

Exhibit No.:

Issues: Green Button Connect

Witness: Katherine Wyszowski

Sponsoring Party: Renew Missouri
Advocates

Type of Exhibit: Direct Testimony

Case No.: ER-2026-0143

Testimony Filed: June 30, 2026

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI**

FILE NO. ER-2026-0143

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
KATHERINE WYSZKOWSKI
ON BEHALF OF RENEW MISSOURI**

July 14, 2026

1		
2		
3		
4	I. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	3
5	II. TARIFF FOR GREEN BUTTON CONNECT	4
6	A. TARIFF OUTLINE	4
7	B. TARIFF JUSTIFICATION	5
8	C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TARIFF AND EVERGY’S CUSTOMER	
9	AUTHORIZATION FORM FOR DEMAND RESPONSE AGGREGATORS	26
10	IV. CONCLUSION	29
11		

1 **I. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

2 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, TITLE AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

3 A. My name is Katherine Wyszowski. I am the State Policy Manager of Mission:data
4 Coalition (“Mission:data”). My business address is 7511 Greenwood Ave N. #1809, Seattle, WA
5 98103.

6 **Q. ARE YOU THE SAME PERSON WHO FILED DIRECT TESTIMONY ON JUNE**
7 **30, 2026 CONCERNING EVERGY’S REVENUE REQUIREMENT?**

8 A. Yes.

9 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

10 A. Having established the need for Green Button Connect My Data (“GBC”) and its associated
11 revenue requirement in prior testimony, I now turn to the policies that are necessary to bring GBC
12 into effective operation. I propose a tariff that describes the rules and responsibilities for Evergy
13 Metro Inc. (“Evergy” or the “Company”) in making GBC available to all ratepayers. I also present
14 justifications for each section of the proposed tariff and consider likely negative outcomes if the
15 Commission declines to require a tariff.

1 **II. TARIFF FOR GREEN BUTTON CONNECT**

2 **A. TARIFF OUTLINE**

3 **Q. WHAT TARIFF DO YOU PROPOSE?**

4 A. I propose a tariff governing Evergy's provision of its GBC implementation, given as
5 Appendix A.

6 **Q. PROVIDE AN OUTLINE OF THE TARIFF YOU PROPOSE.**

7 A. The tariff has the following sections:

- 8 1. Definitions of terms, including a definition of "standard customer data," which refers to
9 all information about a customer's account and usage that I argue should be portable, i.e.
10 transferable to third parties authorized by the customer;
- 11 2. Data portability, which details Evergy's obligation to electronically transfer a customer's
12 standard customer data to a third party upon request;
- 13 3. Eligibility criteria of third parties;
- 14 4. Liability, which limits Evergy's liability for the acts of a third-party data recipient
15 authorized by customers;
- 16 5. Data quality and integrity; and
- 17 6. General, which covers miscellaneous topics such as the applicability of other terms and
18 conditions, certification to the GBC standard, uptime, termination, and end-to-end
19 testing.

20

B. TARIFF JUSTIFICATION

Q. WHY IS A TARIFF NECESSARY FOR GREEN BUTTON CONNECT?

A. In my experience, utilities in other jurisdictions have sought to evade regulatory oversight on matters involving Green Button Connect (GBC). If the Commission were to order Evergy to offer GBC, that requirement by itself would not be sufficient because terms and conditions could be subsequently imposed on data recipients by Evergy that could be unfair, onerous, or could render GBC itself of little value. Any of these outcomes would undermine the purpose of the Commission's orders in the first place. By establishing a detailed tariff at the outset, the Commission can ensure that ratepayers get the most value from investments in advanced metering as well as avoid the need for subsequent litigation of the type seen in other jurisdictions.

Q. PLEASE PROVIDE EXAMPLES OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS OUTSIDE OF TARIFFS THAT YOU BELIEVE ARE PROBLEMATIC.

A. I have seen utilities across the country impose the following problematic terms on data recipients:

- Broad disclaimers on data accuracy, meaning that the utility is not obligated to provide correct information about customers' energy usage and account information.
- The utility may unilaterally terminate access for any reason at any time.
- The utility asserts the right to unilaterally change their terms at any time without notice.
- The utility asserts proprietary rights or intellectual property rights in customer data, thereby prohibiting third parties from analyzing energy usage to help ratepayers save on their monthly bills.
- The utility asserts the right to inspect and audit third party software applications, forcing the disclosure of competitively-sensitive information that a monopoly utility could use to unfairly compete in adjacent markets, such as energy efficiency.

- 1 • The utility anonymizes the data, defeating the purpose of a GBC platform.
- 2 • The utility adopts an overly broad non-disclosure agreement that limits a third party's
- 3 ability to use the data, even in ways that are authorized by customers.
- 4 • Once a customer rescinds the authorization for a third party to access their data, the utility
- 5 requires the third party to destroy all customer data and all derivations, including data
- 6 sent to wholesale markets for settlement and any published studies and statistics based
- 7 upon aggregations of customer data, even if individual customer information can no
- 8 longer be reidentified.

9 **Q. WHY ARE THE ABOVE EXAMPLES PROBLEMATIC?**

10 A. Because they erect unnecessary and sometimes unattainable barriers to customers or to

11 customer-authorized third parties, such as DER aggregators. Rather than putting customers in

12 charge of their own information, the examples above undermine the central purpose of data

13 portability, which is empowering consumers. Instead, the examples above expose third parties to

14 arbitrary coercion and anti-competitive acts of the utility while depriving third parties of due

15 process.

16 **Q. WHAT ARE OTHER REASONS WHY YOU BELIEVE A TARIFF IS**

17 **NECESSARY FOR GREEN BUTTON CONNECT?**

18 A. A tariff will establish the business and technical processes, eligibility requirements,

19 software requirements and other critical topics need to be addressed both in order for Evergy to

20 implement GBC efficiently and for GBC to provide maximum benefits to consumers.

21 My proposed tariff details the precise types of customer information that may be shared so

22 that expectations to both customers and customer-authorized third parties are clearly established

23 in a publicly-accessible document. In my experience, many utilities around the country do not

1 clearly state what information is actually available, leading to confusion and unnecessary costs
2 associated with discovering such information. Of course, usage data is of primary importance, but
3 there are other types of customer data that are critical as well. For example, a distributed energy
4 resources (DER) aggregator wishing to operate in Southwest Power Pool (“SPP”) markets needs
5 to have billing-quality interval usage data, the customer’s premise address and the pricing node or
6 “PNode” of each customer. Other energy management services, operating outside of SPP markets,
7 often need information such as the customer’s account number, particularly for multi-site
8 commercial customers where matching numerous meters to billing accounts is important. Still
9 other applications may need 24 months of billing history in order to benchmark costs per square
10 foot as compared with facilities in other jurisdictions. Given the variety of energy management
11 applications in the market today, it is necessary to clearly and publicly articulate what data is
12 available with customer consent, including variations for different customer classes as applicable.
13 The tariff I propose would provide essential information addressing these topics.

1 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR DEFINITIONS OF STANDARD CUSTOMER DATA.**

2 A. I propose a comprehensive definition of “standard customer data” that includes usage,
3 account and billing information; information needed for demand response participation at SPP;
4 and any other customer-specific information, such as rate codes, that determine a customer’s
5 eligibility and reporting requirements necessary to participate in a renewable energy or demand
6 management program.

7 **Q. WHY IS DEFINING STANDARD CUSTOMER DATA IN THIS WAY**
8 **IMPORTANT?**

9 A. By defining standard customer data broadly, software applications that are authorized by
10 customers could quickly and efficiently assess a customer’s situation and provide a range of
11 actions that a customer could take, ranging from bill savings to energy efficiency incentives to
12 demand response. In my experience, one of the key failures of utilities in other jurisdictions
13 regarding GBC has been providing an insufficient range of customer data in an electronic form,
14 which limits its value. For example, Ameren Illinois and Commonwealth Edison provide interval
15 usage data in kilowatt-hours for each customer via GBC. But this is insufficient for many, if not
16 most, energy management applications, because:

- 17 • Customers with multiple meters (e.g., commercial) are unable to make use of their interval
18 energy usage data because they cannot match usage to a particular building or facility, or
19 a particular account number;

- 1 ● Billing-quality interval usage data is needed by SPP, so it is important that the right type
- 2 and quality of usage data is made available from GBC so that DER aggregators can reduce
- 3 peak power and transmission costs;
- 4 ● Cost reduction services that analyze your bills and identify savings opportunities need to
- 5 know bill amounts in dollars and the applicable rate code. For customers on time-varying
- 6 rates, appliances such as water heaters need to know the applicable rate code in order to
- 7 optimize correctly.

8 **Q. WHY DID YOU INCLUDE CUSTOMER PREMISE ADDRESS IN THE**

9 **DEFINITION OF STANDARD CUSTOMER DATA?**

10 A. According to the *Market Protocols for SPP Integrated Marketplace*, SPP outlines various

11 requirements of dispatchable demand response resources and block demand response resources,

12 including PNode, meter settlement location (i.e., the premise address), and usage data.¹ While

13 PNode and premise address could, in theory, be provided by DER aggregators without

14 involvement of Evergy, it is important that Evergy's records be used because Evergy can deny

15 customer participation in a DER aggregation if there are mismatches between records.

¹ *Market Protocols for SPP Integrated Marketplace*. Southwest Power Pool. Revision 112, updated May 28, 2025, Section 6.1.4 and 6.1.5 at 1006-1008.

1 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE TARIFF’S SECTION ON DATA PORTABILITY.**

2 A. This section describes the GBC service in more detail, outlining the authorization process,
3 authentication details (i.e. how customer identity is established), and how a customer can revoke
4 an authorization. Many of these provisions reinforce what is required under the GBC standard.

5 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE TARIFF’S SECTION ON ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA OF**
6 **THIRD PARTIES.**

7 A. This section describes what a third party must do in order to be eligible to receive customer
8 data. This is a policy matter, not a technical matter. I propose five requirements: (i) demonstrate
9 technical capability to interact securely with Evergy’s servers; (ii) provide contact information and
10 federal tax identification numbers; (iii) acknowledge receipt and review of the tariff; (iv) not have
11 been disqualified as an authorized third party provider in the past by the Commission; and (v)
12 adopt and comply with the most updated version of the 2015 Department of Energy’s Voluntary
13 Code of Conduct Final Concepts and Principles for Data Privacy and the Smart Grid (the
14 “DataGuard Seal”) or a similar nationally accepted eligibility standard approved by the
15 Commission.

16 **Q. WHY ARE ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA IMPORTANT?**

17 A. Because without clearly defined eligibility criteria, that leaves open the opportunity for
18 utilities to engage in discriminatory handling of third parties. A utility could refuse to allow access
19 to a certain third party for unfair or anti-competitive reasons – for example, if a third party was
20 engaged in lawful deployment of renewable energy projects that might be perceived to be
21 competitively threatening. Well-defined eligibility criteria help ensure that each third party is
22 treated equally.

1 **Q. WHAT IS DATAGUARD?**

2 A. DataGuard is a privacy statement that originated with the U.S. Department of Energy.² It
3 consists of a comprehensive statement regarding privacy and the appropriate use of customer data
4 to which companies attest they comply. This attestation is enforceable by the U.S. Federal Trade
5 Commission, which has authority to police unfair or deceptive business acts or practices. State
6 attorneys general may also be able to take enforcement actions based upon similar authority.

7 **Q. HAVE OTHER STATES ADOPTED ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA SIMILAR TO**
8 **WHAT YOU PROPOSE?**

9 A. Yes. California and New Hampshire have very similar requirements. Texas does as well,
10 although Texas does not require adherence to DataGuard.

11 **Q. DOES THE COMMISSION HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE THIRD**
12 **PARTIES TO AGREE TO DATAGUARD?**

13 A. I am not a lawyer, but I believe it is acceptable because DataGuard is connected to Evergy's
14 practices of administering GBC, and Evergy is clearly under the jurisdiction of the Commission. I
15 also note that other states whose commissions do not have regulatory authority over third parties
16 have required DataGuard or substantially similar privacy requirements, such as California and
17 New Hampshire.

² Available at

https://www.missiondata.io/s/DataGuard_VCC_Concepts_and_Principles_2015_01_08_FINAL.pdf

1 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE SECTION ON LIABILITY AND WHY IT IS**
2 **IMPORTANT.**

3 A. The tariff states that Evergy is not liable for the acts of a third party that has received
4 customer data with customer permission. If a customer grants an authorization and then, after data
5 transfer, a third party experiences a data breach of some kind, then Evergy is immunized, except
6 in cases where Evergy has acted recklessly.

7 An important distinction must be made between customer-authorized third parties and
8 *vendors* to a utility. Customer-authorized third parties are at an arm's length to a utility and have
9 no contractual relationship with a utility, other than the tariff. Evergy cannot therefore control a
10 third party, and nor should they. It is precisely the innovation that comes from outside the structure
11 of regulated monopolies that this platform seeks to nurture in Missouri in order to benefit
12 ratepayers. Making Evergy liable for a third party's actions would put the utilities in the role of
13 “policeman,” which is both undesirable and unworkable.

14 **Q. HOW ARE CYBERSECURITY CONCERNS ADDRESSED IN THE PROPOSED**
15 **TARIFF?**

16 A. Cybersecurity is addressed in two ways. First, through a Green Button Connect platform,
17 the customer data that is transferred securely from a utility to a third party is in a read-only format.
18 Meaning, the third party receives a file that has absolutely no pathway, backdoor, or any feasible
19 way to enter a utility's database or system. There is no possible way for Green Button Connect to
20 allow for a breach of the utility's system, because they have no existing system connections to do
21 that. Any concerns that Green Button Connect may allow for a breach of the utility's system is
22 unfounded and impossible. GBC has been deployed for over a decade now, and it has never

1 experienced a data breach that would allow a nefarious party to gain access to a utility bill system,
2 because as stated above, there is no connection between the utility billing system and the GBC
3 API that would allow for that.

4 Second, Dataguard is a representation that the data recipient has a cybersecurity risk
5 management program. Violations of this are enforceable under state and federal laws governing
6 unfair or deceptive business practices. By including a requirement to comply with DataGuard
7 provisions, the third party must have reasonable cyber security practices and procedures to protect
8 customers and their data.

9 Also, for the consideration of the Commission, these risks have already been weighed
10 during the Ameren case, and the Commission approved a Green Button Connect platform for the
11 utility. It would be inconsistent and unfair to customers to limit access to their data over concerns
12 that have already been placated in another utility jurisdiction.

13 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN DATA QUALITY AND INTEGRITY, AND WHY IT IS**
14 **IMPORTANT.**

15 A. Data quality and integrity refer to high-quality, complete records of energy usage and
16 account data that is important to downstream economic decisions. For example, if a customer signs
17 up for a competitive demand response service, the customer can receive payments from a DER
18 aggregator, via SPP, for its load curtailment. Through its monopoly on metering and billing,
19 Evergy is the exclusive “source of truth” for metering information. Providing incorrect interval
20 usage data via GBC creates a significant risk to demand response aggregators, who may face fines
21 and liquidated damages at SPP for Evergy’s failure to provide accurate information.

1 Another example is residential or commercial building energy efficiency retrofits.
2 Modeling energy savings before a retrofit, and verifying savings afterward, are important market
3 functions that are undermined by incorrect or incomplete billing records. It would be unfair to a
4 building owner who, say, makes a multi-million-dollar decision to improve HVAC systems or
5 building envelope insulation based on energy usage data that was false and imprudently handled
6 by Evergy. Similarly, residential efficiency rebates from the Inflation Reduction Act, Section
7 50121 require the Missouri Department of Natural Resources to pay rebates according to “the
8 monthly and hourly (if available) weather-normalized energy use of a home before and after the
9 implementation of a home energy efficiency retrofit...”³ My understanding is that Missouri
10 applied to receive \$75.7 million for these retrofits,⁴ the funds for which were *not* recently retracted
11 by Congress in the “Big, Beautiful Bill.”⁵ Accurate energy data from utilities is essential to
12 administering these funds.

13 **Q. HOW DO YOU ADDRESS DATA QUALITY AND INTEGRITY IN THE TARIFF?**

14 A. I address this topic by obligating Evergy to provide standard customer data under a “best
15 available” standard. The “best available” standard acknowledges that information can change over
16 time (such as when contact records are updated, or meter reading validation processes or re-billing
17 occurs) but Evergy would be required to provide the then-current and accurate information for the
18 customer requested and transmit updates in a timely manner after updates in its systems occur.

³ Inflation Reduction Act (2022) Section 50121.

⁴ <https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/IRA-50121-50122-home-energy-rebates-state-allocations.pdf>

⁵ H.R. 1 — 119th Congress: One Big Beautiful Bill Act.

1 **Q. DO OTHER STATES REQUIRE A “BEST AVAILABLE” DATA STANDARD?**

2 A. Yes, the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission approved a settlement agreement in
3 Docket No. DE 19-197 that references this standard.⁶

4 **Q. DOES EVERGY’S TERMS AND CONDITIONS INCLUDE A DISCLAIMER**
5 **ABOUT THE ACCURACY OF DATA PROVIDED?**

6 A. Yes, the current terms and conditions on Evergy’s website state, “(b) Evergy makes no
7 warranty that (i) these sites or services will meet your requirements, (ii) these sites or services will
8 be uninterrupted, timely, secure, or error-free, (iii) the results that may be obtained from the use of
9 these sites or the services will be accurate or reliable, or (iv) the quality of any products, services,
10 information, or other material obtained by you through these sites will meet your expectations.”⁷

11 **Q. WHAT OTHER TERMS FROM EVERGY’S TERMS AND CONDITIONS ARE**
12 **CONCERNING?**

13 A. Evergy’s website claims proprietary rights to *all* material on its website, which would
14 include customer energy usage data. No “reproduction, distribution or transmission” of such
15 information is permitted. If these terms were to govern the customer data provided via Green
16 Button Connect, then Evergy would appear to have a proprietary right to stop aggregators from
17 sending customer information to SPP for registration or settlement purposes.

18 **Q. TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, WHAT OTHER STATES HAVE ESTABLISHED**
19 **TARIFFS FOR GREEN BUTTON CONNECT OFFERED BY UTILITIES?**

⁶ https://www.puc.nh.gov/Regulatory/Docketbk/2019/19-197/LETTERS-MEMOS-TARIFFS/19-197_2021-04-28_EVERSOURCE_JT_SETTLEMENT_AGREEMENT.PDF

⁷ [Terms and Conditions - Evergy](#)

A. I am aware of several states with regulator-approved tariffs. These are provided in Table 1 below.

State	Is there a GBC-specific tariff?	Have utilities established terms and conditions not approved by the utility's regulator?
California	Yes	Yes (Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas & Electric)
Colorado	No	Yes (Xcel Energy)
Illinois	Yes	Yes (Commonwealth Edison) Not observed (Ameren Illinois)
Kentucky	No	Yes (LG&E-KU) ⁸
Minnesota	No	Yes (Xcel Energy)
New Jersey	Yes	Yes (Rockland Utilities)
New York	Yes ⁹	Unknown
Texas	No	Yes (AEP Texas, Centerpoint, Entergy Texas, Oncor, Texas-New Mexico Power Co and Xcel Energy)

Table 1: States and utilities with a Green Button Connect tariff and other terms established by utilities without approval of their regulator.

Q. WHAT DO YOU OBSERVE ABOUT TABLE 1 ABOVE?

A. Most utilities – even those offering GBC under a regulator-approved tariff – have imposed their own separate terms and conditions upon data recipients.

Q. IS IT A PROBLEM FOR UTILITIES TO MAKE THEIR OWN TERMS AND CONDITIONS GOVERNING GREEN BUTTON CONNECT?

A. Yes, I believe it is. Monopolies have an incentive to exploit adjacent markets, such as digital energy management and demand response, by unfairly leveraging their regulated functions

⁸ Per communication with Accelerated Innovations, LG&E-KU's vendor for Green Button Connect My Data, there are no terms and conditions during the online third-party registration process, but LG&E-KU require third parties to agree to certain terms through an offline process.

⁹ Although technically not called a tariff, the New York Public Service Commission has approved a "data security agreement" which outlines the terms and conditions under which entities authorized by account holders may access data.

1 to diminish competition. Without Commission review, the terms could be anti-competitive, as I
2 have described above.

3 **Q. DOES YOUR PROPOSED TARIFF ADDRESS THIS ISSUE OF TERMS AND**
4 **CONDITIONS?**

5 A. Yes. In the final section (“General”) my proposed tariff clearly states that separate terms
6 and conditions that Evergy may demand have no force or effect.

7 **Q. IN TABLE 1 ABOVE, FOR THE STATES AND UTILITIES WITH NO TARIFF,**
8 **ARE YOU SAYING THERE ARE NO RULES OR REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED**
9 **WHATSOEVER FOR GREEN BUTTON CONNECT?**

10 A. No. All of the state regulators in Table 1 have issued orders of some kind requiring GBC.
11 My point is that a regulatory requirement for a utility to offer GBC is fundamentally distinct from
12 a tariff because a tariff forms a contract between a utility and a third party. Mediating the
13 relationship between monopoly utilities and competitive market actors is an important
14 responsibility of the Commission. An order that merely compels GBC leaves important terms and
15 conditions unaddressed.

16 **Q. ARE OTHER STATES IN THE PROCESS OF CONSIDERING TARIFFS OR**
17 **DETAILED RULES GOVERNING GREEN BUTTON CONNECT OFFERED BY**
18 **UTILITIES?**

19 A. Yes. I am aware of efforts underway in Maryland, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Iowa.

1 **Q. WHAT ARE THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE SECTION TITLED**
2 **“GENERAL”?**

3 A. Section (f)(2) calls for Evergy to obtain independent, yearly certification that it adheres to
4 the GBC standard. Section (f)(3) sets uptime requirements for the GBC platform, ensuring it is
5 usable at least 99% of the time. Section (f)(4) concerns termination and vests customers and the
6 Commission, but not Evergy, with the ability to terminate a data-sharing authorization. Finally,
7 Section (f)(5) requires yearly end-to-end testing by Evergy of the GBC platform.

8 **Q. WHAT IS CERTIFICATION AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?**

9 A. Certification is an important part of following any technical standard. Rather than relying
10 merely on Evergy’s claim that it adheres to the GBC standard, the Commission should require
11 testing by an independent body, the non-profit Green Button Alliance. Certification involves
12 passing numerous technical tests.¹⁰ Certification helps ensure interoperability with other GBC
13 implementations in other states across the country, making it more likely that Missouri ratepayers
14 will be able to take advantage of energy management offerings available elsewhere. Certification
15 also helps reduce administrative and technical support costs because third parties will have clear
16 expectations about what to expect in terms of technical functionality.

17 **Q. WHAT IS THE COST OF CERTIFICATION?**

18 A. According to the Green Button Alliance website, GBC certification costs only \$3,200.

¹⁰ Information on the certification process is available at <https://www.greenbuttonalliance.org/testing>.

1 **Q. WHAT ARE THE UPTIME REQUIREMENTS IN SECTION (f)(3)?**

2 A. I propose a 99.5% uptime requirement, with exceptions for scheduled maintenance
3 windows. This ensures that of the 8,760 hours in a year, GBC will only be offline for 43.8 hours,
4 or just under two days.

5 **Q. WHY ARE UPTIME REQUIREMENTS IMPORTANT?**

6 A. This type of commitment, often called a service level agreement, is common in information
7 technology applications. It is important as an accountability measure because it gives confidence
8 to third parties that they can invest time and resources in Missouri without undue interruption. If a
9 GBC platform is only operational 60% of the time, it will scare away software providers and
10 undermine the purpose of GBC. It also helps the Commission ensure that ratepayer funds are spent
11 prudently.

12 **Q. WHY IS 99.5% UPTIME REASONABLE?**

13 A. 99.5% uptime, along with 200 hours per year of scheduled maintenance windows for
14 security improvements and software updates, is reasonable and achievable because many
15 enterprise software agreements are at least as stringent. I would anticipate that Evergy's existing
16 software vendors would be able to easily meet this requirement. I note that the New Hampshire
17 Public Utilities Commission approved a design of a GBC platform with a 99.5% uptime
18 requirement.¹¹

¹¹ See, e.g., settlement agreement at Bates page 45-46:

<https://www.puc.nh.gov/VirtualFileRoom/ShowDocument.aspx?DocumentId=88f6ce79-16df-4277-b256-8c8cbc881b76>

1 **Q. WHAT ARE THE TERMINATION PROVISIONS OF SECTION (f)(4)?**

2 A. The termination provision states that Evergy is prohibited from terminating an active
3 customer authorization. It says that, if Evergy has a reasonable suspicion that a third party is
4 violating the law or customer privacy, then it can bring these suspicions to the Commission for
5 review and/or action. It also clarifies that the customer and the Commission, and not Evergy, may
6 terminate activate customer authorizations.

7 **Q. WHAT ARE THE END-TO-END TESTING REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION**
8 **(f)(5)?**

9 A. We recommend the Commission require comprehensive end-to-end testing of customer
10 data access platforms at least twice annually. Regular testing is reasonable and a standard
11 expectation for any commercial software platform. It is a basic expectation to verify operational
12 functionality, but without explicit requirements, utilities have disregarded this process and
13 irresponsibly invested in platforms that do not function. Testing must not be done in a controlled,
14 or sandbox environment. The effectiveness of a data sharing platform cannot be assumed without
15 real world testing involving actual customers with documented performance results. We
16 recommend this is done with at least 15 customers of varying rate classes. Routine testing will
17 help identify issues before they adversely affect customers and market participants.

18 **Q. WHY ARE THESE PROVISIONS NECESSARY?**

19 A. It is necessary to prevent Evergy, or any utility, from unilaterally terminating an
20 authorization because of its potential for abuse. Without due process provisions, a utility has the
21 power to use customer privacy as a pretext to unilaterally interrupt data access to third parties, who
22 might be considered competitors.

1 **Q. HAS A STATE WITH STRONG PRIVACY LAWS PROHIBITED UNILATERAL**
2 **TERMINATION OF DATA SHARING BY UTILITIES?**

3 A. Yes. California has some of the strongest privacy laws in the country, with the California
4 Public Utility Commission issuing a comprehensive privacy order in 2011,¹² followed by statutory
5 obligations such as the California Consumer Privacy Act.¹³ Yet the Commission decided that
6 granting utilities unilateral termination rights would be unfair and unreasonable:

7 To clarify further, it is reasonable for the Commission, in its oversight of the
8 utilities and smart meters, to take responsibility for ordering the suspension of third-
9 party access to customer data. Under the procedures adopted in this decision, it is
10 not necessary nor is it reasonable for a utility to suspend access to customer data
11 based on *suspicion* that a third party may be violating tariffs.¹⁴

12 **Q. WHAT PROCESS WOULD YOUR PROPOSED TARIFF PRESCRIBE IF THERE**
13 **IS A SUSPICION THAT A PRIVACY VIOLATION OCCURRED?**

14 A. If a data recipient such as an energy management company or a demand response
15 aggregator is a genuine “bad actor” and has violated customer privacy, then it is reasonable for the
16 Commission to use its fact-finding abilities to investigate the matter. If a violation is ultimately
17 found, then the Commission can order the termination of data sharing. However, delegating this
18 “policing” function to the utility would put the monopoly utility in the powerful position of
19 surveilling, investigating and potentially terminating connections with adjacent market actors,

¹² California Public Utilities Commission, Decision D.11-07-056 dated July 29, 2011. Decision:
https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/WORD_PDF/FINAL_DECISION/140369.PDF Appendix:
<https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/PUBLISHED/GRAPHICS/140370.PDF>

¹³ Title 1.81.5, Part 4 of Division 3 of the California Civil Code. See also
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375

¹⁴ Emphasis in original. California Public Utilities Commission, Decision D.13-09-025 (Sept 23, 2013) at 53.
Available at <https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K191/77191980.PDF>

1 some of whom it might consider its competitors. Fairness thus demands that every utility be
2 stripped of the ability to terminate data sharing.

3 **Q. WAS A TARIFF FOR GREEN BUTTON CONNECT DISCUSSED IN AMEREN**
4 **MISSOURI'S RECENT RATE CASE, FILE NO. ER-2024-0319?**

5 A. Yes. The settlement agreement approved by the Commission reads:

6 55. The Company shall implement Green Button Connect My Data ("GBC")
7 no later than December 31, 2026. No tariff will be implemented in this
8 proceeding. Ameren Missouri will meet with Renew Missouri and other
9 interested stakeholders to discuss possible implementation of a future tariff to
10 become effective 60 days before GBC implementation...

11 **Q. WHAT DO YOU RECOMMEND WITH REGARD TO COORDINATING THE**
12 **TARIFFS APPLICABLE TO EVERGY AND AMEREN MISSOURI?**

13 A. There are significant benefits to standardization across the two utilities. The
14 business terms, eligibility requirements, and performance requirements should be identical
15 so that there is operational and policy consistency among the state's major electric utilities.
16 It would be unfair and arbitrary if, for example, customers in Ameren Missouri's territory
17 were able to use energy management software or smartphone "apps" while customers in
18 Evergy's territory were not, simply because tariff differences resulted in inconsistent or
19 unfavorable operating conditions in Evergy's territory. In my view, the only allowable
20 differences between the tariffs should pertain to specific types of customer data that each
21 utility might maintain for its respective regional transmission organization, such as Evergy
22 having customers' PNodes, because of SPP's requirements, while Ameren Missouri has

1 customers' Commercial Pricing Nodes (CPNodes), necessary to meet MISO's
2 requirements. Thus, the Commission should establish a consistent GBC tariff among the
3 two utilities, with only the limited exceptions I describe.

4 **C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TARIFF AND EVERGY'S CUSTOMER**
5 **AUTHORIZATION FORM FOR DEMAND RESPONSE AGGREGATORS**

6 **Q. WHAT IS EVERGY'S CUSTOMER AUTHORIZATION FORM FOR DEMAND**
7 **RESPONSE AGGREGATORS?**

8 A. Evergy's Customer Authorization Form for Demand Response Aggregators
9 ("Authorization Form") is a form that Evergy requires for customers to enroll with an aggregator.
10 The Authorization Form is a contract between Evergy, the customer and the aggregator that
11 facilitates information exchange, enrollment and SPP registration. I have attached the form to my
12 testimony as KW-1.

13 **Q. HOW IS EVERGY'S AUTHORIZATION FORM SIMILAR TO THE TARIFF**
14 **YOU PROPOSE?**

15 A. At a high level, the Authorization Form shares some similarities with the proposed tariff.
16 For example, the Authorization Form defines what information may be shared; it includes
17 language regarding assumptions of risk in the customer's dealings with an aggregator; and it
18 addresses how a customer can rescind his or her authorization. The Authorization Form and the
19 tariff also share a limitation of liability provision stating that the utility is not liable for data misuse
20 caused by the recipient.

1 **Q. WHAT ARE THE MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EVERGY'S**
2 **AUTHORIZATION FORM AND THE TARIFF YOU PROPOSE?**

3 A. There are five. First, the Authorization Form has not been reviewed or approved by the
4 Commission. This means that Evergy could change the form unilaterally at any time. In theory,
5 Evergy could require different terms for different aggregators without the Commission's
6 knowledge, causing discriminatory treatment. Evergy could also modify customer disclosures
7 without Commission oversight.

8 Second, the Authorization Form puts no obligations on Evergy concerning the timeliness,
9 quality, format, cadence or protocol of data delivery. Without minimum standards or expectations
10 for uniformity, it is extremely difficult for any aggregator to plan their business operations because
11 each customer's information could be handled differently, with costs incurred for accommodating
12 the idiosyncrasies of each response. For example, some Authorization Forms could be processed
13 within 24 hours and data delivered in a certain spreadsheet format via email; others could take
14 weeks or months and be delivered on by CD-ROM via FedEx in a totally different file format.
15 Without guarantees for uniformity, it is very difficult if not impossible for demand response
16 opportunities to be widely available to customers across Missouri.

17 Third, the Authorization Form is limited to demand response. But customers of all types
18 are interested in energy efficiency and cost-saving measures that have nothing to do with wholesale
19 power markets. The Authorization Form requires the signature of a demand response aggregator;
20 there is no way for a customer to grant his or her authorization for data exchange only, for any
21 other purpose. The tariff, in contrast, enables data exchange in a purpose-neutral manner, giving

1 customers the freedom to use their information for any purpose, whether energy efficiency, rooftop
2 solar, cost management, etc.

3 **Q. WHAT ARE SOME OTHER SHORTFALLS OF EVERGY'S AUTHORIZATION**
4 **FORM?**

5 A. Two come to mind. First, the Authorization Form has a narrower definition of information
6 that may be shared, which contributes to administrative inefficiency as the requirements for DER
7 aggregations in wholesale markets evolve over time. Aligning state regulation to make maximum
8 use of wholesale markets is admittedly a challenge; nevertheless, the more comprehensive
9 definition of shareable information in the tariff helps avoid the need for repeated Commission
10 rulemakings over time in order to synchronize Evergy's practices with the customer data
11 requirements of SPP. For example, many jurisdictions prohibit customers with rooftop solar from
12 participating in wholesale markets due to the risk of double-counting benefits. But the presence or
13 absence of rooftop solar for a particular customer does not appear to be covered under Evergy's
14 narrower definition of shareable information, meaning that aggregators are deprived of this
15 information and would be unable to determine a customer's eligibility for demand response. Thus,
16 a broader definition of needed customer information supports administrative efficiency by
17 avoiding repeated rule revisions over time.

18 Secondly, the Authorization Form creates an opportunity for discrimination against DER
19 aggregators by allowing a lengthy and/or onerous customer verification process as it relates to
20 DER aggregators but a shorter, easier process when Evergy offers its services directly to
21 customers. The Authorization Form grants Evergy the right to verify the customer request.
22 verification of the request's authenticity is, of course, necessary and good, but Evergy could use

1 differential practices in order to unfairly disadvantage DER aggregators. Also known as “self-
2 preferencing,” Evergy could potentially add friction to customer enrollment with DER aggregators
3 but not to its own offerings, resulting in an unfair playing field. To address this, the tariff
4 recommends that the customer authentication process be “no more onerous” than the utility’s
5 current process when a customer creates an online account on a utility’s website or when a
6 customer calls the utility by telephone. The tariff guarantees a consistent and symmetrical
7 verification process to ensure that third party firms are not unfairly disadvantaged.

8 **Q. SHOULD EVERGY’S AUTHORIZATION FORM BE CONSIDERED AS AN**
9 **ALTERNATIVE TO THE TARIFF YOU PROPOSE?**

10 A. No. While the Authorization Form may contain some provisions the Commission wishes
11 to emulate in a tariff, it is not a substitute. A key role of the Commission is to mediate interactions
12 between monopoly utilities and customers and aggregators in order to ensure that monopolies do
13 not have the opportunity to abuse their power and that they act in the public interest. The
14 Authorization Form exists outside Commission approval. Without accusing Evergy of unfair or
15 exclusionary conduct, it is still prudent for the Commission to act preventatively to prohibit such
16 conduct from occurring in the future. Moreover, the tariff allows the Commission to establish
17 performance and data accuracy expectations that enable both Evergy and data recipients to plan
18 their respective businesses efficiently. The Authorization Form alone does not accomplish these
19 objectives.

1 **IV. CONCLUSION**

2 **Q. WHAT ARE POSSIBLE NEGATIVE OUTCOMES IF THE COMMISSION DOES**
3 **NOT ESTABLISH A GREEN BUTTON CONNECT TARIFF AS YOU HAVE**
4 **PROPOSED?**

5 A. The tariff I have proposed provides critical requirements to ensure fairness in the
6 relationship between Evergy and customer-authorized data recipients. Without clarity about
7 certain provisions such as service guarantees or non-discriminatory application of eligibility
8 criteria, monopolies such as Evergy can abuse their power and unfairly diminish the ability of
9 energy management firms to compete on a level playing field. A tariff is necessary to ensure that
10 ratepayers have the ability to choose energy management providers that best suit them without
11 undue interference.

12 Market fragmentation is also a significant risk should the Commission decide either not to
13 require a tariff in this case, or to require a tariff that deviates from Ameren Missouri's.
14 Fragmentation unnecessarily increases the costs to demand response market participants operating
15 statewide. For example, in the case of aggregators participating in wholesale markets, if the
16 Commission establishes a data accuracy warranty for Ameren Missouri but not for Evergy,
17 aggregators will suffer the unfair costs and risks associated with incorrect customer usage data that
18 could require greater investment in customer demand response resources in order to reach the same
19 overall curtailment obligation in Ameren Missouri's territory where there is greater trust in the
20 accuracy of usage data.

1 Market fragmentation also has negative effects on energy management efforts that have no
2 connection with wholesale markets. Managing utility bills whether through behavioral changes,
3 peak shaving, load shifting, investments in home or building retrofits, or other efforts are important
4 even if wholesale market revenues are not involved. It would be arbitrary and unfair to energy
5 management firms if the terms by which they receive customer data with customer permission
6 varied significantly across the state of Missouri. If Evergy is permitted to unilaterally create and
7 enforce their own terms and conditions, then energy management software tools and service
8 offerings may be artificially limited in Evergy's territory, reducing choices for customers or
9 artificially increasing costs.

10 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

11 A. Yes.

12

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI**


In the Matter of the Request of Evergy)
Metro, Inc. d/b/a Evergy Missouri Metro for) **File No. ER-2026-0143**
Authority to Implement a General Rate)
Increase for Electric Service)

AFFIDAVIT OF KATHERINE WYSZKOWSKI


STATE OF COLORADO)
) ss
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON)

COMES NOW Katherine Wyszowski and on her oath states that she is of lawful age; that she prepared the attached Direct Testimony; and that the same is true and correct to the best of her knowledge and belief.

Further the Affiant sayeth not.


Katherine Wyszowski

Subscribed and sworn before me this 14 day of July, 2026


Notary Public

My Commission expires: May 25, 2029

