

BEFORE THE TENNESSEE REGULATORY AUTHORITY

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

January 26, 2012

IN RE:

BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS LLC D/B/A AT&T  
TENNESSEE V. HALO WIRELESS, INC.

)  
) DOCKET NO.  
) 11-00119  
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ORDER

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This matter came before Chairman Kenneth C. Hill, Director Sara Kyle and Director Mary W. Freeman of the Tennessee Regulatory Authority ("Authority" or "TRA"), the voting panel assigned to this docket, at a regularly scheduled Authority Conference held on January 23, 2012 for consideration of the *Complaint* filed by BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC d/b/a AT&T Tennessee ("AT&T") against Halo Wireless, Inc. ("Halo") and Halo's *Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice*.

TRAVEL OF THE CASE

On July 26, 2011, AT&T filed a *Complaint* against Halo, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252 and TRA Rule 1220-1-2-.02, requesting that the TRA issue an order "allowing it to terminate its wireless Interconnection Agreement ("ICA") with Halo based on Halo's material breaches of that ICA."<sup>1</sup> The *Complaint* also states that AT&T "seeks an Order requiring Halo to pay AT&T Tennessee the amounts Halo owes" as a result of "an access charge avoidance scheme."<sup>2</sup> On August 10, 2011, Halo filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy informing the TRA that "on August 8, 2011 Halo filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code in the

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<sup>1</sup> *Complaint*, p. 1 (July 26, 2011).

<sup>2</sup> *Id.*

Exhibit 3

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas (Sherman Division)” (“Bankruptcy Court”).<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, Halo stated, “the automatic stay is now in place” and “prohibits further action against [Halo] in the instant proceeding.”<sup>4</sup>

On August 19, 2011, Halo filed a notice of removal to federal district court, which references a separate notice of removal and states that this matter has been removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division (“District Court”) “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452 and Rule 9027 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.”<sup>5</sup> On November 10, 2011, AT&T filed a letter informing the TRA that it may now hear this matter, the District Court having remanded it to the TRA and the Bankruptcy Court having lifted the automatic stay on a limited basis. AT&T requested that this matter be placed on the agenda for the Authority Conference scheduled for November 21, 2011 “for appointing a Hearing Officer and other action as necessary.”<sup>6</sup> On November 17, 2011, Halo filed a *Motion to Abate*, in which Halo requested that the TRA “abate” this proceeding until conclusion of Halo’s appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s October 26, 2011 Order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

At the regularly scheduled Authority Conference held on November 21, 2011, the Authority voted unanimously to deny the *Motion to Abate* and to convene a contested case in this matter and appoint Chairman Kenneth C. Hill as Hearing Officer to handle any preliminary matters, including entering a protective order, ruling on any intervention requests, setting a procedural schedule, and addressing other preliminary matters.<sup>7</sup> Immediately following the Authority Conference, the Hearing Officer convened a scheduling conference in this matter.

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<sup>3</sup> *Suggestion of Bankruptcy*, p. 1 (August 10, 2011).

<sup>4</sup> *Id.* at 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Notice of Removal to Federal Court*, p. 1 (August 19, 2011).

<sup>6</sup> Letter from Joelle Phillips to Chairman Kenneth C. Hill (November 10, 2011).

<sup>7</sup> *Order Denying Motion to Abate, Convening a Contested Case and Appointing a Hearing Officer* (December 19, 2011).

On December 1, 2011, Halo filed *Halo Wireless, Inc.'s Partial Motion to Dismiss and Answer to the Complaint of BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC d/b/a AT&T Tennessee* ("Partial Motion to Dismiss"), and AT&T filed its response to Halo's motion on December 8, 2011. The Hearing Officer heard arguments from AT&T and Halo (collectively, "the Parties") on the *Partial Motion to Dismiss* on December 12, 2011, and issued an order denying the *Partial Motion to Dismiss* on December 16, 2011.<sup>8</sup> The Parties submitted pre-filed direct testimony of their witnesses on December 19, 2011, and pre-filed rebuttal testimony on January 3, 2012. In addition, the Parties submitted pre-hearing memoranda on January 6, 2012.

#### **MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE**

After business hours on Friday, January 13, 2012, Halo filed *Halo Wireless, Inc.'s Notice of May 16, 2006 Order Confirming Plan of Reorganization of Transcom Enhanced Services and Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice* ("Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice"). At the beginning of the Hearing on January 17, 2012, Chairman Hill addressed the *Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice*, giving AT&T an opportunity to respond and setting the matter for consideration during the January 23, 2012 Authority Conference. AT&T filed *BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC dba AT&T Tennessee's Response to Halo Wireless, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice* ("Response") on January 19, 2012.

As more fully explained in the discussion of AT&T's *Complaint* below, Halo's business plan is centered on their assertion that Transcom Enhanced Services, Inc. ("Transcom") is an Enhanced Service Provider ("ESP"). In its *Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice*, Halo requests that the TRA dismiss AT&T's *Complaint* with prejudice on the grounds that during

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<sup>8</sup> *Order Denying Motion to Dismiss* (December 16, 2011).

Transcom's 2005 bankruptcy proceeding,<sup>9</sup> BellSouth/AT&T Corporation were creditors/parties in interest.<sup>10</sup> In the Transcom Bankruptcy Court's April 28, 2005 Memorandum Opinion, the Court concluded that "[Transcom]'s service is an enhanced service, not subject to payment of access charges."<sup>11</sup> Some of the creditors appealed the April 28, 2005 order to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division ("Transcom District Court"), but the Transcom District Court dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the bankruptcy court's Order and Memorandum Opinion.<sup>12</sup> However, the Transcom Bankruptcy Court entered an order on May 16, 2006 confirming Transcom's bankruptcy plan.<sup>13</sup> In this Confirmation Order, the Transcom Bankruptcy Court again stated that Transcom's services are not subject to access charges, but rather qualify as information services and enhanced services that must pay end-user charges.<sup>14</sup> No creditor appealed the May 16, 2006 Order.<sup>15</sup> Halo argues that because this Confirmation Order is binding, AT&T cannot challenge Transcom's status as an ESP.<sup>16</sup> In addition, Halo asserts that *res judicata* or collateral estoppel bars the claims that have been litigated in the bankruptcy court.

To assert a *res judicata* defense, a party must establish: 1) the parties must be identical in both suits; 2) the prior judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; 3) there must have been a final judgment on the merits; and 4) the same cause of action must be involved in both cases.<sup>17</sup> Halo claims that these standards are satisfied because 1) BellSouth was a party to the Transcom bankruptcy case and litigants who have a close and significant relationship (e.g. Transcom/Halo) satisfy the "identical parties" test; 2) the Transcom Bankruptcy Court had

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<sup>9</sup> Transcom filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, ("Transcom Bankruptcy Court") on February 18, 2005 in Case No. 05-31929-HDH-11 ("Transcom bankruptcy"). See *Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice*, p. 2, ¶ 3 (January 13, 2012).

<sup>10</sup> *Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice*, p. 2, ¶ 4 (January 13, 2012).

<sup>11</sup> *Id.* at 3, ¶ 7.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.*

<sup>13</sup> *Id.* at 4, ¶ 10.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.*

<sup>15</sup> *Id.* at 4, ¶ 11.

<sup>16</sup> *Id.* at 6, ¶ 14.

<sup>17</sup> *Id.* at 6, ¶ 17, citing *Osherow v. Ernst & Young, LLP (In re Intellogic Trace, Inc.)*, 300 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir. 2000).

jurisdiction over the 2006 Confirmation Order; 3) the 2006 Confirmation Order is final; and 4) the two actions are based on the same nucleus of operative facts, because the primary issue in both proceedings is whether Transcom provides enhanced services.<sup>18</sup>

Collateral estoppel precludes a party from litigating an issue already raised in an earlier action if: 1) the issue at stake is identical to the one involved in the earlier action; 2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior action; and 3) the determination of the issue in the prior action was a necessary part of the judgment in that action.<sup>19</sup> Halo asserts that 1) AT&T's *Complaint* confronts the authority with an identical issue to that raised in the 2006 Transcom Bankruptcy Court's Confirmation Order, i.e. that Transcom is an ESP not subject to access charges; 2) the issue was litigated in 2006 in the Transcom bankruptcy proceeding; and 3) the determination that Transcom is an ESP was a necessary part of the Confirmation because if it were not, the Plan would not have been feasible and the Confirmation would have been denied.<sup>20</sup>

AT&T opposes the *Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice* on the grounds that the Motion is at odds with the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") *Connect America Fund* Order.<sup>21</sup> AT&T argues that none of the Transcom bankruptcy court proceedings or other earlier proceedings cited by Halo is binding on either AT&T or the Authority.<sup>22</sup> None of the Transcom Bankruptcy Court orders states or suggests that Transcom actually is an end-user, and none of them implies or says anything about the termination or origination of calls.<sup>23</sup> Rather, an ESP is treated as

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<sup>18</sup> *Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice*, pp. 7-8, ¶¶ 18-26 (January 13, 2012).

<sup>19</sup> *Id.* at 10, ¶ 28, citing *Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. U.S.*, 365 F.2d 385, 397 (5th Cir, 2004).

<sup>20</sup> *Id.* at 10-11, ¶¶ 27-30.

<sup>21</sup> *Response*, p. 1 (January 19, 2012); See *Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In the Matter of Connect America Fund; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future; Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for Local Exchange Carriers; High-Cost Universal Service Support; Developing an Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime; Federal-State Board on Universal Service; Lifeline and Link-Up; Universal Service Reform – Mobility Fund*, WC Docket Nos. 10–90, 07–135, 05–337, 03–109; GN Docket No. 09–51; CC Docket Nos. 01–92, 96–45; WT Docket No. 10–208; FCC 11–161, \_\_ FCC Rcd \_\_ (“*Connect America Fund Order*”) (November 18, 2011).

<sup>22</sup> *Response*, p. 3 (January 19, 2012).

<sup>23</sup> *Id.* at 4.

an end-user for the purpose of being exempted from access charges, nothing more.<sup>24</sup> Further the exemption applies only to ESPs, not carriers (like Halo) that transport calls for ESPs.<sup>25</sup> AT&T asserts that the Authority rejected Halo's *res judicata* and collateral estoppel arguments when it rejected Halo's *Partial Motion to Dismiss*.<sup>26</sup> AT&T further asserts that *res judicata* and collateral estoppel cannot apply because: 1) the main order Halo relies upon was vacated by the federal district court; 2) the bankruptcy cases involved Transcom, not Halo, and therefore were not between identical parties; 3) the Transcom bankruptcy cases did not involve the same cause of action as this case, since this case involves claims for Halo's breach of a contract that was not even formed until after the bankruptcy cases, while the bankruptcy cases involved the issue of whether Transcom was subject to access charges; and 4) the issue in this case (whether Transcom must be deemed to originate or re-originate calls) was never raised, much less decided, in the bankruptcy cases.<sup>27</sup>

The Authority agrees with AT&T that neither *res judicata* nor collateral estoppel applies in this case. The panel finds that *res judicata* does not apply because the Transcom bankruptcy case and this docket do not involve identical parties and this is a breach of contract case and, therefore, is not the same cause of action. The panel also finds that collateral estoppel does not apply because the issue in this case - the origination or re-origination and termination of Halo's calls - was not raised in the Transcom bankruptcy case. Based on these findings, the Authority concludes unanimously that Halo's *Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice* should be denied.

#### **THE HEARING**

A Hearing in this matter was held before the voting panel of Directors assigned to this docket on January 17, 2012. The Hearing was publicly noticed by the Hearing Officer on

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<sup>24</sup> *Id.*

<sup>25</sup> *Id.* at 4, n. 8.

<sup>26</sup> *Id.* at 3, n. 6.

<sup>27</sup> *Id.*

December 16, 2011 and January 12, 2012. Participating in the Hearing were the following parties and their respective counsel:

**For BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC d/b/a AT&T Tennessee – Joelle Phillips, Esq.**, 333 Commerce Street, Suite 2101, Nashville TN 37201 and **J. Tyson Covey, Esq.**, Mayer Brown, LLP, 71 S. Wacker Drive, Chicago, IL 60606.

**For Halo Wireless, Inc. – Paul S. Davidson, Esq.**, Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis, LLP, 511 Union Street, Suite 2700, Nashville, TN 37219; **Steven H. Thomas, Esq.** and **Jennifer M. Larson, Esq.**, McGuire, Craddock & Strother, P.C., 2501 N. Harwood, Suite 1800, Dallas, TX 75201; **W. Scott McCollough, Esq.**, McCollough/Henry PC, 1250 S. Capital of Texas Highway, Bldg. 2-235, West Lake Hills, TX 78746.

During the Hearing, the Authority heard testimony from AT&T witnesses J. Scott McPhee and Mark Neinast. Russ Wiseman and Robert Johnson testified for Halo.

#### **AT&T'S COMPLAINT**

In its *Complaint*, AT&T seeks to terminate its wireless ICA with Halo because Halo has violated the ICA by sending AT&T large volumes of traffic that does not originate on a wireless network. AT&T further asks the TRA to order Halo to pay it the amounts that it owes AT&T. AT&T asserts that the TRA has jurisdiction over this matter, because it involves (1) violations of an ICA entered into under 27 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252 that was approved by the Authority and (2) violations of AT&T Tennessee's state tariffs.<sup>28</sup> The *Complaint* contains four counts:

Count 1 - Breach of ICA: Sending Wireline-Originated Traffic to AT&T Tennessee: AT&T charges that Halo sends AT&T traffic that is wireline-originated, interstate, interLATA or intraLATA toll traffic and that Halo disguises it as local traffic to avoid access charges that apply to such traffic. AT&T asks the TRA to order Halo to terminate the Parties' ICA for this breach or, in

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<sup>28</sup> *Complaint*, p. 3 (July 26, 2011).

the alternative, to order Halo to cease and desist from sending wireline-originated traffic not authorized by the ICA to AT&T.<sup>29</sup>

Count 2 - Breach of ICA: Alteration or Deletion of Call Detail: AT&T alleges that Halo consistently alters the Charge Number ("CN"), which prevents AT&T from properly billing Halo based on where the traffic originated. AT&T requests that the Authority authorize it to terminate the Parties' ICA, or, in the alternative, to order Halo to cease and desist from altering the CN on traffic that it delivers to AT&T.<sup>30</sup>

Count 3 – Payment for Termination of Wireline-Originated Traffic: The wireline-originated traffic that Halo previously sent to AT&T is not governed by the Parties' ICA but is instead subject to tariffed switched access charges. AT&T therefore asks the Authority to order Halo to pay all access charges due to AT&T within thirty days of the Authority's order.<sup>31</sup>

Count 4 – Breach of ICA: Non-payment for Facilities: AT&T asks the TRA to order Halo to pay it for transport facilities that AT&T has provided but for which Halo has refused to pay.<sup>32</sup>

#### POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

The Parties have set forth their arguments in full in the record of this docket, in their pre-hearing memoranda and in the presentation of their cases at the Hearing. The following section is intended as a *brief* summary of the positions of AT&T and Halo in this matter.

##### Position of AT&T Tennessee

AT&T asserts that Halo has engaged in three separate types of breaches of the Parties' ICA.<sup>33</sup> Although the ICA requires Halo to send only wireless-originated traffic to AT&T, 74% of

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<sup>29</sup> *Id.* at 3-4.

<sup>30</sup> *Id.* at 4-5.

<sup>31</sup> *Id.* at 5-6.

<sup>32</sup> *Id.* at 6.

<sup>33</sup> *Pre-hearing Memorandum of BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC dba AT&T Tennessee*, p. 1 (January 6, 2012).

the traffic Halo sends to AT&T is landline-originated traffic.<sup>34</sup> According to AT&T, Halo's contention that it is not breaching the ICA is based on a "wireless in the middle" theory, where Transcom is an ESP; ESPs are treated as end-users; and Transcom must be deemed to "re-originate" every call that passes through Transcom to Halo.<sup>35</sup>

AT&T argues that the FCC has expressly rejected Halo's theory in the *Connect America Fund Order*, where the FCC singled out Halo by name.<sup>36</sup> The FCC rejected Halo's theory that calls that begin with an end-user dialing a call on a landline network can be "re-originated" as wireless calls by passing through an ESP with wireless equipment in the middle of the call.<sup>37</sup> Further, the ESP exemption from access charges applies only to ESPs themselves, not to carriers like Halo that serve them.<sup>38</sup> AT&T asserts, however, that Transcom is not an ESP because reducing background noise and inserting "comfort noise" in periods of silence do not alter the fundamental character of the service from the end-user's perspective.<sup>39</sup>

AT&T argues that its call study showing 74% of the calls Halo sends to AT&T are landline-originated is reliable. Further, Halo does not deny that at least some of its calls it sends to AT&T are landline or IP-originated,<sup>40</sup> which results in a breach of the ICA.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> *Id.* at 5. The terms "wireline" and "landline" are used interchangeably in the parties' testimony. For background, federal law specifies that wireless calls that originate and terminate within the same Major Trading Area ("MTA") are "local calls" and subject to reciprocal compensation rates. Calls exchanged between end-users in different MTAs are considered "InterMTA" and are subject to tariffed interstate or intrastate access charges, which are higher than reciprocal compensation rates. Calls that originate from landline telephones are considered "local" if they both originate and terminate within the same local exchange area. Intercarrier compensation rates for intra-exchange calls are set by the landline ICA; the rates for intrastate inter-exchange calls are set by the state access tariff, and the rates for interstate inter-exchange calls are set by the FCC access tariff. See J. Scott McPhee, Pre-filed Direct Testimony, p. 9 (December 19, 2011).

<sup>35</sup> *Id.*

<sup>36</sup> *Pre-hearing Memorandum of BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC dba AT&T Tennessee*, p. 6 (January 6, 2012).

<sup>37</sup> *Id.* at 7.

<sup>38</sup> *Id.* at 9.

<sup>39</sup> *Id.* at 10-11.

<sup>40</sup> The term "IP" refers to Internet Protocol.

<sup>41</sup> *Id.* at 11-12.

AT&T asserts that Halo also breached the ICA by inserting false charge numbers; specifically, Halo inserts a Transcom Charge Number ("CN") on every call, and the effect is that every call appears local.<sup>42</sup>

AT&T alleges that Halo is breaching the ICA by refusing to pay for interconnection facilities it obtains from AT&T. Because 100% of the traffic between the Parties is traffic that Halo terminates on AT&T's network, Halo is responsible for 100% of the cost of the interconnection facility under the Parties' wireless ICA.<sup>43</sup>

Position of Halo Wireless, Inc.

Halo asserts that it is not in breach of the ICA and AT&T is not entitled to "significant amounts of money" from Halo for the traffic at issue.<sup>44</sup> Halo further asserts that it has a valid and subsisting Radio Station Authorization from the FCC authorizing Halo to provide wireless service as a common carrier and to operate stations in the "3650-3700" MHz band,<sup>45</sup> and is therefore governed exclusively by federal law.<sup>46</sup> Halo argues that the FCC has exclusive jurisdiction over federal licensing and that a state commission cannot take any action that would amount to a suspension or revocation of a federal license.<sup>47</sup>

Halo provides Commercial Mobile Radio Service ("CMRS") and sells telephone exchange service to Transcom, which is a high volume customer.<sup>48</sup> Halo asserts that Transcom is an ESP because it changes the information content of every call that passes through its system and also

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<sup>42</sup> *Id.* at 12-13.

<sup>43</sup> *Id.* at 14-15.

<sup>44</sup> *Halo Wireless, Inc.'s Pre-hearing Memorandum*, p.1 (January 6, 2012).

<sup>45</sup> Russ Wiseman Pre-filed Direct Testimony, p. 2 (December 19, 2011).

<sup>46</sup> *Halo Wireless, Inc.'s Pre-hearing Memorandum*, p. 2 (January 6, 2012).

<sup>47</sup> *Id.* at 2-3.

<sup>48</sup> *Id.* at 1.

offers enhanced capabilities.<sup>49</sup> Transcom is an end-user, not a carrier.<sup>50</sup> Therefore, Halo argues that it is a CMRS carrier selling wireless telephone exchange service to an ESP end-user and its traffic is not wireline-originated.<sup>51</sup> All of the calls received from Transcom within a particular MTA are terminated in the same MTA, so that all of the traffic is subject to local charges in the ICA.<sup>52</sup>

Halo argues that it does not alter or delete call detail in violation of the ICA.<sup>53</sup> Halo populates the CN parameter with the Billing Telephone Number ("BTN") of its end-user customer - Transcom.<sup>54</sup> AT&T alleges improper modification of signaling information related to the CN parameter, but the basis of this claim once again results from the assertion that Transcom is a carrier rather than an end-user.<sup>55</sup> Halo is exactly following industry practice applicable to an exchange carrier providing telephone exchange service to an end-user, and in particular a communications-intensive business end-user with sophisticated Customer Premises Equipment ("CPE").<sup>56</sup>

Halo asserts that it does not owe facilities charges to AT&T.<sup>57</sup> Under the ICA, AT&T may only charge for interconnection facilities when AT&T-provided facilities are used by Halo to reach the mutually agreed Point of Interconnection ("POI").<sup>58</sup> Under the terms of the ICA, the POI is where Halo's network ends.<sup>59</sup> AT&T is attempting to shift cost responsibility for what it calls facilities" to Halo when the ICA assigns responsibility to AT&T because the "facilities" are all on AT&T's side of the POI.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> *Id.*

<sup>50</sup> *Id.* at 4.

<sup>51</sup> *Id.* at 4-6.

<sup>52</sup> *Id.* at 1.

<sup>53</sup> *Id.* at 6-8.

<sup>54</sup> *Id.* at 8.

<sup>55</sup> *Id.*; see also Russ Wiseman Pre-filed Direct Testimony pp. 26-28 (December 19, 2011).

<sup>56</sup> *Id.*

<sup>57</sup> *Id.* at 9-14.

<sup>58</sup> *Id.* at 9.

<sup>59</sup> *Id.*

<sup>60</sup> *Id.* at 14.

## FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

### Jurisdiction

Throughout these proceedings, Halo has raised objections and challenged the jurisdiction of the Authority to consider the *Complaint* in this matter. The Authority finds that it has jurisdiction to consider the *Complaint* pursuant to both federal and state law. The Authority approved the interconnection agreement between AT&T Tennessee and Halo by order dated June 21, 2010 in TRA Docket No. 10-00063.<sup>61</sup> Interconnection agreements are reviewable and enforceable by the Authority pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252 and, in instances where the “market regulation” statute applies, are enforceable pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-5-109(m). Further, the Authority has jurisdiction over complaints concerning telecommunications service providers who have elected “market regulation” such as AT&T, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-5-109(m). Halo did not object to the Authority’s jurisdiction to approve the interconnection agreement that now lies at the center of this dispute.<sup>62</sup>

The District Court, in its Order remanding this matter back to the Authority, also recognized the TRA’s jurisdiction over the interpretation of the ICA. The District Court explained the respective roles of the Court and the Authority, stating:

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“the Act”) requires that all ICAs be approved by a state regulatory commission before they become effective. State commissions such as the TRA have authority to approve and disapprove interconnection agreements, such as the one at issue herein. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(1). That authority includes the authority to interpret and enforce the provisions of agreements that the state commissions have approved. *Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utility Comm’n of Texas*, 208 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2000); *Millennium One Communications, Inc. v. Public Utility Comm’n of Texas*, 361 F.Supp.2d 634, 636 (W.D. Tex. 2005). Federal district courts have jurisdiction to review interpretation

<sup>61</sup> See *In Re: Petition For Approval Of The Interconnection Agreement and Amendment Thereto Between BellSouth dba AT&T Tennessee and Halo Wireless, Inc.*, Docket No. 10-00063, Order Approving the Interconnection Agreement and Amendment Thereto (June 21, 2010).

<sup>62</sup> See *In Re: Petition for Approval of the Interconnection Agreement and Amendment Thereto Between BellSouth dba AT&T Tennessee and Halo Wireless, Inc.*, Docket No. 10-00063.

and enforcement decisions of the state commissions. *Id.*; *Southwestern Bell* at p. 480, 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6). Here, as noted above, there is no state commission determination to review.

In *Central Telephone Co. of Virginia v. Sprint Communications Co. of Virginia, Inc.*, 759 F.Supp.2d 772 (E.D. Va. 2011), the court held that federal district courts have federal question jurisdiction to interpret and enforce an ICA, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. *Id.* at 778; see also *BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. MCI Metro Access Transmission Servs., Inc.*, 317 F.3d 1270, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2003) (federal courts have jurisdiction under Section 1331 to hear challenges to state commission orders interpreting ICAs because they arise under federal law) and *Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. MCI Metro Access Transmission Servs.*, 323 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2003) (federal courts have jurisdiction to review state commission orders for compliance with federal law). Although these cases involved state commission orders, their holdings provide guidance on this issue.

Based on the reasoning in the above-cited cases, the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the ICAs arise under federal law. As stated in *Verizon Maryland*, ICAs are federally mandated agreements and to the extent the ICA imposes a duty consistent with the Act, that duty is a federal requirement. *Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Global NAPS, Inc.*, 377 F.3d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 2004).

The fact that this Court has jurisdiction does not end the matter, however. The fact that the Court *could* hear this action does not necessarily mean the Court *should* hear this action. Although the Act details how parties, states and federal courts can draft and approve ICAs, it is silent on how and in what fora parties can enforce ICAs. *Global NAPS, Inc. v. Verizon New England Inc.*, 603 F.3d 71, 83 (1st Cir. 2010). Because the Act does not specifically mandate exhaustion of state action, whether to construe the Act as prescribing an exhaustion requirement is a matter for the Court's discretionary judgment. *Ohio Bell Tel. Co., Inc. v. Global NAPS Ohio, Inc.*, 540 F.Supp.2d 914, 919 (S.D. Ohio 2008).

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that interpretation and enforcement actions that arise after a state commission has approved an ICA must be litigated in the first instance before the relevant state commission. *Core Communications, Inc. v. Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc.*, 493 F.3d 333, 344 (3d Cir. 2007). A party may then proceed to federal court to seek review of the commission's decision. *Id.* Citing *Core*, a district court in Ohio has also held that a complainant is required to first litigate its breach-of-ICA claims before the state commission in order to seek review in the district court. *Ohio Bell*, 540 F.Supp.2d at 919-920 (citing cases from numerous district courts).

On the other hand, in *Central Telephone*, the court held that a party to an ICA is not required to exhaust administrative remedies by bringing claims for breach of an ICA first to a state commission. *Central Telephone*, 759 F.Supp.2d at 778 and 786.

The Court agrees with the reasoning of the *Core* and *Ohio Bell* opinions. The Act provides for judicial review of a “determination” by the state commission. Until such determination is made, the Court cannot exercise this judicial review. *See Ohio Bell*, 540 F.Supp.2d at 919. As the *Core* court stated: “a state commission’s authority to approve or reject an interconnection agreement would itself be undermined if it lacked authority to determine in the first instance the meaning of an agreement that it has approved.” *Core*, 493 F.3d at 343 (citing *BellSouth Telecommunications*, 317 F.3d at 1278, n.9).<sup>63</sup>

The Authority is mindful, however, of the restrictions placed upon these proceedings by the Order of the Bankruptcy Court. In an Order issued on October 26, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court ruled that “pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 . . . is not applicable to currently pending State Commission Proceedings,” including proceedings brought by AT&T.<sup>64</sup> However, the Bankruptcy Court further stated that

any regulatory proceedings . . . may be advanced to a conclusion and a decision in respect of such matters may be rendered; provided however, that nothing herein shall permit, as part of such proceedings:

- A. liquidation of the amount of any claim against the Debtor; or
- B. any action which affects the debtor-creditor relationship between the Debtor and any creditor or potential creditor.<sup>65</sup>

Therefore, nothing in this Order is intended to permit as part of these proceedings the liquidation of the amount of any claim against Halo or to affect the debtor-creditor relationship between the Parties beyond that permitted in the Bankruptcy Court’s October 26, 2011 Order.

#### AT&T’s Complaint - Count 1

Count 1 of the *Complaint* alleges that Halo has breached the ICA by impermissibly sending traffic originating from wireline telephones to AT&T, although the interconnection agreement only

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<sup>63</sup> *BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Halo Wireless, Inc.*, Case No. 3-11-0795, M.D. Tenn., *Memorandum*, pp. 4-6 (November 1, 2011).

<sup>64</sup> *In re: Halo Wireless, Inc.*, Case No. 11-42464, Bkrtcy. E. D. Tex., *Order Granting Motion of the AT&T Companies to Determine Automatic Stay Inapplicable and for Relief from the Automatic Stay*, p. 1 (October 26, 2011).

<sup>65</sup> *In re: Halo Wireless, Inc.*, Case No. 11-42464, Bkrtcy. E. D. Tex., *Order Granting Motion of the AT&T Companies to Determine Automatic Stay Inapplicable and for Relief from the Automatic Stay*, p. 2.

permits Halo to send AT&T traffic that originates from wireless networks. The applicable language from the interconnection agreement reads:

Whereas, the Parties have agreed that this Agreement will apply only to (1) traffic that originates on AT&T's network or is transited through AT&T's network and is routed to Carrier's wireless network for wireless termination by Carrier; and (2) traffic that originates through wireless transmitting and receiving facilities before [Halo] delivers traffic to AT&T for termination by AT&T or for transit to another network.<sup>66</sup>

The Authority interprets the language of the ICA to require Halo only to deliver traffic that has originated through wireless transmitting and receiving facilities. Thus, evidence that Halo has delivered wireline-originated traffic will result in a finding that Halo has breached the ICA.

The Authority has reviewed Halo's *ex parte* filings with the FCC in the *Connect America Fund* docket, where the description of Halo and Transcom's operations is the same as that which has been presented to the TRA in this proceeding. Indeed, reviewing the *ex parte* filings made by Halo makes it clear that the FCC was aware of Halo's assertion that it provided service to ESPs and used wireless technology. In the resulting *Connect America Fund Order*, the FCC addressed and rejected Halo's assertion that traffic from its customer Transcom is wirelessly originated. The *Connect America Fund Order* states:

We first address a dispute regarding the interpretation of the intraMTA rule. Halo Wireless (Halo) asserts that it offers "Common Carrier wireless exchange services to ESP and enterprise customers" in which the customer "connects wirelessly to Halo base stations in each MTA." It further asserts that its "high volume" service is CMRS because "the customer connects to Halo's base station using wireless equipment which is capable of operation while in motion." Halo argues that, for purposes of applying the intraMTA rule, "[t]he origination point for Halo traffic is the base station to which Halo's customers connect wirelessly." On the other hand, ERTA claims that Halo's traffic is not from its own retail customers but is instead from a number of other LECs, CLECs, and CMRS providers. NTCA further submitted an analysis of call records for calls received by some of its member rural LECs from Halo indicating that most of the calls either did not originate on a CMRS line or were not intraMTA, and that even if CMRS might be used "in the middle,"

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<sup>66</sup> J. Scott McPhee, Pre-filed Direct Testimony, pp. 6-7 (December 19, 2011).

this does not affect the categorization of the call for intercarrier compensation purposes. These parties thus assert that by characterizing access traffic as intraMTA reciprocal compensation traffic, Halo is failing to pay the requisite compensation to terminating rural LECs for a very large amount of traffic. Responding to this dispute, CTIA asserts that “it is unclear whether the intraMTA rules would even apply in that case.”<sup>67</sup>

After clearly describing the operations of Halo, including its use of wireless technology and relationship with Transcom, the FCC found that calls are not originated by Transcom and that wireline originated calls are not reclassified as wireless calls because of a wireless link in the middle of the call path. The FCC in the *Connect America Fund Order* continues:

We clarify that a call is considered to be originated by a CMRS provider for purposes of the intraMTA rule only if the calling party initiating the call has done so through a CMRS provider. Where a provider is merely providing a transiting service, it is well established that a transiting carrier is not considered the originating carrier for purposes of the reciprocal compensation rules. Thus, we agree with NECA that the “re-origination” of a call over a wireless link in the middle of the call path does not convert a wireline-originated call into a CMRS-originated call for purposes of reciprocal compensation and we disagree with Halo’s contrary position.<sup>68</sup>

The Authority agrees with the FCC’s rejection of Halo’s assertions and finds that the “re-origination” of a call over a wireless link in the middle of the call path does not convert a wireline-originated call into a wireless-originated call for purposes of reciprocal compensation.

Nor does Halo deny that it is sending traffic that originated on the wireline PSTN.<sup>69</sup> In response to the question, “Do you admit that some of the communications in issue actually started on other networks?” Halo’s witness Mr. Wiseman responds “Most of the calls probably did start on other networks before they came to Transcom for processing. It would not surprise me if some of them started on the PSTN.”<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> *Connect America Fund Order*, ¶ 1005 (footnotes omitted). The term “CLEC” refers to Competitive Local Exchange Carrier.

<sup>68</sup> *Connect America Fund Order*, ¶ 1006 (footnotes omitted).

<sup>69</sup> The term “PSTN” refers to the Public Switched Telephone Network, which means the calls were originated on the landline network.

<sup>70</sup> Russ Wiseman, Pre-filed Direct Testimony, p. 14 (December 19, 2011).

AT&T's traffic study also demonstrates that Halo has delivered wireline traffic to AT&T. AT&T estimates that about 74% of the traffic Halo sends to AT&T originates on the networks of landline carriers.<sup>71</sup> Even though Halo does not deny it has likely sent wireline traffic to AT&T, it contests the accuracy of AT&T's traffic study. Halo's arguments against AT&T's traffic study are: (1) that telephone numbers are an unreliable indicator of who originates a call, if wireless technology is used for the call and where the call originates and (2) calls that originate using IP technology are not landline calls.

The Authority acknowledges that a certain degree of imprecision can occur when analyzing the origin to individual telephone calls, due to factors such as the advent of number portability and the growth of wireless and IP telephony. However, because of these technical issues, the industry has developed conventions and practices to evaluate calls for the purpose of intercarrier compensation. The Authority finds that the methodology used to collect the data and the interpretation of the data in the AT&T study are based upon common industry practices to classify whether traffic is originated on wireline or wireless networks. In addition, the Authority finds that the convention of collecting data for a single week is sufficient to demonstrate whether wireline traffic was sent to AT&T by Halo. Further, Halo identifies several calls included in AT&T's traffic study as likely being IP-originated,<sup>72</sup> which is considered by the industry to be wireline-originated for the purpose of intercarrier compensation rules.<sup>73</sup>

Based upon the Authority's agreement with the FCC's dispositive decision in the *Connect America Fund Order*, Halo's admission that it has delivered wireline-originated and IP-originated traffic to AT&T, and the information contained in AT&T's traffic study, the Authority finds that Halo has materially breached its interconnection agreement with AT&T.

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<sup>71</sup> Mark Neinast, Pre-filed Direct Testimony, pp. 3, 11 and Attachment MN-3 (December 19, 2011).

<sup>72</sup> Russ Wiseman, Pre-filed Rebuttal Testimony, pp. 8-9 (January 3, 2012).

<sup>73</sup> Mark Neinast, Pre-filed Rebuttal Testimony, p. 6 (January 3, 2012).

AT&T's Complaint - Count 2

Count 2 of the *Complaint* alleges that Halo breached its interconnection agreement with AT&T by improperly altering call detail information that allows AT&T to properly classify calls for the purpose of intercarrier compensation. Section XIV.G of the ICA requires:

The parties will provide each other with the proper call information, including all proper translations for routing between networks and any information necessary for billing where BellSouth provides recording capabilities. This exchange of information is required to enable each party to bill properly.<sup>74</sup>

In addition, Section XIV.E of the ICA also requires Halo to provide many types of call detail information, including the Charge Number.

In most cases, industry members use the Calling Party Number ("CPN") to determine whether a call is jurisdictionally long-distance or local. In rare cases a CN is included in the call detail record to indicate the number that will actually be financially responsible for the call. For example, some businesses want all calls made by its employees in a particular office to be billed to single number. Halo admits that it uses Transcom's BTN to populate the CN fields on traffic since February 2011.<sup>75</sup>

As with Count 1, the Authority finds that the FCC's *Connect America Fund Order* dispositively resolves this issue. Because the FCC dismisses "re-origination" by Transcom, Transcom clearly cannot be the originating entity and thus inserting Transcom's number as the Charge Number is inappropriate. Therefore, because Halo has improperly altered call detail information, the Authority finds that Halo has materially breached its interconnection agreement with AT&T.

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<sup>74</sup> *Complaint*, p. 4 (July 26, 2011).

<sup>75</sup> Russ Wiseman, Pre-filed Direct Testimony, pp. 29-30 (December 19, 2011).

### AT&T's Complaint – Count 3

Count 3 of the *Complaint* alleges that Halo has not properly compensated AT&T for the traffic it has delivered. Halo has been paying AT&T reciprocal compensation, which is only appropriate if the end-user initiated the call wirelessly within the MTA in which it is terminated, instead of switched access charges, which are appropriate for wireline-originated calls. The FCC's decision in the *Connect America Fund Order*, with which the Authority concurs, is that Halo's traffic does not originate within an MTA with its customer Transcom. In addition, AT&T's traffic study demonstrates that AT&T terminated calls that originated outside the MTA where it was terminated. Further, Halo's use of MTA specific numbers to assert a 100% intra-MTA factor necessarily implies that switched access charges were avoided since Transcom was not the true originating party.

The Authority's findings on Counts 1 and 2 of the *Complaint* concerning the wireline and IP-origination of Halo's traffic necessarily lead to the conclusion that Halo has not been properly compensating AT&T for the traffic it has delivered. The payment of reciprocal compensation is only appropriate if the end-user, which is not Transcom, initiated the call wirelessly within the MTA where it is terminated. Thus, Halo has failed to compensate AT&T for calls where it was due switched access charges. Therefore, the Authority finds that Halo is liable to AT&T Tennessee for access charges on the interstate and intrastate interLATA and intraLATA landline traffic it has sent to AT&T Tennessee.

### AT&T's Complaint - Count 4

Count 4 of the *Complaint* alleges that Halo has refused to pay AT&T for transport facilities. Section V.B, page 10 of the ICA states:

BellSouth will bear the cost of the two-way trunk group for the proportion of the facility utilized for the delivery of BellSouth originated Local traffic to Carrier's POI within BellSouth's service territory and within the LATA (calculated based on the number of minutes of traffic identified as BellSouth's divided by the total minutes of use on the facility), and Carrier will provide or bear the cost of the two-way trunk group for all other traffic, including Intermediary traffic.<sup>76</sup>

Halo does not dispute that it terminates all of its traffic on AT&T's network, but it does dispute AT&T's charges for the two-way trunk groups that connect the Parties. Halo details the arrangement of facilities with which it connects to AT&T in various locations, and it cites from FCC rules to argue that AT&T cannot charge Halo for facilities on AT&T's side of the POI.<sup>77</sup> This line of reasoning might be appropriate if Halo were a CLEC. However, Halo is not a CLEC but rather a CMRS provider, and under the ICA it signed with AT&T, each party is required to pay its share of the facilities cost. The Authority finds that Halo owes AT&T for the proportionate share of the facilities that connect Halo's Point of Presence ("POP") to AT&T's network as required by the ICA. The ICA allocates the costs of facilities based on the proportion of traffic each party sends to the other party, and since Halo sends 100 % of its traffic to AT&T, the Authority finds that Halo should pay 100% of the cost for these facilities as required by the ICA.

#### Transcom Is Not an Enhanced Service Provider

The FCC has established a bright-line rule that the "enhanced" service designation does not apply to services that merely "facilitate establishment of a basic transmission path over which a telephone call may be completed, without altering the fundamental character of the telephone service," and that a service is not "enhanced" when the service does not alter the fundamental character of the service *from the end-user's perspective*.<sup>78</sup> Thus, for example, the FCC has held that

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<sup>76</sup> Mark Neinast, Pre-filed Direct Testimony, p.19 (December 19, 2011).

<sup>77</sup> Russ Wiseman, Pre-filed Direct Testimony, p. 41 (December 19, 2011).

<sup>78</sup> *Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934*, 11 FCC Rcd. 21905, ¶ 107 (1996).

services are not “enhanced” when customers use the same dialing method for allegedly “enhanced” calls that they would for any other call,<sup>79</sup> or where the alleged “enhancement” was made “without the advance knowledge or consent of the customer” that placed the call and the customer is not “provided with the ‘capability’ to do anything other than make a telephone call.”<sup>80</sup>

The Authority finds that Transcom’s services fail to meet the FCC’s bright-line rule, since the record in this proceeding indicates that Transcom provides no services to actual end-users and does not offer any enhancements discernable to the person that actually places the call.<sup>81</sup> The record also supports the conclusion that end-users are completely unaware that Transcom is even involved in call delivery.<sup>82</sup> Nor does Halo’s testimony prove that Transcom is an ESP. Halo asserts that Transcom

... employs computer processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the received information. The platform will provide the customer additional, different, or restructured information. This is done by generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing or making available information via telecommunications.<sup>83</sup>

However, despite the claim of computer processing of data, Transcom only reduces background noise and inserts “comfort noise” in periods of silence so that those periods of silence are not mistaken for the end of a call.<sup>84</sup> The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission rejected a similar claim relating to Transcom’s services, finding that “the removal of background noise” and

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<sup>79</sup> *Petition for Declaratory Ruling that AT&T’s Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony Services are Exempt from Access Charges*, 19 FCC Rcd. 7457, ¶ 15 (2004) (“*IP-in-the-Middle Order*”).

<sup>80</sup> *AT&T Corp. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding Enhanced Prepaid Calling Card Services*, 20 FCC Rcd. 4826, ¶ 16, n. 28 (2005) (“*AT&T Calling Card Decision*”).

<sup>81</sup> Mark Neinast, Pre-filed Rebuttal Testimony, p. 5 (January 3, 2012).

<sup>82</sup> *Id.*

<sup>83</sup> Robert Johnson, Pre-filed Rebuttal Testimony, p. 12 (January 3, 2012).

<sup>84</sup> *Id.* at 12-13.

“the insertion of white noise” do not make Transcom an ESP.<sup>85</sup> The alleged “enhancements” that Transcom claims it makes to calls that transit its network are simply processes to improve the quality of the call. Telecommunications networks have been routinely making those types of improvements for years and, in some cases, decades. Carriers have routinely incorporated equipment into networks that have, for example, expanded the dynamic range of a voice call to improve clarity. The conversion from analog to digital and back to analog has significantly improved call quality, yet none of these processes are deemed “enhancements” in the sense of an ESP.<sup>86</sup> For the reasons above, the Authority finds that Transcom is not an ESP for this particular traffic.

**IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:**

1. Halo Wireless Inc.’s *Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice* is denied.
2. BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC d/b/a AT&T Tennessee is authorized to terminate the interconnection agreement previously approved by the Authority in TRA Docket No. 10-00063 and to stop accepting traffic from Halo Wireless, Inc.
3. Halo Wireless, Inc. is liable to BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC d/b/a AT&T Tennessee for access charges on the interstate and intrastate interLATA and intraLATA landline traffic it has sent to AT&T Tennessee thus far and for the interconnection facilities it has obtained from AT&T Tennessee. However, nothing in this Order is intended to permit as part of these proceedings the liquidation of the amount of any claim against Halo or to affect the debtor-creditor relationship between the Parties beyond that permitted in the *Order Granting Motion of the AT&T*

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


<sup>85</sup> *Palmerton Tel. Co. v. Global NAPS South, Inc., et al.*, PA PUC Docket No. C-2009-2093336, 2011 WL 1259661, at 16-17 (Penn. PUC, March 16, 2010). (“We find that Transcom does not supply GNAPS with ‘enhanced’ traffic under applicable federal rules”). Note that the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission specifically rejected the Transcom Bankruptcy Court’s April 28, 2005 Memorandum Opinion finding Transcom to be an ESP on the basis that Transcom had indicated in that proceeding that it provided “data communications services over private IP networks (VoIP).” *Id.* The Authority is not persuaded by the Transcom bankruptcy court rulings regarding Transcom’s status as an ESP, either.

<sup>86</sup> *Id.*

*Companies to Determine Automatic Stay Inapplicable and for Relief From the Automatic Stay* [Dkt. No. 13], issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division, in Case No. 11-42464-btr-11 on October 26, 2011. AT&T Tennessee may pursue further action for the collection of access charges or facilities charges in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division, or other appropriate fora as permitted by that Court.

4. Any party aggrieved by the Authority's decision in this matter may file a Petition for Reconsideration with the Authority within fifteen days from the date of this Order.

5. Any party aggrieved by the Authority's decision in this matter has the right to judicial review by filing a Petition for Review in the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, within sixty days from the date of this Order.

  
Kenneth C. Hill, Chairman  
Sara Kyle, Director  
Mary W. Freeman, Director