

Exhibit No.: 129NP  
Issue(s): Fuel Adjustment Clause  
Witness: James Massmann  
Sponsoring Party: Union Electric Company  
Type of Exhibit: FAC Rebuttal Testimony  
Case No.: ER-2010-0036  
Date Testimony Prepared: February 26, 2010

FILED  
April 22, 2010  
Missouri Public  
Service Commission

**MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

**Case No. ER-2010-0036**

**FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**JAMES MASSMANN**

**ON**

**BEHALF OF**

**UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY  
d/b/a AmerenUE**

**\*\*DENOTES HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION\*\***

St. Louis, Missouri  
February 26, 2010

UE Exhibit No. 129NP  
Date 3-22-10 Reporter JS  
File No. ER-2010-0036

**NP**

1                   **FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

2                                   **OF**

3                                   **JAMES MASSMANN**

4                                   **CASE NO. ER-2010-0036**

5                                   **INTRODUCTION**

6           **Q.     Please state your name and business address.**

7           A.     James Massmann, AmerenEnergy Fuels and Services Company (AFS), One  
8    Ameren Plaza, 1901 Chouteau Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri 63103.

9           **Q.     What is your position with AmerenEnergy Fuels and Services Company?**

10          A.     I am the Manager of Natural Gas Supply.

11          **Q.     What is the function of AmerenEnergy Fuels and Services Company?**

12          A.     AFS is an affiliate of Union Electric Company d/b/a AmerenUE (AmerenUE)  
13    which is charged with acquiring and managing natural gas and generation fuel resources for  
14    all of the Ameren affiliated companies, including AmerenUE.

15          **Q.     Please describe your educational background and employment**  
16    **experience.**

17          A.     I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering in 1980  
18    and a Masters of Science degree in Engineering Management in 1986, both from the  
19    University of Missouri – Rolla. I was employed by Union Electric Company in August 1982  
20    and became an Ameren Corporation employee upon the December 1997 merger. Prior to  
21    being promoted to the position of Manager of Natural Gas Supply in 2005, I held several  
22    positions in the Natural Gas Supply and Transportation Department, including Gas Supply  
23    Executive and Gas Systems Analyst since 1998. Prior to that, I was a Resource Planning

1 Engineer in the Corporate Planning Department, an engineer in the Engineering &  
2 Construction Department, and an engineer in the Nuclear Engineering Department.

3 **Q. What are your responsibilities as Manager of Natural Gas Supply?**

4 A. My primary responsibility is to direct the management and procurement of  
5 reliable and economic gas supply, transportation and storage services for Ameren affiliates,  
6 including AmerenUE's gas distribution system and AmerenUE's gas-fired electric generating  
7 units. I also participate in proceedings before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  
8 (FERC) involving AmerenUE's interstate pipeline suppliers and before the Missouri Public  
9 Service Commission (Commission). Finally, I oversee daily operations including load  
10 forecasting, system balancing, storage management, nominations, and scheduling.

11 **PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

12 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?**

13 A. My testimony responds to the direct testimonies filed on February 22, 2010,  
14 by providing additional information and an update to testimony previously filed in Case No.  
15 ER-2008-0318 regarding AmerenUE's Fuel Adjustment Clause (FAC) that is relevant to my  
16 response to those witnesses. In Case No. ER-2008-0318 AmerenUE witness Scott Glaeser  
17 filed direct testimony and rebuttal testimony supporting AmerenUE's proposed FAC. I have  
18 now assumed Mr. Glaeser's responsibilities regarding gas supply for AmerenUE. I have  
19 reviewed Mr. Glaeser's direct and rebuttal testimonies from Case No. ER-2008-0318, and  
20 find them to be accurate and supportive of my opinions expressed in this testimony. They  
21 also remain relevant to the questions raised in the Commission's **Order Directing the**  
22 **Parties to Submit Testimony Concerning the Appropriateness of AmerenUE's Current**  
23 **Fuel Adjustment Clause** and to the issues raised in the direct testimonies filed by other

1 parties on February 22. Consequently, I am attaching those testimonies as Schedules  
2 JM-FR1 and JM-FR2, respectively.

3 **Q. Do the issues previously addressed by Mr. Glaeser, related to the**  
4 **procurement of gas supply to fuel the Company's gas-fired generation plants, still**  
5 **support the need for an FAC and the appropriateness of the existing sharing provision**  
6 **in AmerenUE's FAC?**

7 A. Yes. The uncertainty and magnitude of AmerenUE's natural gas costs for  
8 gas-fired generation have not changed materially since the conclusion of the last rate case.  
9 Since direct testimony in Case No. ER-2008-0318 was filed in early 2008, natural gas  
10 markets have seen unprecedented price changes. In 2008, the New York Mercantile  
11 Exchange (NYMEX) Futures market settlement price for natural gas jumped from  
12 \$7.17/MMBtu in January to \$13.10/MMBtu in July of that year. From that time, the  
13 NYMEX Future prices began a steep decline until they bottomed at \$2.84/MMBtu in  
14 September 2009. Currently, the March 2010 prompt month Futures Contract is trading at  
15 \$4.85/MMBtu nearing expiration. These NYMEX Futures prices reflected, at the time they  
16 existed, the market's actual expectation for natural gas prices. As the drastic price swings we  
17 have seen illustrate, the natural gas market is highly uncertain and unpredictable. While the  
18 market may expect a \$4.85/MMBtu price today, that expectation could be drastically  
19 different weeks or months from now.

20 **Q. Mr. Glaeser indicated in his direct testimony in the last case that U.S. gas**  
21 **production had declined. Please comment.**

22 A. Mr. Glaeser noted that the industry consensus at that time was that there  
23 would be a decline of gas production from conventional production basins and the potential

1 for increased imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and the development of unconventional  
2 methods of natural gas production. Although imports of LNG have been modest, the  
3 industry consensus today regarding overall gas supplies has changed, and we have seen  
4 tremendous growth in the unconventional production of natural gas since Mr. Glaeser's  
5 direct testimony in that case was filed.

6 **Q. With the development of large reserves of unconventional natural gas and**  
7 **LNG, do you expect natural gas prices to remain stable?**

8 A. Absolutely not. The price of natural gas continues to be unpredictable. In  
9 previous testimony, and based on events since then, it is apparent that the consensus of  
10 industry experts or market indicators cannot be used to reliably predict natural gas prices.  
11 Although there are reports of greater reserves of unconventional natural gas, there are still  
12 environmental risks and pipeline infrastructure development risks that may prevent these  
13 reserves from entering the market.

14 **Q. In her February 22, 2010 testimony, Staff witness Lena Mantle suggested**  
15 **that the Company has some control over its fuel costs. Can the management of a utility**  
16 **such as AmerenUE control natural gas market prices?**

17 A. No. The market prices for natural gas in the U.S continue to be driven not  
18 only by external conditions in North America such as weather, hurricanes in the Gulf of  
19 Mexico or gas imports from Canada, but also by global influences such as crude oil prices  
20 driven by crises in the Middle East. None of these major influences can be controlled by any  
21 company, nor can such events be easily forecasted. While we can hedge a portion of our  
22 natural gas needs to lock-in some near-term price certainty, we cannot control prices, and if

1 the quantity of the gas we need changes materially, as it often does, we will be a price-taker  
2 in markets we do not control for the additional gas that we need.


3 **Q. In previous testimony, Mr. Glaeser noted that natural gas-fired**  
4 **generation is used to serve unpredictable peaks in the demand for power, future growth**  
5 **in the demand for power, and as a generation capacity backstop for coal and nuclear**  
6 **plant outages. Does AmerenUE still use gas-fired generation for these purposes?**

7 **A. Yes.** The gas-fired generators owned and operated by AmerenUE are  
8 resources that can be started relatively quickly and can be used to meet unpredictable and  
9 rapid changes in load.

10 **Q. Can gas generation demand for AmerenUE be forecast with certainty?**

11 **A. No.** Gas-fired generation is utilized to meet peak demand during extreme  
12 weather conditions, to serve as a reliability backstop for other resources, and to support  
13 opportunity sales in the volatile daily power markets. It is impossible to accurately forecast  
14 this demand with all the associated variables. In Case No. ER-2008-0318 Mr. Glaeser noted  
15 that the forecasted gas-fired demand for 2009 and 2010 was 8,553,000 MMBtu and  
16 **\*\*\_\_\_\_\_\*\*** MMBtu respectively. Actual gas fired demand in 2009 was only 2,945,000  
17 MMBtu, just over one-third of the forecast. The current forecast of gas-fired generation for  
18 2010 is **\*\*\_\_\_\_\_\*\*** MMBtu, which is only **\*\*\_\_\*\*%** of the previous forecast. Whether  
19 that forecast holds is uncertain, and generation could be much, much higher. The following  
20 chart has been updated from Mr. Glaeser's rebuttal testimony in Case No. ER-2008-0318,  
21 which in that testimony was labeled Chart SAG-R3.

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
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**Q. In Ms. Mantle's testimony she stated that "[f]luctuations in natural gas and purchased power prices did not have a material impact on AmerenUE's fuel and purchased power expense since AmerenUE only used a small amount of natural gas and purchased power to meet its net system input" Has that situation always been true?**

**A.** No. As Mr. Glaeser stated in his direct testimony in Case No. ER- 2008-0318, the total energy produced by the natural gas-fired plants is generally a modest 1 to 2% of total generation (in megawatt-hours). However, the actual cost may be as high as 13% of the total fossil fuel costs in a given year. The following graph illustrates the unpredictability and the magnitude of total cost incurred by AmerenUE from gas-fired generation. The variability in the total cost is material. In 2007 and 2009, the total cost was \$79,029,754 and \$24,262,962 respectively, a difference of \$54,766,793.





1  
2 **Q. Looking to future years, what is the projected range of fuel costs for**  
3 **AmerenUE's gas-fired generation?**

4 A. Keeping in mind that gas-fired generation fuel costs are highly unpredictable,  
5 AmerenUE's current five year forecast projects fuel costs to vary from \$\*\*\_\_\*\* million in  
6 2010 to \$\*\*\_\_\*\* million in 2014. The point is that natural gas costs for generation are  
7 significant even at approximately \$\*\*\_\_\*\* million, but they could easily be up to \*\*\_\_\*\*  
8 times that high.

9 **Q. Mr. Massmann, you showed that the actual magnitude of the price and**  
10 **demand forecast uncertainty results in a variance between forecast and budget of over**  
11 **\$35 million in 2007, \$23 million in 2008, and \$25 million in 2009. Is it likely similar**  
12 **variances will occur in the future?**

13 A. Yes. By the nature of gas-fired generation, demand will continue to be  
14 unpredictable and natural gas prices will continue to be volatile. Without the existing FAC,  
15 fuel costs for gas-fired generation will expose AmerenUE to the ever-increasing problem of



1 under-recovery, or it could go the other way, and AmerenUE's natural gas costs for  
2 generation in base rates could be higher than incurred natural gas costs. The existing FAC  
3 treats both the Company and customers fairly by tracking the changes in these highly  
4 uncertain costs.

5 **Q. Do you have any comments on the contentions of Messrs. Brubaker and**  
6 **Kind that a greater sharing percentage is needed in order for AmerenUE to have the**  
7 **proper incentive to prudently manage its net fuel costs, including its natural gas costs**  
8 **for generation?**

9 A. Yes, I do. Mr. Glaeser addressed this issue in detail in Section VI of his  
10 rebuttal testimony in the last case (Schedule JM-FR2 attached hereto), and like all of his prior  
11 testimony, I fully endorse his comments on this subject. AmerenUE continues to have strong  
12 incentives to manage its gas supply and transportation costs diligently, with a goal of  
13 achieving the lowest cost, consistent with our obligation to provide reliable service.  
14 AmerenUE witness Lynn M. Barnes also addresses these issues in her rebuttal testimony  
15 filed concurrently with this testimony.

16 **Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

17 A. Yes, it does.

In the Matter of Union Electric Company d/b/a AmerenUE's Tariffs to Increase its Annual Revenues for Electric Service. ) Case No. ER-2010-0036  
) Tracking No. YE-2010-0054  
) Tracking No. YE-2010-0055

STATE OF MISSOURI                    )  
  ) ss  
CITY OF ST. LOUIS                    )

1. My name is James Massmann. I work in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, and I am employed by AmerenEnergy Fuels and Services Company as Manager of Gas Supply.

3. I hereby swear and affirm that my answers contained in the attached testimony to the questions therein propounded are true and correct.

  
James Massmann

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24 day of February, 2010.

Alma S. Patterson  
Notary Public

**Debra K. Patterson - Notary Public**  
**Notary Seal, State of**  
**Missouri - St. Louis County**  
**Commission #08482293**  
**My Commission Expires 10/31/2012**

**MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

**Case No. ER-2010-0036**

**FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**JAMES MASSMANN**

**SCHEDULE JM-FR1 IS DEEMED HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL IN ITS ENTIRETY**

Exhibit No.:  
Issues: Gas Costs for Generation;  
Volatility and Uncertainty  
in Gas Costs  
Witness: Scott A. Glaeser  
Sponsoring Party: Union Electric Company  
Type of Exhibit: Rebuttal Testimony  
Case No.: ER-2008-0318  
Date Testimony Prepared: October 10, 2008

**MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

**CASE NO. ER-2008-0318**

**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**SCOTT A. GLAESER**

**ON**

**BEHALF OF**

**UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY  
d/b/a AmerenUE**

**St. Louis, Missouri  
October 14, 2008**

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1 **REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

2 **OF**

3 **SCOTT A. GLAESER**

4 **CASE NO. ER-2008-0318**

5 **I. INTRODUCTION**

6 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

7 A. Scott A. Glaeser, AmerenEnergy Fuels and Services Company ("AFS"),  
8 One Ameren Plaza, 1901 Chouteau Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri 63103.

9 **Q. Are you the same Scott A. Glaeser that previously filed testimony in**  
10 **this proceeding?**

11 A. Yes, I am.

12 **Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?**

13 A. I have reviewed the direct testimonies of Staff and intervener witnesses,  
14 and I will be rebutting certain positions taken by these witnesses as it  
15 relates to my testimony in this proceeding. Specifically, I am responding  
16 to Missouri Public Service Commission Staff ("Staff") witnesses Erin  
17 Maloney and Lena Mantle; State of Missouri witness Martin Cohen,  
18 Missouri Industrial Energy Consumers witness Maurice Brubaker; and  
19 Noranda Aluminum, Inc. witness Donald Johnstone.

20 **II. OVERVIEW OF REBUTTAL OF TESTIMONY**

21 **Q. What specific areas will be addressed in your rebuttal testimony?**

22 A. My rebuttal testimony is responding to positions taken in the direct  
23 testimony of Staff and certain interveners concerning the Fuel Adjustment

1 Clause ("FAC") requested in this case by AmerenUE. First, I will address  
2 the Staff's assertion that natural gas prices are not volatile. Second, I will  
3 address the difficulty in price hedging natural gas prices for peaking gas  
4 generation and how it does not eliminate market volatility in response to  
5 State witness Cohen. Finally, I will address contentions raised by the Staff  
6 and certain interveners that there would be little incentive for AmerenUE  
7 to prudently manage natural gas prices with an FAC in place.

8 **III. NATURAL GAS MARKET VOLATILITY AND UNCERTAINTY**

9 **Q. Mr. Glaeser, Staff witness Maloney states on page 31 of the Staff Cost**  
10 **of Service Report ("Staff Report") that "The Staff analyzed the trend**  
11 **in natural gas prices over a two-year period using twelve month**  
12 **moving averages and could determine no discernable trends in price."**  
13 **The Staff Report further states "These 12-month moving averages**  
14 **were very constant over this two-year period indicating relative**  
15 **natural gas price stability on an annual basis over this two-year**  
16 **period." Do you agree with these statements?**

17 **A.** Absolutely not. The natural gas market in the U.S. represents one of the  
18 most volatile commodity markets in the world and how anyone can make  
19 the statement that natural gas prices are stable is beyond belief.  
20 Furthermore, Staff's method of analysis is flawed and the conclusion the  
21 Staff draws from its analysis is incorrect. Instead of examining actual gas  
22 *market* prices, Staff analyzes actual fuel cost data *from AmerenUE*,  
23 arbitrarily throws out high gas prices that do not fit their assertion, and



1           then uses a twelve-month moving average method in an effort to  
2           artificially remove volatility. This masks the true market volatility to  
3           which gas generators are exposed.

4           **Q. What mistakes did the Staff make in their analysis of natural gas**  
5           **prices?**

6           A. An examination of Ms. Maloney's workpapers confirms that in their  
7           analysis of natural gas market prices, the Staff used AmerenUE's *actual*  
8           fuel costs as representative of gas *market* prices. Actual fuel costs include  
9           a variety of price hedged gas supply packages, storage withdrawals, and  
10          market priced gas supply packages. In other words, it represents our price  
11          hedged gas supply portfolio in which we employ various hedging  
12          instruments and physical resources to dampen price volatility. It does not  
13          represent market prices, nor does it give an indication of future cost  
14          exposure for gas generation. Furthermore, Staff witness Maloney appears  
15          to have arbitrarily removed certain months with high fuel costs (March  
16          2008 for Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company ("PEPL") and Mississippi  
17          River Transmission ("MRT")) and tried to further "smooth out" prices by  
18          replacing these months with artificially lower values. Again, in order to  
19          see market volatility, actual market prices must be used rather than actual  
20          costs with various levels of hedged pricing. Finally, Staff witness  
21          Maloney, for no clear reason, applies a 12-month rolling average to  
22          "smooth out" gas prices in an effort to further mask price volatility.

1           **Q.    Beyond those flaws in the Staff's analysis, are there problems in the**  
2                   **conclusions reached by Staff witness Maloney?**


3           A.    Yes. Staff witness Maloney concludes that the gas prices are stable during  
4                   the two-year period even though the gas price information contained in her  
5                   own data on Table 2 (Staff Report, p. 31) directly contradicts her  
6                   conclusion. This data shows PEPL actual gas costs ranging from a low of  
7                   \$5.22/MMBtu in December of 2007 to a high of \$11.07/ MMBtu in  
8                   February of 2008. In other words, actual costs increased by approximately  
9                   100%, or more than doubled, in just two months, yet Ms. Maloney  
10                  concludes that prices are not volatile.

11          **Q.    What evidence is available to support the fact that natural gas prices**  
12                   **are volatile?**

13          A.    There are many sources of data to prove the volatility of natural gas prices.  
14                  The New York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX") futures market is the  
15                  industry standard for natural gas price discovery for current and future  
16                  periods and also for financial price hedging. Chart SAG-R1 below uses  
17                  NYMEX data to show that natural gas prices have been highly volatile for  
18                  the period of January through September of 2008. The graph shows that  
19                  the extreme high and low natural gas prices predicted in my direct  
20                  testimony, Schedule SAG-E4, have been tested and surpassed in the recent  
21                  July through September 2008 period. The gas markets have experienced  
22                  unprecedented volatility since 2000, but this volatility has been even more  
23                  pronounced this year.

24

**Chart SAG-R1**



**Q. Do others in the energy industry agree that natural gas prices are volatile?**

**A.** Yes, many industry experts have publicly stated that natural gas markets are volatile. Petroleum Industry Research Associates ("PIRA"), a well respected petroleum industry research organization, noted that "This month's \$3+ Henry Hub gas price collapse quickly brings the word volatility to mind in the context of other numerous examples that have made gas prices virtually synonymous with volatility since the 1990s."

In the Commission's Report and Order in The Empire District Electric Company rate case, Case No. ER-2008-0093, issued July 30, 2008, the Commission stated "In an era where fuel costs are highly volatile, a fuel adjustment clause may be appropriate if the company is to


1           earn its authorized rate of return.” While natural gas is still a relatively  
2           small portion of AmerenUE’s fuel mix, that share has been growing very  
3           quickly in terms of fuel volume and even more quickly in terms of dollar  
4           amount. Consequently, without an FAC, volatile natural gas prices expose  
5           AmerenUE to an ever-increasing problem of under-recovered fuel costs  
6           with significant up and down swings in its net fuel costs. Moreover, as  
7           explained in Mr. Arora’s testimony, this increasing exposure to uncertain  
8           natural gas markets is occurring in combination with AmerenUE’s  
9           exposure to coal cost uncertainty and off-system sales uncertainties, all of  
10          which results in substantial uncertainty in AmerenUE’s net fuel costs to  
11          which the FAC will apply.

12          **Q.    Is there evidence supporting long-term trends and volatility of natural**  
13          **gas prices?**

14          A.    The long-term volatility of natural gas prices is shown on Chart SAG-R2  
15          below, which illustrates the daily natural gas prices as published in Platt’s  
16          Gas Daily NGPL TxOk East (which reflects prices on Natural Gas  
17          Pipeline Company of America in the Texas/Oklahoma region) for the past  
18          decade. The NGPL TxOk East market represents an important supply  
19          source and market pricing point for AmerenUE’s gas generation. The  
20          chart clearly shows that daily natural gas prices are extremely volatile,  
21          having ranged from a low of under \$2.00 per MMBtu in 1998 to well over  
22          \$12.00 per MMBtu in multiple periods. It also important to realize the  
23          market fundamentals for natural gas have dramatically changed. The

1 trend over the past ten years reveals that natural gas prices have increased  
2 from \$2.00 per MMBtu in 1998 to over \$8.00 per MMBtu in 2008. This  
3 graph illustrates that natural gas markets have exhibited exceptional price  
4 volatility and steadily increasing prices.

5 **Chart SAG-R2**



6  
7 **Q. What natural gas market fundamentals have changed causing this**  
8 **increased volatility and higher gas prices?**

9 **A.** As I explained in my direct testimony, the balance between supply and  
10 demand in the U.S. is precarious since many of the conventional  
11 production basins, such as the massive Hugoton field in Kansas and  
12 Oklahoma, have been in decline for many years. Natural gas from these  
13 mature production basins was previously brought to the market at costs

1 well below \$4.00 per MMBtu. These supplies are now being replaced by  
2 nonconventional and deepwater Gulf of Mexico ("GOM") gas reserves,  
3 which are significantly more expensive to drill and produce, and Liquefied  
4 Natural Gas ("LNG") which is subject to global market prices. For  
5 example, the estimated cost to drill, complete, and produce natural gas  
6 from the Fayetteville shale formations in Arkansas is approximately \$4.50  
7 per MMBtu, which effectively creates a new long-term price floor for gas  
8 markets. Other shale plays in the U.S. are producing at even higher cost  
9 levels due to expensive horizontal drilling and complex fracturing  
10 techniques required to produce natural gas from shale formations. Also,  
11 the U.S. is a net importer of natural gas from both Canada and from  
12 supplies of LNG from overseas countries such as Trinidad, Qatar, and  
13 Egypt. LNG prices have recently exceeded \$18 per MMBtu for LNG  
14 delivered to Japan. LNG is now providing more gas supplies to the U.S.,  
15 but it does so by placing the U.S. in the global LNG market, similar to  
16 global crude oil markets. This introduces a new level of uncertainty and  
17 volatility to U.S. gas prices that is likely to be seen for many years into the  
18 future or, similar to the crude oil markets, may be a permanent factor. In  
19 addition, crude oil prices have a direct influence on natural gas prices on  
20 both the physical markets and financial futures trading with the recent  
21 record price for crude oil of \$147 per barrel also supporting the  
22 simultaneous price spike in natural gas prices to \$14 per MMBtu. Finally,  
23 the financial markets have exerted a significant influence on natural gas



1 prices due to the massive influx or outflows of capital seeking higher  
2 returns or protection from inflation.

3 **Q. Please explain how the financial markets influence natural gas prices.**

4 A. As I described in my direct testimony, the financial markets invest capital  
5 in commodity markets such as natural gas or crude oil with the goal of  
6 creating profits from price volatility. The financial players have no  
7 physical need for natural gas, yet they move billions of dollars in and out  
8 of natural gas financial positions with the goal of generating profit. The  
9 massive amount of money managed by the financial funds chasing a  
10 constrained commodity such as natural gas or crude oil definitely  
11 contributes to price volatility.

12 **Q. What do all these factors that affect U.S. natural gas prices mean with**  
13 **respect to AmerenUE's ability to control fuel costs?**

14 A. It means that natural gas prices are well beyond the control of AmerenUE  
15 or any other company

16 **Q. Mr. Glaeser, considering the volatile and unpredictable swings in**  
17 **natural gas prices, how can companies such as AmerenUE with gas**  
18 **generation control these fuel costs?**

19 A. Simply put, we cannot control the market prices for natural gas nor can we  
20 directly control fuel costs. As I discussed in my direct testimony, the  
21 market prices for natural gas in the U.S are driven not only by external  
22 conditions in North America such as hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico or  
23 gas imports from Canada, but by global influences such as crude oil prices



1 driven by crisis in the Middle East or nuclear outages in Japan. None of  
2 these major influences can be controlled nor can such events be easily  
3 forecasted. Operators of gas generation can attempt to manage the  
4 exposure to price volatility through price hedging strategies. However,  
5 there are significant constraints on our ability to hedge gas used for  
6 generation, and the hedges themselves are derived from the very same  
7 volatile natural gas market.

8 **IV. PRICE HEDGING FOR NATURAL GAS GENERATION**

9 **Q. In State witness Martin Cohen's direct testimony, page 7, he states**  
10 **that "A utility can protect its fuel portfolio through such activities as**  
11 **negotiating long-term contracts, purchasing fuel in forward markets,**  
12 **and employing financial hedging strategies." Do you agree with this**  
13 **statement?**


14 **A.** Only in part. AmerenUE does employ hedging strategies including long-  
15 term contracts, forward purchases, financial hedges, and physical  
16 resources to dampen price volatility for natural gas; however, price  
17 hedging only dampens market volatility, it does not eliminate volatility  
18 and these hedges must be secured from the very same volatile market. In  
19 other words, there is no parallel market with stable gas prices to secure  
20 future price hedges. In addition, the highly uncertain demand of  
21 AmerenUE's peak-load gas generation creates significant problems in  
22 efficiently price hedging fuel costs.

23 **Q. Why is the demand for AmerenUE's gas generation so uncertain?**

1           A.    The demand for AmerenUE's gas generation, especially for simple-cycle  
2                    peaking turbines in AmerenUE's generating fleet, is highly uncertain. Gas  
3                    generation is utilized to serve demand during peak periods and when  
4                    power market "spark spreads" support gas generation for off-system sales.  
5                    AmerenUE's gas generation is also used for reliability dispatch when base  
6                    load units trip off or for transmission congestion relief, again causing  
7                    significant uncertainty in future demand independent of gas market prices.  
8                    All of these scenarios are difficult to forecast, even for next day  
9                    operations, with any accuracy. To demonstrate the unpredictability of  
10                   AmerenUE's gas generation, Chart SAG-R3 below illustrates actual  
11                   natural gas generation demand versus budget forecast for 2005 through  
12                   August of 2008. The graph reveals that the actual demand for natural gas  
13                   can deviate significantly from the forecast on a month-by-month and  
14                   annual basis. What the graph does not reveal is that daily demand can  
15                   deviate significantly even during a peak operating month such as July.  
16                   The turbines may be idle for days and then operate at peak output the next  
17                   day.  
18                   [Table on Next Page]

1

**CHART SAG-R3**



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3

**Q. Why does the uncertainty of gas generation demand make it difficult to fully hedge future fuel costs?**

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**A.** To efficiently hedge future natural gas costs, you need to know exactly how much volume and what future months to hedge in order to secure financial instruments such as NYMEX futures contracts, call options, or over-the-counter financial swaps. The great uncertainty in the level of future demand forces AmerenUE to limit future hedge positions for forecasted native load sales. Any demand above the forecast cannot be hedged, simply because the demand is unknown. Conversely, when actual demand is less than forecasted, there is a potential for AmerenUE to be stuck with stranded hedges in excess of demand. As noted in my direct testimony, the actual demand for gas-fired generation for AmerenUE has varied from 50% to 207% of the forecasted demand from 2004 to 2007.

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1                   Due to this uncertainty, it is impossible to fully hedge future gas  
2                   generation.

3           **Q.    Are there any other factors that prevent effective hedging of**  
4           **AmerenUE's gas generation?**

5           **A.**    Yes. The mismatch between the gas industry and the electric industry  
6                   prevents effective forward hedging of AmerenUE's peak-load gas  
7                   generation. The standard financial instruments utilized by the gas industry  
8                   are designed for uniform flows throughout each month. While hedging  
9                   would be more feasible for utilities that use natural gas (e.g., combined  
10                  cycle plants) to serve their baseloads, AmerenUE's peak-load gas  
11                  generation operates in a non-uniform manner. Frequently, the monthly  
12                  forecasted demand for generation is comprised of a few peak days, with  
13                  the remainder of the month idle. With this demand profile and available  
14                  gas hedging options, there is a mismatch between future demand and  
15                  demand that can be effectively hedged. As I noted, this hedging problem  
16                  stands in contrast to utilities that utilize combined-cycle gas generation  
17                  plants for a larger portion of their baseload power requirements. The more  
18                  certain future gas demand created by operating in a baseload or  
19                  intermediate mode (such as generating during all five workdays each week  
20                  for 10 to 12 hours per day) enables more effective future price hedging  
21                  and therefore less volatility. As Mr. Arora explains in his direct and  
22                  rebuttal testimonies, utilities with simple-cycle peaking generation require

1 an FAC just as much as utilities with combined-cycle plants operating in  
2 baseload or intermediate mode such as Empire or Aquila

3 **Q. Staff witness Mantle (Staff Report, p 60) states “The Commission**  
4 **found in the Aquila and Empire rate cases that two components of**  
5 **fuel and purchased-power expense, the cost of natural gas, and spot**  
6 **purchased-power costs, have fluctuated significantly in the past and**  
7 **are expected to continue to be volatile in the future. However,**  
8 **Ameren uses a much smaller percentage of natural gas-based power**  
9 **and spot purchased-power to serve its load than either Aquila or**  
10 **Empire.” Do you agree with Ms. Mantle that Aquila and Empire each**  
11 **deserve to have an FAC to the extent that they are more reliant upon**  
12 **“natural gas-based power and spot purchased-power”?**

13 **A.** No. As I stated above, utilities that employ natural gas generation for  
14 intermediate and base power demands have greater certainty of their  
15 underlying demand for natural gas and purchased-power. This certainty of  
16 demand allows them to effectively hedge more of their natural gas costs  
17 with hedging tools, such as NYMEX futures contracts, which are available  
18 for periods beyond five years in the future. To the extent that AmerenUE  
19 could have known gas generation demand, it could effectively hedge  
20 natural gas costs, in addition to hedging its coal costs. In fact, the natural  
21 gas NYMEX futures market provides superior liquidity for hedging prices  
22 than is available for coal. The argument that an FAC is appropriate for  
23 Aquila and Empire, since they are more reliant upon natural gas and

1 purchased-power than AmerenUE, is flawed, both because gas is an ever-  
2 increasing portion of AmerenUE's supply and also given the very  
3 significant exposure of AmerenUE's net fuel costs to volatile and  
4 uncertain power markets.

5 **V. MATERIAL IMPACT OF NATURAL GAS PRICE VOLATILITY**

6 **Q. Mr. Glaeser, Staff witness Mantle states "For AmerenUE fluctuations**  
7 **in natural gas prices and spot purchased-power prices have not been**  
8 **substantial enough to have a material impact on AmerenUE's revenue**  
9 **requirement." (Staff Report, p. 61). Do you agree that fluctuations in**  
10 **natural gas prices are not substantial enough to have a material**  
11 **impact on AmerenUE?**

12 **A. No. Although the total percentage of gas generation cost for AmerenUE is**  
13 **less than that of Aquila or Empire, the magnitude of AmerenUE's gas**  
14 **costs are significant and can have a material impact on AmerenUE. In my**  
15 **direct testimony I noted that future natural gas procurement costs can vary**  
16 **by \$38,110,000 to \$156,153,170 (a difference of \$118 million) in 2009**  
17 **and from \$51,500,800 to \$222,555,600 (a difference of \$171 million) in**  
18 **2012.**

19 **VI. PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL GAS COSTS**

20 **Q. Witnesses Johnstone, Brubaker and Cohen each assert that**  
21 **AmerenUE will not prudently control fuel costs if it is permitted to**  
22 **use an FAC. What policies and strategies are in place to assure that**  
23 **AmerenUE will prudently manage fuel costs?**

1           A.     AmerenUE's management of its fuel risk is governed by Ameren's Risk  
2                   Management Policy and internal strategies and policies. Ameren has a  
3                   Risk Management Steering Committee comprised of senior level  
4                   management which oversees the Risk Management Policy for gas-fired  
5                   generation, as well as for AmerenUE's gas local distribution company  
6                   (LDC). The AmerenUE gas generation Risk Management Policy  
7                   mandates a three-year planning horizon with upper and lower limits for  
8                   price hedging forecasted native load. In addition to the Risk Management  
9                   Policy, we have internal strategies governing the portfolio of natural gas  
10                  supply resources designed to ensure firm deliverability, allow "no-notice"  
11                  turbine starts, and to dampen price volatility. To meet these goals, we use  
12                  a portfolio of resources including firm transportation from production  
13                  areas, leased storage capacity, intraday supply packages, and financial  
14                  hedging instruments.

15           **Q.     Will AmerenUE continue to implement the existing policies and**  
16                   **strategies discussed above if granted an FAC by the Commission?**

17           A.     Yes. AmerenUE's track record in applying best cost control and risk  
18                   management practices in the presence of a cost adjustment clause has  
19                   already been demonstrated in the context of the Purchase Gas Adjustment  
20                   ("PGA") mechanism.

21           **Q.     If AmerenUE is granted an FAC, what incentives exist to ensure**  
22                   **prudent management of fuel supply?**



1           A.     Actual fuel costs, including hedging costs, will be filed with the  
2                   Commission in the annual FAC reconciliation. Imprudent fuel costs will  
3                   be subject to disallowance, providing a direct incentive for proper  
4                   management. This process is similar to the PGA reconciliation procedure  
5                   for AmerenUE's gas LDC. In addition, the AmerenUE proposal includes  
6                   a 95%/5% sharing mechanism where any increase/decrease in fuel cost  
7                   will be shared between the customers and AmerenUE, providing an  
8                   additional financial incentive. Mr. Lyons addresses other incentives in his  
9                   rebuttal testimony.

10          **Q.     What experience do you have managing natural gas costs and**  
11                   **complying with fuel cost reconciliations?**

12          A.     AmerenUE has a long track record of prudently and successfully  
13                   managing natural gas costs for the LDC through the PGA, which is a  
14                   mechanism very similar to the proposed FAC. AmerenUE is experienced  
15                   in providing full disclosure and support of LDC costs during Staff's  
16                   reconciliation reviews each year. Although the PGA provides a  
17                   mechanism for passing costs directly to the customers, AmerenUE  
18                   aggressively pursues natural gas price and volume hedging. AmerenUE  
19                   has been an industry leader in hedging natural gas; it was one of the first  
20                   Missouri utilities to use futures to hedge natural gas financially, utilize  
21                   third party off-system storage after FERC Order No. 636 deregulation, and  
22                   extensively hedge gas supply prior to the peak winter season.

1           **Q.     Witnesses Johnstone, Brubaker and Cohen suggest that the PGA**  
2                   **reconciliation process does not provide an intense level of review. Do**  
3                   **you agree?**

4           **A.     No. The Staff PGA reconciliation reviews are very intensive and thorough**  
5                   **with every aspect of gas supply procurement, hedging, and system**  
6                   **operations audited and analyzed by Staff.**

7           **Q.     On page 4 of his direct testimony, Mr. Brubaker states that “One of**  
8                   **the dangers with an automatic adjustment clause is that the utility**  
9                   **becomes less attentive to managing its costs because of the directly**  
10                  **reimbursable nature of these costs under the FAC.” Do you agree**  
11                  **that AmerenUE will be less attentive to managing costs if it is**  
12                  **permitted to use an FAC?**

13          **A.     No. AmerenUE employs professional fuel managers that are passionate**  
14                  **about their work and take pride in managing fuel costs. We have a long**  
15                  **track record of being good stewards in obtaining gas supplies for both**  
16                  **AmerenUE’s gas-fired generators and the LDC. We have proven that we**  
17                  **are serious about our “obligation to serve” and maintaining stable and**  
18                  **reasonable rates for our customers.**

19          **Q.     Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

20          **A.     Yes, it does.**

In the Matter of Union Electric )  
Company d/b/a AmerenUE for )  
Authority to File Tariffs Increasing )  
Rates for Electric Service Provided ) Case No. ER-2008-0318  
To Customers in the Company's )  
Missouri Service Area. )

STATE OF MISSOURI )  
 ) ss  
CITY OF ST. LOUIS )

1. My name is Scott A. Glaeser. I am employed by Ameren Energy Fuels and Services as Vice President – Gas Supply and System Control.
2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my Rebuttal Testimony on behalf of Union Electric Company, d/b/a AmerenUE, consisting of 18 pages (and Schedules \_\_\_ through \_\_\_ if any), all of which have been prepared in written form for introduction into evidence in the above-referenced docket.
3. I hereby swear and affirm that my answers contained in the attached testimony to the questions therein propounded are true and correct. /

Sec # A Slava

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2008.

Amanda Tesdall

My commission expires:

