Exhibit No.: Issues: Interchange Sales Jurisdictional Allocations Amortization Expense Witness: James R. Dittmer Type of Exhibit: Surrebuttal Testimony Sponsoring party: DOE-NSSA Case No.: ER-2006-314 Surrebuttal Testimony Date: October 6, 2006

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

CASE NO. ER-2006-0314

Public Version

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

JAMES R. DITTMER

ON BEHALF OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY – NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Kansas City, Missouri October 2006

"** Designates that "Highly Confidential" or "Proprietary" information has been removed pursuant to the Standard Protective Order

1		SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY
2		OF JAMES R. DITTMER
3 4		KANSAS CITY POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
5		CASE NO. ER-2006-0314
6		
7	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS.
8	А.	My name is James R. Dittmer. My business address is 740 Northwest Blue Parkway,
9		Suite 204, Lee's Summit, Missouri 64086.
10		
11	Q.	BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED?
12	А.	I am a Senior Regulatory Consultant with the firm of Utilitech, Inc., a consulting firm
13		engaged primarily in utility rate work.
14		
15	Q.	HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE?
16	А.	Yes. On August 8, 2006 I filed direct testimony on behalf of the United States
17		Department of Energy that is representing the interest of the National Nuclear
18		Security Administration (DOE-NNSA') and other affected Federal Executive
19		Agencies. On September 8, 2006 I filed rebuttal testimony-also on behalf of DOE-
20		NSSA.
21		
22	Q.	ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU FILING SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY IN
23		THIS CASE?
24	А.	This surrebuttal testimony is also being filed on behalf of DOE-NNSA.
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0.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

I will be addressing two topics. First, within its initial direct filing, through witness 2 А. Mr. Don Frerking, KCPL proposed to allocate off-system sales margins between the 3 Missouri retail, Kansas retail and wholesale jurisdictions employing a new allocation 4 methodology that KCPL refers to as the "unused energy allocator." Within rebuttal 5 testimony filed on September 8, 2006 Mr. Frerking continued to embrace the concept 6 of employing the "unused energy allocator" to assign off-system sales margins to the 7 However, while continuing to embrace the concept of 8 various jurisdictions. employing the "unused energy allocator," Mr. Frerking nonetheless revised and 9 purportedly corrected the calculation underlying the noted allocator. One purpose of 10 this surrebuttal testimony is to establish that, notwithstanding the Company's revision 11 12 to its allocator development, all arguments that I made in rebuttal testimony in opposition to the use the "unused energy allocator" remain valid. In fact, the revision 13 actually further highlights one of the significant problems of its use that I discussed 14 15 within rebuttal testimony.

16

Second, KCPL witness Mr. Michael Cline has filed rebuttal testimony addressing the topic of the Additional Amortization required to achieve financial metrics agreed to by a number of parties signing the Stipulation and Agreement in Case No. EO-2005-0329. Mr. Cline provides a rebuttal schedule that attempt to show that the revenue requirement is lower in the short run if capital requirements are funded through 'traditional ratemaking' rather than through "Additional Amortization." There are elements to Mr. Cline's analysis that are very misleading. Accordingly, a second

1		purpose of this surrebuttal testimony is to respond to some of Mr. Cline's assertions or
2		conclusions.
3		
4		UNUSED ENERGY ALLOCATOR
5	Q.	PLEASE BEGIN BY FIRST PROVIDING YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF
6		THE COMPANY'S REVISED CALCULATION OF ITS PROPOSED
7		"UNUSED ENERGY ALLOCATOR."
8	А.	KCPL originally developed the unused energy allocator for each jurisdiction
9		(Missouri, Kansas, and FERC) in the following manner:
10 11		Average of 12 Coincident MW Demands for the Jurisdiction (whether it is Missouri, Kansas or FERC)
12 13		Times Total Hours in a Year (8,760)
14 15		Equals-Subtotal"Available Energy" for each Jurisdiction.
16 17 18		Less: Actual Energy Served to Each Jurisdiction for the Year (Sales plus Line Losses For Each Jurisdiction)
19 20		Equals-'Unused Energy' for Each Jurisdiction
21 22		This calculation was originally made for each jurisdiction-Kansas, Missouri and
23		FERC. Using this algorithm, each jurisdiction's "unused energy allocator" was then
24		developed by dividing its calculated "unused energy" by the calculated total company
25		amount of "unused energy." KCPL's original development of its "unused energy
26		allocator' is shown on the top half of Schedule JRD-1 that was attached to my rebuttal
27		testimony filed on September 8, 2006.
28		

1 Within its rebuttal filing, KCPL revised the development of the "unused energy 2 allocator." Specifically, now KCPL proposes to calculate the "Available Energy" 3 employed in its factor development for each jurisdiction by multiplying the total 4 system capacity available times each jurisdictions' demand factor times the total 5 number of hours in the year (i.e., 8,760). The actual development of KCPL's revised 6 'unused energy allocator" can be found on the top half of attached Surrebuttal Schedule 7 JRD-1.

8

9 Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THIS KCPL REVISION?

KCPL originally calculated the Missouri jurisdictional "unused energy allocator" to be 10 А. 46.18%. KCPL's revised Missouri jurisdictional "unused energy allocator" is 51.55%. 11 Thus, KCPL's revision causes over five percent more of non-firm off-system sales 12 13 margins to be allocated to the Missouri jurisdiction. I would note that a portion of that shift is caused by updating for the twelve months ending December 2005 versus 14 15 KCPL's original filing that was based on the twelve months ending September 2005. 16 Ultimately the revenue requirement value of this allocation issue to the Missouri jurisdiction will be dependent upon the "total company" off-system sales margin 17 determined by this Commission to be reasonable. As noted elsewhere in this record, 18 19 there is also a significant difference among the parties as to quantification of the 20 appropriate ongoing level of total company off-system sales margins to be considered 21 within cost of service development. On the bottom half of attached Surrebuttal 22 Schedule JRD-1 I show the value of this allocation issue at the Company-proposed as

well as DOE-NSSA-proposed total company level of non-firm off-system sales
 margins being proposed.

3

AN EARLIER ANSWER YOU STATED THAT, 4 О. WITHIN 5 NOTWITHSTANDING THE KCPL REVISIONS DESCRIBED WITHIN ITS **REBUTTAL TESTIMONY, THE ARGUMENTS YOU MADE WITHIN YOUR** 6 **REBUTTAL TESTIMONY REMAINED VALID. PLEASE EXPAND UPON** 7 8 THAT COMMENT.

9 A. Within my rebuttal testimony I addressed four arguments in opposition to the 10 adoption of KCPL's "unused energy allocator." Notwithstanding a fairly significant 11 change in its development, adoption of the KCPL-revised "unused energy allocator" 12 would still be inappropriate. None of the criticisms stated within my rebuttal 13 testimony have been addressed with the KCPL revision. To the contrary, the revised 14 calculation actually emphasizes one of the flaws of the allocator that I addressed 15 within rebuttal testimony.

16

17 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE FLAW THAT HAS BEEN EMPHASIZED AS A 18 RESULT OF THE KCPL REVISION.

A. Within my rebuttal testimony I described how the purported propriety of the "unused energy allocator" is built upon an implicit assumption that virtually all "unused" MWHs that become the basis for the "unused energy allocator" would have been "used" to make additional off-system sales. I went on to explain and quantify how KCPL was achieving off-system MWH sales volumes that were but a fraction of the calculated 'unused energy?'

23

1

KCPL has revised the calculation of the "unused energy" to consider the maximum 4 5 capacity that each jurisdiction was "paying for" rather than only the 12 CP average of 6 each jurisdiction's demands as had been employed within its original calculation. As a 7 result of this revision, the calculated total company "unused energy" grew from the 8 originally-calculated amount of 7,205,409 MWHs to a revised amount of 22,760,083 9 MWHs. This revision highlights and emphasizes a point made within my rebuttal 10 testimony-namely, that because of market conditions, KCPL undertakes sales that are 11 but a mere fraction of the theoretical amount of "unused energy" that it has to sell. 12 Thus, to suggest—as employment of the "unused energy allocator" implicitly does—that 13 the level of off-system sales margins being achieved is significantly influenced by 14 "available energy" simply does not comport with the facts of the situation. 15 Accordingly, for this, and other reasons stated within my rebuttal testimony, I 16 strongly urge the rejection of this never-before-adopted allocation methodology.

17

18 This very key assumption that the majority of the calculated "unused energy" is being 19 sold is simply incorrect. Specifically, in each year, there are many hours when KCPL 20 does not make interchange sales from a number of units that are not being "used" to 21 make retail sales. Because the market price for interchange sales is below the 22 variable running cost for many of its units, no interchange sales are made from 23 KCPL's relatively high cost units for many hours of the year even though such units

1		are clearly available to make additional interchange sales (and used within the
2		development of the 'unused energy allocator'). In fact, during calendar year 2005,
3		KCPL had non-firm interchange sales of only ** 2005 ** MWHs. Clearly, many
4		of the "unused' MWHs calculated to be available for sale into the wholesale market (as
5		discussed above-22,760,083) are not being sold on the non-firm interchange market.
6		KCPL's "unused energy allocator" fails to recognize that, just because a jurisdiction is
7		not 'using' all the energy it is 'paying for,' does not mean that KCPL will have a market
8		in which to sell such "unused energy."
9		
10		It cannot be overemphasized that employment of this erroneous assumption that is
11		implicit within the development of KCPL's "unused energy allocator" invalidates its
12		adoption. Jurisdictions should not be given "credit" for unused energy when clearly
13		significant amounts of so called "available" energy are not being sold because market
14		conditions do not permit.
15		
16		
17		"ADDITIONAL AMORTIZATION" ANALYSIS
18	Q.	PLEASE STATE THAT PORTION OF MR. MICHAEL CLINE'S REBUTTAL
19		TESTIMONY THAT YOU WILL BE ADDRESSING.
20	А.	At page 5 of his rebuttal testimony Mr. Cline states the following:
21		Ratepayers are disadvantaged in the short-run if a high level of cash
22		flow for financing is provided through Additional Amortizations rather
23		than the cash being sourced through traditional ratemaking. This
24		concept is illustrated in the attached Schedule MWC-3. The Schedule

1		illustrates two scenarios for financing a \$1 million capital expenditure.
2		The first solves for the mix of equity and debt required to generate the
3		necessary earnings needed to reach an FFO to Total Debt ratio of 25%
4		without Additional Amortizations. The second scenario assumes the
5		expenditure is financed with 100% debt. Since there are no marginal
6		earnings under this scenario, full reliance on Additional Amortizations
7		is required in order to maintain a 25% FFO to Total Debt ratio. The
8		resulting Additional Amortization is \$400,000, or 40% of the
9		expenditure amount. The revenue requirement in the second scenario
10		is over 300% greater than that of the scenario with no Additional
11		Amortizations. (Michael W. Cline Rebuttal Testimony, page 5,
12		Emphasis included within original testimony text)
13		
14		Because I will be addressing Mr. Cline's rebuttal Schedule MWC-3, for convenience I
15		have affixed a copy of the noted document to this testimony as Surrebuttal Schedule
16		JRD-2.
17		
18	Q.	WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF MR. CLINE'S TESTIMONY YOU HAVE
19		QUOTED.
20	А.	In an earlier discussion leading up to the quote above Mr. Cline asserts a conclusion
21		that an over-reliance on Additional Amortization would be inferior to achieving a
22		similar financial metric through means such as granting a higher return on equity or
23		other means of traditional rate relief. However, that discussion segued into a question
24		of "what would be the impact on ratepayers" of granting more Additional Amortization
25		in lieu of more "traditional' rate relief. The quote above was provided in answer to this
26		latter question. Thus, it would appear that the purpose of Mr. Cline's testimony is to

draw the reader to a conclusion that even in the short run it is cheaper for ratepayer if
 more rate relief is granted in the form of "traditional" cost of service rate relief *rather than* through reflection of "Additional Amortization."

4

Q. WHAT EXCEPTION DO YOU TAKE TO MR. CLINE'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

First, I want to disperse any mistaken notion that might be drawn from Mr. Cline's 7 Α. rebuttal testimony and Mr. Cline's rebuttal Schedule MWC-3 (again, that has been 8 affixed to this surrebuttal testimony as Surrebuttal Schedule JRD-2) that the granting 9 of a higher return on equity or the granting of some other form of "traditional" rate 10 relief might some how be less expensive for ratepayers even in the short run. Second, 11 12 while I disagree with assumptions employed in Mr. Cline's schedules, I would agree that his math works in his example-for a one year period. However, even by Mr. 13 Cline's admission, this is a "short run' calculation. By limiting his analysis to one year 14 15 Mr. Cline conceals the much higher cost to ratepayers over the long run if this 16 Commission were to substitute the granting of rate relief to achieve agreed-upon 17 targeted financial metrics through authorizing a higher return on equity rather than granting"Additional Amortization" expense. 18

19

Q. DOES MR. CLINE'S REBUTTAL SCHEDULE MWC-3 DEMONSTRATE
 THAT THE GRANTING OF RATE RELIEF IN THE FORM OF
 TRADITIONAL RATE RELIEF IS LESS EXPENSIVE TO RATEPAYERS IN

2

THE SHORT RUN THAN GRANTING RATE RELIEF IN THE FORM OF "ADDITIONAL AMORTIZATION?"

- 3 Absolutely not. Schedule MWC-3 is a mathematical exercise that calculates the А. incremental revenue requirement cost, for one year only, of financing \$1.0 million of 4 incremental capital investment in two different ways. Under one scenario it is 5 6 assumed that the \$1.0 million of capital investment will be financed with 68% equity and 32% debt, with equity and debt costs of 11.5% and 6.0%, respectively. Under the 7 8 second scenario, it is assumed that 100% of the incremental capital investment will be 9 financed with debt with an interest rate of 6.0%. Both scenarios target a Funds-From-10 Operations to Debt ratio of 25%, which is consistent with one of the financial metric 11 targets included within the Case No. EO-2005-0329 Stipulation and Agreement.
- 12

With the 68% equity/32% debt scenario, a relatively small amount of Funds-From-Operation (FFO) is required to meet the incremental financing that is only 32% debt financed. In fact, not-too-coincidentally under this first scenario, all of the targeted FFO percentage can be met with an 11.5% return on the assumed (68%) equity financing of the investment.

18

Under the 100%-debt-financing scenario described, with absolutely no Funds-From-Operations (FFO) generated from any assumed equity return requirement, and with a much higher "debt" base upon which the 25% FFO/Debt ratio is calculated, this hypothetical scenario calculates a needed after-tax "Additional Amortization" amount of \$250,000 (\$1,000,000 debt base times the targeted FFO/Debt ratio of 25%). Further, under the 100% debt-financing scenario, the after-tax amortization amount is grossed up for assumed federal and state income taxes to arrive at the revenue requirement impact of the "Additional Amortization" calculated. From Schedule MWC-3 Mr. Cline appears to lead the reader to a conclusion that it is cheaper, at least in the short run, if more "traditional" rate relief—such as in the form of authorizing a higher equity return and/or assuming a higher equity ratio – is recognized when developing retail rates in lieu of allowing more "Additional Amortization" expense.

8

9 Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH SUCH A CONCLUSION?

10No. I believe Mr. Cline's example was created utilizing unrealistic assumptions with a Α. specific intention to incorrectly draw a conclusion that "Additional "Amortization" is 11 more expensive for ratepayers-at least in the short run-than the granting of additional 12 'traditional' rate relief. In actuality, I believe the only thing that Mr. Cline's example 13 points out is that it is a mathematical certainty that if a company were to undertake a 14 15 required financing with 100% debt, and if one were to assume that there were no 16 Funds-From-Operations being generated from existing operations in excess of the 17 targeted minimums, that the utility would be looking for some form of rate relief that 18 would provide incremental FFO to meet the targeted FFO/Debt ratio on any 19 incremental debt financing.

20

21 Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE ELEMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS SURROUNDING 22 MR. CLINE'S EXAMPLE WITH WHICH YOU TAKE EXCEPTION.

First, his analysis was limited to considering only the cost of capital and FFO/Debt 1 А. ratio required for the assumed incremental capital investment. It does not consider 2 the fact that the FFO resulting from depreciation expense, deferred tax expense and 3 equity return on *existing* plant investment already included in rate base could be 4 available to meet all or a portion of the 25% FFO/Debt ratio on the *incremental* debt 5 financing assumed within his two scenarios. In fact, it would only be logical to 6 7 assume that the *existing* capital structure-prior to the incremental financing requiredwas already relatively equity-thick and thus generating substantial FFO before a 8 company would consider financing a significant capital investment with 100% debt 9 10 financing. To the extent that FFO from existing operations was more than adequate to meet the minimum targeted FFO/Debt ratio for existing debt it could be possible 11 12 that no"Additional Amortization" would be required to meet the incremental FFO/Debt ratio associated with the *incremental* debt financing assumed in Mr. Cline's example. 13

14

Second, Mr. Cline's simple illustration completely fails to recognize the fact that the *incremental* capital investment will result in *incremental* non-cash depreciation and deferred income tax expense that will yield more FFO than he has reflected within his example. If Mr. Cline had reflected the FFO resulting from non-cash depreciation and deferred income taxes associated with the assumed incremental investment, a lower amount of Additional Amortization expense would have been required under both scenarios analyzed.

Third, I am not a cost of capital expert, but I believe that most cost of capital experts 1 would agree that a capital structure financed with 68% equity-which Mr. Cline uses 2 in the scenario designed to generate the purported lower short run revenue 3 requirement - would be costly and inefficient. If a Company were to finance 4 incremental capital investment with such a high percentage of equity, I submit it 5 would probably do so only because its capital structure had become, or was 6 becoming, too debt leveraged. In sum on this point, I believe this proportionately 7 high equity financing assumption is unrealistic and has been specifically employed to 8 create an example that will support a pre-conceived conclusion. Conversely, as 9 already noted, I believe it is reasonable to assume that a utility would only undertake 10 the financing of a significant capital investment with 100% debt financing if its 11 12 capital structure already had a proportionately high equity ratio that was generating a 13 FFO/Debt ratio in excess of the targeted minimum that would be available to provide 14 coverage on all or a significant portion of incremental debt financing. In short, I 15 believe Mr. Cline's financing assumption have been specifically established to be able 16 to undertake the mathematical calculations that would purportedly support his desired conclusion-namely, that in the short run Additional Amortization is more expensive 17 18 to ratepayers than granting other forms of traditional rate relief or recognizing other 19 mixes for financing incremental capital investment required

20

Fourth, Mr. Cline's limited example fails to reveal that rate relief in the form Additional Amortization can be substituted for a higher equity return to achieve the same targeted minimum FFO/Debt ratio. Specifcally, I would emphasize that

Additional Amortization can be substituted for a higher return on equity yielding exactly the same targeted FFO/Debt ratio as well as the same level of required rate relief. While rates for the immediate future will be no higher when Additional Amortization is substituted for a higher equity return, future rates will be reduced from that otherwise calculated as the "Additional Amortization" is eventually returned as a "credit" amortization to ratepayers within ensuing test year cost of service studies.

7

8 Q. REFERRING TO THE LAST POINT MADE, PLEASE FURTHER EXPAND 9 UPON HOW ADDITIONAL AMORTIZATION CAN BE SUBSTITUTED FOR 10 A HIGHER EQUITY RETURN TO ACHIEVE THE SAME TARGETED 11 MINIMUM FFO/DEBT RATIO.

A. This result is simply a mathematical outcome of the way the FFO/Debt ratio is calculated and can be observed by example. Specifically, on attached Surrebuttal Exhibit JRD-3 I first show within columns (c) and (d) the two scenarios designed by Mr. Cline within his Schedule MCW-3. I note that column (b) of attached Surrebuttal Schedule JRD-3 also shows the source of, or describes the calculation underlying, amounts shown on a given line.

18

As shown within column (e), I have revised the "return on equity" assumed from the Company-proposed 11.5% to the DOE-NSSA-proposed 9.0%. When the lower DOE-NSSA-proposed return is reflected, the targeted FFO/Debt ratio is no longer met, and accordingly, a level of Additional Amortization is calculated to achieve the additional FFO to meet the targeted FFO/Debt ratio. As one can observe from a

review of calculations shown in column (e), the targeted FFO/Debt ratio can be met 1 through the granting of rate relief in the form of Additional Amortization versus a 2 higher return on equity with no difference in required rate relief. Thus, in the short 3 run, rate relief granted will be the same whether authorized in the form of Additional 4 Amortization or a higher equity return. However, all other things equal, rates will be 5 lowered in the long run if the rate relief in the short term is granted in the form 6 7 Additional Amortization rather than in the form of a higher equity return. Again, this 8 occurs inasmuch as costs deferred through the Additional Amortization would, in 9 subsequent years, be reflected as a "credit" or reduction to the otherwise-calculated test 10 year cost of service.

11

12 In the example shown in column (e) of Surrebuttal Schedule JRD-3, one can observe 13 that the revenue requirement remains the same with Additional Amortization and a 14 9.0% return on equity as it had been with the Company-proposed 11.5%. However, 15 the before-tax Additional Amortization in the amount of \$27,441 that is being 16 deferred in year one in this example would eventually be returned to ratepayers "with 17 interest over ensuing years following the heavy construction period. The interest to 18 be returned to ratepayers would be in the form of a rate base offset as the deferred 19 credit balance generated with the Additional Amortization expense is reflected as a 20 reduction to rate base in future rate proceedings.

21

Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE THE CALCULATIONS SHOWN ON COLUMNS (F) AND (G) OF SURREBUTTAL SCHEDULE JRD-3?

The primary purpose of calculations reflected within column (f) is to simply show 1 А. how, with continuing employment of the Company's assumption that there is no 2 available "excess" FFO from existing operations to meet the FFO requirement for 3 incremental debt financing, that the revenue requirement will automatically change 4 by merely moving from the Company's original 68% equity/32% debt financing split 5 to a 50% equity/50% debt financing plan. The point being, under the rigid 6 assumptions that KCPL employed in establishing its original two scenarios, the mere 7 shifting of financing assumptions drives the revenue requirement outcome of the 8 calculation. Mr. Cline attempts to draw a conclusion from calculations under his two 9 original scenarios that the revenue requirement will be lower through the granting a 10 higher equity return or other traditional cost of service increases than it would be 11 12 through the granting of rate relief based upon Additional Amortization. In reality, 13 what Mr. Cline's calculations demonstrate is simply that in the short run financing with debt will be more expensive than financing with equity if one assumes that the 14 targeted FFO/Debt ratio cannot be maintained with FFO from existing operations. 15

16

17 Column (g) simply shows, once again, how the revenue requirement in this initial 18 year under analysis will not change if the rate relief granted is based on Additional 19 Amortization rather than a higher return on equity even under the 50%-equity/50%-20 debt financing assumption that is reflected within Column (f).

21

Q. YOUR DISCUSSION THUS FAR HAS ADDRESSED THE SHORT RUN, OR
FIRST YEAR IMPACT, OF VARIOUS FINANCING PROPOSALS AND/OR

SHOULD THE LONG TERM BASES FOR GRANTING RATE RELIEF. 1 BE ALTERNATIVES ALSO FINANCING VARIOUS 2 IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVES BEING CONSIDERED IN ANY ANALYSIS OF 3 **CONSIDERED?** 4

Yes. As I have noted, Mr. Cline's analysis and discussion was limited to a one year 5 А. period. For reasons previously stated, I believe his analysis is flawed-at least from 6 the perspective of attempting to defend the conclusion he wishes to draw from such 7 calculations. However, forgetting those disagreements for the moment, I would 8 simply emphasize that any analysis that addresses the revenue requirement impact of 9 granting rate relief on the basis of a traditional cost of service versus Additional 10 Amortization, or financing with debt versus equity, should always consider the 11 12 expected impact over a period of more than one year.

13

14 As already noted, rate relief in the form of Additional Amortization expense will result in future savings to ratepayers as the deferred credit is eventually considered 15 within future test year cost of service calculations. Second, undue reliance on equity 16 17 financing is expensive to ratepayers. Specifically, not only is the return on common equity typically the highest cost of alternative sources of capital, common equity 18 returns are required to be "grossed up" for additional federal and state income. For 19 20 example, after converting for required income tax payments, the before-tax cost-or 21 revenue requirement impact-of a 9.0% return on equity is 14.4% (9.0% times the gross tax conversion factor of 1.602564 equals 14.4%). The true cost-or before-tax 22 23 cost of equity-is more than double the interest cost of 6.0% reflected within Mr.

5	Q.	DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY?
4		
3		are explored.
2		of the capital investment should be carefully evaluated when financing alternatives
1		Cline's Schedule MWC-3. Thus, the high cost of equity-rich financing over the life

6 A. Yes, it does.

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of the Application of Kansas City)Power & Light Company to Modify Its Tariff to)Begin the Implementation of Its Regulatory Plan)

Case No. ER-2006-0314

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF MISSOURI)) SS. COUNTY OF JACKSON)


BEFORE ME, the undersigned notary public, this day personally appeared JAMES R. DITTMER, to me known, who being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says:

'My name is JAMES R. DITTMER. I am of legal age and a resident of the State of Missouri. I certify that the foregoing testimony and exhibits, offered by me on behalf of the Department of Energy–National Nuclear Security Administration, are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.'

James R. Dittmer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a notary public, on this day of October, 2006.

6.26-2010



Notary Public in and for the State of Missouri

My Commission Expires:

Reconcilation of KCPL and DOE's Recommendations Regarding Interchange Sales Margins Reflects Impact of Allocation Issue at KCPL's and DOE's Recommended Total Company Margin Level Case No. ER-2006-0314

Line			Total			
No.	Description(a)	Reference (b)	Company	Missouri (d)	Kansas	Wholesale
	(a)	(u)	(c)	(u)	(e)	(f)
	Development of Allocators:					
1	Production - kW		2,652.1	1,427.4	1,201.5	23.2
2	Production - %		100.00%	53.82%	45.30%	0.88%
3			4 000 0	0.000.0	(00 E
4	Peak Capacity Allocated on Demand Basis		4,389.0	2,362.2	1,988.3	38.5
4 5	Annual Hours		8,760	8,760	8,760	8,760
6			0,700	0,100	0,700	0,700
7	Total Energy - mWh	Ln 1 x Ln 5	38,447,640	20,692,771	17,417,938	336,930
8						
9	Energy With Losses - mWh		15,687,557	8,960,193	6,583,077	144,287
10	Energy With Losses - %		100.00%	57.12%	41.96%	0.92%
11 12	I have a line ray and		22 700 002	44 300 530	40.004.004	400.040
12	Unused Energy - mWh Unused Energy - \$	Ln 7 - Ln 9	22,760,083 100.00%	11,732,578 51.55%	10,834,861 47.60%	192,643 0.85%
14	ondsed Linergy - \$		100.00 %	51.55%	47.00%	0.05 %
15						
16						
17	Value of Allocation Issue Utilizing KCPL's Proposed					
18	Level of Total Company Off-System Sales Margins					
19		Line 13 X Line		an a salar ta wanta ana ata ata ata		
20	Energy - Profit on Sales (KCPL's Unused Energy)	20, Col. C **				
21 22		Line 10 X Line				
22	Energy - Profit on Sales (Energy With Losses)	23, Col. C **	Contra a stationa	e d'an aireacht		
24	Energy - Front on Bales (Energy With Ebases)	20, 001. 0	and the second			CARLES AND
25	Difference - Value of Allocation Issue Utilizing					
26	KCPL's Proposed Total Company Off-System					
27	Sales Normalized Margin Level	Ln 23 - Ln 20 **				
28						
29	Value of Allocation Issue Utilizing DOE's Proposed					
30	Level of Total Company Off-System Sales Margins					
31 32	France, Brefit on Salar (KOB) is University France)	Line 13 X Line		aniana di manana ana ana		
32 33	Energy - Profit on Sales (KCPL's Unused Energy)	32, Col. C **	a sa ang sa		e andre i de la seconda de	
34		Line 10 X Line				
35	Energy - Profit on Sales (Energy With Losses)	35, Col, C **		a an an galain bha		
36	3,					
37	Difference - Value of Allocation Issue Utilizing					
38	DOE's Proposed Total Company Off-System	_				
39	Sales Normalized Margin Level	Ln 35 - Ln 32 **	and the second			*
40						
41	Total Impact on Missouri Rev Requirement					
42	of DOE-NSSA Margin Adjustment	Ln 20- Ln 35	=	\$(21,125,097)		

Surrebuttal Schedule JRD-1

Schedule MWC-3 Impact of Financing on Revenue Requirements

	Equity Financing	Debt <u>Financing</u>
Capital Investment	1,000,000	1,000,000
Equity Financing Debt Financing Total Financing	684,932 315,068 1,000,000	1,000,000 1,000,000
Return on Equity Earnings Amortization Deferred Taxes Funds from Operations FFO / Debt Ratio	11.50% 78,767 78,767 25%	11.50% 400,641 (150,641) 250,000 25%
Interest Rate Interest Expense	6% 18,904	6% 60,000
Tax Rate Total Income Taxes Deferred Taxes Current Taxes Revenue Requirement	37.60% 47,462 47,462 145,133	37.60% (150,641) 150,641 460,641
Proof Revenue Amortization Interest Expense Pre-tax Income Income Taxes Earnings	145,133 - - 18,904 126,229 47,462 78,767	460,641 400,641 60,000

This schedule was originally affixed to Mr. Michael Cline's rebuttal testimony filed on September 8, 2006 and has been reproduced here only for convenience when reviewing the Surrebuttal Testimony of James Dittmer Analysis of Alternatives Regarding Authorized Returns, Capital Mix for Incremental Financings, & "Equity Returns" Versus Recognition of Additional "Amortization Expense"

Assumed 9.00% ROE & 50/50 Debt/Equity Financing	(g) 1,000,000	500,000 500,000 1,000,000	25%	125,000	9.00% 45,000	80,000	1.602564	128,205	6.0% 30,000	37.60% 27,115 (48,205) 75,321	230,321		230,321 128 205	30,000	27,115	45,000
50/50 Debt/Equity Financing	(f) 1,000,000	500,000 500,000 1,000,000	25%	125,000	11.50% 57,500	67,500	1.602564	108,173	6.0% 30,000	37.60% 34,647 (40,673) 75,321	230,321		230,321 108 173	30,000	92,147 34,647	57,500
Company Suggested Financing Split but Assuming a 9.00% ROE	(e) 1,000,000	684,932 315,068 1,000,000	25%	78,767	9.00% 61,644	17,123	1.602564	27,441	6.0% 18,904	37,60% 37,144 (10,318) 47,462	145,133		145,133 27 444	18,904	98,788 37,144	61,644
ttion of s Example Debt Financing	(d) 1,000,000	1,000,000	25%	250,000	11.50% -	250,000	1.602564	400,641	6.0% 60,000	37.60% - (150,641) 150,641	460,641		460,641 400 641	60,000		
Duplication of Company's Example Equity Financing Financir	(c) 1,000,000	684,932 315,068 1,000,000	25%	78,767	11.50% 78,767	(0)	1.602564	(0)	6.0% 18,904	37.60% 47,462 0 47,462	145,133		145,133	18,904	126,229 47,462	78,767
Reference	(b) Assumed	Assumed L. 1 - L. 2 Line 1	Per S&A	Line 3 * Line 5	Assumed Line 2 * Line 7	Line 6 - Line 8	1/(1-Tax Rate)	Line 11 * Line 12	Assumed Line 3 * Line 14	Given (L. 12 -1)*L. 8 L. 11 - L. 13 Line 17 - Line 18	Lines 8+13+15+17		Line 20	Line 14	Sum Lines 22 - 24 Line 24 * Line 16	Line 25 - Line 26
Description	(a) Capital Investment Required	Equity Financing Debt Financing Total Financing	FFO/ Debt Ratio Required	Required Funds From Operation	Authorized Return on Equity Equity Earnings on Assumed Equity Financing	Additional FFO Required After Considering After Tax Equity Returns - In the Form of After-tax Amortization	Tax Gross Up Factor	Before-Tax Amortization	Assumed Interest Rate Interest Expense	Tax Rate Income Taxes on Equity Return Deferred Taxes Total Current Taxes	Revenue Requirement	Proof:	Revenue Requirement:	Announcement Interest Expense	Pre-tax Income Income Taxes	Earnings
Line No.	-	0 m 4	ŝ	9	⊳ ∞	9 1 1 9 1	12	13	14 15	16 17 19	20	21	22	24	25 26	27

Surrebuttal Schedule JRD-3