Exhibit No.:

Issue(s):

Recommended Conditions for

Authorizing UE's Participation in MISO

Witness/Type of Exhibit:

Kind/Rebuttal

Sponsoring Party:

Public Counsel

Case No.:

EO-98-413

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

RYAN KIND

Service Commission

Submitted on Behalf of the Office of the Public Counsel

UNION ELECTRIC

Case No. EO-98-413

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

RYAN KIND

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY d/b/a AMERENUE

CASE NO. EO-98-413

- Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, TITLE, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
- A. Ryan Kind, Chief Utility Economist, Office of the Public Counsel, P.O. Box 7800,
 Jefferson City, Missouri 65102.
- Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND EMPLOYMENT BACKGROUND.
- A. I have a B.S.B.A. in Economics and a M.A. in Economics from the University of Missouri-Columbia (UMC). While I was a graduate student at UMC, I was employed as a Teaching Assistant with the Department of Economics, and taught classes in Introductory Economics, and Money and Banking, in which I served as a Lab Instructor for Discussion Sections.

My previous work experience includes three and one-half years of employment with the Missouri Division of Transportation as a Financial Analyst. My responsibilities at the Division of Transportation included preparing transportation rate proposals and testimony for rate cases involving various segments of the trucking industry. I have been employed as an economist at the Office of the Public Counsel (Public Counsel or OPC) since April 1991.

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Q. HAVE YOU TESTIFIED PREVIOUSLY BEFORE THIS COMMISSION?

A. Yes, prior to this case I submitted written testimony in numerous gas rate cases, several electric rate design cases and rate cases, as well as other miscellaneous water, gas, electric, and telephone cases.

Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

- A. My testimony will address the following topics associated with the request made by Union Electric (UE or AmerenUE or the Company) for the Commission to authorize the Company's participation in the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO):
 - Overview of origins of this docket in the UE/CIPS merger docket (EM-96-149)
 - Public Counsel's involvement in the formation of the MISO
 - Shortcomings of the MISO as approved by the FERC
 - Public Counsel's recommendations
- Q. How did this docket for approval of UE's participation in the MISO result from the UE/CIPS merger docket (EM-96-149)?
- A. Market power issues were raised by parties in the merger case. The testimony of Public Counsel and Commission Staff (Staff) witnesses discussed the role that ISOs can play in mitigating market power issues. The Commission responded to this testimony by ordering UE to join an ISO or file a plan with the Commission "for establishing an independent entity charged with the operation, pricing and planning of its transmission system."

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After the Commission issued its Report and Order in the UE/CIPS merger case in February 1997, Ameren was one of the transmission owning utilities that filed an application with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on January 15, 1998 for approval of the MISO. Then, on March 30, 1998, UE filed its application requesting Commission authority to participate in the MISO. The Commission opened this docket in response to that application.

- Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE POTENTIAL MARKET POWER PROBLEMS THAT LED THE COMMISSION TO BELIEVE THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONDITION ITS APPROVAL OF THE UE/CIPS MERGER ON UE'S WILLINGNESS TO JOIN AN ISO OR FORM AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY THAT OPERATES UE'S TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.
- A. The Commission's Report and Order in EM-96-149 stated at page 16 that "to address the vertical market power concern that Ameren could use its transmission system to restrict competition from other generation, the regional transmission group should be an entity that will independently operate the transmission systems of the vertically integrated utilities within the region."
- Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE A MORE FORMAL DEFINITION OF VERTICAL MARKET POWER?
- A. Yes, the following definitions are from the proposed education message that the Education Working Group submitted to the Commission in the August 14, 1998 work group report.

Market power - the ability of a firm, alone or in concert with other firms, to profitably maintain the price of a product above the competitive market level for an extended period of time. Suppliers with vertical or horizontal market power could charge unfair prices and realize excessive profits..

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Vertical market power - this type of market power involves the ability of a firm to control an essential element in the vertical production chain and, through that control, cause competitors to be at a disadvantage through either restricted access or higher costs for the products or services required to produce and deliver the specific product.

- IS THERE A GENERAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IN THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY THAT WHEN A Q. UTILITY IS VERTICALLY INTEGRATED DUE TO ITS OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF DISTRIBUTION, TRANSMISSION, AND GENERATION ASSETS, THE UTILITY WILL BE CAPABLE OF UTILIZING ITS TRANSMISSION ASSETS TO GAIN VERTICAL MARKET POWER?
- Yes, this concept is generally accepted, and the FERC issued orders 888 and 889 in A. response to its concern that vertically integrated utilities may use their transmission assets to exercise vertical market power. Through orders 888 and 889, the FERC hoped to decrease the ability of vertically integrated electric utilities to discriminate against others in transmission pricing and access. More recently, the FERC has been encouraging ISOs and exploring the need to define boundaries for, and require participation in, regional transmission organizations (RTOs).
- WAS THE MISSOURI OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC COUNSEL INVOLVED IN THE DISCUSSIONS Q. THAT LED TO THE FILING OF THE MISO FERC APPLICATION?
- Yes, we took advantage of the opportunity to provide input into the ISO formation Α. process through attendance at meetings and collaboration with state consumer advocate offices in other MISO states.

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Q. DID OPC PARTICIPATE IN THE FERC DOCKET WHERE THE MISO APPLICATION WAS CONSIDERED?

- A. Yes, we intervened in the FERC case as part of the Midwest Coalition for Effective Competition (MCEC). A summary of the issues addressed by the MCEC in the FERC MISO application case was included in the Public Counsel Response that was filed in this docket on July 22, 1998. One complete copy of the MCEC Request to Intervene and Protest in FERC Docket Nos. EC-98-24 and ER-98-1438 was attached to the Public Counsel Response so that it may be reviewed in the Commission case file.
- Q. WAS THE MCEC SUCESSFUL IN PURSUADING THE FERC TO ADOPT MOST OF ITS POSITIONS ON THE MISO FERC APPLICATION?
- A. No. Unfortunately, the FERC approved most of the application (except for the MISO's proposed pricing provisions) as filed by the MISO. Public Counsel was particularly disappointed that the FERC decided not to give the MISO the authority to take over control area operations.
- Q. DOES PUBLIC COUNSEL BELIEVE THAT EVEN WITH THE MISO, AMEREN WILL HAVE

 THE ABILITY TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST OTHER USERS OF ITS TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

 AND PROVIDE A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE TO ITS GENERATION ASSETS?
- A. Yes. This potential for UE to exercise market power will become especially important to Missouri consumers if the Missouri Legislature decides to restructure this state's electric industry.
- Q. WHAT IS PUBLIC COUNSEL'S VIEW ON WHETHER THE MISSOURI ELECTRIC INDUSTRY SHOULD BE RESTRUCTURED?

Rebuttal Testimony of Ryan Kind

A. Public Counsel believes that even if restructuring is done in the best possible manner, small consumers may suffer. If restructuring is not done properly, then we could go from a system of well regulated monopolies to unregulated monopolies or oligopolies. Even if restructuring results in a system where numerous competitors as seeking to fulfill the energy needs of consumers, consumers may get little benefit from this "competition" if some of the competitors possess significant market power.

- Q. WHAT ARE SOME OF THE LIKELY SOURCES OF MARKET POWER IN A RESTRUCTURED

 MISSOURI ELECTIC INDUSTRY?
- A. Vertical market power could be exercised through the control of either distribution or transmission assets if the vertically integrated utilities that own these assets are allowed to discriminate against competitors in terms of reliability, access, pricing, or privileged access to information. Horizontal market power could arise from: (1) the concentration of ownership of generation assets in relevant markets and (2) market power exercised at the retail merchant (aggregator) level through incumbent advantages in the areas of brand name recognition, product bundling, default provider status, privileged access to customer and competitor information, long-term special contracts, and stranded cost subsidies.
- Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THE COMMISSION HAS AN OPPORTUNITY IN THIS DOCKET TO ENSURE
 THAT UE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO UTILIZE ITS TRANSMISSION ASSETS TO EXERCISE
 VERTICAL MARKET POWER IF RETAIL WHEELING IS PERMITTED IN MISSOURI?
- A. Yes, OPC believes the Commission should condition its approval of UE's participation in the MISO on the Company's willingness to transfer its control area functions to the MISO prior to the implementation of retail wheeling legislation in Missouri. The transfer

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19 20 of these functions could be accomplished most efficiently by transferring the personnel and facilities that are currently utilized to perform these functions to the MISO.

- IS THE AVAILABILITY OF THIS OPTION DEPENDENT ON THE MISO'S WILLINGNESS TO Q. ACCEPT THE TRANSFER OF UE'S CONTROL AREA OPERATIONS TO IT?
- Yes. If the MISO declines to accept the transfer of UE's control area operations, then UE A. should be required to transfer its control area operations to a separate independent entity that is created for this purpose.
- SHOULD UE BE REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE WILLINGNESS OF THE MISO TO Q. ACCEPT ITS CONTROL AREA OPERATIONS WELL IN ADVANCE OF ANY DATE THAT IS SET FOR THE START OF RETAIL WHEELING IN MISSOURI?
- Yes. This should be relatively easy to do, even if UE waits until any retail wheeling A. legislation is passed prior to determining the willingness of the MISO to accept UE's control area operations. Due to the many intermediate steps that must be accomplished (rate unbundling, affiliate rules, stranded cost recovery plans, etc.) prior to the beginning of retail wheeling, UE should be able to determine the MISO's willingness to accept UE's control area operations at least one year in advance of the start of retail wheeling.
- WHAT IF THE MISO IS UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE TRANSFER OF UE'S CONTROL Q. **AREA OPERATIONS?**
- If this occurs, then UE should be required to transfer its control area functions to a A. separate independent entity that would operate UE's transmission assets.

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE CONTROL AREA FUNCTIONS THAT PUBLIC COUNSEL IS RECOMMENDING BE TRANSFERRED TO THE MISO OR A SEPARATE ENTITY.

- A. Control areas are responsible for providing the minute to minute balancing of generation and load within the control area. This must be accomplished on a continual basis to maintain reliable service within the control area through automatic generation control (AGC). In order to be able to effectively use AGC to maintain control area balance and voltage support, the control area operator must have sufficient advance notice of the loads that are likely to occur at any given time and advance notice of the generation resources (and associated transmission scheduling) for meeting these loads.
- Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS REGARDING THE DIRECT TESTOMONY OF UE'S WITNESS, MR. R. ALLEN KELLY?
- A. Yes, Mr. Allen states at line 18 on page 5 of his testimony that:

AmerenCIPS and AmerenUE will need to review orders issued as to the Midwest ISO by this commission, the Illinois Commission, other state commissions, and other federal regulatory agencies. Ameren will need to review those orders to ensure that any conditions imposed by those commissions and agencies are reasonable and appropriate for Ameren, its customers and its shareholders. If not, AmerenCIPS and AmerenUE may once again need to consider other regional transmission options.

I am concerned that UE has indicated an intention to consider withdrawing from the MISO if it is not satisfied with orders related to its participation that are issued by "this commission, the Illinois Commission, other state commissions, and other federal regulatory agencies." Public Counsel does not believe that UE should be allowed to withdraw from the MISO without first seeking authorization from this Commission. For this reason, OPC recommends that the Commission require UE to request the Commission's authorization for the Company to withdraw from the MISO prior to doing so.

Q. ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT UE MAY CHOOSE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE MISO IF THE CONDITIONS POSED BY REGULATORY COMMISSIONS REMOVE ANY STRATEGIC OR FINANCIAL ADVANTAGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMPANY'S OWNERSHIP OF TRANSMISSION ASSETS?

- A. Yes. In other words, if regulatory policies succeed in ensuring that UE no longer has the potential to use its transmission assets to exercise vertical market power, then the Company may seek to avoid being required to participate in an ISO or any other RTO.
- Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT PUBLIC COUNSEL IS MAKING IN THIS CASE.
- A. OPC recommends that the Commission prescribe the following conditions for its approval of UE's application in this case.
 - At least one year prior to the start of retail wheeling in Missouri, UE should to
 determine the MISO's willingness to accept UE's control area operations and
 report this determination to the Commission.
 - If the MISO is willing to accept UE's control area operations, then these
 operations should be transferred to the MISO at least six months prior the start
 of retail wheeling in Missouri.
 - If the MISO is not willing to accept UE's control area operations, then these operations should be transferred to an independent entity at least six months prior to the start of retail wheeling in Missouri.
 - UE must request the Commission's authorization for the Company to withdraw from the MISO prior to doing so.

Rebuttal Testimony of Ryan Kind

- Q. IS OPC OPPOSED TO THE APPROVAL OF UE'S APPLICATION IN THIS CASE WITHOUT THE ABOVE RECOMMENDED CONDITIONS?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?
- A. Yes.

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Company (AmerenUE) for an Order Authorizing it to Participate in the Midwest ISO.) Case No. EO-98-413
AFFIDAVIT OF RYAN KIND	
STATE OF MISSOURI)) ss COUNTY OF COLE)	
Ryan Kind, of lawful age and being first duly so	worn, deposes and states:
 My name is Ryan Kind. I am the Chief Counsel. 	Utility Economist for the Office of the Public
2. Attached hereto and made a part hereconsisting of pages 1 through 10.	of for all purposes is my rebuttal testimony
3. I hereby swear and affirm that my stater true and correct to the best of my knowle Rya	ments contained in the attached testimony are dge and belief. Representation of the attached testimony are discounted by the state of the attached testimony are discounted by the attached testimony a
	ry, 1999. Any Localner ry S. Koestner ary Public

My commission expires August 20, 2001