no less than thirty percent of total consolidated capitalization and for Laclede Gas Company to maintain its common equity at no less than thirty-five percent. The Company has advised the Staff and OPC that it is its intention not to have equity percentages that fall below the respective thirty and thirty-five percent limits they propose for establishment. However, the results of unintended or involuntary events, or combination of such events could possibly cause those limits to be breached contrary to the intentions of the Company. For example, a large regulatory disallowance, a catastrophic explosion, a significant loss of sales, or some other unintended and unanticipated event or combination of events could cause the breach of those limits and place the Company in default of the proposed condition. For that reason, the Company has proposed to substitute the term "intention" for the term "agrees." Both Condition No. 4 and Condition No. 7, regarding maintenance of credit ratings, are examples of requirements that are inherently unreasonable because they seek to

impose obligations on the Company that it may not be able to satisfy for reasons that are entirely beyond its control. As I indicated earlier, the Company cannot provide a blanket guarantee that such ratios and ratings will be maintained under any and all circumstances since the conditions which permit such maintenance, ranging from the impact of regulatory actions on the Company's finances to the financial impact of changes in market or operational conditions affecting its regulated business, are partially or fully beyond its control. The Company can, however, state that it fully intends to maintain equity ratios and credit ratings at or above the levels described in Condition Nos. 4 and 7. Moreover, the Company can also make a commitment to the Commission that it will not voluntarily or intentionally take any action that would cause its equity ratios or credit ratings to fall below these levels. These commitments, which are, in fact, within the Company's ability to keep, have been reflected in its proposed modifications to Condition Nos. 4 and 7. After discussion with the Staff and OPC, the Company also expanded the description of short-term debt contained in the originally proposed condition in recognition of the nature and extent of the Company's short term debt requirements. Schedule No. 1 also contains Staff and OPC's proposed condition No. 4, the Company's above described modifications side by side for comparison. What about Staff and OPC proposed Condition Nos. 7, 8, and 9? Condition No. 7, concerning the maintenance of Laclede Gas Company's debt, and any preferred stock, rating at investment grade, discussed above, is certainly consistent with the Company's past and present intention. All of its current debt

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Q.

A.

ratings with Standard and Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch are above investment grade and have been for some time. Nevertheless, the Company is unable to control the outcome of such ratings as they can be influenced by the results of operations, regulatory decisions and other events which are unintended by the Company. For example, in 1997, Fitch downgraded the Company's First Mortgage Bonds from AA- to A+ because the Company's financial protection measures equated to levels more consistent with the lower rating. The Company wanted to maintain the AA- rating with Fitch but was unable to do so. There was no holding company possibility in the offing at the time of the downgrade. Fitch was simply not impressed with the Company's financial results despite the fact that the immediately two preceding winters were somewhat colder than normal. Lower rated debt is usually more expensive than higher rated debt and this eventually may impact the gas company's cost of capital to some degree. Downgrades of utility debt can occur and normally the resultant change of cost is recognized in the regulated utility's capital cost. However, the Commission's broad ratemaking power permits it to reject unreasonable costs. Therefore, if the gas company were to suffer a downgrade in its debt rating and that event under the circumstances would otherwise result in an unreasonable increased cost to gas customers, the Commission's powers are such it could reject, based on the facts, an unreasonable increase in cost. The point here is that the Commission should permit the Company to continue in its intention to maintain an investment grade rating; and deal with any unreasonable cost incurrence in the subsequent rate case. Between rate cases, any increase or decrease in costs will not be reflected in

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

- 1 existing rates, thus the customer is protected in the interim and the Commission
- 2 can exercise any necessary oversight prior to the recognition of that cost in rates.
- 3 Q. Is ratemaking oversight the ultimate protection against the cost increased concerns
- 4 expressed in Staff and OPC Condition Nos. 8 and 9?
- 5 A. Yes. Mr. Burdette recognizes at page 9 of his rebuttal testimony that proposed
- 6 Condition Nos. 7, 8 and 9 (the latter two concern additional cost guarantees for
- 7 ratepayers) "...are intended to protect ratepayers from increased costs (general
- 8 revenue requirement and cost of capital) due to the reorganization." As expressed
- 9 above, the Commission's ratemaking power is well suited to providing such
- protection as necessary. The Commission recognized that very solution in its
- recent decision approving the merger of Utilicorp United, Inc. and St. Joseph
- Light and Power Company, Case No. EM-2000-292 finding that "... if the
- 13 Company's cost of debt is unreasonable, appropriate adjustments can be made to
- protect the ratepayers." (Report and Order dated December 14, 2000, page 11 of
- 15 44, Case No. EM-2000-292.)
- Schedule No. 1 reflects proposed Staff and OPC Condition Nos. 7, 8 and 9 side by
- side with Laclede's proposed solution, all as discussed above.
- 18 Q. Please describe the Company's response to the remaining two Staff and OPC
- 19 proposed financial conditions.
- A. Staff and OPC Condition No. 11 deals generally with obtaining information to
- verify compliance with the prior ten proposed conditions. The Company believes
- that its response is consistent with Condition No. 11 and includes some

appropriate reservation of rights language. Schedule No. 1 reflects the Staff and OPC proposed Condition No. 11 and Laclede's response.

Q.

A.

No. Staff and OPC proposed Condition No. 1, a condition intended to limit the business activities to be conducted in the future by the Laclede Group, Inc., the unregulated holding company, and its unregulated subsidiaries. As stated at the outset, the Company is strongly opposed to the application of this proposed limitation for a number of valid reasons.

Does that conclude your discussion of the eleven proposed financial conditions?

First of all, as referenced earlier, the Public Service Commission law clearly provides that the Commission's consent or authorization to <u>any act</u> in such other business shall not be required. Section 393.140(12) provides as follows:

In case any electrical corporation, gas corporation, water corporation or sewer corporation engaged in carrying on any other business than owning, operating or managing a gas plant, electric plant, water system, or sewer system which other business is not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the commission, and is so conducted that its operations are to be substantially kept separate and apart from the owning, operating, managing or controlling of such gas plant, electric plant, water system or sewer system, said corporation in respect to such other business shall not be subject to any of the provisions of this chapter and shall not be required to procure the consent or authorization of the commission to any act in such other business or to make any report in respect thereof. But this subdivision shall not restrict or limit the powers of the commission in

respect to the owning, operating, managing or controlling by such corporation of such gas plant, electric plant, water system or sewer system, and said powers shall include also the right to inquire as to, and prescribe the apportionment of, capitalization, earnings, debts and expenses fairly and justly to be awarded to or borne by the ownership, operation, management or control of such gas plant, electric plant, water system or sewer system as distinguished from such other business. (emphasis supplied)

It logically follows that the Commission has no power to dictate which unregulated businesses in which the holding company and its unregulated subsidiaries may engage.

Q. Are there other negative legal implications associated with Staff and OPC proposed Condition No. 1?

Α.

Yes. Laclede has a right to engage in legitimate business enterprises. A right specifically recognized by Section 393.140(12) RSMo. While the law recognizes generally a right to classify for regulatory purposes based on actual differences in the subject matter, in this case neither Staff nor OPC have articulated any reasonable basis for suggesting the Commission should limit Laclede's right to engage in any legitimate business. Nor have they provided any reasonable factual basis which would support discriminating between Laclede's right to engage in businesses of its choice versus the similar rights of any other utilities which the Commission regulates. Many of those other utilities engage in a wide variety of unregulated businesses through subsidiary companies without the Commission's

guidance or approval as shown by Schedule No. 2. Ameren, Atmos Energy Corporation, Kansas City Power & Light, Southern Union and Utilicorp United, Inc. are energy utilities that currently engage in such business. The Staff and OPC's proposed Condition No. 1, if approved by the Commission, would arbitrarily and capriciously deny Laclede those same legitimate opportunities. place it at a competitive disadvantage, and could result in substantial harm to Laclede and its affiliates. There has been no rational relationship established by Staff or OPC that articulates the need to broaden the Commission's policy and the Commission's legitimate objectives or to act contrary to the plain language of Section 393.140(12). Aside from the legal concerns expressed above, why isn't the "energy business" and the business activities derived from changes in the natural gas business a sufficient area within to seek new, unregulated business opportunities? First of all, there may prove to be opportunities in the "energy business" and other business activities emerging from changes in the natural gas business. Laclede is not rejecting investigating reasonable business opportunities here. However, the "energy business" has certainly proven to be extremely volatile for both electric and gas entities in the past year and is likely to continue to be volatile going forward. If you are seeking to avoid risks associated with a new enterprise, one would certainly be particularly cautious in considering possible businesses experiencing significant volatility. In addition, limiting the holding company's future to business possibilities in the "energy business" and change-driven gas

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Q.

A.

1		developments alone is simply an unreasonably narrow focus if seeking
2		unregulated opportunities is an objective.
3	Q.	The Staff's proposed Condition No. 1 also permits the Company to expand its
4		existing unregulated, subsidiary operations to those considered incidental to
5		current operations, does it not?
6	A.	Yes, however, that very limited expansion, namely to only those activities
7		considered "incidental" to current operations, dramatically underscores the
8		apparent inconsistency inherent in Staff's proposal. If the Company has
9		experience in a current subsidiary business, that would seem to be the very place
10		the Staff would encourage growth and expansion given its apparent view that the
11		holding company's knowledge and experience lie there. Yet, to the contrary, the
12		Staff's proposal is to strictly limit that possibility to "incidental" activities only. It
13		is worth noting that Mr. Burdette's version of proposed Condition No. 1 omits the
14		"incidental" limitation, the only obvious difference of any kind between the Staff
15		and OPC" in their package of financial conditions.
16	Q.	What reasons do the Staff and OPC offer in support of proposed Condition No. 1?
17	A.	Staff witness Bible offers no explanation in his testimony as to why proposed
18		Condition No. 1 is appropriate. OPC witness Burdette offers the following two
19		sentences:
20		"This condition limits the extent to which the companies can get involved
21		in unregulated ventures outside the area of expertise or experience,
22		without obtaining Commission approval. This limitation will help contain
23		business risk." (Surrebuttal testimony, page 7).

1 Mr. Burdette seems unaware that expertise and experience can be acquired, or 2 otherwise obtained, either individually or within an existing organization. 3 Q. Are there any other considerations why the limited "business" condition proposed by Staff and OPC is inappropriate? 4 5 Certainly. Another extremely important consideration is that the condition, as A. 6 proposed by Staff and OPC, requires the Commission to provide any waiver from 7 this limitation. With all due respect, how is the Commission to reasonably 8 execute that responsibility? What criteria should it apply? The law clearly states 9 that the provisions of Chapter 393 which, describes the Commission powers, 10 should not apply. Obviously, proposed Condition No. 1 is the first step down a 11 very slippery, regulated or unregulated slope and the Commission should avoid 12 going there. The Commission, in the previously cited Utilicorp United, Inc. and 13 St. Joseph Power and Light merger decision, was presented with a somewhat 14 similar proposal by the Staff wherein it sought to have the Commission attempt to 15 limit UtiliCorp's right to lobby the legislature to enact legislation regarding 16 stranded costs. The Commission wisely refused to impose that Staff proposed 17 condition, stating "Staff does not indicate where the Commission would find the 18 authority...." That thought applies equally here. 19 Another relevant reason is that the "business" condition was apparently designed 20 by the Staff and OPC, entities without any obvious "expertise or experience" in 21 that area. That fact alone should, under Mr. Burdette's own criteria, eliminate this 22 condition from further consideration.

1 Q. If KCP&L accepted all of the Staff and OPC's proposed conditions, and those are 2 exactly the same financial conditions proposed here, including proposed Condition No. 1, doesn't that prove that the conditions are lawful and reasonable? 3 4 A. Not at all. All that it proves is that for whatever reason, a reason perhaps known 5 only to KCP&L, that company chose to accept these conditions. One can 6 speculate that within the overall settlement in the KCP&L case there was other 7 some "consideration" not obvious to the uninitiated that made the acceptance of 8 these conditions worthwhile to KCP&L. What is certain however, is that a series 9 of conditions apparently fashioned from rigorous negotiation with KCP&L is now 10 being offered as the appropriate conditions for a very different size and type of 11 utility. We should not be surprised to find that one set of conditions does not fit, 12 or is not acceptable, to all companies. Do the reports as to the apparent problems in California and elsewhere, conveyed 13 Q. by Messrs. Bible and Burdette in their surrebuttal testimony, nevertheless require 14 the Commission to accept all of the Staff and OPC proposed conditions and other 15 16 restrictions without any modifications? 17 A. Not at all. Mr. Burdette's testimony describing examples of so-called financial 18 abuse by Pacific Gas and Electric Corporation and Southern California Edison 19 respectively in California, seems to rely on memos prepared by an organization 20 identified as the "Utility Reform Network ('Turn')." The correctness and accuracy of any reports on the California situation need to be appraised in the cold 21 22 light of day with balanced information from all quarters, not just from a utility

reform network. For example, the Turn memos suggest cash outflow from the

23

utilities to the parents, yet the cited portions of the memos do not address what apparently created the real problem for the utilities in the first place, namely, their apparent inability to pass through their power costs. The Commission should not be stampeded by unbalanced, partial reports about California into accepting conditions that are without true merit.

Likewise, Mr. Bible describes apparent financial problems Western Resources is undergoing in Kansas based on information obtained from various sources. That situation too still remains to be played out and what effect, if any, it may have on customers in Kansas is currently unknown. What is known is that Western had not restructured itself into a holding company prior to incurring its present

difficulties. Therefore, the initiation of a holding company structure was not, in this instance, the cause for potential detriment that might occur in the future. In

short, problems can occur for a company without it being in a holding company.

OTHER PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS

- What other restrictions that have been proposed in this proceeding do you address?
- 17 A. Mr. Kind, a witness for the OPC, has presented rebuttal testimony which requests
 18 the Commission to impose five additional restrictions upon the Company in this
 19 proceeding as prerequisites to the approval of the Application. They involve
 20 (1) the possibility of preemption by the SEC of the Commission's ratemaking
 21 authority; (2) provision of information on employee transfers; (3) provision of
 22 information on diversification plans; (4) provision of access to books, records and
 23 personnel of Laclede and its affiliates; and (5) requirement that Laclede Group

and Laclede not to merge with, acquire, or be acquired by another company that has a controlling interest in a public utility unless the transaction is approved by the Commission (this requirement is the non-financial Condition No. 12 which appears on Schedule No. 1) (sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "OPC Requirements"). Q. Does the Company believe that the OPC Requirements are reasonable and necessary to avoid detriment to the public interest? No. At least not all of them. Mr. Kind relies on general speculation and A. conjecture to construct far-fetched scenarios that form a purported basis for a need for the OPC Requirements. For example, OPC Requirement No. 1, regarding the "possibility" (Mr. Kind's word) of SEC preemption of the Commission's ratemaking authority as it pertains to the gas company depends on the "possibility" that Laclede's holding company or its successor might become a registered holding company. Laclede has absolutely no plans, intention or interest in becoming a "registered" holding company, if for no other reason that it involves much more paperwork and does not provide Laclede any advantages. Furthermore, Laclede has yet to even become an "exempt" holding company. As Mr. Kind's testimony makes clear, these types of OPC restrictions were agreed to by large electric companies going through merger approvals and not ones seeking "exempt" holding company status such as is Laclede's case. Furthermore, in Laclede's case, the gas company is not going to be the holding company, but a subsidiary of the holding company. Mr. Kind has presented only speculation, and highly unlikely speculation at that, as a tenuous basis for OPC's Requirement

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

- No. 1. Finally, it is highly likely that PUCHA itself will be repealed in the near 1 future since the Senate Banking Committee in April 2001 voted 19-1 to repeal 2 PUCHA. Therefore, the Commission should recognize Mr. Kind's claims for the 3 sheer speculation that they are and summarily reject them. 4 What is the Company's view of OPC Requirement No. 2 seeking information on 5 Q. 6 employee transfers? Based upon Mr. Kind's testimony, his chief concern seems to be a claimed 7 A. inability to track a possible dilution of talent somehow flowing between Laclede 8 and any of its affiliates and that this poses a risk to ratepayers. Mr. Kind does not 9 offer any examples where there has been any such dilution of talent from Laclede 10 11 to any of its existing subsidiaries, or any other examples of such events at other 12 utilities in Missouri under any circumstances. He acknowledges that the Company has observed there will be no dilution of talent or diversion of 13 14 management attention from the provision of regulated services, but apparently 15 that statement is not "firm" enough because it is not embedded in a process that 16 generates a report to the OPC which report, interestingly enough, does not provide 17 any apparent basis to conclude that a dilution of talent is, or is not occurring, only 18 that transfers are occurring. Does Mr. Kind offer any further information regarding this restriction requiring 19 Q. 20 employee transfer information?
- 21 A. Yes. He advised that such a restriction was not necessary for KCP&L because,
 22 unlike Laclede, it currently has no Stay from the Application of the Affiliated
 23 Transaction Rules. It seems apparent that the real purpose of this proposed

restriction is a substitute for a rule that Laclede and others have appealed to the courts as it is their right to do. In the previously and oft cited Utilicorp United Inc., and St. Joseph Light and Power Company merger Order issued by the Commission on December 14, 2000, OPC made an attempt to obtain a pledge from Utilicorp for information that apparently was likewise encompassed by the Affiliated Transaction Rule. Utilicorp resisted OPC's demand claiming it was already bound by the Affiliated Transaction Rule and an additional pledge was unwarranted. The Commission, in declining to require the pledge, found in essence, that if the Affiliated Transaction Rule is upheld compliance will continue to be required and if it is overturned, compliance will not be required. Laclede's challenge to the Affiliated Transaction Rule is not a frivolous pursuit. If its challenge succeeds, it will not be required to comply and if its challenge fails, its existing stay will be revoked and it will comply. An attempt to circumvent a lawfully issued stay from the Application of the rule in question certainly is not an appropriate basis for approving Restriction No. 2. Please describe the third restriction proposed by Mr. Kind.

Q.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

A.

Mr. Kind's Restriction No. 3 seeks the Company's diversification plans, including on an on-going annual basis, all new and revised and updated business plans for the Laclede Group and its affiliates (including Laclede), a description of any and all joint marketing/promotional campaigns between Laclede, The Laclede Group and any of its affiliates, and narrative descriptions of all products and services offered by the Laclede Group and its affiliates. This restriction provides duplicative discovery requirements as well.

Q. Is this restriction appropriate?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

A.

No. The Affiliate Transaction Rule is sufficient to cover OPC's information needs as it relates to true affiliated transactions. The information which OPC seeks here is not primarily about transactions between affiliates, but obviously, for the most part, concerns detailed, voluminous business and marketing plans as well as descriptions of all new products and services. This requirement is not routinely required of regulated utilities currently. This requirement is extremely burdensome for any entity and to require the holding company, and its subsidiaries, unregulated businesses not subject to the provisions of Chapter 393 of the Missouri Statutes, to comply with this restriction would be neither lawful nor supported by the statements presented by the OPC. Once again, the OPC asserts that KCP&L agreed to "...this type...." of condition in its stipulation and agreement. A review of that document, however, fails to reflect any obvious agreement of any kind concerning the provision of KCP&L's diversification plans or the other detailed items sought by OPC from Laclede by this OPC proposed restriction. Clearly, if KCP&L had agreed to this specific restriction, rather than "...this type...." of restriction, as asserted by the OPC, that restriction's existence would be obvious since much of what KCP&L agreed to and what is demanded here of Laclede reflects the exact same language. Nevertheless, whatever KCP&L may or may not have agreed to should not form the basis for the Commission's decision in this matter. In fact, the Commission made that point recently in refusing to apply market power conditions agreed to by parties in one merger to a different merger when parties to the latter merger refused to agree to

the condition. (See Utilicorp United Inc. and St. Joseph Light and Power

Company, Report and Order dated December 14, 2000 at pages 21-22).

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Q.

A.

Q. Is the OPC Requirement No. 4, seeking access to the books, records and personnel of Laclede and its affiliates, necessary to avoid any true detriment to the public?

Not really. Mr. Kind's testimony voices a suspicion that Laclede's commitment to books and records access is somehow tainted because it makes it within the context of "... applicable current or future laws or regulations." To most people that commitment is meaningful. We are a nation of laws. The Commission is a creature of statute. One can only surmise that Mr. Kind requires a commitment which is not bounded or dependent on what the law provides since he has characterized one that is made pursuant to law as "meaningless." It is also obvious from Mr. Kind's testimony that he expects sweeping access to everyone and everything whether or not the law provides for it. His final fear, that Laclede's language of "...charges to, or payments from ...," somehow creates a loophole by which it can avoid affiliate transaction scrutiny, is without substance for two reasons. First, the Affiliated Transaction Rule will be upheld or it will fail, in which latter case a new such rule will likely be promulgated. In the interim, the OPC and others can utilize the Commission's existing process, established by law, to file complaints, or use discovery or similar tools to satisfy itself that costs are not shifted or otherwise improperly charged.

What is the Company's position on the OPC's Requirement No. 5, and Staff's similar request that Laclede and The Laclede Group agree that The Laclede Group

will not merge with, acquire, or be acquired by another company that has a controlling interest in a public utility unless this transaction is approved by the Commission?

.

Α.

A.

- Laclede is agreeable in concept to that restriction, but recommends adoption of the more concise language which has been proposed by Staff Witness Rackers for this purpose. In fact, the Company's suggested language is the same as Staff's, except for the last sentence which was added in recognition of the possibility that the Commission could reject jurisdiction on its own initiative. Laclede does not intend to argue, or urge any other party to argue, against such jurisdiction if it reaches closure on this matter. However, without the provision contained in that final sentence, a Commission disavowal of jurisdiction leaves the parties somewhat at sea. The sentence is intended to clarify that condition.
- Q. Do you have any comments or observations regarding the conditions sponsored
 by Staff Witness, Rackers, in this proceeding?
 - As I mentioned earlier, many of Mr. Rackers' conditions are similar, if not identical to the restrictions proposed by Mr. Kind on behalf of the OPC. With respect to potential SEC and FERC preemption, witness Rackers and witness Kind have very different descriptions of the requirements they propose. From an examination of the KCP&L settlement document, it is clear the OPC presentation was used as to SEC matters. However, it is not necessary to reach that decision point since, as my earlier testimony notes, the possibility that Laclede could ever become a registered holding company is beyond remote. There is absolutely no basis in fact in Messers. Rackers and Kind's brief comments on this subject that

to suggest that this fear of preemption has any legitimacy. The fact that others, who were, or are likely to become, registered holding companies, agreed to a restriction or condition supposedly dealt with that contingency, is not as we know any legitimate basis for compelling a party not similarly situated and not at all agreeable to the apparent large administrative burden involved to be unreasonably compelled to add some more meaningless documents to its files. In that regard, the Commission should examine the pervasive and detailed requirements, including an extensive so-called optional procedure, which appear in part as Schedule No. 2, Paragraph Nos. 1a through 1g, and Schedule No. 3 to Mr. Rackers' testimony, and to Schedule No. 1 of Mr. Kind's testimony. Finally, as briefly mentioned earlier, Mr. Kind's testimony and schedule only propose a purported need to solve for SEC preemption, while Mr. Rackers' testimony and schedules suggest a wider need to avoid both SEC and FERC preemption. In the often alluded to KCP&L settlement, OPC's proposal on this subject which was apparently used in the Stipulation and Agreement included both SEC and FERC preemption. This suggests that something is different in this case since the OPC has not included FERC preemption. My point is that not only is the "potential" more than remote for Laclede to become a registered holding company, the apparent absolute precondition for any of the detailed requirements and contingencies to be operative at all; moreover, their seems to even be confusion as to what preemptions might apply between Staff and OPC. That condition is often a very reliable signal that something is not right; and for that very practical reason

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

1		as well Mr. Rackers and Mr. Kind's varying recommendations should be
2		disregarded.
3	Q.	Do you have any response to Staff's and OPC's recommendations that
4		Commission approval be sought before any transfer of utility assets is made by
5		the Company?
6	A.	Yes. Both Mr. Rackers in Section 2 of Schedule 2-1 to his rebuttal testimony, as
7		well as Mr. Trippensee at page 13 of his rebuttal testimony have proposed such a
8		condition. In fact, Mr. Trippensee has proposed a substantially broader condition
9		that would require Commission approval for the transfer of any assets or functions
10		currently performed by Laclede Gas Company. Laclede believes both of these
11		proposed conditions are unreasonable and unnecessary.
12	Q.	Why is that?
13	A.	Once again, Missouri law already contains requirements mandating Commission
14		approval for transfers of certain utility assets that are used and useful in providing
15		utility service. To the extent the conditions proposed by Staff and OPC are
16		designed to replicate these statutory provisions they are unnecessary and
17		duplicative. And to the extent they seek to broaden the Commission's jurisdiction
18		beyond these statutory limits, they are inconsistent with Missouri law. In either
19		event, they should be rejected.

30

Does the Company intend to comply with its legal obligations to seek

Commission approval before it transfers assets that meet the statutory criteria for

20

21

22

Q.

such approval?

ł	A.	Of course it does.	And the C	Company is also	willing to	adopt Mr.	Racker's
---	----	--------------------	-----------	-----------------	------------	-----------	----------

- 2 recommendation in Section 3 of Schedule 2-2 that would require the Company to
- 3 provide notification to the Staff and Public Counsel in the event it makes the
- decision to transfer job positions, departments and or functions to an affiliate.
- 5 This should afford both Staff and OPC with an opportunity to assess whether any
- such transfer requires Commission approval under applicable law and, if it does,
- 7 insist that such approval be obtained.
- 8 Q. Does the Company agree with Mr. Racker's recommendation in Section 7 of
- 9 Schedule 2-3 that Laclede Gas Company should not seek recovery of any costs
- related to the restructuring from ratepayers?
- 11 A. No. While the Company is certainly willing to account for such costs in a manner
- that permits them to be identified, we firmly support the Commission's prior
- determination in other proceedings that such matters should be addressed in a rate
- case proceeding and not as part of the approval process.
- 15 Q. Does Laclede have any objections to either of the recommendations set forth in
- Sections 6 and 8 of Schedule 2-3 to Mr. Racker's rebuttal testimony?
- 17 A. No. Both the requirement to provide a list of all jurisdictions in which Laclede or
- an affiliate files affiliate transaction information, as contained in Section 6, as
- well as the requirement to provide final journal entries for the reorganization and
- 20 explain any deviation of more than 10% from the estimated performance entries,
- as set forth in Section 8, are acceptable to the Company.
- 22 Q. Do you have any concluding comments?

1 A. Yes. The Company has attempted to address to the extent possible the various
2 conditions and recommendations proposed by the other parties in their rebuttal
3 testimony. Given the number of those conditions and requirements, however, the
4 Company's failure to discuss a specific proposal should not be construed as an
5 indication that the Company necessarily agrees with such proposal.

6 Q. Does this conclude your surrebuttal testimony?

7 A. Yes.

8

9

32

Staff Condition

1. Laclede Group and its subsidiaries will not conduct any material business activities that are not part of the "Energy Business" or are not reasonably related to business activities derived from changes in the natural gas industry as a result of competition without Commission approval. With regard to expansion of Laclede Gas Company's current operations in natural gas marketing, real estate development, insurance services and the compression of natural gas, activities will be limited to those considered incidental to current operations.

Laclede Condition

Laclede rejects Staff's Condition No. 1. Imposing limits on unregulated business opportunities is beyond the Commission's statutory authority is unwarranted by the facts, is bad public policy, and denies the Company equal protection of the law.

2. Laclede Group, Inc. will not pledge
Laclede Gas Company's common stock as
collateral or security for the debt of the
Holding Company or a Subsidiary without
Commission approval.

The Laclede Group, Inc. will not pledge Laclede Gas Company's common stock as collateral or security for any debt of the Holding Company or a subsidiary of the Holding Company which is payable at periods of more than twelve months without first obtaining Commission approval.

3. Laclede Gas Company will not guarantee the notes, debentures, debt obligations or other securities of the Holding Company or any of its subsidiaries, or enter into any "make-well" agreements without prior Commission approval.

Laclede Gas Company will not guarantee any notes, debentures, debt obligations or other securities of the Holding Company or the Holding Company's subsidiaries which are payable at periods of more than twelve months, or enter into any "make-well" agreements without first obtaining Commission approval.

4. Laclede Group, Inc. agrees to maintain consolidated common equity of no less than 30% of total consolidated capitalization and for Laclede Gas Company to maintain its common equity at no less than 35%. Total capitalization is defined as common equity, preferred stock, long-term debt and short-term debt. Common equity is defined as parvalue of common stock plus additional paid-in capital, plus retained earnings, minus treasury stock.

It is The Laclede Group, Inc.'s intention to maintain consolidated equity of no less than 30 percent of its total permanent consolidated capitalization and the intent of Laclede Gas Company to maintain its equity at no less than 35% of its total capitalization. Total capitalization is defined as common equity, preferred stock, long-term debt, and short-term debt, excluding short-term debt supporting natural gas and propane inventories, purchased gas costs and cash working capital. The Laclede Group, Inc. and Laclede Gas Company agree to notify the Staff and Public Counsel in the event they become aware of any material possibility that either or both companies will be unable to maintain their respective equity ratios.

5. Reports

Laclede Gas Company shall submit quarterly to the Financial Analysis Department of the Missouri Public Service Commission certain key financial ratios as defined by Standard & Poor's Credit Rating Service, as follows:

- a. Pre-tax interest coverage;
- b. After-tax coverage of interest and preferred dividends;
- c. Funds flow interest coverage;
- d. Funds from operations to total debt;
- e. Total debt to total capital (including preferred); and
- f. Total common equity to total capital.

6. Laclede Gas Company's total long-term borrowings including all instruments shall not exceed Laclede Gas Company's regulated rate base.

Laclede Gas Company shall submit quarterly to the Staff's Financial Analysis Department certain key financial ratios that will be calculated, to the extent practical, consistent with those employed by Standard and Poor's Credit Rating Service. These key financial ratios shall include:

- a. Pre-tax interest coverage;
- b. After-tax coverage of interest and preferred dividends;
- c. Funds flow interest coverage;
- d. Funds from operations to total debt;
- e. Total debt to total capital (including preferred); and
- f. Total common equity to total capital.

Laclede Gas Company's total long-term borrowings of any kind or character and excluding short-term debt shall not exceed Laclede Gas Company's regulated rate base.

7. Laclede Gas Company shall maintain separate debt and, if outstanding, preferred debt ratings. Laclede Gas Company agrees to maintain its debt and, if outstanding, preferred stock rating at investment grade.

Consistent with its representations in previous financing applications and assuming reasonable regulatory treatment, it is Laclede Gas Company's intention to maintain its debt and, if outstanding, its preferred stock rating at an investment grade credit rating. Laclede Gas Company agrees to notify the Staff and Public Counsel in the event it becomes aware of any material possibility that it will not be able to maintain such a credit rating.

8. The Laclede Group, Inc. and Staff agree that the allowed return on common equity and other costs of capital will not increase as a result of the reorganization.

As more fully described in the Company's Condition 9, Laclede believes the Commission's authority to deal with any unreasonable costs where that facts warrant is complete protection for the customers.

9. The Laclede Group, Inc. guarantees that the customers of Laclede Gas Company shall be held harmless if the reorganization creating The Laclede Group, Inc. with Laclede Gas Company as a subsidiary, results in a higher revenue requirement for Laclede Gas Company than if the reorganization had not occurred.

The Laclede Group, Inc. agrees that the Commission has, and will continue to have, the authority after the Proposed Restructuring to regulate, through the lawful exercise of its current statutory powers, any transfer or disbursement of earnings from Laclede Gas Company to an affiliate that would jeopardize the Company's ability to meet its utility obligations. The Laclede Group, Inc. also agrees that the Commission has the authority, through the lawful exercise of its ratemaking powers, to ensure that the rates charged by Laclede Gas Company for regulated utility service are not increased as a result of the unregulated activities of Laclede's affiliates and Laclede agrees not to challenge the lawful and reasonable exercise of such authority or the appropriateness of using such a standard for purposes of determining Laclede's rates.

10. The Laclede Group, Inc. and Laclede Gas Company shall provide the Staff unrestricted access to all written information provided to common stock, bond, or bond rating analysts, which directly or, indirectly, pertains to Laclede Gas Company or any affiliate that exercises influence or control over Laclede Gas Company or has affiliate transactions with Laclede Gas Company. Such information includes, but is not limited to, reports provided to, and presentations made to, common stock analysts and bond rating analysts. For purposes of this condition, "written" information includes but is not limited to any written and printed material, audio and videotapes, computer disks, and electronically stored information. Nothing in this condition shall be deemed to be a waiver of The Laclede Group, Inc.'s or Laclede Gas Company's right to seek protection of the information.

The Laclede Group, Inc. and Laclede Gas Company shall provide the Commission access, upon reasonable written notice during normal working hours and subject to appropriate confidentiality protections, to all written information provided to common stock, bond, or bond rating analysts, which directly or, indirectly pertains to Laclede Gas Company or any affiliate that exercises influence or control over Laclede Gas Company or has affiliate transactions with Laclede Gas Company. Such information includes, but is not limited to, reports provided to, and presentations made to, common stock analysts and bond rating analysts. For purposes of this condition, "written" information includes but is not limited to, any written and printed material, audio and videotapes, computer disks, and electronically stored information. Nothing in this condition shall be deemed to be a waiver of The Laclede Group, Inc.'s or Laclede Gas Company's right to seek protection of the information or to object to the relevancy or use of such information by any party.

11. The Holding Company will provide the Commission Staff, upon request and with appropriate notice, all information needed to verify compliance with the conditions authorized in this proceeding and any other information relevant to the Commission's ratemaking, financing, safety, quality of service and other regulatory authority over Laclede Gas Company.

Upon request, Laclede Gas Company and The Laclede Group, Inc. agree to make available to Staff and Public Counsel, upon written notice during normal working hours and subject to appropriate confidentiality protections, all books and records of The Laclede Group, Inc., Laclede Gas Company and its affiliates as may be reasonably required to verify compliance with the CAM and the conditions set forth herein and any other information relevant to the Commission's ratemaking, financing, safety, quality of service and other regulatory authority over Laclede Gas Company, provided that Laclede Gas Company and any affiliate or subsidiary of The Laclede Group, Inc. shall have the right to object to such production of records or personnel on any basis under applicable law and Commission rules. excluding any objection that such records and personnel of affiliates or subsidiaries are not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction and statutory authority by virtue of or as a result of the implementation of the Proposed Restructuring.

12. The Holding Company will not, directly or indirectly, acquire or merge with, or allow itself to be acquired by or merged with a public utility or the affiliate of a public utility, where the affiliate has a controlling interest in a public utility, without prior approval from the Commission and a finding that the transaction will not be detrimental to the public.

The Holding Company will not, directly or indirectly, acquire or merge with or allow itself to be consumed by or merged with, a public utility or the affiliate of a public utility, where the affiliate has a controlling interest in a public utility without prior approval from the Commission and a finding that the transaction is not detrimental to the public. It is expressly understood that this condition shall not be binding in the event that the Commission on its own initiative or at the urging of a party other than The Laclede Group, Inc, its subsidiaries, or an entity that is party to such merger or acquisition, declines to assert jurisdiction over such transaction.

Subsidiary Companies Of Major Missouri Utilities

```
KLT Inc.
     KLT Telecom Inc.
     KLT Gas Inc.
     KLT Energy Services Inc.
     KLT Investments Inc.
     KLT investments II inc.
Home Service Solutions Inc. (HSS)
      R.S. Andrews Enterprise, Inc.
      Worry Free Service, inc.
New Unregulated Generation Company (formed in 2/01)
UtiliCorp
Aquila, Inc.
Aquila Canada Corporation
Aquila Energy Marketing Corporation
Aquila Risk Management Corporation
UtiliCorp Asia Pacific, Inc.
UtiliCorp Asia Pacific Pty Ltd.
UtiliCorp Australia, Inc.
UtiliCorp South Pacific, Inc.
UtiliCorp Networks Canada Ltd.
UtiliCorp Networks Canada (Alberta) Ltd.
Ameren
Ameren Development Company
      Ameren Energy Communications, Inc.
      Ameren ERC, Inc.
            Missouri Central Railroad
Ameren Energy, Inc.
Ameren Energy Resources Co.
      Ameren Energy Development Company
            Ameren Energy Generating Company
      Ameren Energy Fuels and Services Company
      Ameren Energy Marketing Company
      Illinois Materials Supply Co.
Ameren Services Company
Central Illinois Public Service Company (CIPS)
      CIPS Energy Inc.
CIPSCO Investment Company
      CIPSCO Securities Company
      CIPSCO Leasing Company
            CLC Aircraft Leasing Company
            CLC Leasing Company A
            CLC Leasing Company B
      CIPSCO Energy Company
            CEC-PGE-G Co.
            CEC-PGE-L Co.
            CEC-APL-G Co.
            CEC-APL-L Co.
                  Massac Energy, L.L.C.
            CEC-PSPL-G Co.
            CEC-PSPL-L Co.
            CEC-MPS-G Co.
            CEC-MPS-L Co.
            CEC-ACE-G Co.
            CEC-ACE-L Co.
            CEC-ACLP Co.
      CIPSCO Venture Company
Union Electric Company
      Union Electric Development Corporation
Electric Energy, Inc.
```

Kansas City Power & Light

Southern Union

Southern Union Energy International, Inc. Mercado Gas Services Inc. Southern Transmission Company Norteno Pipeline Company SUPro Energy Company Atlantic Gas Corporation PG Energy Services, Inc. PEI Power Corporation Southern Union Total Energy Systems, Inc. Valley Propane Southern Union International Investments, Inc. Energia Estrella del Sur, S. A. de C. V. ProvEnergy Power Company, LLC Valley Appliance Merchandising Company (VAMCO) Morris Merchants, Inc. Alternate Energy Corporation (AEC) Fall River Gas Appliance Company Energy WorX Inc. Keystone Pipeline Services, Inc. Lavaca Realty Company

ATMOS Energy Corporation

Atmos Energy Holdings, Inc.

Atmos Energy Services, Inc.

Greeley Energy Services, Inc.

Trans Louisiana Energy Services, Inc.

WKG Energy Services, Inc.

Trans Louisiana Industrial Gas Company, Inc.

Egasco, LLC

Enertrust, Inc.

Enermart Energy Services Trust

Energas Energy Services Trust

United Cities propane Gas, Inc.

Atmos Energy Marketing, LLC

Atmos Leasing, Inc.

Atmos Non-Regulated Shared Services, Inc.

Atmos Storage, Inc.

UCG Storage, Inc.

WKG Storage, Inc.

Atmos Exploration and Production, Inc.

Trans Louisiana Gas Storage, Inc.