Exhibit No. 226

OPC – Exhibit 226 Testimony of Jordan Seaver Surrebuttal File No. ER-2024-0261 Exhibit No.:

Issue(s): Resource Planning/Grid Resilience

And Innovation Partnerships

Witness/Type of Exhibit: Seaver/Surrebuttal
Sponsoring Party: Public Counsel
Case No.: ER-2024-0261

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

JORDAN SEAVER

Submitted on Behalf of the Office of the Public Counsel

THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY D/B/A LIBERTY

FILE NO. ER-2024-0261

September 17, 2025

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

JORDAN SEAVER

Empire District Electric Company d/b/a Liberty CASE No. ER-2024-0261

1	I.	INTRODUCTION
2	Q.	What is your name and what is your business address?
3	A.	My name is Jordan Seaver, and my business address is 200 Madison Street, Governor Office
3		Building, Suite 650, Jefferson City, MO 65102.
5	Q.	By whom are you employed and in what capacity?
6	A.	I am employed by the Office of Public Counsel ("OPC") as a Policy Analyst.
56789	Q.	Have you previously testified before the Missouri Public Service Commission ("The
8		Commission") in this case?
9	A.	Yes.
10	Q.	What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony?
11	A.	The purpose of this testimony is to respond to the rebuttal testimonies of Liberty witnesses
12		Mr. Aaron Doll, Mr. Todd Tarter, and Mr. Jeffery Westfall. Mr. Doll claims that I have
13		misrepresented the Southwest Power Pool's ("SPP") publicly stated reasons for changing
14		resource adequacy requirements. Mr. Tarter suggests that I have not considered the full
15		context or picture of the changes occurring across the SPP territory and how those changes
16		have affected all utilities in said territory. Mr. Westfall opposes my proposed position in
17		comments regarding the recovery of Grid Resilience and Innovation Partnerships ("GRIP")
18		project costs in a future rate case. Additionally, Mr. Westfall addresses comments I made
	H	in my direct testimony about the recent change in risk management software for vegetation

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management inspections.

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- Is whether or not SPP has stated that it changed its resource accreditation requirements due to the goal of net-zero carbon emissions relevant to your point "that the direct cause of resource accreditation changes at the SPP is due to the goal of net-zero carbon emissions" as Empire witness Mr. Doll insinuates on p. 11 of his rebuttal testimony?
- A. No. My claims on p. 6 of my direct testimony are not about SPP's publicly stated reasons for changing its capacity accreditations. To quote from my direct, I say:

"The change in the supply-side additions in the 2022 to the 2025 preferred plan is certainly a result, at least in part, due to the change in SPP's resource accreditation. But, the reason that SPP has changed its resource accreditation is that the goal of net-zero carbon emissions, achieved by replacing thermal generation with wind and solar generation, is the direct cause of the [sic] those resource accreditation changes in SPP."

What I was attempting to say succinctly, if clumsily, in this passage is that the change in Empire's preferred plan from 2022 to 2025 is, **at least in part**, a result of the changes in how SPP accredits resource capacity. And the reason that SPP made changes to its resource capacity accreditation is, **at least in part**, due to the attempt, by many utilities across its territory, and by many parties in various sectors of the economy and government, to achieve net-zero carbon emissions.

- Q. Do you disagree with Mr. Doll's testimony further on p. 11 of his rebuttal testimony, that "SPP pointed to a variety of factors that contributed to their resource adequacy reforms: load growth, shrinking reserve margins, retirements of conventional units, changing load shapes, variability of wind/solar output, significant thermal outages during extreme weather, etc."?
- A. No. The "load growth" experienced over the last 10 or so years is certainly driven by electrification of appliances and of transportation, each of which is a result, at base, of the attempt to achieve net-zero carbon emissions.

However, a significant factor affecting the "shrinking reserve margins" in SPP is the closing of baseload plants, which happen to be coal. But it wasn't coincidental that these specific plants were shut down and not others, because net-zero carbon emissions cannot be achieved without ceasing the use of coal (or of almost all coal). This shuttering of baseload coal plants is the biggest part of the "retirements of conventional units" that Mr. Doll mentions, and, as I stated just above, is the biggest driver of "shrinking reserve margins."

Additionally, and as noted by SPP in its future load analyses¹, the push to transition residential appliances and transportation to electric rather than gas is also shifting seasonal load patterns by making seasonal peaks in both winter and summer. This shifting usage pattern is what creates, **in part**, the changing load shape. And this partial cause of shifting load shapes is what Mr. Doll is talking about when he mentions the "variability of wind/solar output".

Mr. Doll appears, then, to agree with me that the changing resource capacity accreditations at SPP are, **at least in part and to a significant degree**, caused by the attempt to achieve netzero carbon emissions, which has been undertaken by Liberty across its footprint, and many other utilities (if not all) in SPP's service territory, as well as more broadly across the various regional transmission organizations ("RTOs") and independent system operators ("ISOs"), as well as at various levels of government, business, etc.

So, while attempting to argue for the conclusion that SPP did not make the red herring statement that "the direct cause of resource accreditation changes at the SPP is due to the goal of net-zero carbon emissions, which is achieved by replacing thermal generation with wind and solar generation," Mr. Doll has instead agreed with my point, which is that the goal of net-zero carbon emissions is a significant direct cause (of possibly other causes; after all, something can be causally overdetermined) of the resource accreditation changes at the SPP.

¹ Ryan Jones, Jonathan Kadish, et al., "Future Load Scenarios for Southwest Power Pool", Evolved Energy Research, see pages 6-11, as well as many more throughout the report.

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- Q. Is Mr. Doll correct where he states on p. 12 of his rebuttal testimony that you have erroneously claimed "that Evergy Missouri West utilized the generation interconnection capability at the former Asbury Power Plant for its newly proposed natural gas generation facilities"?
- A. Yes. As pointed out by Mr. Doll, upon receiving a data request from the Company regarding this part of my direct testimony, I noted that I inadvertently stated that Evergy Missouri West had acquired generation interconnection capability at the former Asbury Power Plant site for natural gas generators. What I meant to state was that Evergy Missouri West acquired generation interconnection capability for a new solar generation facility.
 - Mr. Doll suggests that this error detracts from my point that Empire failed to plan and take action to take advantage of its own existing generating resource interconnection sites. It is plain from the fact that Evergy Missouri West did secure generating resource interconnection at the site and Empire failed to secure it that my error does not detract from my overall point.
- Q. What is your response to Mr. Tarter's rebuttal testimony, pp. 13-15, where he discusses your claims about resource planning for Empire at the level of the parent company Liberty Utilities?
 - Mr. Tarter's comments highlight the nuances in the changes of resource planning from Empire's 2022 IRP to now. He suggests that the changes taking place in SPP and in the nation more broadly are the main driver of the changes in Empire's preferred IRP plans. I agree with him that "the magnitude of these developments," viz., resource accreditation changes at the SPP level, make changes in the IRP preferred plan at the very least warranted. But the IRP changes that I highlighted are the changing amounts of solar, wind, and gas generation additions that were being proposed for Empire from 2019 to the present. My point is that Empire, due to the direction imposed on it by Liberty Utilities, has a goal of retiring its thermal generation, while building and adding wind and solar generation. This is not debatable, as they have committed to net-zero carbon emissions in the future, and the actions taken since the retirement of the Asbury plant show this. Furthermore, the reasons that Empire now is building more gas plants is directly tied to the Company's adoption of the net-zero carbon

emissions goal. The Company is stuck building gas plants to meet SPP's changing resource capacity accreditation requirements, which are a result of Liberty Utilities' decision to retire thermal generation and replace it with wind and solar generation.

Mr. Tarter's comments actually highlight the fact that this goal has been adopted more broadly by other utilities in SPP, and outside of SPP in other RTOs and ISOs. The results of this "ideological plan" are the resource adequacy changes at SPP. I earlier addressed the issue of whether SPP has publicly stated that their change in resource accreditation is due to wide implementation of the net-zero carbon emissions goal, and I do not believe that lack of such a statement from the RTO has any bearing on my arguments that the changes in resource adequacy at SPP are a result of the wide implementation of the net-zero carbon emissions goal (see above in my testimony responding to Mr. Doll).

- Q. Do you agree with Mr. Westfall that there is no link between, on the one hand, the initial failure of Empire to conduct infrastructure inspections and work, and, on the other, of the introduction of the Customer First program?
- A. I have not yet been given enough information to believe that the Customer First program had no role to play in this failure, nor have I been given enough information by the Company to determine exactly how the Customer First program played into its initial failure to conduct inspections and perform corrective work. I have received multiple responses to data requests ("DR") about this issue, and the information provided does not explicitly state what occurred to cause the initial failure.

With Public Counsel DR 2509 I asked, "Are Empire's inspections of infrastructure in compliance with Rule 20 CSR 4240-23.020(3)(C) conducted in part or in total by using its Customer Fist program?" Empire's response was, "Yes, in part. The Customer First platform was used to generate the list of assets scheduled to be inspected in 2024." With Public Counsel DR 2512 I asked whether the Customer First Enterprise Asset Management ("EAM") system was used to conduct infrastructure inspections in accordance with the rule above and, if "yes", how the EAM system is used or what it does. Empire's response was affirmative

1 (because the Company provided information about what the EAM system does). Empire's 2 description of what the EAM system does for infrastructure inspections is the following: 3 "EAM supports the following items Inspection Schedule (Maintenance Plans) 4 **Capacitor Inspection Condition** 5 6 Inspection order for a circuit/line Remediation order for repair 7 8 Asset list for all inspections on a circuit/line" 9 Empire gave a more detailed description in the response to Public Counsel DR 2513: "1. SAP EAM (Enterprise Asset Management) 10 11 **Purpose:** Manages the entire lifecycle of physical assets (e.g., power lines, 12 transformers, substations, pipelines) to maximize uptime, reduce 13 maintenance costs, and ensure compliance. 14 **Core Capabilities:** 15 Asset registry and master data management 16 Maintenance planning and execution (corrective, preventive, 17 predictive) 18 Work order and service request processing 19 Spare parts and inventory integration 20 Failure analysis and reliability metrics 21 **Mobile work management** (e.g., SAP Field Service or 3rd-party apps) 22 Integration with GIS, CIS, PM, and ERP systems 23 **Used By:** 24 Maintenance planners and schedulers 25 Field technicians 26 27 Operations engineers" 28

But, in its response to Public Counsel DR 2511, where I asked why the majority of the planned inspections in Case No. EO-2026-0002 were not completed, the Company gave this explanation:

"In 2024, Liberty implemented two key enhancements to its inspection process: (1) identifying corrective actions and (2) performing remediation work. These changes were designed to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of the maintenance program, ultimately aiming to reduce overall program costs for our customer. While the long-term benefits of these improvements are expected to materialize in the coming years, the initial implementation proved more complex than anticipated. As a result, the rollout of these substantial and beneficial changes led to delays in completing the 2024 inspections.

"As part of its 2024 improvements, Liberty revised its approach to managing remediation work identified during intrusive inspections by selecting a single vendor capable of performing both inspections and corrective actions. This integrated approach streamlines the process by consolidating responsibility under one point of contact, improving coordination and accountability. However, securing the contract took significantly longer than anticipated, requiring multiple rounds of negotiation to reach acceptable terms. Following contract execution, additional time was needed to develop and finalize the required data deliverables, further contributing to delays.

In 2024, Liberty identified a strategic opportunity to align patrol and detailed inspections with the rollout of its new risk-based Cost Benefit Analysis Tool (CBAT), **ENGIN**. Because ENGIN relies heavily on accurate asset condition data to evaluate system investments, Liberty aimed to make the field data collection process dual-purpose—meeting compliance inspection requirements while also gathering enhanced data to maximize ENGIN's effectiveness.

To deliver greater value to customers, Liberty issued a competitive Request for Proposal (RFP) in July 2024. This process resulted in the

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 selection of two vendors—replacing the single vendor model used since 2009. This change not only expanded our resource pool but also introduced competitive pressure to improve pricing and service quality.

While there was initial confidence that most 2024 inspections could be completed within the year, the process of finalizing inspection criteria, data formats, and configuring contractor data collection tools took longer than expected. These delays were largely due to underestimating the complexity of ensuring data could be efficiently uploaded into Liberty's systems.

Despite the initial setbacks, the use of multiple contractors has accelerated progress. Liberty is currently on track to complete both the 2024 and 2025 scheduled inspections by the end of this year."

While I appreciate the overview Empire provided in this response, I cannot discern from it why the inspections were delayed. It is unclear what the two vendors resulting from the RFP were chosen to do, and how they were involved with the single vendor that was chosen to perform both the inspections and the corrective actions for intrusive inspections. It is unclear to me how the process did not already include "corrective actions" and "performing remediation work", or how these would have delayed the inspections and vegetation management. Finally, in the response Empire states, "These delays were largely due to underestimating the complexity of ensuring data could be efficiently uploaded into Liberty's systems." But this response does not explicitly state that the Customer First program was not part of this problem, nor does it explain why the prior, purported benefits of the new vendors, new contractors, and new software systems were not able to handle the assimilation of data for vegetation management inspection and work.

- Q. Does Mr. Westfall provide any additional explanations or information in his rebuttal testimony for the initial failure of Empire to conduct infrastructure inspections and work?
 - No, Mr. Westfall's rebuttal testimony does not provide much more information on this matter than his responses to Public Counsel's DRs 2509-2515 did. I don't believe that sufficient explanation has been given for the specific issues that caused such a delay in planned inspections and vegetation management work. I also don't believe that the Customer First

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program (in particular the EAM) has been shown to not be an issue for the initial failure to complete all of the planned inspections in a timely manner. Additionally, the complexity of the vegetation management process shown here is touted as being a benefit to customers, but it appears at this time to have hindered infrastructure inspections and management that were not an issue in the past.

- Q. Does this conclude your testimony?
- A. Yes.

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of the Request of The)	
Empire District Electric Company d/b/a)	
Liberty for Authority to File Tariffs)	Case No. ER-2024-0261
Increasing Rates for Electric Service)	
Provided to Customers in Its Missouri)	
Service Area)	

AFFIDAVIT OF JORDAN SEAVER

STATE OF MISSOURI)	
)	SS
COUNTY OF COLE)	

Jordan Seaver, of lawful age and being first duly sworn, deposes and states:

- 1. My name is Jordan Seaver. I am a Policy Analyst for the Office of the Public Counsel.
- 2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my surrebuttal testimony.
- 3. I hereby swear and affirm that my statements contained in the attached testimony are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Jordan Seaver Policy Analyst

Subscribed and sworn to me this 11th day of September 2025.

TIFFANY HILDEBRAND
NOTARY PUBLIC - NOTARY SEAL
STATE OF MISSOURI
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 8, 2027
COLE COUNTY
COMMISSION #15637121

Tiffany Hildebrand Notary Public ildeed

My Commission expires August 8, 2027.