

**STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA  
UTILITIES COMMISSION  
RALEIGH**

DOCKET NO. P-19, SUB 454

BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

In the Matter of	
Petition of Verizon South, Inc., for Declaratory	)
Ruling that Verizon is Not Required to Transit	)
InterLATA EAS Traffic between Third Party	)
Carriers and Request for Order Requiring	)
Carolina Telephone and Telegraph Company	)
to Adopt Alternative Transport Method	)
	ORDER DENYING PETITION

BY THE COMMISSION: On January 30, 2002, the Commission issued an Order establishing extended area service (EAS) between the Durham exchange of Verizon South, Inc. (Verizon), the Pittsboro exchange of Carolina Telephone and Telegraph Company (Carolina or, collectively with Central Telephone Company, Sprint), and the Hillsborough exchange of Central Telephone Company (Central or, collectively with Carolina Telephone and Telegraph Company, Sprint) (the EAS Order).<sup>1</sup> This EAS was implemented on June 7, 2002. EAS from the Durham exchange to the Pittsboro exchange and zero-rated expanded local calling from the Durham exchange to the Hillsborough exchange were implemented earlier in the tax flow-through docket, Docket No. P-100, Sub 149.

Shortly after the EAS was implemented, the Public Staff began receiving complaints from customers in the Pittsboro exchange who were unable to complete calls to numbers in the Verizon Durham exchange as either local or toll calls. On investigating these complaints, the Public Staff learned that Verizon was blocking calls from the Pittsboro exchange to competing local provider (CLP) and commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) end-users in the Durham exchange. Verizon stated that it blocked the calls because "the proper interconnections between the CLPs, CMRSs and Sprint have not yet been established."<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, the Public Staff learned that Verizon had also begun blocking calls from Central's Roxboro exchange to CLP customers in Durham, calls that it previously had been completing. The Roxboro/Durham route is a two-way interLATA EAS route that has been in service since February 14, 1998. IntraLATA EAS calls from the Hillsborough exchange to CLP end-users in Durham have not been blocked. In its letters

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<sup>1</sup> *In the Matter of Carolina Telephone and Telegraph Company – Hillsborough and Pittsboro to Durham Extended Area Service, Order Approving Extended Area Service, Docket No. P-7, Sub 894 (January 30, 2002).*

<sup>2</sup> See Verizon's letters from Joe Foster to Nat Carpenter dated July 11, 2002, and October 31, 2002, attached as Exhibits A and B to Verizon's Petition.

to the Public Staff, Verizon agreed to discontinue its blocking until the matter had been resolved by the Commission.

On December 9, 2002, Verizon filed a Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Petition) requesting "that the Commission issue a ruling clarifying that Verizon is not required to transit Sprint's InterLATA EAS traffic destined to third party CLPs/CMRS providers" and "that the Commission direct Sprint to cease delivering traffic destined for third-parties to Verizon and make alternative arrangements for proper delivery of such traffic."

On December 10, 2002, the Commission issued an Order seeking comments and reply comments. Petitions to intervene have been filed by The Alliance of North Carolina Independent Telephone Companies (the Alliance); BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., (BellSouth); AT&T Communications of the Southern States, LLC, (AT&T); ALLTEL Carolina, Inc., and ALLTEL Communications, Inc., (collectively, ALLTEL); KMC Telecom, Inc. (KMC); ITC^DeltaCom, Inc., (ITC); Level 3 Communications, Inc., (Level 3); US LEC of North Carolina, Inc., (US LEC); and Barnardsville Telephone Company, Saluda Mountain Telephone Company, and Service Telephone Company (collectively, TDS Companies). All petitions to intervene were allowed.

ITC, Level 3 and KMC, US LEC, Sprint, the Public Staff, BellSouth, and AT&T filed initial comments. Verizon, the Alliance, Sprint, and the Public Staff filed reply comments.

On May 16, 2003, the Commission issued an Order scheduling an oral argument on June 19, 2003, to consider:

(1) Whether Verizon is legally obligated to perform a transiting function or to act as a billing intermediary in regards to third-party traffic, and

(2) If so, the principles that should inform the rates, terms and conditions for such services and the appropriate procedure for arriving at a decision about them.

On May 23, 2003, Verizon filed a Motion for Clarification requesting that the Commission make clear that the oral argument would address only legal and not factual issues. On June 3, 2003, Sprint filed a response to Verizon's Motion for Clarification in which it argued that the only issues to be resolved in this matter are legal.

On June 5, 2003, the Presiding Commissioner issued an Order clarifying that the purpose of the oral argument was to decide whether Verizon is obligated as a matter of law pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996<sup>3</sup> and other applicable provisions of law to perform a transiting function or to act as a billing intermediary with regards to third-party traffic with particular reference to the third-party interLATA EAS calls at issue in this docket. The Order reserved to Commissioners the right to ask questions of the

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3 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 *et seq.*, "the Act."

participants at the oral argument bearing upon the regulatory process should the matter be decided in one way or another.

The oral argument was heard by the Commission, Commissioner Joyner presiding, on July 15, 2002.

On August 29, 2003, the Commission received briefs and/or proposed orders from the following: Verizon, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. (BellSouth), Sprint, the Public Staff, AT&T Communications of the Southern States, Inc. (AT&T), and US LEC of North Carolina, Inc (US LEC). Of these, Sprint, the Public Staff, AT&T, and US LEC may be classified as proponents of the duty to provide the transiting function as a matter of law, while Verizon and BellSouth may be classified as opponents. Since the arguments of the proponents are largely the same, their arguments will be summarized collectively as those of the "Proponents." Likewise, those of Verizon and BellSouth will be summarized collectively as those of the "Opponents." Since many of the citations to the law are the same, but with the Opponents and Proponents putting a different construction on them, the text of the most common citations is set out below.

#### Most Common Citations

##### Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TA96)

Sec. 251(a) General Duty of Telecommunications Carriers.—Each telecommunications carrier has the duty—

- (1) to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers....

Sec. 251(b) Obligations of All Local Exchange Carriers—Each local exchange carrier has the following duties....

- (5) Reciprocal Compensation.—The duty to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications.

Sec. 251(c) Additional Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers.—In addition to the duties contained in subsection (b), each incumbent local exchange carrier has the following duties:....

- (2) Interconnection.—The duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange carrier's network--

- (A) for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access;
- (B) at any technically feasible point within the carrier's network;
- (C) that is at least equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange carrier to itself...or any other party to which the carrier provides interconnection; and

reasons as generally set forth by the Proponents. Accordingly, Verizon's Petition for Declaratory ruling in its favor is denied.

The Commission is persuaded that a transit obligation can be well supported under both state and federal law. The Commission does not agree with the Opponents' view that duties and obligations under TA96 do not or cannot exist separately from their incarnation in particular interconnection agreements pursuant to the negotiation and arbitration process—or, as Verizon put it, "[TA96] contemplates only duties that are to be codified in interconnection agreements, not duties that apply independent of interconnection agreements."

Aside from not being compelled by the history, structure, or real-world context of TA96, the "interconnection agreements-only" approach suggested by the Opponents would lead to a number of undesirable, even absurd, results. For example, it would call into question the status of generic dockets, which are an efficient means by which the Commission can resolve interconnection issues arising under TA96 *en masse*. Apparently, the state commissions would be limited to arbitrating interconnection agreements one-by-one. There is simply no evidence that Congress intended to abolish generic dockets by the states; indeed, quite the opposite is suggested. See, for example, Section 251(d)(3) (Preservation of State Access Regulations). As a practical consequence, adoption of the Opponents' view would immoderately multiply the number of interconnection agreements—and the economic costs relating to entering into them—because the corollary of the Opponents' view is that, in order to fully effectuate rights and obligations, everyone must have an interconnection agreement with everybody else, even if the amount of traffic exchanged is minimal. The overall impact would be a tendency to stifle competition by the imposition of uneconomic costs as, for example, by the construction of redundant facilities.

If there were no obligation to provide transit service, the ubiquity of the telecommunications network would be impaired. Indeed, in a small way this has already happened in this case when Verizon refused to transit certain traffic. It should also be noted that the privilege of initiating arbitration proceedings is not symmetrical. Even if an ILEC, such as a smaller one with less than 200,000 access lines, urgently desires an interconnection agreement from a CLP or CMRS, it may not be able to get one. These effects illustrate the ultimate unsupportability of the Opponents' view of their obligations as ILECs to interconnect indirectly—essentially, as matters of grace, rather than duty.

The fact of the matter is that transit traffic is not a new thing. It has been around since "ancient" times in telecommunications terms. The reason that it has assumed new prominence since the enactment of TA96 is that there are now many more carriers involved—notably, the new CMRS providers and the CLPs—and the amount of traffic has increased significantly. Few, if any, thought about complaining about transit traffic until recently. It strains credulity to believe that Congress in TA96 intended, in effect, to impair this ancient practice and make it merely a matter of grace on the part of ILECs, when doing

so would inevitably have a tendency to thwart the very purposes that TA96 was designed to allow and encourage.

The Opponents rely heavily on the *Virginia Arbitration Order* for the proposition that there is no obligation to provide the transit function. The *Order* was not meant to bear such a heavy burden. A close examination of the *Order* yields a more equivocal conclusion. The fact is that the FCC, as is the case in many matters, has not definitively made its mind up on the matter. In the meantime, the telecommunications market and its regulation march on. As much as we would wish for definitive guidance from the FCC, the states cannot always wait for that body to rule one way or another—or somewhere in between.

The Opponents have urged that, in any event, the states are preempted from relying on state law to create a transit obligation. This would seem to follow logically from their view that TA96 has established a comprehensive "interconnection agreements-only" approach. The Commission, as noted above, views this approach as insupportable. In fact, it should be clear that Congress contemplated that states *do* have a role in establishing interconnection obligations as long as they do not thwart the provisions and purposes of Section 251. As alluded to earlier, Sec. 251(d)(3) of TA96 specifically provides that "[i]n prescribing and enforcing regulations to implement the requirements of this section, the Commission shall not preclude the enforcement of any regulation, order, or policy of a State commission that (A) establishes access and interconnection obligations of local exchange carriers; (B) is consistent with the requirements of this section; and (C) does not substantially prevent implementation of the requirements of this section and the purposes of this part." It is significant that the wording of this provision mentions both state "policies" and the "purposes" of Sec. 251. It is also useful to observe that the Opponents' "interconnection agreements-only" view would "read out" this savings provision and render it nugatory, because anything done outside of interconnection agreements would, according to the Opponents, be contradictory to Sec. 251. This is yet another example of the consequences of the Opponents' idiosyncratic interpretation of TA96. Establishing a transit obligation and defining reasonable terms and conditions is well within a state's purview, even *arguendo* that no such positive obligation can be derived from TA96.

The real challenge facing the industry and the Commission is not whether there is a legal obligation for ILECs to provide a transit service. The Commission is convinced that there is. The Commission is confident that, should the FCC ever address the issue, it will find the same. The *real* question is what should be the rates, terms and conditions for the provision of that service. Those are matters included or includible under Docket No. P-100, Sub 151. Certainly, interconnection agreements are by and large desirable things, and as many companies as practicable should enter into them. No one really denies that. But it is not always practicable because, among other things, the privilege of petitioning for arbitration under Sec. 252 of TA96 is not symmetrical. This simply reinforces the case that, ultimately, there may need to be a default provision made for those that do not have such agreements or cannot interconnect directly. In such cases, this *may* require ILECs as intermediaries. The equities of the situation are reasonably straightforward—those that


seek to terminate traffic should pay for its termination and the one that transits should be compensated for its services. This *may* also require that an ILEC perform a billing intermediary function—again for reasonable compensation. The system of ubiquitous interconnection and the seamless telecommunications network may well be compromised without this “fail-safe” device. The Commission will move expeditiously on Docket No. P-100, Sub 151 should negotiations come to naught.

IT IS, THEREFORE, SO ORDERED.

ISSUED BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION.

This the 22<sup>nd</sup> day of September, 2003.

NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Gail L. Mount". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly stylized font. The letters are dark and the ink appears to be on a light-colored surface.

Gail L. Mount, Deputy Clerk

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Commissioner Robert V. Owens, Jr. did not participate.