Exhibit No.: Issue(s): MEEIA Witness: William (Bill) R. Davis Type of Exhibit: Surrebuttal Testimony Sponsoring Party: Union Electric Company File No.: EO-2018-0211 Date Testimony Prepared: September 17, 2018

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

FILE NO. EO-2018-0211

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

WILLIAM ("Bill") R. DAVIS

ON

BEHALF OF

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY

d/b/a Ameren Missouri

St. Louis, Missouri September, 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY	2
III.	SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS	6
IV.	STAFF'S POSITION ENDS DEMAND-SIDE PROGRAMS	8
V.	THE MEEIA 2019-24 PLAN IS BENEFICAL TO ALL CUSTOMERS	10
VI.	THE PROPOSED EARNINGS OPPORTUNITY IS JUSTIFIED	19
VII.	MEEIA 2019-24 IS IMPLEMENTING THE IRP'S PREFERRED RESOURCE PLAN	23
VIII.	WHY A SIX-YEAR PLAN IS BETTER	26
IX.	COMPREHENSIVE PORTFOLIO OF PROGRAMS	31
X.	RESPONSE TO RIDER EEIC CONCERNS	40
XI.	MULTIFAMILY LOW-INCOME PROGRAM	44
XII.	COMBINED HEAT AND POWER	47
XIII.	PAYS AND ON-BILL FINANCING	49
XIV.	OTHER MISCELLANEOUS POINTS MADE IN REBUTTAL	52

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

WILLIAM (BILL) R. DAVIS

FILE NO. EO-2018-0211

1	I I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>			
2	Q. Please state your name and business address.			
3	A. My name is William (Bill) R. Davis and my business address is One			
4	Ameren Plaza, 1901 Chouteau Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri 63103.			
5	Q. What is your position with Ameren Missouri?			
6	A. I am the Director of Energy Efficiency and Renewables for Union Electric			
7	Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri ("Ameren Missouri" or "the Company").			
8	Q. Please describe your educational background and employment			
9	experience.			
10	A. I received a Bachelor of Science in Economics from Illinois State University			
11	in 2002. I subsequently received a Master of Science in Economics with an emphasis in			
12	regulatory economics from Illinois State University in 2003. I completed several			
13	internships during my college career, including an internship with Illinois Power Company.			
14	Upon completion of my master's degree, I began working full time for Caterpillar, Inc. at			
15	its corporate headquarters in Peoria, Illinois as an Advanced Quantitative Analyst in the			
16	Business Intelligence Group, with the primary duties of performing economic and sales			
17	analyses.			
18	In May 2005, I joined Ameren Services Company as a Load Research and			

19 Forecasting Specialist in the Corporate Planning Department. My duties included

1	electricity and natural gas sales forecasting, load research, weather normalization, and				
2	various other sales analyses. In September 2007, I became a Senior Load Research				
3	Specialist and then moved to the Resource Planning Group in March 2009. In October				
4	2011, I became a Senior Corporate Planning Analyst. In that position, I was responsible				
5	for Ameren Missouri's 2011 Integrated Resource Plan and the 2012 Missouri Energy				
6	Efficiency Investment Act ("MEEIA") filing. In March 2013, I was promoted to Manager				
7	of Economic Analysis and Pricing, where I was responsible for the Company's rate design,				
8	class cost of service, and various other regulatory matters. I was promoted to my current				
9	position in September 2016, where I am responsible for planning and operating the				
10	Company's demand-side programs.				
11	II. <u>PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY</u>				
12	Q. What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony?				
12 13	Q. What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony?A. My surrebuttal testimony responds to the Rebuttal Report submitted by the				
13	A. My surrebuttal testimony responds to the Rebuttal Report submitted by the				
13 14	A. My surrebuttal testimony responds to the Rebuttal Report submitted by the Missouri Public Service Commission Staff ("Staff"), and rebuttal testimonies filed by the				
13 14 15	A. My surrebuttal testimony responds to the Rebuttal Report submitted by the Missouri Public Service Commission Staff ("Staff"), and rebuttal testimonies filed by the Missouri Department of Economic Development – Division of Energy ("DE"), the Office				
13 14 15 16	A. My surrebuttal testimony responds to the Rebuttal Report submitted by the Missouri Public Service Commission Staff ("Staff"), and rebuttal testimonies filed by the Missouri Department of Economic Development – Division of Energy ("DE"), the Office of the Public Counsel ("OPC"), the Consumers Council of Missouri ("CCM"), the National				
13 14 15 16 17	A. My surrebuttal testimony responds to the Rebuttal Report submitted by the Missouri Public Service Commission Staff ("Staff"), and rebuttal testimonies filed by the Missouri Department of Economic Development – Division of Energy ("DE"), the Office of the Public Counsel ("OPC"), the Consumers Council of Missouri ("CCM"), the National Housing Trust ("NHT"), the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC"), and the Tower				
 13 14 15 16 17 18 	A. My surrebuttal testimony responds to the Rebuttal Report submitted by the Missouri Public Service Commission Staff ("Staff"), and rebuttal testimonies filed by the Missouri Department of Economic Development – Division of Energy ("DE"), the Office of the Public Counsel ("OPC"), the Consumers Council of Missouri ("CCM"), the National Housing Trust ("NHT"), the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC"), and the Tower Grove Neighborhoods Community Development Corporation ("Tower Grove"). In				

22 following topics addressed in each:

1	•	Summary of Key Points – A discussion of four key points that respond to
2		the positions of other parties: 1) demand-side programs are the lowest cost
3		and least risk long-term resource option; 2) the Company's plan benefits all
4		customers by reducing electricity bills and providing significant economic
5		benefits; 3) offering a robust and diverse set of programs is the most
6		effective strategy to maximize the benefit of demand-side programs for
7		nonparticipants; 4) the proposed earnings opportunity is clearly justified
8		based on the demonstrated forgone earnings on avoided or deferred
9		investment in future supply and delivery infrastructure, and is demonstrably
10		reasonable as shown by benchmarking against other jurisdictions.
11	•	Staff's Position Ends Demand-Side Programs – A discussion of why all
12		of the Company's demand-side programs would have to end if the Missouri
13		Public Service Commission ("Commission") were to agree with the
14		positions and underlying logic reflected in Staff's Rebuttal Report, and why
15		such a result would be severely detrimental to customers and demand-side
16		programs across the state and contrary to good regulatory policy.
17	•	MEEIA 2019-24 is Beneficial to All Customers – A discussion of why,
18		contrary to Staff's and OPC's positions, there are tremendous benefits to all
19		customers from the Company's proposed plan. In this section, I discuss and
20		quantify significantly more benefits that were not addressed in the
21		Company's original filing; including additional avoided transmission
22		expenses as well as the economic, environmental, and risk management
23		benefits. These additional benefits are ultimately "icing on the cake" to the

- 1already overwhelming benefits previously quantified. I also provide2updated customer impacts showing the reduction of rates caused by the3federal Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. Finally, I discuss how a robust and4diverse portfolio is a good strategy to produce benefits for all customers.
- Why a Six-Year Plan is Better A discussion of why a longer
 implementation period (i.e., longer MEEIA cycle) is consistent with the
 MEEIA goal of achieving all cost-effective demand-side savings. I also
 discuss how the proposed Integrated Resource Plan ("IRP") Check-In
 Process outlined in the Company's original filing effectively provides
 protections associated with future uncertainties.
- Comprehensive Portfolio of Programs A discussion of why it is
 important to follow a strategy of having robust and diverse offerings to
 customers, as well as the Company's response to Staff's comments and
 concerns about the Company's proposed programs.
- 15 Response to Rider EEIC Concerns Regarding Calculation of the 16 **Throughput Disincentive** – A discussion of the Company's responses to 17 four Staff concerns about the proposed Rider EEIC. Included in that 18 discussion is a recognition that there could be minor improvements, if 19 desired, to address the issues Staff raises relating to the inclusion of Demand 20 Response Net Energy ("DRENE") in Rider EEIC and custom measures. I 21 also provide responses about why it is important to maintain throughput 22 disincentive vintages for each program year to match evaluation results and

- why requiring a sunset clause on throughput disincentive recovery may
 unnecessarily limit legitimate cost recovery.
- Multifamily Low-Income Program A discussion of the various
 recommendations made by NHT, NRDC, and Tower Grove, including the
 recommendation to move budgets from the early years to later years to
 better reflect the long lead time common with achieving deeper customer
 savings in the multifamily market.
- Combined Heat and Power ("CHP") A discussion that demonstrates
 CHP does not qualify for inclusion in the proposed portfolio because it is
 not cost-effective and does not result in a modification of electricity
 consumption on the customer's side of the meter.
- PAYS and On-Bill Financing A discussion of the issues that plague the
 implementation of financing programs, together with recommendations for
 Commission action to move financing options forward.
- Other Miscellaneous Points Made In Rebuttal A discussion of the 15 16 Company's responses to various other items not addressed in the prior 17 points, including the following: treatment of certain non-cost-effective 18 measures based on Staff concerns, changes to measure incentive ranges 19 based on Staff concerns, CCM's request for the Company to support an 20 Energy Efficiency Equity baseline study, evaluation budgets in response to 21 OPC, Staff's comments on MEEIA rate design, and changes to proposed 22 program tariffs to point to the Company's energy efficiency homepage.

1	III. <u>SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS</u>
2	Q. What are your key points in response to the other parties' rebuttal
3	testimonies?
4	A. While I address all of the various issues raised in response to others' rebuttal
5	testimonies, there are a few key points that are critical to the Commission's decision.
6	First, the Company's IRP process has consistently demonstrated that demand-side
7	programs (energy efficiency and demand response) are the lowest cost long-term resource.
8	The IRP process in Missouri is intense and robust; therefore the Commission should have
9	confidence that a long-term commitment to demand-side resources is a quality "no regrets"
10	investment for customers. Staff and OPC express concern about future uncertainty, yet the
11	comprehensive IRP risk analysis shows demand-side resources perform the best in all
12	future scenarios. It is difficult to comprehend why Staff (and OPC, which did not provide
13	any comments on the Company's most recent triennial IRP filing) did not raise any issues
14	in the Company's very recent triennial IRP docket, only to now allege, just a few months
15	after that docket concluded, that the Company did not analyze supply-side and demand-
16	side resources on an equivalent basis and that the Company's avoided cost estimates are
17	substantially wrong. The fact remains that not only does the Company's proposed MEEIA
18	plan contribute to deferrals of future supply-side investment; it also effectively protects
19	customers from billions of dollars of risk associated with significant and sudden changes
20	in future supply-side generation needs. It also continues to be true that demand-side
21	programs are cost effective and provide the lowest cost means of reducing load.
22	Second, the proposed MEEIA plan is beneficial to all customers. In its initial filing,
23	the Company identified \$920 million in lifetime net benefits from the utility cost test

1 ("UCT") viewpoint and \$630 million in lifetime net benefits from the total resource cost 2 ("TRC") standpoint. Including inadvertently overlooked avoided transmission expenses 3 adds \$43 million more of lifetime savings to both perspectives. Contrary to Staff's and 4 OPC's positions, Company witness Matt Michels' surrebuttal testimony demonstrates the 5 reasonableness of those estimates and reiterates that they are grounded in the Commission's 6 IRP rules and best practices. As DE states, the Company's initial estimates were 7 significantly understated by excluding other real benefits to customers. Looking at the 8 economic benefits alone, the Company's proposed plan will create \$1 billion in economy-9 wide benefits that supports 42,000 job years in Missouri. But the proposed plan creates 10 non-economic benefits as well. During the implementation period alone all customers will 11 benefit from the reduction in 4.7 million metric tons of carbon emissions, 7,000 metric tons 12 of sulphur dioxide emissions, and 2,300 metric tons of nitrogen oxide emissions.

13 Third, implementing a robust portfolio with a diverse set of offerings is an effective 14 strategy to maximize benefits to all customers. The Company's proposal includes 15 new 15 programs (including new education initiatives) as well as a dramatic expansion of low-16 income program scope and budgets. Based on historical savings and participation data, I 17 estimate 824,000 customers have participated in the Company's demand-side programs 18 from 2009 through June 2018, and I estimate during the 2019-24 implementation period 19 for the plan proposed in this docket, 650,000 will participate. Including low-cost and no-20 cost savings opportunities is an important element to reach large numbers of customers, 21 which is why behavioral, education, appliance recycling, and demand response are 22 valuable program options.

1 Last, the Company's proposed earnings opportunity is reasonable. Energy savings 2 directly reduce the Company's near-term investment opportunity in renewable energy 3 resources while demand savings directly reduce the size of and investment in the 4 distribution and transmission grid in the long-term. The Company has presented 5 quantitative evidence demonstrating the interrelationship of MEEIA cycles and how those 6 cycles build on one another. Only with continued commitment to demand-side programs 7 can we maximize future supply-side deferrals (in this context, "supply-side" includes both 8 renewable energy resources and distribution and transmission investment) and minimize 9 future investment needs for customers. The Company has fairly and appropriately allocated 10 the direct and interrelated benefits of the long-term supply-side deferrals in estimating the 11 earnings it will forgo by operating demand-side programs. Indeed, the quantified foregone 12 earnings are significantly more than the earnings opportunity requested by the Company in this case because the Company reduced its requested earnings opportunity by 32%-49%¹ 13 14 to better align the earnings opportunity level with other earnings opportunities allowed in 15 other jurisdictions. Staff's recommendation of an earnings opportunity of zero is logically 16 indicative of a view that demand-side programs should cease in Missouri.

17

IV. STAFF'S POSITION ENDS DEMAND-SIDE PROGRAMS

18 Q. Please summarize Staff's primary recommendation and conclusions in 19 their rebuttal testimony.

20

21

22

A. Ms. Dietrich's testimony summarizes Staff's claim that Ameren Missouri's plan cannot be approved because it has not equally valued demand-side and supply-side (including delivery infrastructure) investments and it does not provide benefits to all

¹ Based on a range of combinations of future MEEIA cycles, as described in p. 60 of the MEEIA 2019-24 Report filed June 4, 2018.

1 customers regardless of whether they participate in the approved programs. To support its 2 position, Staff has completely disregarded the Company's recently adjudicated triennial 3 IRP (which was determined to have *met* the IRP rule requirements) and invented its own 4 set of avoided cost estimates. Based on these newly invented avoided cost estimates and 5 the assertion that demand-side programs can only benefit all customers if there is an 6 immediate need to build generation, Staff claims that the MEEIA 2019-24 plan cannot 7 legally be approved. Paradoxically, Staff concludes that an extension up to 12 months of 8 the current MEEIA 2016-18 plan can legally be approved, yet if Staff's position were 9 correct, extension of the 2016-18 plan would suffer from the same legal flaws.

10

Q. Why does Staff's position mean the end to demand-side programs?

11 If Staff is correct, then very few demand-side programs would be A. 12 considered cost effective, customers would derive little benefit from running those few 13 demand-side programs, and the elimination of the earnings opportunity would provide no 14 financial incentive for the utility to engage in demand-side programs. Further, it is my 15 understanding that Kansas City Power & Light Company has sufficient generation capacity 16 and that KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations is not expecting to build new supply-side 17 resources, which means Staff's positions in this case would effectively lead to the end of 18 demand-side programs for the largest investor-owned utilities in the state of Missouri. I 19 submit that such outcomes are not consistent with sate policy or with the general 20 observations and conclusions evident over the past nearly decade of IRPs.

1 **Q**. Is there risk to customers by abandoning demand-side programs? 2 Absolutely, Mr. Michels provides some very costly examples of sudden A. 3 changes in future supply-side needs that could be abated by the continued pursuit of 4 demand-side programs. 5 V. THE MEEIA 2019-24 PLAN IS BENEFICAL TO ALL CUSTOMERS 6 Q. Is the Company's proposed MEEIA 2019-24 plan beneficial to all 7 customers? 8 A. Absolutely. The Company's plan will reduce revenue requirements by over \$960 million on a lifetime present value basis.² Contrary to Staff's position, Mr. Michels' 9 10 surrebuttal testimony demonstrates that the avoided generation capacity costs and avoided 11 investments in distribution and transmission infrastructure are real customer benefits and 12 fully support the estimates I just mentioned. 13 Q. DE testified that the Company has underestimated the benefits of its 14 proposed MEEIA 2019-24 plan. Is that true? 15 A. Yes. Although I disagree with DE's recommendation to include bill savings 16 in the TRC, there are significantly more benefits of the Company's proposed MEEIA 17 2019-24 plan than we presented in our original filing. 18 Has the Company performed any quantitative analyses of additional **Q**. 19 benefits associated with its proposed plan? 20 A. Yes. I have quantified several additional sources of benefits, including: 21 1) previously inadvertently excluded reduced transmission and energy market costs from 22 MISO; 2) the economic benefits generated by the cost-effectiveness of demand-side

² As discussed below, this includes avoided Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. ("MISO") Schedule 26A and other energy-based market charges.

programs; 3) illustrative environmental benefits associated with a reduction in air
 emissions; and 4) the value of resource flexibility in the face of future uncertainties.

Q. What avoided MISO transmission and energy market costs were
inadvertently excluded from the avoided costs in the Company's initial plan filing?

5 A. MISO Schedule 26A, other transmission charges, and other market charges 6 that are all assessed to Ameren Missouri based on the level of its load were inadvertently 7 excluded. Because these charges are allocated to Ameren Missouri on a load share ratio, 8 reductions in energy consumption arising from demand-side programs directly reduce the 9 amount of these charges. Schedule 26A charges are associated with a specific kind of 10 regionally-allocated transmission projects, the MISO Multi-Value Projects. Other avoided 11 market charges directly attributable to a reduction in retail energy consumption include 12 Revenue Neutrality Uplift charges, Revenue Sufficiency Guarantee charges, Administration charges, Ancillary Services charges, and Inadvertent Interchange charges. 13

14

15

Q. What is the value to customers associated with avoiding these MISO transmission charges?

A. For the MEEIA 2019-24 plan, accounting for these avoided MISO
transmission charges increases the lifetime net benefits for all customers by \$43 million.

18 Q. How did you determine how much economic benefit is caused by the
19 MEEIA 2019-24 plan?

A. First, I would like to note that the Company has included the economic impact of resource choices in its IRP preferred resource plan selection criteria in each of its last three IRPs (2011, 2014, and 2017). No party has claimed that doing so was a deficiency or a concern. In those IRP analyses, demand-side resource plans have performed

1 very well based on the preferred resource plan selection criteria, which means, among other 2 things, that those plans generate the most jobs. The economic benefits of demand-side 3 resources ultimately accrue to all customers. To quantify the economic benefits of the 4 proposed MEEIA 2019-24 plan, the Company retained the services of Econsult Solutions 5 Inc. ("ESI"), which specializes in these types of economic analyses. ESI's full report is 6 attached as Schedule WRD-SR1. Looking at the economic benefits alone, the Company's 7 proposed plan will create \$1 billion (lifetime present value) in economy-wide benefits that 8 supports 42,000 job years in Missouri (an average of 1,625 jobs per year). These economic 9 benefits are associated with customers having more disposable income as a result of the 10 cost savings from the proposed demand-side programs. This type of analysis and results 11 support the previously established expectations that demand-side programs are good for 12 the local economy.

Q. Do demand-side resources create additional environmental benefits that accrue to all customers?

15 Yes. Demand-side resources reduce the level of supply-side resources that A. 16 must be constructed and operated. This means that as load and demand in the MISO market 17 is reduced by demand-side programs generating units located somewhere in MISO's 18 footprint necessarily run less and thus emit fewer pollutants. While I was unable to find 19 marginal emission rates for the MISO market, the Emissions & Generation Resource Integrated Database³ contains average emission rates for the Midwest region of the 20 21 Southeastern Reliability Council. Based on this data, during the 2019-24 implementation 22 period alone, all customers will benefit from a reduction of 4.7 million metric tons of

³ The Emissions & Generation Resource Integrated Database (eGRID) is a comprehensive source of data on the environmental characteristics of almost all electric power generated in the United States.

carbon emissions, 7,000 metric tons of sulphur dioxide emissions, and 2,300 metric tons
 of nitrogen oxide emissions.

Q. Is there economic value in pursuing demand-side programs now in order to create future resource planning flexibility and protect customers from unexpected major supply-side resource needs?

6 Yes. Mr. Michels discusses this value in his surrebuttal testimony. Staff and A. 7 OPC seem to assume that future uncertainties will only reduce the need for future supply-8 side investments. Without repeating Mr. Michels' conclusions on this topic, his testimony 9 makes it clear that in the event changed planning assumptions result in earlier future 10 supply-side resource needs, not investing in demand-side programs now would result in 11 greater need for additional supply-side generation than would otherwise be the case. In 12 short, doing nothing (as Staff implies) or doing only a minimal number of demand-side programs (as OPC proposes) increases risks to customers. Extending Mr. Michels' 13 14 surrebuttal analysis to show the full present value of revenue requirement ("PVRR") 15 impact, such scenarios would result in PVRR that is higher by \$3.9 billion to \$4.6 billion for plans⁴ where generation needs are advanced and Realistic Achievable Potential 16 17 ("RAP") level demand-side programs are abandoned. Avoiding these risks is a benefit that 18 accrues to all customers.

- Q. Do demand-side programs perform well in the Company's
 comprehensive IRP risk analysis?
- A. Yes. As Mr. Michels' surrebuttal testimony shows, demand-side resource
 plans have the lowest PVRR compared to other supply-side resource plans under all

⁴ As Mr. Michels explains in his surrebuttal testimony, this refers to Plans "M" and "N" from the 2017 IRP.

planning assumptions. This makes demand-side programs a "no regrets" resource
 investment for customers.

3

PARTICPANTS AND NONPARTICPANTS

- Q. OPC discusses winners and losers of demand-side programs. What are
 the primary causes of the situation where OPC claims these winners and losers exist?
 A. The first cause arises from using rate designs that allow the shifting of fixed
 costs from participants to non-participants. The second cause arises as a result of a
 customer's decision to take advantage of available demand-side programs (i.e., participants
 compared to nonparticipants).
- 10

11

Q. Is changing rate design to minimize the shifting of fixed costs between participants and nonparticipants a practical solution at this time?

- 12 A. Certainly not in this proceeding—such a change would have to be implemented in a rate case. I have personally testified about how increases in monthly fixed 13 14 charges impact the shifting of costs between participants and nonparticipants in more than 15 one rate case and have found that the Commission and other parties do not see this as a 16 palatable solution. Regardless, following the rate design principle of gradualism (making 17 gradual changes in rate design to avoid rate shock) means that rate design changes would be a long-term solution and not something to quickly resolve the issue. This poses a 18 19 dilemma, because while rate design is the primary driver of participants shifting costs onto 20 nonparticipants, changes to rate design do not seem to be an immediate opportunity to 21 resolve the issue.
- Q. Is *minimizing* the portfolio a reasonable fix to the issues between
 participants and nonparticipants?

1 A. No. As OPC notes, reducing participation maximizes the benefit for 2 participants because there are more nonparticipants on to which fixed costs can be shifted. 3 Therefore, reducing participation runs directly counter to the policy requirement that 4 programs result in benefits to all customers regardless of whether they participate.

5

6

Q. Is *maximizing* the portfolio a reasonable fix to the issues between participants and nonparticipants?

7 Yes. Because changes to rate design are effectively "off the table" at the A. moment, it is logical that the best way to meet the statutory obligation to approve programs 8 9 that benefit all customers regardless of whether they participate is to get as many customers 10 to participate as possible. As OPC states, the more participation increases, the less 11 nonparticipants exist onto which fixed costs can be shifted. Furthermore, the more 12 participants (and therefore the fewer nonparticipants) there are, the more the economic 13 results for the "average customer" will more closely mirror the results of the TRC. The 14 TRC (and UCT) recognizes the shifting of fixed costs from participants onto 15 nonparticipants as a net zero and thus represents the average overall impact to customers. 16 Therefore, increased participation will reduce cost-shifting opportunities, which will result 17 in average impacts that more closely mirror the TRC (and UCT) results. This is also a 18 logical tie to the fact that the MEEIA statute provides the TRC is the preferred cost-19 effectiveness test.

20 Q. Has OPC supported the notion of increasing participation as a 21 beneficial strategy?

A. Yes. Below is an excerpt from Dr. Marke's rebuttal testimony from the
Company's last MEEIA case (File No. EO-2015-0055):

1 Increasing levels of customer participation is essential, because as more 2 customers participate in energy efficiency programs, more customers will 3 experience the benefits of net bill reductions. In fact, when seeking to 4 mitigate rate impact concerns, regulators often consider increasing program 5 budgets—rather than decreasing them—as a way of increasing participation 6 and increasing the portion of customers that experience net benefits from 7 energy efficiency programs.

8 If the majority of customers eventually become program participants, then 9 concerns about rate impacts should be significantly mitigated as more 10 customers experience net reductions in their bills.

- O Has Staff roco
 - Q. Has Staff recognized the notion of increasing participation as a
- 12 **beneficial strategy?**
- 13 A. Yes. Below is an excerpt from the transcript of the hearing in File No. EO-
- 14 2015-0055, where Staff witness John Rogers is responding to a question from
- 15 Commissioner Rupp:

Q.

- 16 Q. So explain to me your thought process. Is it the utility's job to get
 17 everyone to participate or is there a benefit available but it's up to
 18 the individual to choose whether or not to participate?
- 19A. Well, that's one of -- that's one of the paths forward to make the20current portfolio more acceptable is to increase through -- through21some kind of process to improve the program so that more22customers can participate.
- 23

11

How many customers have participated in the Company's programs to

24 date?

A. From 2009 through June 2018, I estimate that 824,000 of Ameren

- 26 Missouri's 1.2 million customers (almost 70%) have participated in the Company's energy
- 27 efficiency programs.⁵ This amount of participation demonstrates a vast majority of
- 28 customers are participating and benefiting from the Company's demand-side programs.

⁵ Incorporates the apportionment of the 16 million incentivized bulbs as well as the 16,000 school kits; while controlling for cross participation in multiple programs.

Q. Has the Company revisited its estimated MEEIA 2019-24 participation after a more comprehensive analysis of past participation?

A. Yes. Our initial estimate of participation relied on assumptions about cross participation, but the analysis of past participation helps better understand those relationships. An updated analysis actually shows participation at about 650,000, which is roughly equivalent to the previous estimate provided with the Company's original filing, which was 665,000.

8 Q. With regard to customer participation levels, Staff says that customers 9 are "forced" to participate in the Home Energy Report. Is that an accurate 10 assessment?

11 Not at all. First of all, upfront effort is a barrier to achieving energy savings A. 12 so delivering the Home Energy Report as an "opt-out" program as opposed to an "opt-in" 13 program is a good strategy. But customers are certainly not "forced" to participate. We 14 send customers information about ways to save energy and those customers can opt-out at 15 any time. Finally, customers on the program are generally happy with the program as the 16 satisfaction rating is 91%. Ninety-one percent of customers would not be satisfied if they 17 were being "forced" into something, demonstrating that the negative connotation of Staff's 18 characterization is misplaced.

19

20

Q. Is analyzing the impact of a particular MEEIA plan on nonparticipants for that particular MEEIA plan proper?

A. No. Doing so ignores the fact that a participant from a previously approved plan may be a non-participant in a current MEEIA plan. As I mentioned earlier, with sustained efforts to offer comprehensive programs it is reasonable to assume that over the

long term the costs and benefits of participants and non-participants will approximate the
 TRC. Since the portfolio TRC (and the TRC's of each non-low-income program) exceeds
 1.0, this means all customers will be benefitting from demand-side programs.

- Q. Staff shows its analysis of long-term bill impacts (revenue requirement
 impacts) and rate impacts for the preferred resource plan, which includes an ongoing
 commitment to RAP level demand-side resources. Does that comparison show
 anything about the impact between participants and nonparticipants?
- A. Not at all. Staff simply interprets higher rates as bad for nonparticipants but presents no analysis of how many, if any, nonparticipants there will be after 20 years of sustained implementation of demand-side resources. The Commission should take away from Staff's presentation of that data two main points: 1) bills are lower, and 2) maximizing participation with sustained, robust, and diverse program offerings is the best strategy to ensure all customers enjoy lower bills.
- Q. How does this discussion about maximizing participation relate to the
 differences between supply-side and demand-side resources?
 - A. When it comes to supply-side resources, everyone is an automatic "participant," meaning there are no "nonparticipants." Therefore, maximizing participation in demand-side resources is an effective strategy to better align how customers as a whole are impacted by demand-side resources with how customers as a whole are impacted by supply-side resources.
 - 21

Q. How can the Commission maximize the number of participants?

A. By maintaining an ongoing commitment to implementing demand-side
programs. Approving the Company's proposed MEEIA 2016-24 plan is a good step toward

achieving that objective as the plan offers a wide variety of ways for customers to
 participate. Later in my testimony I provide more details about those opportunities in
 response to Staff's concerns about the Company's proposed portfolio.

4

UPDATES FOR CHANGES IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXES

- 5 Q. Staff's Rebuttal Report mentioned updating net margin rates to reflect
- 6 the change in the corporate income tax and resulting recent impact on customer bills.

7 Have you updated your results to reflect those changes in margin rates?

- A. Yes. My Schedule WRD-SR2 includes a full summary of the portfolio costeffectiveness, including avoided transmission costs (as discussed earlier), using the new
 federal tax rates.⁶
- 11 Q. What is the impact on throughput disincentive estimates as a result of
- 12 the lower margin rates?
- A. The estimated throughput disincentive drops from \$174 million to \$158.6 million, which is a \$15.4 million reduction in costs to customers. This represents a direct reduction in the amount of dollars that will flow through Rider EEIC, as well as a reduction to the potential cost shift between participants and nonparticipants.
- 17

VI. <u>THE PROPOSED EARNINGS OPPORTUNITY IS JUSTIFIED</u>

18

Q. Please summarize the positions in the case regarding the Company's

- 19 proposed earnings opportunity.
- 20

21

A. The Commission Staff claims there is no justification for an earnings opportunity, while the OPC proposed an earnings opportunity equal to 10% of program

⁶ To avoid any confusion, please note that we previously analyzed the federal tax impact for the earnings opportunity, but had not yet performed the update for the throughput disincentive. That update is performed here.

1 costs for a substantially scaled back portfolio. Staff further dismisses the importance of the

- 2 interrelationship between MEEIA cycles.
- 3 0. Does the proposed MEEIA 2019-24 plan contribute to the deferral of 4 future supply-side resources?
- 5 A. Absolutely. The Company quantitatively demonstrated that the MEEIA cycles are interrelated and that maximizing deferrals of future supply-side investment rely 6 7 on the *accumulation* of demand-side savings over long periods of time. The table below (a 8 copy of Table 10 from the MEEIA 2019-24 report) clearly shows how the combination of 9 MEEIA cycles result in maximum deferrals, as well as how MEEIA 2019-24 ("Cycle 3" in 10 the table below) contributes to future deferrals.

Table 10 – MEEIA 2019-24 Impact on Supply-Side Resource Deferral

		CC Deferral	NPV of EO	Gain from Cycle 3		
	Synergies	# of Years	\$ Million	CC Deferral	NPV EO	EO Annual
	Cycle 3-4	12	\$106	ц	\$39.5	\$9
	Cycle 4	7	\$66	5	Ş59.5	<i>\$9</i>
Maximum	Cycle 3-4-5	34	\$266	13	\$88.2	\$20
Deferrals 📐	Cycle 4-5	21	\$178	15	<i>3</i> 00.Ζ	Ş20
	Cycle 3-4-5-6	39	\$298	L	\$32.2	\$7
	Cycle 4-5-6	34	\$266	5	<i>3</i> 52.Ζ	Ş/

- 11 As can be seen, the more MEEIA cycles that are successively operated, the more 12 years of deferral that are achieved.
- 13

Q. Has the Company fairly allocated the total forgone earnings from 14 operating demand-side programs to the proposed MEEIA 2019-24 plan?

15 A. Yes. Using the analysis above, it is clear that demand-side actions today 16 influence future supply-side resource needs. Therefore, it is important to allocate that value 17 back to the appropriate MEEIA cycle that creates the benefits. This is exactly the same 18 logic behind the "cost causation" principles for allocating costs that the Commission

1 routinely follows when making ratemaking decisions. Further, not allocating the 2 appropriate portion of the benefit back to the appropriate MEEIA cycle will create 3 unreasonable rate impacts in the future if, as Staff apparently favors, all of the foregone 4 earnings arising from operating demand-side programs are held until the last moment. As 5 an analogy, consider a relay race where all four runners are required to complete the race 6 to win; if one follows Staff's logic, the first three runners provide no value at all because 7 only the runner who crosses the finish line counts.

8

Q. Based on discussions about workpapers with Staff, did the Company 9 find any reasons to update its estimates of forgone earnings?

10 A. Yes. First, contrary to Staff's Rebuttal Report, the forgone earnings already 11 reflected the new federal income taxes, so no updates were needed for that issue. However, 12 when reviewing its workpapers with Staff, the Company discovered that it was using an 13 outdated capital cost for wind resources (which overstated the foregone earnings) and that 14 it used the wrong inputs regarding the economic and tax life of distribution investments 15 (which understated the forgone earnings). After incorporating these two corrections, we 16 prepared the below table which summarizes the updated estimates.

Table 1 –	Updated	Forgone	Earnings	Analysis
-----------	---------	---------	-----------------	----------

Foregone Earnings Category	NPV of Foregone Earnings	6-yr Annuity Amount for MEEIA 2019-24 EO
Renewable Compliance	\$59	\$13.7
Combined Cycle Plants	\$32-\$88*	\$7-\$20*
Transmission & Distribution	\$77	\$17.8
Total (\$MM):	\$169-\$225	\$39-\$52

*Dependent on combinations of MEEIA cycle implementations

17 0. Did the Company's earnings opportunity proposal reflect the full 18 amount of forgone earnings estimated?

A. No. While strictly based on forgone earnings, the Company could have justified a much higher earnings opportunity, we elected to reduce the requested earnings opportunity by paring back our forgone earnings estimates by at least 32%.⁷ This brought the earnings opportunity request more in line with earnings opportunities generally approved in other jurisdictions.

- 6 Q. Should the fact that the requested earnings opportunity is based on 7 forgone earnings estimates that are between 32%-49% below those actually 8 quantified give comfort to the Commission that there will not be "double recovery" 9 of earnings?
- 10 A. Yes.

Q. You mentioned that the Company reduced its earnings opportunity
request to bring it more in line with what was observed in other jurisdictions. Please
elaborate.

- A. The Company performed a benchmarking analysis to other jurisdictions.
 This benchmarking significantly influenced the Company's requested amount as evidenced
 by the reduction of 32%-49% compared to the amount of quantified forgone earnings.
- 17 Q. Has anyone disputed the earnings benchmarking analysis?
- 18 A. No.
- 19 Q. For there to be a risk of double recovery, the Commission would need 20 to believe the Company will somehow invest in supply-side resources to meet the same 21 load needs in addition to its investment in demand-side resources. Is there any 22 credible evidence in the Company's 2017 IRP analyses that shows a scenario where

⁷ The requested earnings opportunity would be a 49% reduction from the higher end of the forgone earnings analysis.

1 there is ongoing investment in both demand-side resources and supply-side resources

2 to meet the same load needs?

A. Absolutely not. Furthermore, using performance metrics to ensure program success effectively mitigates this type of risk. Every megawatt and megawatt-hour of savings will directly or indirectly impact future supply-side investments.

6

6 Q. Is the Company's earnings opportunity matrix well balanced to 7 support a variety of desired outcomes?

8 Yes. There is still significant weight given to long-life peak demand savings A. 9 while also recognizing that energy savings provide significant near term savings. Separate 10 goals and comprehensive performance metrics for the low-income sector will drive 11 excellent outcomes for customers. Also, separate goals for residential lighting and the 12 Home Energy Report effectively address the concerns and risks for those programs. In fact, 13 with regard to the earnings opportunity matrix, the only feedback received is from DE who 14 preferred more weight be applied to energy savings. Based on the testimony (or lack 15 thereof), I don't believe any changes are needed to the Company's proposal.

16

VII. MEEIA 2019-24 IS IMPLEMENTING THE IRP'S

17

PREFERRED RESOURCE PLAN

Q. Is the pursuit of the Realistic Achievable Potential level of demand-side
 programs part of the Company's Resource Acquisition Strategy as reflected in its IRP
 analyses?

21 A. Yes.

Q. Has there been discussion over the years about retaining a strong link
between the IRP rules and MEEIA rules.

1 A. Yes, and I have been directly involved in that discussion. It has been clear 2 that the Commission has favored a strong link between the IRP and MEEIA.

3

Q. Why is the IRP important in the context of a MEEIA filing?

A. The IRP provides a robust foundation for long-term resource planning decisions by analyzing a variety of resource options and comprehensively conducting risk assessments. In contrast, a MEEIA filing is a short/medium term implementation plan that is presented with the limited scope of analysis regarding that particular demand-side resource plan for that particular period of time. For a MEEIA plan, the magnitude/direction in developing implementation specifics is largely predetermined by the more comprehensive IRP analysis.

11 Q. From a long-term planning standpoint, what has changed since the 12 Company's last triennial IRP - and specifically its Resource Acquisition Strategy -13 was ruled to be compliant with the Commission's IRP rules just three months ago, in 14 late June 2018?⁸

A. Nothing material has changed from a long-term resource planning standpoint. The only thing that seems to have changed are the positions of Staff and OPC, neither of which expressed concern when the Company was transparent in its IRP about substantially increasing its spending on demand-side resources. In fact, the MEEIA 2019-24 plan before the Commission is in substance the demand-side resource plan reflected in the preferred resource plan contained in the triennial IRP that was just found to be

⁸ "[T]he Commission finds that the 2017 triennial Integrated Resource Planning filing made by Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri complies with the requirements of this chapter, and that the utility's resource acquisition strategy meets the standards stated in 4 CSR 240-22." *Order Regarding 2017 Integrated Resource Plan*, File No. EO-2018-0038 (June 27, 2018).

1	compliant wi	th Commission rules, except that the Company is proposing to implement the		
2	MEEIA plan at a cost that is nearly one-third <i>lower</i> than assumed in the IRP.			
3	Q.	Did either OPC or Staff provide comments in the Company's recent		
4	IRP about a	nalyzing a smaller demand-side resource portfolio?		
5	А.	Not at all. In fact, the Commission Staff was adamant that the Company		
6	should provi	de additional analysis of a Mid-DSM portfolio, which already was a level		
7	higher than	the Company is currently proposing. OPC did not file any comments in		
8	response to the	ne Company's IRP.		
9	Q.	In the Company's most recent IRP, was the analyzed earnings		
10	opportunity	higher than the Company is proposing in this case?		
11	А.	Yes. The 2017 IRP analysis included \$47.7 million per year for each year		
12	of the plann	ing horizon (based on a quantitative forgone earnings analysis), which is		
13	significantly	higher than the Company has requested.		
14	Q.	Did any parties in the Company's most recent IRP file comments about		
15	the earnings	opportunity that was included in the 2017 IRP?		
16	А.	No.		
17	Q.	Does it make sense to spend eight months adjudicating the Company's		
18	IRP filing, 1	receive zero comments about the Company's IRP implementation plan		
19	that is only	a few months away from being filed, and then have parties adopt		
20	completely r	new positions to oppose the implementation plan?		
21	А.	Absolutely not. In fact, I think the IRP Check-In Process we propose as part		
22	of our MEEI	A 2019-24 program will explicitly help us avoid this type of situation in the		
23	future by fur	her solidifying the link from the IRP to decisions about MEEIA.		

1	VIII. WHY A SIX-YEAR PLAN IS BETTER
2	Q. If Staff and OPC are truly concerned about the ability of making
3	demand-side investments to impact future supply-side resources, wouldn't a longer
4	term commitment to demand-side programs ensure those benefits?
5	A. Yes. The Company's robust IRP analyses have demonstrated that investing
6	in demand-side programs is the lowest cost and best long-term strategy to meet future
7	resource needs and reduce customer risks.
8	Q. Has the Company performed any quantitative analysis to support the
9	conclusion that longer-term commitments to demand-side resources help defer
10	supply-side resources even if those resource needs are further out in the future?
11	A. Yes. As part of the MEEIA 2019-24 report, ⁹ the Company analyzed the
12	impact of starting and stopping MEEIA cycles and showed that without a sustained
13	commitment to demand-side resources the future resource deferrals cannot be achieved.
14	That same analysis also demonstrated that the MEEIA cycles are interrelated, meaning that
15	the MEEIA cycles build on each other to achieve the long term savings. Reducing or
16	eliminating MEEIA 2019-24 will surely reduce the ability to defer future supply-side
17	investment. Such a result is counter to the claimed motivations of Staff and OPC in
18	recommending rejection of the proposed plan.
19	Q. Does the IRP Check-In process alleviate the concerns about risks of
20	changes in future planning assumptions?
21	A. Yes. The Company has proposed clear linkages to its next IRP to drive the
22	ongoing commitment to making demand-side investments. In short, if key planning

⁹MEEIA 2019-24 Report, pp. 59-64.

assumptions from the 2017 IRP hold, then MEEIA 2019-24 goes on as planned. In contrast,
 if the assumptions change then further Commission approval of the 2022-24 budgets, goals,
 and earnings opportunity would be required.

4

5

Q. How does a longer implementation period with an IRP Check-In process reduce Company risk and increase customer risk as Staff claims?

6 A. It does not. Long-term pursuit of all cost-effective demand-side resources 7 is the goal of MEEIA. As I will discuss further below, there are additional benefits to 8 customers of being able to achieve more savings in the long-term. The IRP Check-In 9 process effectively protects customers from material changes in planning assumptions. 10 Making a longer-term commitment to demand-side resources decreases risks to customers 11 as it increases the likelihood of deferring the next supply-side resource. The Company 12 doesn't receive any special benefit from a longer implementation period; to the contrary, 13 the Company can easily be at greater risk to meet its performance targets if savings 14 opportunities erode because of changes in lighting and HVAC baselines that could occur 15 during the six-year implementation period, as Staff postulates.

Q. OPC and Staff state there is simply too much future uncertainty to approve a six-year plan. Do you agree?

A. No, I do not. Of course there is uncertainty about future planning assumptions and results; the nature of planning for the future means there will always be uncertainty. In fact, the three triggers the Company has identified as part of the IRP Checkin process outlined in the Company's original filing are precisely the triggers that would be most affected by the types of uncertainties that OPC and others are concerned about. The main difference in the Company's proposal is that it provides the same avenue to update

1 the most important aspects of the MEEIA plan (budgets, savings targets, and earnings) 2 opportunity) without starting all over on all of the other elements of the plan. For example, 3 there is general agreement on the basics of the throughput disincentive mechanism and 4 program cost recovery and those elements were carried forward from MEEIA 2016-18 and 5 are compliant with Commission rules. We ask: why do we need to re-adjudicate those 6 elements of the plan over and over again? Further, there are "bread and butter" programs 7 being offered that do not need to be re-adjudicated over and over. With proper opportunities 8 to adapt to market conditions, the portfolio of programs can continue unless those critical 9 three triggers point to a new direction. If one of those triggers happen, the Commission 10 would then need to provide further approval, as I described earlier.

11 Q. DE proposed a modification to the IRP Check-in process to provide 12 "lighter" annual discussions about new savings opportunities with a more in-depth 13 discussion as part of the mid-cycle check-in process. Is the Company supportive of 14 such a modification?

A. Yes, and I believe it would also address the concerns expressed by NHT and possibly CCM. Although we would need to work out some details about how to facilitate the process and what path to follow to implement changes, such a process can work. I understand the desire to explore other savings opportunities and not lock ourselves into the same programs for the full implementation period. It is also possible that those discussions may lead to modifications of existing programs to better meet customer demands.

Q. Does a six-year plan support the MEEIA goal of achieving all costeffective demand-side savings?

1 A. Absolutely. Without a longer implementation horizon it will not be possible 2 to achieve deeper customer savings. For instance, long lead time projects are typically large 3 investments for customers, and without some type of commitment from the energy 4 efficiency programs those opportunities will be lost for a very long period of time. This 5 supports the conclusion that stopping demand-side programs (or shrinking the portfolio) 6 will dramatically reduce future opportunity because there will have been so much forgone 7 opportunity in measures that have long useful lives.

8

Does a longer implementation period address some of the concerns **Q**. 9 Staff has raised about demand response useful life?

10 A. Yes. I will discuss demand response later in my testimony, but the crux of 11 Staff's concern about demand response is that it is only cost-effective if there is an ongoing 12 commitment to run the programs. Clearly a longer implementation period will help with 13 those concerns, although it doesn't solve Staff's perceived concern in the later years. Again, 14 while a six-year implementation period does not resolve all the challenges we face, the 15 longer implementation period is responsive to this concern of Staff.

16 Q. Are there other utilities and jurisdictions with longer implementation 17 periods?

18 A. Yes. Below is a table from the Company's response to OPC Data Request 19 2005 which shows 17 other utilities with demand-side program plans with implementation 20 periods of five years or longer.

State/Province	Utility	Implementation Period(years)
MI	DTE Energy	6
	Alliant Energy – Iowa	5
IA	Black Hills Energy – IA	5
	MidAmerican Energy	5
VA	Dominion	5
	Duquesne Light	5
	FirstEnergy - Met-Ed	5
	FirstEnergy – Penelec	5
PA	FirstEnergy - Penn Power	5
	FirstEnergy - West Penn Power	5
	PECO	5
	PPL Electric Utilities	5
BC	FortisBC	5
СА	Los Angeles Department of Water & Power	5
CA	PG&E	5
IL	MidAmerican Energy – IL	5
FL	Orlando Utilities Commission	5

1

2

Q. Can a three-year implementation period work if the Commission prefers a shorter commitment to demand-side programs?

A. Clearly a three-year implementation period can "work" in that we have operated two, three-year MEEIA cycles before. The trade-off is that we would forgo the ability to achieve deeper savings and some offerings or goals would no longer make sense. For example, if the Commission were to approve a three-year plan, I would recommend reducing the multifamily average savings targets by at least 50% (on top of pushing out the first year goal by one year as recommended by NHT and NRDC). Further, I would question

the value of implementing a Strategic Energy Management program as it is likely we will see limited savings within a three-year implementation period. My overall point is that there is no good reason to limit the implementation period to just 3 years given the availability of the IRP Check-in Process.

5

IX. <u>COMPREHENSIVE PORTFOLIO OF PROGRAMS</u>

6

Q. Does MEEIA 2019-24 include a robust offering of programs?

A. Yes. In fact, having a robust offering of programs is important to maximize
participation by offering a diverse set of opportunities for participation.

9

10

Q. Staff criticizes the Company's proposed plan saying it isn't based on primary market research. Is that a relevant criticism?

11 No. First, Staff notes that the Company did not perform primary market A. 12 research in its 2016 potential study. Second, Staff seemingly dismisses the fact that the 13 Company effectively included every program offering for which it received credible bids. 14 This fact alone should give the Commission comfort that the Company's proposed portfolio 15 is comprehensive and based on the best available market data. After all, is a long-term 16 potential study (which assesses an uncertain future) the best information about which 17 programs are viable and should be offered or are *actual bids* from implementers willing to 18 put compensation at risk to run specific programs a better source of information? I submit 19 that the latter is best.

20 Q. Did Staff and other stakeholders support the Company's waiver 21 request to forgo primary market research in its 2016 potential study?

- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. Are customers satisfied with the Company's current programs?

1 A. Yes. Customer satisfaction scores are quite high ranging from 88% to 100%. 2 Q. Did the Company seek feedback from parties before filing its proposed 3 plan? 4 A. Yes. In fact, the results from the fully documented 2016 collaborative 5 (which included a summary report filed with the Commission) was included in the Company Request for Proposals ("RFP") for program implementation. Both DE and NHT 6 7 expressed satisfaction in their testimonies with the Company's approach to soliciting 8 feedback on its proposed portfolio. 9 **Q**. Staff suggests the Company collect data about customers through 10 evaluations about participants and non-participants to help understand customer 11 preferences and help plan future programs. Does the Company agree with that 12 recommendation? 13 А Yes, and Staff's suggestion fits well with the Company's vision that 14 evaluation research be conducted in a way that it can be used for future portfolio analysis 15 and planning. 16 Q. Staff provided concerns about several programs, please respond. 17 A. Certainly. Staff's initial concerns focus on the residential lighting programs; 18 specifically about potential future changes in baselines. Staff claims that Ameren Missouri 19 has not accounted for a change in baseline. 20 Q. Is that assertion true? 21 No, it is not true. For purposes of setting performance goals and assessing A. 22 cost effectiveness, the Company assumed that compact fluorescent lights "CFLs" would 23 become the baseline in 2023 and that the Company would continue to promote more

1 expensive specialty bulbs and "smart" bulbs. Staff's primary error is assuming all light bulb 2 types and market segments are equal. The program design specifically excludes big box 3 stores for the promotion of standard A19 light emitting diodes "LEDs" and instead targets 4 areas and stores where markets are not transformed, like discount, pharmacy, and grocery 5 stores where upfront costs and accessibility are more important purchasing factors than at 6 the big box retailers. In addition, the modeling clearly shows that a majority of the 7 incentivized lights in future years are specialty bulbs and "smart" bulbs (e.g. internet 8 connected bulbs). These bulb types still have significant upfront costs and are much less 9 likely to be in a transformed market in the implementation period. The Company is also 10 proposing two additional steps to control risk around the residential lighting programs. 11 First is a specific evaluation requirement to perform an annual assessment to identify 12 specific Stock Keeping Units ("SKUs") of lights for each delivery channel that should no 13 longer be offered because of market changes. This evaluation requirement was clearly 14 stated in the MEEIA 2019-24 report and helps differentiate which delivery channels and 15 SKUs are being transformed. Last, Staff points out downside risk for the delivery of the 16 residential lighting program but all of the performance risk is on the Company. It is clear 17 that there is still opportunity in the residential lighting sector and that offering a variety of 18 LED bulbs is a good opportunity for customers to participate.

19

Q. What were Staff's concerns about the Home Energy Report ("HER")?

A. The primary concern was about the cost-effectiveness of the program to date. Staff specifically opines, with zero supporting data, that it would be just as well to put a link on customer bills to the Company's energy efficiency programs. First, I need to clarify that the HER is about achieving behavioral savings above and beyond the

Company's other programs, so linking to the energy efficiency page will not produce any 1 2 additional savings. Staff's unsupported opinion is also counter to the fact that many utilities 3 have been running successful behavioral programs. The Company's HER has been 4 improving each year and we expect it to continue to improve as we look to implement some 5 exciting new additions like engaging near real-time alerts, more disaggregated and 6 customized recommendations, a more engaging web presence, and possibly offering 7 rewards for completing energy savings goals. To be clear, this program is important to provide customers with low-cost and no-cost savings opportunities and a diverse set of 8 9 savings options. Further, the Company has proposed a specific energy savings goal as part 10 of the earnings opportunity for the HER which places the risk of performance on the 11 Company.

Staff goes on to express the same concerns it expressed about the Small Business Energy Report ("SBER") it expressed about the HER. The Company has proposed the SBER as an education program. The small business customer segment is a diverse group of customers, and it is important to be able to provide them with low-cost and no-cost savings opportunities. On the one hand, Staff testifies that the Company should continue to educate customers about energy savings and its programs, yet here is an example where we have proposed to do just that and Staff is recommending against it.

19

Q. Does Staff express concerns about other programs?

A. Yes. Staff next turns to the HVAC program and expresses concerns about future baselines as well as the incentive levels between efficiency levels. First, Staff suggests that the baseline could raise the Seasonal Energy Efficiency Ratio ("SEER") level for central air conditioners and air-source heat pumps. It is noteworthy that the Company's

1 model includes a very limited amount of incentivized units at the SEER levels Staff is 2 concerned about. It is also important to point out that if there was a change in baseline, the 3 program evaluation would incorporate that baseline change and ultimately put more risk of 4 meeting performance goals onto the Company. Regarding incentive levels between the 5 different efficient levels of equipment (e.g. a SEER 19 versus a SEER 17), Staff suggests 6 that it is logical that higher efficiency levels are more cost-effective and therefore should 7 get substantially higher incentives to cover the higher incremental cost. Contrary to Staff's 8 hypothesis, higher efficiency levels are less cost-effective compared to the baseline 9 efficiency level because the costs to achieve higher efficiency levels tend to increase 10 nonlinearly and the energy savings include diminishing returns. Said another way, it costs 11 more to get less savings as you increase the efficiency level of HVAC equipment. Looking 12 at the incentives with this knowledge shows that as you increase the efficiency level of the 13 equipment, the incentive covers a lesser percentage of the incremental cost (because 14 incremental cost is increasing) but the incentive per kWh-saved goes up (because the 15 amount of savings is decreasing). Therefore the Company's proposed incentive level 16 balances this effect across equipment efficiency levels and the incentives are ultimately 17 fine-tuned based on evaluation results and experience with market uptake.

Next, Staff questions the inclusion of the proposed Appliance Recycling program. Staff shares its recollection that cost-effectiveness was a primary cause of that program being removed from the MEEIA 2016-18 portfolio. However, other factors influenced the program's removal from the MEEIA 2016-18 plan, including the relatively few demand savings resulting from the program compared to other priorities at the time. The unique characteristics of the earnings opportunity structure that placed extremely high value on

1 peak demand savings and a desire to increase the number of participants were strong 2 influencers of reallocating those program dollars. However, in MEEIA 2019-24, we have 3 a more balanced earnings opportunity matrix that places a higher value on energy savings 4 and a diverse range of program offerings. It is noteworthy that the Company's proposed 5 earnings opportunity matrix still strongly values longer-lived measures that result in high 6 coincident peak demand savings. The Company has modeled significant levels of free 7 ridership as Staff mentions, yet the program remains cost-effective. 8 The appliance recycling program is another important element to having a robust 9 portfolio that offers a no cost participation option. It is ironic that Staff is questioning the 10 inclusion of the appliance recycling program as this program was one of few that remained 11 cost-effective under Staff's substantial cuts to avoided costs. 12 Q. Should the Commission move the Business Social Services program out 13 from under the low-income umbrella, as suggested by Staff? 14 A. No. This is a unique opportunity to target businesses that directly interact 15 with low-income customers because that is the businesses' primary objective. Including 16 this program in the low-income umbrella will provide additional opportunities for 17 enhanced incentives and deeper savings. 18 Q. Does the Company agree with Staff's recommendation to expand the 19 eligible customers for Business Social Services? 20 A. I believe the Company has appropriately scoped this program, and has in 21 fact included many of the potential beneficiaries that Staff asked to be added. The 22 program's scope does, in fact, include the following: 23 Commercial, nonprofit, and tax-exempt business customers in the Small General Service (2M) and Large General Service (3M) rate 24

1 2 3 4	classes, that are doing business to provide social services to the low- income public, including food banks, food pantries, soup kitchens, homeless shelters, employment services, worker training, job banks, and childcare facilities.
5	The Company believes, then, that the scope includes a wide variety of non-profits
6	as Staff has requested. If Staff believes that this description has inadvertently excluded
7	certain nonprofits, it is open to rephrasing of this section.
8	Q. Staff criticizes the lack of details regarding the proposed education
9	programs for the residential portfolio. How do you respond?
10	A. It is simply not possible to scope out every aspect of the portfolio before
11	approval. Regardless, we have tried to provide as much information as possible about each
12	program and I believe we have been able to provide more details at this stage of approval
13	than we ever have been able to do in the past.
14	Q. What percent of Ameren Missouri's budget covered education
15	programs in MEEIA 2013-15 and MEEIA 2016-18?
16	A. Specifically, the education budget percentage is 3.46% in MEEIA 2013-15
17	and 1.87% in MEEIA 2016-18, as compared to the 1.65% included in MEEIA 2019-24.
18	Q. What details were provided for the education programs under MEEIA
19	2013-15 or MEEIA 2016-18 at the time of Commission approval?
20	A. None.

1 **DEMAND RESPONSE**

2 **Q**. Is Staff supportive of the Company's proposed demand response 3 programs?

4 A. No. Although Staff compliments the Company on some elements of its 5 decisions around the demand response proposals, ultimately Staff says the programs are 6 not cost-effective.

7

8

Did Staff previously ask that the Company's MEEIA filing include an 0. aggregator-style demand response program?

9 A. Yes, before the Company submitted its application in this case, Staff made 10 such a request in this record. The Company responded at that time that it was contemplating 11 including such programs. This indicates an apparent change in Staff's position. I do not 12 understand why Staff asked the Commission to require Ameren Missouri to include an 13 aggregator-style demand response program and then, when the Company files such a 14 proposal, Staff recommends its rejection.

15

Q. In Staff's positions regarding cost-effectiveness, was the useful life a 16 primary factor in that decision making?

17 A. Yes. Ignoring Staff's erroneous views about avoided costs, the next biggest 18 issue was regarding the useful life of the demand response programs. Specifically, it is 19 Staff's positon that the useful life should only be the time up to the termination of a MEEIA 20 implementation period; i.e., when the MEEIA cycle ends, the useful life also ends.

21 Q. Is limiting the useful life of demand response programs to the length of 22 the MEEIA implementation period a reasonable constraint?

No. In fact, such a constraint will lead to illogical results. First, as I 1 A. 2 discussed earlier, the IRP is a comprehensive analytical framework that reflects long-term 3 decision making. Under even Staff's constrained view of avoided costs, it is entirely 4 possible that the IRP could conclude (based on a long-term assessment) that demand 5 response is needed during the implementation period. Based upon that IRP result, the 6 Company would seek to implement demand response programs but could not do so because 7 those programs are not cost-effective during the MEEIA implementation period, even 8 though the IRP clearly identifies those programs in its resource acquisition strategy. Such 9 a result is illogical. If followed, it would force removal of demand response from the 10 resource acquisition strategy even though a compliant IRP and resource acquisition 11 strategy just concluded that demand response *should be included*.

Q. If a demand response program's useful life (when determining costeffectiveness) is constrained by the MEEIA implementation period, would it ever be cost-effective?

A. Actually, placing such a constraint mitigates in favor of *lengthening* the implementation period (i.e., the MEEIA cycle length). However, that doesn't resolve all of the problems because each passing year would dramatically reduce the cost-effectiveness of the program. In short, using the MEEIA implementation period as the useful life of demand response *effectively eliminates demand response as a resource option*.

20

21

Q. Is Staff correct that there is risk that a demand response program may not be continued from MEEIA plan to subsequent MEEIA plan?

A. Yes, that is a risk. However, the Commission and Staff can promote supportive policies to minimize that risk. Examples of supportive policies include:

consistently supporting demand-side investment plans; supporting and approving longer
 implementation periods; creating more stability in earnings opportunity across MEEIA
 plans; recognizing demand response as a low-cost participation opportunity, etc.

4

X. <u>RESPONSE TO RIDER EEIC CONCERNS</u>

5

Q. Has Staff raised concerns about the Company's proposed Rider EEIC,

6 which would enable it to recover costs of the MEEIA 2019-24 plan?

A. Yes, although the concerns are limited to a few select areas. Staff expresses no concerns about the basic structure of Rider EEIC, which has been in place for several years. Instead, Staff has raised concerns about: 1) the inclusion of DRENE; 2) the ability to include energy savings from custom measures; 3) the use of program year vintages of throughput disincentive; and 4) the lack of a sunset clause for throughput disincentive recovery. Staff also raises concerns about the Net Margin Rates included in Rider EEIC, but Company witness Steve Wills will respond to those concerns.

14

Q. Should the Commission exclude DRENE from Rider EEIC?

15 No. DRENE is the change in energy associated with demand response A. 16 events, and was added specifically to account for the inclusion of demand response in the 17 portfolio. While demand response reduces peak demand, it can actually do more than that. 18 Specifically, it can also change the net *energy* consumption before, during, and after the 19 demand response event. For example, it is common for residential customers to precool a 20 house *leading up to* a demand response event (thus increasing energy consumption before 21 the event), then aggressively reduce energy consumption *during* the demand response 22 event, and finally "snapback" to cool the house back to a desired level (resulting in 23 increased energy consumption after the event). In contrast, business customers often simply

reduce electrical loads during the event period (like reducing the amount of lighting or
 shutting down a production process) without any precooling or snapback, resulting in a
 reduction in energy consumption

4

5

Q. If Staff has concerns about how DRENE will be determined, is the appropriate response to exclude it from Rider EEIC?

A. No. If the Commission prefers more specificity be incorporated into the approved plan, then we should only allow DRENE as part of the true-up process after the evaluations are complete on the amount of DRENE. It is inappropriate, however, to assume that net energy is not affected during demand response events.

10 Q. What is the estimated amount of throughput disincentive recovery for 11 DRENE?

12 The total DRENE estimated for the entire proposed A. six-year implementation period is \$1.1 million, as compared to the total \$158.6 million estimated 13 14 throughput disincentive (about seven-tenths of 1% (.0069)). The fact that the amount is 15 relatively small does not mean the Commission should eliminate it. The fact that the 16 amount is relatively small simply provides the Commission with more context about the 17 relative magnitude of DRENE recovery as compared to other drivers of throughput 18 disincentive.

Q. Staff raises concerns about the ability to include savings reported by
the program administrator that are not in the Deemed Savings Table. Is that a
legitimate concern?

A. It should not be, since the Company believes the Deemed Savings Table has
been appropriately constructed given the programs offered in MEEIA 2019-24. But maybe

1	there is an opportunity to improve the wording in the tariff. The issue is that there are
2	measures that do not have specific values in the Deemed Savings Table because the savings
3	are calculated as custom projects (a common practice currently being followed and allowed
4	by the TRM, as has been the case since the start of MEEIA 2013-15). Below is the current
5	wording in the Company's active Rider EEIC tariff, which allows savings to be reported
6	by the program administrator. The Company is willing to revise its proposed Rider EEIC
7	to mirror the currently effective Rider EEIC if the Commission prefers (as seen below).
8 9 10 11 12	For Measures under the Multifamily Market Rate, Multifamily Low-Income, Business Strategic Energy Management Program, Business Custom Incentive Program, Business New Construction Incentive Program, and Business Retro-Commissioning Program, the ME will be the annual value attributable to the installations reported monthly by the program implementer.
13	reported monthly by the program implementer.
13 14	Q. Is it possible to true-up throughput disincentive without tracking
14	Q. Is it possible to true-up throughput disincentive without tracking
14 15	Q. Is it possible to true-up throughput disincentive without tracking program year vintages?
14 15 16	 Q. Is it possible to true-up throughput disincentive without tracking program year vintages? A. Not in a practical way. Each program year has its own evaluation that is
14 15 16 17	 Q. Is it possible to true-up throughput disincentive without tracking program year vintages? A. Not in a practical way. Each program year has its own evaluation that is specific to the circumstances of that program year and each year's savings persist into future
14 15 16 17 18	 Q. Is it possible to true-up throughput disincentive without tracking program year vintages? A. Not in a practical way. Each program year has its own evaluation that is specific to the circumstances of that program year and each year's savings persist into future years. It is important to keep the vintages straight to properly match up the evaluation
14 15 16 17 18 19	 Q. Is it possible to true-up throughput disincentive without tracking program year vintages? A. Not in a practical way. Each program year has its own evaluation that is specific to the circumstances of that program year and each year's savings persist into future years. It is important to keep the vintages straight to properly match up the evaluation results during overlapping periods. Not keeping track of vintages will make matters worse
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Q. Is it possible to true-up throughput disincentive without tracking program year vintages? A. Not in a practical way. Each program year has its own evaluation that is specific to the circumstances of that program year and each year's savings persist into future years. It is important to keep the vintages straight to properly match up the evaluation results during overlapping periods. Not keeping track of vintages will make matters worse by creating multiple savings estimates for multiple periods of time. Tying each program

- 24 adjustment will need to use the best available information at the time of each rate case
- 25 because the lag in the evaluation process will not align with the rate case timeline.

Q. Does the large customer opt-out have anything to do with tracking
 throughput disincentive vintages or the length of MEEIA implementation periods as
 Staff suggests?

4 A. No. There can always be a timing mismatch of opt-out and the occurrence 5 of costs regardless of throughput disincentive true-up details or the length of 6 implementation periods because the ability to opt-out transcends those details. For 7 example, a large customer who has not participated can opt out in the first year of a newly 8 approved MEEIA cycle or a large customer can participate in the first year then opt out 9 after three years and completely avoid paying for the earnings opportunity. If anything, the 10 Company's proposal for annual throughput disincentive true-up and annual earnings 11 opportunity payouts will increase the fairness related to opt-out issues with cost recovery.

12

13

Q. Should the Commission require the Company to implement a sunset on its throughput disincentive recovery?

14 A. No. The MEEIA 2016-18 sunset was added as part of an overall settlement 15 agreement, but it is not something the Company believes *should* continue because it can 16 prevent full recovery of MEEIA-related costs. Under the MEEIA statute, the Commission 17 is required to provide for full and timely cost recovery. Ultimately, the throughput 18 disincentive will cease when all savings are included in base rates through rebasing 19 adjustments in general rate proceedings. The Commission MEEIA rule requirement to file 20 rate cases at intervals of no longer than four years with an approved Rider is sufficient 21 control about how long the throughput disincentive costs for MEEIA 2019-24 costs will 22 continue.

1	XI. MULTIFAMILY LOW-INCOME PROGRAM
2	Q. What recommendations were made regarding the Company's
3	proposed multifamily low-income program?
4	A. Aside from Staff and OPC's position to cut budgets, timelines, and earnings
5	opportunity metrics, the NHT, Tower Grove, and NRDC provided specific
6	recommendations. The recommendations are as following: 1) NHT and NRDC recommend
7	changes to the timing of budgets and performance goals; 2) NHT raises concerns about
8	pathways to eligibility; 3) NHT recommends changes to availability of energy audits;
9	4) NHT and Tower Grove recommend increased incentive levels; 5) NHT recommends
10	accommodations for substantial rehabilitation projects; and 6) Tower Grove recommends
11	publishing an exhaustive list of potential projects on its website.
12	Q. Does the Company agree that adjusting its budget and performance
13	targets to accommodate a "ramp-up" is appropriate?
14	A. Yes. Since the Company's proposed plan is a significant increase over its
15	current plan and there is a transition toward deeper energy sayings, it makes sense to adopt

15 current plan and there is a transition toward deeper energy savings, it makes sense to adopt 16 such an adjustment. The table below includes a modified budget proposal for Commission 17 approval that is very close to what NRDC recommends with regard to ramping up early in 18 the implementation period as well as on a \$/kWh saved basis. However, the modified 19 budget retains the same total \$25 million proposed six-year budget from the Company's 20 MEEIA 2019-24 Report.

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Annual Budget (\$ million)	\$1.5	\$2.2	\$3.35	\$5.16	\$6.4	\$6.4
MWh Savings	900	1,650	2,680	4,644	5,760	5,760
\$/kWh Saved	\$0.6	\$0.75	\$0.8	\$0.9	\$0.9	\$0.9

	williani (Bill) R. Davis
1	Q. Would changing the annual budgets and performance criteria for the
2	multifamily low-income program result in changes to the Company's proposed
3	Earnings Opportunity Calculator?
4	A. Yes. Because the multifamily low-income performance metric includes an
5	annual budget threshold that must be met to qualify for an earnings opportunity, those
6	annual budget inputs will need to be updated. Consistent with NHT's recommendation, I
7	propose to set the percent savings goal to 0% for 2019 (reflecting a delay in assessing
8	savings performance), 10% for 2020, and 15% for each year thereafter. I have updated the
9	Earnings Opportunity Calculator (attached as Schedule WRD-SR3) to reflect the updated
10	budget and savings goals for the multifamily low-income programs.
11	Q. Does the Company agree with NHT's proposed changes to the eligibility
12	pathways?
13	A Vest and the requested changes are relatively minor

13 A. Yes, and the requested changes are relatively minor.

Q. Does the Company agree with NHT's recommendations concerning
energy audits?

A. Yes. The recommendations provide more options for customers. However, as these are provided at no cost to the customer, we will continue to require a Level 1 assessment for every new program application.

- 19 Q. Do you agree with NHT's and Tower Grove's recommendations
 20 regarding incentive levels?
- A. It is too early to say. The Company has aggressive goals for the multifamily low-income program which may require increased incentive levels in the future. The Company will certainly do its best to respond to market conditions and offer the required

1 amount of incentives to achieve the program's goals. The 11-Step Change Process is an 2 effective tool to increase incentive levels in the future if the initial levels are insufficient to 3 meet program goals.

- 4
- Do you agree with NHT's recommendation regarding accommodations Q. 5 for substantial rehabilitation projects?

6 A. Not entirely. These substantial rehabilitation projects are a great example of 7 "long lead time" projects. In MEEIA 2016-18 the Company received approval to make 8 commitments to long lead time projects similar to what NHT is recommending. However, 9 the Company did not request such approval as part of its initial MEEIA 2019-24 plan. The 10 first reason the Company did not request the ability to make commitments beyond MEEIA 11 2019-24 is because it is already a six-year implementation period which helps with the 12 types of concerns NHT is raising regarding the ability to make longer-term commitments. 13 The second reason the Company didn't seek approval of the ability to make commitments 14 beyond the 2019-24 implementation period is because we do not yet have experience with 15 the long lead time project process from MEEIA 2016-18. The Company prefers to share 16 the experience with long lead time projects from MEEIA 2016-18 and at a later date, if it 17 makes sense, to seek similar or modified treatment for long lead time projects. Even so, the 18 Company provides up to a 12-month funding commitment within the implementation 19 period and will accommodate extensions and Low Income Housing Tax Credits ("LIHTC") 20 timelines when possible.


21 Q. Does the Company agree with Tower Grove's recommendation to list 22 eligible measures on its website?

1 A. Yes, with a caveat. For the multifamily low-income program, the Company 2 will be offering incentives based on the measure category type similar to the way the 3 Business Custom program works. That approach essentially allows for any measure that 4 produces energy savings to qualify. To that end, it is impossible to post every possible 5 qualifying measure. However, the Company agrees to post information about the types of 6 projects that could qualify as well as case studies on its website. 7 XII. COMBINED HEAT AND POWER 8 Q. Do you agree with DE's recommendation to include CHP as an option 9 under the Business Custom program? 10 A. No. For CHP to be included in a demand-side program (per the MEEIA 11 statute), it must meet at least two criteria: 1) it must be cost-effective; and 2) it must modify the net consumption of electricity on the retail customer's side of the electric meter.¹⁰ CHP 12 13 fails to meet either criteria. Please explain how to determine whether CHP meets those two 14 Q. aforementioned criteria. 15 16 A. The figure below simply illustrates a CHP setup and shows the value 17 proposition it offers. The illustration shows a typical setup without CHP on the left and a 18 typical setup with CHP on the right. A CHP setup is meant to replace the same electrical 19 and thermal output as a customer would receive by its own boiler system and procuring 20 electricity from the local utility (as seen in the middle of the illustration as 30 units of 21 electricity and 45 units of heat output). In doing so, the CHP setup achieves an increase in 22 efficiency (~75% efficiency versus ~50% efficiency in the illustration below); meaning its

^{10 § 393.1075.2(3),} RSMo

- 1 cost-effectiveness is measured by whether the increased fuel efficiency outweighs the cost
- 2 to achieve those efficiencies. Further, it is clear from the illustration below that a CHP
- 3 setup does not modify the *consumption* of electricity because the units of electricity 30
- 4 units is the same with or without CHP. All CHP does is change the source of the
- 5 electricity but it does not modify *consumption* of electricity, as the law requires.

Figure 1 – CHP Illustration



Q. Based on an analysis of the illustration above, is CHP cost-effective?
A. No, not even close. Using inputs from the illustration above and fuel price
forecasts from the Company's 2017 IRP, the calculation shows that the efficiency gain
alone does not cover the difference in fuel costs; thus resulting in increased fuel costs
instead of decreased fuel costs. Clearly adding CHP project costs to the cost-effectiveness

1	calculation si	mply makes the economic picture bleaker. I have included the working Excel
2	file with the	calculations and inputs as Confidential Schedule WRD-SR4.
3	Q.	Ameren Missouri currently offers customer rebates for CHP as part of
4	its MEEIA	programming. Has any customer submitted a rebate application in
5	MEEIA 201	6-18 for a CHP project?
6	Α.	No.
7		XIII. PAYS AND ON-BILL FINANCING
8	Q.	Has the Company recently solicited bids for customer on-bill financing,
9	on-bill tariff	and/or on-bill repayment (''on-bill'') programs?
10	А.	Yes, on two occasions. First was after the MEEIA 2016-18 collaborative
11	and second w	vas as part of its MEEIA 2019-24 request for proposals.
12	Q.	Did the Company receive executable bids for customer on-bill
12 13	Q. financing pr	
	_	
13	financing pr A.	ograms?
13 14	financing pr A. was for progr	rograms? No. After the MEEIA 2016-18 collaborative bidding, the single bid received
13 14 15	financing pr A. was for progr due to the rec	Pograms? No. After the MEEIA 2016-18 collaborative bidding, the single bid received ram administration only. The bidder then agreed to seek a capital provider, but
13 14 15 16	financing pr A. was for progr due to the red was severely	Pograms? No. After the MEEIA 2016-18 collaborative bidding, the single bid received ram administration only. The bidder then agreed to seek a capital provider, but quirements of the collaborative stipulation and Commission rules, the search
13 14 15 16 17	financing pr A. was for progr due to the red was severely more expense	Pograms? No. After the MEEIA 2016-18 collaborative bidding, the single bid received ram administration only. The bidder then agreed to seek a capital provider, but quirements of the collaborative stipulation and Commission rules, the search limited. Therefore, it was determined that the cost to run the program was far
 13 14 15 16 17 18 	financing pr A. was for progr due to the red was severely more expense program wer	Pograms? No. After the MEEIA 2016-18 collaborative bidding, the single bid received ram administration only. The bidder then agreed to seek a capital provider, but quirements of the collaborative stipulation and Commission rules, the search limited. Therefore, it was determined that the cost to run the program was far give than originally expected and therefore plans for an on-bill financing
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 	financing pr A. was for progr due to the red was severely more expense program wer	Pograms? No. After the MEEIA 2016-18 collaborative bidding, the single bid received ram administration only. The bidder then agreed to seek a capital provider, but quirements of the collaborative stipulation and Commission rules, the search limited. Therefore, it was determined that the cost to run the program was far sive than originally expected and therefore plans for an on-bill financing e cancelled. The Company did not receive any on-bill financing program bids

A. No. After two procurement events, no bids were received to implement any
 form of on-bill financing options to customers.

Q. Will studying on-bill financing programs, as DE suggests, provide additional value?

5 A. No. In addition to the recent feasibility study performed by Cadmus, a study of Ameren Missouri territory prepared by Pays® America, Inc., was completed in 2004.¹¹ 6 7 Furthermore, in late 2017, DE set up an on-bill financing meeting with members of the 8 Environmental and Energy Study Institute ("EESI") and Ameren Missouri as well as a 9 webinar that included other Missouri Stakeholders, in which we provided our on-bill 10 financing RFP and stipulation for EESI comment and provided recommendations. The 11 Company is open to implementing customer on-bill financing programs, but has been 12 unable to secure service providers necessary to move forward due to known interrelated 13 policy issues and trade-offs that have not been resolved. For instance, not allowing disconnections, as DE proposes, for non-payment of loan amounts will increase risk to 14 15 capital providers and result in raising the offered interest rate to double digits.

16

Q. Are there critical policy issues that would need to be determined before moving forward with on-bill financing programs?

A. Yes. With each type of on-bill financing program, when the perceived repayment risk is higher the pool of interested program administrators and capital providers becomes limited. Correspondingly, high risk significantly increases the cost for administration, interest rates and loan origination. If the Commission really wants to

¹¹ Pays® America Inc. (aka Energy Efficiency Institute, the proprietary owner of PAYS®), performed a feasibility study designed to help AmerenUE and the Missouri Residential & Commercial Energy Efficiency Collaborative to determine whether or not to pursue implementing the PAYS® system in Missouri.

1	advance on-bill financing options then I recommend the Commission approve, via rule, the
2	policy directions listed directly below as enablers for financing programs. With that new
3	policy direction, the Company will seek implementation contractors and return to the
4	Commission for approval of specific plans and budgets. Absent adoption of the policies
5	below, I recommend we shelve plans for the utility to offer on-bill financing programs and
6	focus on other opportunities.
7	Policy Directions to Enable Financing Options
8	1) When an energy efficiency on-bill financing payment is added to
9	the utility bill it should be treated in the same way as the energy payment,
10	including disconnects.
11	2) In order to keep interest rates low, the program should set up a
12	loan loss reserve to cover customer defaults.
13	3) The program should provide capital repayment at 100% every
14	month regardless of the customer making the payment.
15	4) All program costs should be recovered through the EEIC over the
16	life of the customer loans.
17	5) Loan repayment periods should be 10 years.
18	Q. Is on-bill financing the only financing path available to customers who
19	want to participate in energy efficiency programs?
20	A. No. Several of the MEEIA 2019-24 program implementation bidders
21	proposed to help customers secure financing as part of their program designs. Ameren
22	Missouri implementers work on a largely pay-for-performance basis making it to their
23	advantage to bring customer solutions that enable participation in the programs. A few

specific examples include: the multi-family low-income program implementer can provide
access to their Community Development Financial Institution ("CDFI")¹² for loan funds
while the business program implementer is planning to partner with a financing provider
for commercial participants.

5 Q. Staff expressed concerns about how long throughput disincentive costs 6 could carry on into the future. Do financing costs end with a MEEIA implementation 7 period?

A. No. In fact, with longer loan terms (typically offered to reduce monthly payment amounts) the ongoing costs could carry forward for a long time after the end of a MEEIA implementation period. For example, a 10-year loan approved at the end of a MEEIA plan will result in costs for the next 10 years (payment support, bad debt collection, customer service, etc.)

13

XIV. OTHER MISCELLANEOUS POINTS MADE IN REBUTTAL

Parties raised a number of other additional issues in rebuttal. Please

- 14 **Q.**
- 15 respond.

A. I will start with Staff's concern about the Company including non-costeffective measures in its MEEIA 2019-24 plan. In response to Staff Data Request 0070, the Company provided a list of 28 measures in non-low-income programs that individually did not pass the TRC included in the Company's spreadsheet model, along with an explanation of why those measures were included. Subsequently, Staff requested more explanation or for those measures to be removed. Upon further inspection, I agree that nine of the measures should be removed. However, I also discovered that 13 of the measures

¹² A CDFI is a financial institution that provides credit and financial services to underserved markets and populations.

1 were in fact cost-effective. There were a few HVAC measures that proved to be cost-2 effective after fixing erroneous inputs and there were also a few lighting measures that 3 passed the measure screen as cost-effective but the modeling included program delivery 4 costs in the measure-level TRC for modeling convenience which resulted in overstated 5 measure costs. The six remaining measures are not cost-effective but are higher SEER 6 levels being incentivized without providing a higher incentive. For example, a SEER 19 7 air-source heat pump is not cost-effective, but the program will provide the same incentive for the SEER 19 as it would for the cost-effective SEER 17; thus the additional cost to 8 9 achieve a SEER 19 is paid by the participant.

Q. Does Staff have legitimate concerns about the cost-effectiveness of programs if all measures were at the maximum incentive level included in Appendix D to the MEEIA 2019-24 report?

13 A. No. For all measures to move to the maximum of the ranges included in 14 Appendix D would be an extremely unlikely situation. Plus, the 11-Step Change Process 15 requires the Company to perform cost-effectiveness analyses at the time of a decision to 16 change incentive levels. Regardless, to "check the box" for the Commission, I ran the 17 analysis anyway. In running the analysis, the Company identified some improvement 18 opportunities in Appendix D to split a couple of measures into more granular categories. 19 For example, the incentive range on Residential LEDs was quite large because that 20 grouping included "smart" or "connected" LED bulbs which have a much higher up-front 21 cost. Therefore, separating that LED category into two categories helps clarify which 22 measures would be eligible for higher incentives. A redlined Appendix D is included as 23 Schedule WRD-SR5 that clearly shows the changes to meet Staff's suggestion that all non-

1 low-income programs are cost-effective with all measures at the maximum incentive included in Appendix D. 2

3 Q. Staff has requested that the evaluation, measurement and verification 4 (EM&V) contractors perform the cost-effectiveness modeling for MEEIA 2019-24. Is 5 that a reasonable request?

- 6 A.
 - Yes, and I am supportive of including those activities in the scope of work for the evaluation contractors.
- 8

7

RESPONSE TO CCM

9 **Q**. CCM has requested the Company provide historical data about the 10 programs as well as commit to providing that data on an ongoing basis in an effort to 11 support the development of an Equitable Energy Efficiency baseline. Is the Company 12 supportive of that request?

13 A. Without commenting on the value of developing an Equitable Energy 14 Efficiency baseline, the Company is certainly willing to provide historical participation 15 data as well as some aggregate usage data. In fact, I have summarized the historical data requested in testimony as Schedule WRD-SR6.¹³ I do not think it is necessary to commit 16 17 to providing this type of data on an ongoing basis since we do not know how useful the 18 results of the study will be, whether updates to the study will be valuable, and/or what the 19 appropriate interval for updates will be. If the Commission prefers this data be provided on 20 an ongoing basis, then I propose the aggregated zip code level participation data and zip 21 code level average usage be provided in an Appendix to the evaluation reports for CCM to 22 access at their convenience.

¹³ The provided data does not include savings from the residential lighting and school kit programs since program delivery method does not allow for the collection of customer specific data.

Q. Is there a more immediate opportunity to make use of an Equitable Energy Efficiency baseline study?

A. Yes. The Company is finishing its draft for its Request for Proposals for its next demand-side potential study. In that Request, the Company is asking for bidders to estimate a separate potential estimate for low-income customers. Because costeffectiveness is not necessarily a constraint for the development of low-income potential, developing a scenario of potential (and associated budgets) that is based on the results of an Equitable Energy Efficiency baseline is likely a good opportunity for stakeholders to understand how such a study could directly influence future program/budget decisions.

10

EM&V BUDGETS

Q. OPC expresses concerns about the value of evaluations compared to the
 cost of performing those evaluations. Are those concerns valid?

A. First, the evaluations are trying to measure things that did not happen so there is inherent uncertainty with the process and results. Second, budgets are capped by Commission rules at 5% which means for MEEIA 2019-24 that would be approximately \$25 million budgeted for evaluation. Even with a total of \$25 million, it is still not possible to evaluate every aspect of every measure every year. Thus, evaluations are a matter of prioritization on how the funds will be utilized.

- Q. Is it possible to reduce budgets from the 5% allowed by the rule and
 still achieve reasonable estimates?
- A. Absolutely. In fact, the more that parties can agree upon certain parameters
 and priorities the deeper the cuts to the budgets can be. While I understand the desire to

improve our understanding of savings estimates, every dollar not spent on evaluations
 could either go toward the programs or simply not be spent.

3 Q. OPC further wishes to limit the definition of net-to-gross to free4 ridership and spillover, is that appropriate?

A. No, and the Commission agreed that it was not appropriate in the rulemaking that led to the current MEEIA rules when OPC advanced the same position. The Commission ruled that it should not constrain what an evaluator is allowed to examine. In addition, specifying the subcategories of free-ridership and spillover up-front increases the transparency of what will be evaluated. For OPC to say "limit net-to-gross to freeridership and spillover" is overly vague because those words in fact contain the subcategories the evaluator plans to examine; which are also best practice approaches.¹⁴

12 Q. Are there some things the Company and evaluators can do to improve 13 the evaluation process?

14 A. Yes. First, I will note that evaluation reports are voluminous and can be 15 overwhelming to comprehensively review. To aide with that review, the Company has 16 created an Excel version of its TRM which will add more transparency on how formulas 17 are being applied. TRM updates will also be cataloged in the Excel file so everyone can 18 track measure-level changes over time. In addition, the Company will be adding a portfolio 19 summary report to the annual evaluation reporting requirement as a single source of the 20 portfolio results as well as highlights of important updates for the stakeholders (of course 21 the detailed reports will also be available). Further, the Company will be asking the

¹⁴ United States Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Uniform Methods Project, "<u>Chapter 21: Estimating Net Savings – Common Practices</u>". Pp. 3-6.

1 evaluator to lead an annual review of each program year's evaluation plan prior to execution

2 of that plan so stakeholders have an opportunity to provide comments.

3

<u>MEEIA RATE DESIGN</u>

4 Q. Staff raises a concern that the Rider EEIC charge is a flat charge per
5 kWh all year long. Please respond.

- A. The Company recommended separate summer and winter rates for the
 recovery of MEEIA costs in its MEEIA 2013-15 filing (File No. EO-2012-0142) whereas
 Staff specifically recommended a flat year-round rate. We have proposed a flat year-round
 rate, just as Staff recommended.
- 10 WEBSITE LINKS IN MEEIA TARIFFS

11 Q. Staff raised concerns about the MEEIA tariffs referring to the Ameren

12 Missouri homepage instead of the energy efficiency homepage. Is that an appropriate

- 13 change?
- A. Yes, the tariffs should be updated to reflect a more precise web location to
- 15 find the appropriate information.
- 16 Q. Does this conclude your surrebuttal testimony?
- 17 A. Yes, it does.

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri's 3rd Filing to Implement Regulatory Changes in Furtherance of Energy Efficiency as allowed by MEEIA.

File No. EO-2018-0211

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM ("BILL") R. DAVIS

)

STATE OF MISSOURI)) ss **CITY OF ST. LOUIS**)

William ("Bill") R. Davis, being first duly sworn on his oath, states:

My name is William ("Bill") R. Davis. I work in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, 1. and I am employed by Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri as Director Energy Efficiency & Renewables.

2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my Surrebuttal Testimony on behalf of Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri consisting of ____57____ pages and Schedule(s) wRD-SR1, WRD-SR2, WRD-SR3, WRD-SR4, WRD-SR5, & WRD-SR6, all of which have been prepared in written form for introduction into evidence in the above-referenced docket.

3. I hereby swear and affirm that my answers contained in the attached testimony to the questions therein propounded are true and correct.

WILLIAM ("BILL") R. DAVIS

Scribed and sworn to before me this <u>14th</u> day of <u>September</u>, Cathlew I. Dehne 2018.

Notary Public

My commission expires

Marca 7, 2000

